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ABSTRACT
The replacement of traditional seriatim opinions with an “Opinion of 
the Court,” offers what initially appears to be an interesting but seemingly 
trivial characteristic of American law. In fact, this departure from 
convention represents an exceptional shift in the behavioral actions and 
expectations of American appellate judges. This switch in the method of 
judicial communication is an exemplar for the belief that institutions, and 
the rules that regulate them, matter seriously. Failure to appreciate and 
insist upon “sincerity” as a distinctive judicial trait has impoverished 
historical and structural approaches to constitutional argument and has 
aided in the conflation of judges and legislators. Moreover, the initial 
demotion of sincerity as a cardinal value of American judicial power was an 
amendment of constitutional structure of rather dubious motive and utter 
lack of process.
Anglo-American history reveals that judges performing their 
appellate functions consciously and consistently attended to a sincere, 
individual execution of their duty. Furthermore, an exploration of important 
Anglo-American jurisprudence reveals that sincerity is a presupposed 
though often neglected judicial virtue. This tripartite argument also 
includes a review of important constitutional theory and legal commentary 
regarding judicial communication. In the broadest sense, I endeavor to 
explain that the nature of law is inextricably related to its delivery and that 
the Constitution admits of a conversing, plurally-voiced dynamic of 
communication. These sorts of inquiries are true to American founding 
beliefs that a new science of politics can apply to old problems of 
governance. These arguments also highlight a guiding principle for any 
judiciary functioning in a constitutional democracy: public communication 
is critical for any consenting polity to discern the worth and import of the 
rule of law.
2
P r e fa c e
like an opinion of a Supreme Court Justice, this paper is addressed to 
several audiences. The aim is to suggest that each of these audiences has 
neglected an important tradition of American law, and that this neglect has 
consequences. Establishing historical and jurisprudential foundations for 
this tradition is a large part of the goal for the argument which follows. 
Additionally, there is a secondary benefit which is accrued in making the 
attempt to establish foundations that I believe should be made more explicit: 
whatever the degree of persuasion attained, the vast bulk of materials which 
would be relevant to a debate on whether the tradition is either important or 
relevant can be found in the notes and bibliography of this paper. Before 
the attempt is made though, I wish to inform any constituent of the possible 
interested groups of my basic approach to the existing scholarship.
It is fair to say that each of the three parts of my argument is greatly 
influenced by a portion of the available materials. My exploration of 
American legal history, for example, is in the main a review and analysis of 
case law, certain selected statutes, and one or two exceptional letter-writing 
colloquies. In general, I have eschewed history by personal biography. 
Private speeches and comments have not been the basis of the argument 
from history laid out here. To the community of legal theory, there is no 
doubt that my discussion is guided by the philosophical reconstructions and 
distillations of a coterie of contemporary scholars who- through their 
extraordinary effort- have given students such as myself access to the 
insights of great thinkers on the subject of law. Gerald Postema’s masterful- 
and indispensable- exploration of Benthamite positivism and its relationship 
to Common Law theory is one illustration of this. To the allegation that this 
dependence is harmful I can only respond that I would rather carry the 
additional baggage of great scholars than pretend that I could myself provide
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the knowledge and context needed for each of the jurisprudential giants I 
explore. The third part of the paper, which deals with American 
constitutional theory and practice, can be indicted on a similar charge, that I 
am simply reacting to a small, influential argument about the American 
judiciary. The remarkable thing is that the argument I am reacting to is 
forwarded by a rather large number of constitutional commentators; the 
coterie in this case is in fact a thundering herd. I leave a great deal 
untouched in this area as well; Publius is only the tip of the iceberg, for 
example. These disclaimers of method are not sufficiently powerful to 
warrant omission at the outset by the interested student.
The word “acknowledge” does not convey the deep appreciation and 
respect I have for the group of people who have inspired and supported my 
endeavors. I was especially fortunate to come into contact with Dr. William 
Harris at an early point in my undergraduate career at the University of 
Pennsylvania. Professor Harris’ dedication to his craft and to his students 
was unmatched and remains for me the model of what undergraduate 
teaching at its best can be.
My years of study at the London School of Economics were both 
challenging and wonderful. The simple reality of being a graduate student 
at the LSE is that your primary supervisor is all-important. I could not have 
asked for a better mentor than Alan Beattie. What sets Alan apart from 
others I have discussed my ideas with is that the healthy concern and 
scepticism he brings to discussions with his students is tempered by trust. 
When a student feels that he is trusted- that an initial reciprocal respect is 
accorded his attempts at scholarship- the result can be rations of confidence 
which are indispensable to the lonely struggles of argument construction.
He has been a friend and a colleague to a Yankee in Queen Elizabeth’s Court; I 
will miss him deeply.
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Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey provided important insights in the earlier 
stages of my work, and her general interest and friendship were also greatly 
appreciated. Cheryl always made me aware of the professional and practical 
facets of the academy, and in that way rounded out the education of a 
graduate student. I will miss Thanksgiving in Brockley.
Many people gave their time by meeting with me and reading portions 
of the manuscript at different stages. Gary McDowell at the University of 
London allowed me to audit his graduate seminar in American constitutional 
history, and met with me individually to discuss my ideas and provide 
suggestions. Sanford Levinson of the University of Texas confirmed the 
general possibility and importance of a thesis such as this at an early stage 
and pointed me in the direction of some pivotal material. Ronald Dworkin of 
Oxford University in a brief discussion introduced me to a few articles which 
proved indispensable to my thesis. Leonard Leigh was also an accessible and 
insightful audience for my chapters of legal history. Mark Tushnet, Louis 
Seidman and Sherman Cohn of Georgetown University Law Center also took 
the time to meet with me and discuss certain aspects of my paper, confirming 
the maxim that the best academics are accessible. Paul Kelly’s total critique 
of an early rough draft of the paper at the LSE was indispensable. The 
British Library of Political and Economic Science has an exceptionally 
knowledgable staff and proved helpful throughout my registration at the 
LSE. The staff of the Government Department is comprised of cheerful, 
diligent staff who never tired of my endless questioning and bothering.
Finally, my thoughts are always of my parents, my sister, my family 
and my close friends who supported me while we were separated by the 
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I have sworn upon the altar of God, eternal hostility 
against every form of tyranny over the mind of man.
Thomas Jefferson
The man that hath no music in himself,
Nor is not moved with concord of sweet sounds,
Is fit for treasons, stratagems, and spoils;
The motions of his spirit are dull as night,
And his affections dark as Erebus;





In 1989, distinguished law professor John Hart Ely gave a lecture 
where he lamented that he was one of the few remaining members of the 
“legal process” school.1 The progeny of the legal realists, Ely explained, 
were dominating the landscape on both the left and the right with their 
slogans that law simply is politics and that “there is no reason courts should 
feel an obligation to behave differently from elected officials.” Ely’s lecture 
was couched in terms that betrayed his belief that the dominant view was 
wrong and that a reemergence of the legal process school would be both 
beneficial and likely.2 How could such a renaissance be made (or 
encouraged) to occur? A short answer to this question, one that is developed 
throughout these pages, starts by recognizing that the obligations of judges 
are shaped and motivated like other political and legal obligations. Courts 
will stop behaving like legislatures when judges stop behaving like 
legislators. For judges to stop behaving like legislators, the institutions in 
which they reside must be purged of those incentives which encourage such 
behavior. Ultimately, what is required is a reconceptualization of judicial 
power. This thesis, then, is a small but concerted attempt to realize the aims 
of those like Ely; those like him must do more than bear witness to their 
demise.
If a large portion of the genius of the Constitution, as Bruce Ackerman 
correctly e x p la in s ,3 is that it attempts to economize the (all too scarce)
1 Ely gave the Sibley Lecture at the University of Georgia Law School on October 
31, 1989. An extended version of the Sibley Lecture was published two years later.
John Hart Ely, “Another Such Victory: Constitutional Theory and Practice in a World 
Where Courts Are No Different from Legislatures,” 77 Virginia Law Review 833-79 
(1991).
2 See, for example, ibid., 854 at note 57.
3 Bruce Ackerman, We The People, vol. 1: Foundations (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991), 198-99.
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resource of civic virtue (or public-spirited deliberation), then this paper is 
about a lost economy. What follows is an argument in support of a postulate- 
an axiom or prerequisite- of judicial behavior which I believe to be 
fundamental to the proper exercise of “The judicial Power of the United 
States.” The postulate was part and parcel of a complete original 
understanding of what American judicial power was and was envisioned to 
be. The thesis presented here is not another theory of judicial review or a 
broad accusation of tyranny by judiciary. This thesis is also not another 
vigorous defense- explicitly or by implication- of that approach to 
constitutional interpretation known as “original understanding.” Instead, 
this thesis is inspired by that uniquely American premise that “there is an 
intimate connection between procedure and substance, and that the 
institutional arrangements of a polity have a direct bearing upon its 
substantive actions.”4 What this means is that the Constitution in the first 
instance is about structure, not intention of any kind. The Constitution is 
largely about structure because those that framed and ratified it believed 
that structure would achieve desirable ends (intentions) like establishing 
justice and securing blessings of liberty. Moreover, structure properly 
understood is more than just architecture; attitudes and behavioral 
conventions inform and affect structure in important ways. “Inferring 
from structure” is a potent and legitimate source of constitutional 
interpretation and must include inferences and deductions made from the 
understood attitudes and conventions which pervade the institutions under 
analysis. Expectations and postulates of legal and political behavior then are 
essential for the preservation and maintenance of constitutional structure. 
With these rather uncontroversial premises in mind we can commence our 
inquiry.
4 Gary L. MacDowell, Equity and the Constitution: The Supreme Court, Equitable 
Relief, and Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1982), 8.
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A Fundamental Postulate of Tudicial Behavior
Judicial power is supposed to be different than either executive or 
legislative power. As such, judges should behave differently than those who 
do not exercise judicial power. Today in the United States however, the 
judiciary consistently behaves in a way that is at odds with the foundational 
principles of that special authority. In fact, this behavioral postulate is so 
often violated that it is hardly regarded as a postulate at all. More alarming 
still, the operating institutional conventions of the United States Supreme 
Court (as well as lower appellate courts) will tend to produce outcomes that 
are in constant conflict with the postulate and make it probable that the 
postulate will continue to be violated.
Tudses should behave sincerely. It is a seemingly innocuous postulate, 
but it has far-reaching consequences. The key word of course is “sincerely,” 
and what is meant by sincere includes meanings like, “being the same in 
actual character as in outward appearance; genuine; real; without deceit, 
pretense, or hypocrisy. ”5 The virtue of sincerity in this context no doubt 
includes within its meaning terms like honesty and candor. David Shapiro 
offers elegant assistance when he writes that, “The problem of [judicial] 
candor... arises only when the individual judge writes or supports a 
statement he does not believe to be so. ”6 This sort of positive definition 
though is not enough to convey the full meaning of the idea, as Shapiro well 
knows. Sincere behavior in the fullest sense is fundamentally opposed to 
strategic behavior, or, by transitivity, strategic behavior is not proper 
judicial behavior. Lawyers, legislators, presidents and other legal officials 
do not have to comport with the sincerity postulate; indeed, it is demonstrable 
that the authority of these positions not only permits but even requires such
5 Webster's New World Dictionary, third college edition (1988), s.v. “sincere.”
6 David L. Shapiro, “In Defense of Judicial Candor,” 100 Harvard Law Review 
736 (1987).
behavior at times. American judicial authority, however, is different. It is 
derived directly from the sincerity of the office, because that office is 
distinctively and essentially more human and less institutionalized than 
other offices. The basic claim that will be argued in the pages that follow is 
that- unlike executive and legislative power- judicial power owes its 
legitimacy to its close and special relationship with the individual human 
mind throughout its exercise. Before this connection is discussed further 
though there is more to explain and moderate here lest I unnecessarily 
confuse the reader or exaggerate the central claim.
Instances of judicial strategy are largely unexamined and 
disorganized in discussions of law and adjudication today. Shapiro has 
identified and classified five species of judicial “dissembling” which seem to 
cover the examples well and help to clarify the problem. They are as follows: 
(1) “Continuity”, (2) “Collegiality and Majority-Building”, (3) “Fear of the 
Effect of Knowledge”, (4) “The Conflict of Values and the Tragic Choice”, and 
(5) “Legal Right and Moral Duty.”7 Judicial strategy on behalf of continuity 
involves those instances where candor is sacrificed on behalf of the 
appearance of temporal coherence or a “natural evolution” of the l a w .8 
There is no doubt an intimate relationship between concerns of strategy on 
behalf of continuity by judges and prevailing conceptions of stare decisis, as 
well as other general views about legal change. Because of the 
contemporary shape of these conceptions of legal change, it is fair to say 
that concerns about lack of candor due to concerns of continuity are 
infrequent today, not the principal point of attack of those who think about 
such matters. Strategic behavior due to the “fear of truth”9 (type 3, above) is
7 Ibid., 739-49.
8 Ibid., 739 [“A certain amount of conscious dissembling... is an appropriate, 
even a necessary, way of maintaining a sense of our connection with the past.”].
9 Ibid., 744 [“...fear that truthfulness would adversely affect the person 
addressed or would cause an undesired kind of behavior.].
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rarely done by judges, though those instances that can be identified are some 
of the most well-known examples of the practice. The fourth and fifth types 
of strategic behavior, moreover, are nonstarters for our purposes. The 
portrayal of strategic behavior as acceptable if done on behalf of 
reconciling irreconcilable “basic values”^  can only establish footing if the 
basic values which have been constitutionalized by a polity include such a 
commitment to that brand of “reconciliation.” The problem of judicial 
strategy in pursuance of an overriding moral commitment (type 5) does not 
exist in the American context, because of two prevailing facts about 
American legal history which have been present since the birth of the 
republic (and even before): (1) an important “natural law” strain, and (2) 
the available option of judicial invalidation of legislative and executive legal 
products. In fact, sentiments of collegiality or institutional loyalty are most 
often the animating force behind acts of judicial strategy; this particular 
strategic “animus” is in need of the most thorough and direct examination.
It is worth clarifying that in principle each of these five species of strategic 
judicial behavior is the target of the argument that fills these pages. As a 
practical matter however I believe that two of the five (types 2 and 3 of 
Shapiro’s) provide justification for the great bulk of judicial strategy 
employed by the Supreme Court of the United States and the lower federal 
appellate courts.
To clarify matters further before the argument proceeds to any great 
depth, there are two important distinctions to keep in mind when the term 
“judges” is used in the formulation of the sincerity postulate. Firstly, I am 
referring to judges who are deciding matters of law, not fact. It is only to
10 Ibid., 747 [“...Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt have argued that a certain 
amount of dishonesty may be desirable, if not inevitable, when life-and-death or other 
critical choices involve a clash of basic values.”]. See G. Calabresi and P. Bobbitt, Tragic 
Choices (1978). Even if the unfortunate and unavoidable “tragic choice” is a fact of 
American law, that does not mean that such a phenomenon should govern or animate its 
institutional character.
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questions of law addressed by the judge where the sincerity postulate is 
operative.il Only appellate judges and courts are our concern here. Any 
student of the law is fully aware that often times matters of fact are not 
treated at all sincerely in a court of law. Factual situations that are highly 
doubtful to ever have occurred are spoken into the record for serious 
consideration by courts of law. Treating matters of fact insincerely does not 
threaten the authority of a common law judge. Matters of law, on the other 
hand, are a different story. Also remember that this general view of 
adjudication (within which the sincerity postulate is operative) is concerned 
solely with the resolution of cases on their merits. It is reasonably 
transparent that appellate courts in the United States engage in agenda- 
setting behavior that is certainly strategic and perhaps at times only 
minimally sincere. Processes such as the granting of appeals and writs of 
certiorari are not necessarily governable by the sincerity postulate.12 
Keeping these qualifications in mind, the more detailed sincerity postulate 
that is our subject reads as follows: Appellate judges, when deciding cases on 
their merits, should behave sincerely, not strategically.
To reiterate, keep in mind that throughout the following discussion 
judicial expression is the focus. How judges decide and communicate their 
decision is a serious part of the structuralism of American judicial power that 
has either been glanced over or ignored by the traditional constitutional and 
legal narrative. It is only logical that the understandings of properly 
judicial behavior influenced the construction of the American constitutional
11 Indeed, I am willing to be very cautious here. Even in cases of mixed 
jurisdiction I would withhold the applicability of the sincerity postulate.
12 There may be certain aspects of these processes that are governable by the 
sincerity postulate. In the United States Supreme Court, for example, a great deal of ink 
has been spilled on just what the precedential weight of these institutional decisions 
are- a clear indication that there is still really no consensus as to the standards of 
behavior judges should aspire towards when deciding such matters. In any event, these 
sorts of questions are more complicated because there are issues of jurisdiction-setting 
by Congress that is explicitly warranted by the Constitution. Decisions on the merits 




There are many ramifications of having judges aspire to an ideal of 
sincerity, and some of the most readily apparent of these will now be 
discussed. Start with perhaps the most obvious prohibition of the postulate.
It is clear that a judge when obeying the sincerity postulate may not 
“mitigate the rigours of the law,” by opting for an escape from an articulate 
response. Judicial power requires reason-giving. A judicial opinion of a 
case considered justiciable must in some discernible way meet the issues 
presented and not simply transform itself exclusively into, for example, an 
appeal for executive clemency. Doing so would modify the mandatory quality 
of adjudication beyond the point of recognition and would permit a strategic 
opportunity that judges are not permitted to exploit. The principle of the 
separation-of-powers in a constitutional democracy should not permit relief 
from the possible embarrassments of discussion and attempted reconciliation 
of a legal case. In fact, the perpetual colloquy that takes place among the 
branches goes to the very heart of the separation-of-powers principle.^  
Sincerity is a necessary prerequisite of this communication; strategic 
judicial behavior only undermines the constitutional structure.
More exactly, the sincerity postulate prohibits “conclaving” or 
compromising a judge’s ratio decidendi for any reason. A sincere judge 
should make sure that his or her individual opinion is recorded when 
deciding a case. It should be fairly plain that the Supreme Court’s current 
practice of rendering its “opinion of the Court,” is continually at odds with 
the sincerity postulate. The authority of a judge is derived directly from the 
sincerity of the office, and any compromise of a case’s rationale can only be 
described as strategic. Furthermore, at a deeper level of substantive legal 
content, the sincerity postulate prohibits a judicial pronouncement from 
being just the regurgitation of vague “tests” of policy; an actual weighting
13 More will be said on this subject in chapters 3, 8 and 9. See text, infra.
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of particular principle should be demonstrated. There is more to say about 
requirements such as these, for that is the task of the bulk of what follows. 
For the moment though, it is important to initially explain some of what the 
postulate permits as well as some foreseeable consequences of the postulate 
for the channelling of judicial power in the United States.
Begin with an important consequence of accepting sincerity as a 
judicial aspiration. The sincerity postulate at the core of judicial behavior 
visibly alters the customary internal process of Supreme Court decision 
making and, by extension, our own understandings of certain key points and 
players within that process. Opinion-assignment by the Chief Justice or the 
most senior Associate Justice (when the Chief is not in the majority) after the 
preliminary conference vote would no longer occur if proper attention was 
paid to the postulate (except, perhaps, in those instances where sincere 
majorities were achieved on both the case’s result and rationale). The 
clearest possible articulation of the judge’s ratio being the goal of the 
sincerity postulate, an institutionalized process of collective compromise is 
clearly at odds with it. The role of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court has 
been transformed illegitimately into a position that actually serves to 
undermine the source of his and his brethren’s authority by detaching the 
only accountable product of their effort. The same can be said of “seniority” 
generally as a rule of decision to the extent that it contributes to such 
detachment.14
There are to be sure a great number of objections to the initial 
argument laid out here. Many of these can be neutralized by considering
14 Seniority is determined by length of service except in the case of the Chief 
Justice, who is always considered the most senior justice. Seniority has been an
important factor in Court tradition. Even under the seriatim form which prevailed in
the Court’s early years, reverse seniority governed the order of pronouncement.
Seniority has also determined such traditions as seating arrangements on the bench and 
at conference. Managerial and public relations duties have also been the province of the 
Chief Justice traditionally. None of these senses of seniority contributes to the 
detachment of the products of the exercise of judicial power.
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what the postulate permits. Firstly, the sincerity postulate does not prohibit 
agreement among judges. To the extent that any plurality of judges reach 
their result according to the same rationale, such agreement is plainly 
allowed. All that is required is that the ensuing rationale is sincerely 
obtained. Next, persuasion is also fully reconcilable with the sincerity 
postulate. A change of mind or a newly discovered path of decision is fully 
commensurate with a sincere approach. Of course, certain means of 
persuasion would be unallowable, such as the purposeful “watering down” or 
fundamental compromise of a rationale to win support. Rationale logrolling 
and case trading are two examples of genetically strategic behavior and thus 
violative of the sincerity postulate.
Having briefly illustrated some of the aims, prohibitions, allowances 
and foreseeable consequences of the sincerity postulate the crucial question 
can be asked: from what and where is this postulate derived? Why elevate 
“sincerity” to such a position? Simply put, sincerity should be so elevated 
because the dominant theories of adjudication in the field of Anglo- 
American jurisprudence demand it, knowingly or not. Furthermore, and 
perhaps most importantly, sincerity deserves such serious attention because 
American constitutionalism was based upon it.
The ideas I have sketched out so far may be interpreted as those of a 
typical “judicial conservative.” In a sense this is true; I write as a person 
who is wary of illegitimate increases of judicial power. In another important 
way though, this paper demonstrates at a basic institutional level just how 
hollow such conservative claims of “original understanding” really are 
today. The structure of the Constitution has been transformed to a point 
where its most fundamental departmental relationships no longer serve the 
same ends or interact in the ways originally intended. Inexplicably, these 
“extra-Article V” transformations are virtually unaccounted for in the 
bibliography of originalist theory. Any truly complete “original
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understanding” of American judicial power must include the understanding 
of just how that power was to be exercised; there was a purpose- indeed, a 
theory- behind the constitutional method. Without such attention and 
explanation, arguments for original understanding today are seriously 
incomplete and logically unextended. Many commentators take proponents 
of originalism to task in a similar way when they castigate them for their 
doctrinal contortions or avoidance of rights issues like those asserted in the 
famous desegregation cases. Attempts to reconcile a consistent theory of 
originalism with a serious theory of precedent even lead some commentators 
to conclude that some originalists are really “prudentialists” first, 
originalists only s e c o n d a r i l y ,  is These sorts of criticisms, I believe, are even 
more justifiable when conveyed at this basic institutional level which I have 
been describing and serves as the platform of the whole of what follows.
Most every time the Supreme Court issues an institutional opinion today, it 
abandons the original understanding of how judicial power was to be 
exercised. This is because American judicial power was originally 
understood to be sincerely administered. Today judicial power is regularly 
employed in a strategic manner, undermining the potential force of that 
power and improperly amplifying the highest judicial voice in the land. To 
demonstrate the dominance of the strategic view, one need only survey the 
writings of the bench, bar and academy; for roughly the last forty years 
most commentators have contended that federal appellate judges today are 
too individualistic and that, in the case of the Supreme Court, a lack of 
appreciation of collegiality has been harmful to the institution. 16 The trend 
since the 1950’s of increasing dissenting and concurring behavior by the
1 5 See, for example, Philip Bobbitt’s treatment of the jurisprudence of Robert 
Bork in Bobbitt, Constitutional Interpretation (1991), 83.
16 See for example John P. Frank, Marble Palace: The Supreme Court in 
American Life (1958), 129.
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Justices is abhorred by the overwhelming majority of the academy.17 This 
wide consensus concerning the nature of American judicial power is proof 
that the history of judicial expression through the early nineteenth century 
is not deeply understood.
Chief Justice John Marshall’s decision in 1801, for example, to institute 
the convention of institutionalized judicial expression immediately enhanced 
the strength and unity of the Court. In fact, Marshall’s manoeuvre amounted 
to a genuine shift of constitutional power in the United States. This was no 
one-off historical anomaly. Marshall’s move was an early salvo of a battle 
over the institutionalism of the “judicial Power of the United States.” What 
we are left with today is a Supreme Court which in fact has allowed similar 
institutional concerns to erode its distinctive power-exercising function.
To understand the importance of institutional changes such as 
Marshall’s, to understand how we have the kind of judicial power we have, a 
basic review of modem Supreme Court procedure is in o r d e r . 18 There are 
five ways that a case can come before the Supreme Court of the United States. 
They are as follows: (1) original jurisdiction, (2) appeal, (3) writ of 
certiorari, (4) certification, and (5) extraordinary writ.
Original Jurisdiction. Very few cases come to the Court via original 
jurisdiction; for example, from 1970-1983, a total of fifty-seven cases (an 
average of four per term) came to the Court on original jurisdiction. 19 Most 
original jurisdiction cases involve suits between two or more states. Article
17 See Appendix 1, infra.
18 For this section I have relied on several texts for information about Supreme 
Court procedure, jurisdiction and informal practice, as follows: Henry J. Abraham, The 
judicial Process, sixth edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); idem, The 
ludiciarv: The Supreme Court in the Governmental Process, tenth edition (New York and 
London: New York University Press, 1996); F. Frankfurter and J. Landes, The Business 
of the Supreme Court (New York: Macmillan, 1928); H.W. Perry, Jr., Deciding to Decide: 
Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1991); Posner, Richard A. The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985); R. L. Stern and E. Gressman. 
Supreme Court Practice, fifth edition (Washington: Bureau of National Affairs, 1978).
19 Perry, Deciding to Decide. 25.
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Ill, Section 2 of the Constitution explains the subject-matter distinctions 
which determine the jurisdictional classification of a case.20 Original 
jurisdiction cases go directly to the Supreme Court. Justice Marshall, in 
Cohens v. Virginia, put forward the notion that the Supreme Court was not 
required to exercise original jurisdiction in all the cases spelled out in 
Section 2.2* This strictly narrowed the aperture for those cases in which a 
“state shall be a party.”
Appeals. Within the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, cases where review 
is “obligatory” are called appeals. Within ninety days after final judgment 
has been entered in a lower court or if rehearing has been denied, the party 
wishing to appeal the case files a notice of appeal in the lower court and a 
jurisdictional statement in the Supreme Court. In addition to all the specific 
requirements the jurisdictional statement must contain, it must also state 
“reasons why the questions presented are so substantial as to require 
plenary consideration, with briefs on the merits and oral argument, for 
their resolution.”22 This requirement allows the Court to dismiss 
“obligatory” appeals for want of a “substantial federal question.” Notices of 
appeal, like writs of certiorari (discussed below), in addition to showing that 
jurisdiction is technically proper, must also persuade the Court that the 
issues presented by the case are deserving of review. 23 “Even though the
20 u.S. Const., Article III, §2, para. 2: “In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, 
other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Parly, the 
supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, 
the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such 
Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.” The Supreme Court 
publishes rules which govern the procedures used for seeking review in selected 
volumes of the U.S. Reports and in the Appendix to Title 28 of the U.S. Code. Perry, 
Deciding to Decide. 28-29. Supreme Court Rule 9 governs the review process for 
procedures in original actions.
21 6 Wheat. 264(1821).
22 Stern and Gressman, Supreme Court Practice. 377-378; Perry, Deciding to 
Decide. 29. Supreme Court Rules 10 and 15 govern the review process for appeals.
23 of course, throughout this process of filing an appeal by the appellant, the 
appellee is granted opportunity to present motions for dismissal. Motions such as these 
are linked to the notice submitted by appellant, but one of the Court’s rules (Rule 16)
? 0
jurisdictional and formal procedures for certiorari differ from appeals,” one 
student of the Court writes, “the process, in reality, is not all that
different. ”24
Throughout the 1970's and most of the 1980’s, appeals made up roughly 
20 to 25 percent of the cases argued before the Court. In 1988, Congress 
removed most categories of appeal, giving the Court virtually complete 
discretion in selecting which cases to review. 25
Writ of Certiorari. Overwhelmingly, the most common way for a case 
to come before the Supreme Court is for the Court to grant a writ of 
c e r t i o r a r i . 26 Writs of certiorari are discretionary writs, matters of “judicial 
grace.” Today, certiorari accounts for almost all cases (about 95 percent) 
argued before the Court; even before the 1988 reforms by Congress were 
instituted, certiorari accounted for about 80 percent of all cases argued. The
permits the appellee to move “on any other ground the appellee wishes to present as a 
reason why the Court should not set the case for argument.” Peny, Deciding to Decide. 
30.
The following table (Copied from Perry, Deciding to Decide. 294) lists the 
requirements for appeal and certiorari, for federal and state cases:
Federal Court:
Appeal
1. Act of Congress held unconstitutional in civil action; or
2. Court of Appeals invalidates state statute; or
3. Decision by three-judge court
Certiorari
1. Any civil or criminal case in Court of Appeals, before or after judgment or decree.
State Court:
Appeal
1. Treaty or statute of the United States held invalid: or
2. State statute held valid when challenged as repugnant to U.S. Constitution, law, or 
treaty.
Certiorari
1. Decision from highest possible court, and judgment is final: and
a. Validity of state statute is drawn in question on grounds of repugnancy to U.S. 
Constitution, treaty, or statute; or
b. Violation of federal right claimed; and:
(1) claim must have been asserted in state court, and
(2) state decision not based on adequate and independent nonfederal
grounds.
24 Perry, Deciding to Decide. 32.
25 Public Law 100-352.
26 Supreme Court Rules 17 and 19 govern the review process for certiorari.
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Court began to use the writ of certiorari in 1891, when an Act of Congress 
made some types of lower court decisions a matter for the Court’s discretion 
via the writ.27 While the practice of “granting cert.” started slowly, it grew 
in fits and starts until the late 1920’s.28 It was the Judiciary Act of 1925 that 
proved to be a major turning point, greatly enlarging the Court’s 
discretionary jurisdiction by replacing mandatory appeals with petitions for 
certiorari.
The Supreme Court spends a great deal of its time deciding whether or 
not to grant cert., and in most cases it decides not to do so. In 1992, for 
example, 7,223 cert, petitions were made to the Court; the Court granted cert, 
to 97 cases, about 1.3 percent of the time. 29 As a rough estimate for the 1970- 
1992 terms, the Court granted cert, to about 3 to 5 percent of all cases. Given
27 Lee Epstein, et. al., The Supreme Court Compendium: Data. Decisions, and 
Developments (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc., 1994), 46.
28 Total petitions for certiorari for the 1916-1925 terms:
Term Granted Denied Other Total
1916 53 217 0 270
1917 49 225 7 281
1918 55 267 14 336
1919 46 246 11 303
1920 50 250 7 307
1921 58 267 17 342
1922 85 323 21 429
1923 72 293 41 406
1924 68 364 24 456
1925 100 428 11 539
TOTAL 10 TERMS 636 2880 153 3669
Source: Frankfurter and Landes, The Business of the Supreme Court. 295.
29 It is common for students of the Court to distinguish between regular cert, 
petitions and those that are made in forma pauperis (i.f.p). When a litigant does not 
have the money to bring an appeal, he may file in forma pauperis, exempting him from 
paying court costs. Much of the growth in the Supreme Court's caseload is attributable 
to the sharp increase in i.f.p.’s. The vast majority of i.f.p. petitions are presumed to be 
frivolous. These petitions then tend to skew the numbers somewhat. In 1992 for 
example, of the 7,223 cert, petitions filed, 4,792 of them were i.f.p. petitions. Of these, 
14 were granted cert., a percentage of .3. Excluding i.f.p. petitions, 2,441 regular 
petitions were filed in 1992. Of these, 3 percent were granted cert., a total of 83. See 
Epstein, et. al., Supreme Court Compendium. 71. One political scientist gives a fair 
appraisal of the cert, process, given facts like these: “Whatever the implications, it is 
fair to say that for over half of the docket [the i.f.p.’s], the process is even more cursory 
than the standard treatment, which itself is fairly hasty.” Perry, Deciding to Decide, 
104.
such daunting prospects for success, it is important to remember that any 
decision to “deny cert.,” from a doctrinal or jurisprudential perspective, is 
theoretically without meaning; by refusing to grant cert., the Supreme Court 
is not saying that the judgment of the lower court was correct.
Certification. A virtually non-existent path to review, certifying 
questions to the Supreme Court is done by the lower court, not the litigants. 
From 1946-1974, the Court reviewed three certified questions.30
Extraordinary Writ. The Supreme Court can issue special writs that 
allow for certain cases to be reviewed. Writs of mandamus, prohibition, 
habeas corpus, and common-law certiorari writs are all examples of 
extraordinary writs.3i
From this brief overview, it is abundantly clear that the Court’s 
jurisdiction today is almost totally discretionary. Furthermore, scholarship 
has conveyed the strong impression that the agenda-setting procedure of 
today’s court is animated by a view of the Court by its members as primarily 
one of law clarification, not error correction (or “justice-doing”). The time 
and docket pressures that exist simply do not allow the Court to watch and 
ensure that justice is done in every case that raises an interesting 
q u e s t i o n .32 This brief jurisdictional overview, however, does not convey any 
sense of how the Court decides, both jurisdictionally and on the merits. This 
is the present task, to illustrate, internal Court practice- a practice which is 
largely characterized by unwritten rules.33 When the court receives a cert.
30 Stem and Gressman, Supreme Court Practice. 592.
31 Ibid., 627. Writs of mandamus and prohibition order a lower court to, 
respectively, do something or not do something. Writs of habeas corpus ask for a person 
who claims to be unlawfully held to be released. Common-law certiorari writs are 
different from the more common, statutory-generated writ of certiorari, and review 
based on this type writ is rare. See Perry, Deciding to Decide. 28, 294-98.
32 See, for example, Perry, Deciding to Decide. 35-40.
33 For much of this discussion on the informal procedures of the Court I have 
relied on Henry J. Abraham, The judicial Process, sixth edition (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1993), 170-244; Perry, Deciding to Decide. 41-91; Murphy, Elements 
of judicial Strategy: Bernard Schwartz, Decision: How the Supreme Court Decides Cases
petition (or an appeal notice), they are processed in a few interesting ways. 
Most Justices are part of a “cert, pool,” which was instituted by Chief Justice 
Burger and several of his colleagues and was formed to reduce the workload 
of an ever-increasing number of cert, petitions. The petitions are randomly 
and proportionately distributed among the members of the pool. The 
members of the pool then have their clerks cert, pool memorandum which is 
then copied and distributed to each of the pool chambers. Those members 
who are not part of the cert, pool evaluate each petition themselves. Of 
course it goes without saying that the clerks of each Justice are a part of this; 
reviewing and preparing cert, memos are what these clerks do for much of 
their time at the Court. After the memos have been written, the Chief Justice 
prepares and circulates a “discuss list” to all chambers.34 Any Justice can 
add cases to the discuss list just by informing the Chief Justice’s 
administrative clerk. All cases that do not make the discuss list are 
automatically denied cert. 35
Each Friday during term is conference day for the C o u r t .  36 The 
morning is spent discussing cases that have already been argued, and after 
lunch the conference focuses on the discuss list. Only the Justices are 
present at conference. The Chief Justice begins discussion of the first case 
on the discuss list, and each Justice in order of seniority gives his comments 
on the case and usually announces his vote at that time. Any case which 
receives four votes is granted cert. This is known as the Court’s “Rule of
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
34 chief Justice Hughes first circulated a “dead list” to other chambers where 
cases that were not worthy of review would be listed. This practice prevailed until 
1950, when the process was reversed. Cases that were considered worthy of discussion 
are listed. Perry, Deciding to Decide. 85.
35 in fact, the average discuss list only contains about 75 cases. More than 
three-quarters of cert, petitions are dismissed without even having been discussed at 
conference. Abraham, The Tudicial Process. 195.
36 Since 1974 the Court has also had a conference on Wednesday afternoons. On 
this aspect of the Court’s practice, see Perry Deciding to Decide. 43-44, 98-102; 
Abraham, The Judicial Process. 194.
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Four,” and has been part of Supreme Court practice since at least 1925. In 
certain areas of the law where the Court has solidified into two discernible 
blocs (one of five, the other of four Justices), the minority bloc knows that 
they will lose on the merits if cert, is granted. So the minority bloc in these 
cases does not vote to grant cert., requiring an effective “Rule of Five” to 
operate. The Rule of Five, in fact, is a rare and more sophisticated variant of 
a more general tactic called a “defensive denial.” There are areas of law and 
specific cases where a Justice reasonably believes that if a case were granted 
cert., the outcome on the merits would not be to his liking. So a Justice may 
deny cert, for a case he believes is cert-worthy. In many instances this will 
confine the legal precedent to a small jurisdiction rather than allow the 
Court to pronounce it as a national r u le .  37
When a case is granted cert., it is scheduled to be argued, usually some 
months later; oral arguments are accompanied by written briefs and are 
governed by strict time limits. After oral argument, the next Friday morning 
at conference the case will be discussed. Again, the Chief Justice is the first 
to state his views of the case and select the issues to be discussed. Most studies 
of the Court make the point that the internal procedure of the Court at 
conference is to “discuss down and vote up.” That is to say, the discussion of 
a case proceeds from the most senior to the most junior Justice, voting 
proceeds in r e v e r s e . 38 However, interviews with five Justices of the Burger 
Court conducted by H.W. Perry paint a different picture than the 
conventional w i s d o m . 39 The Court both discusses and votes by seniority, 
starting with the Chief Justice. These votes at conference are only 
preliminary and may be changed at any time. But though conference votes 
may lack permanence, they do not lack importance. The most senior Justice
37 See Ibid., 198-207.
38 See for example, Abraham, The Judicial Process. 196, at note 124.
39 Perry, Deciding to Decide, 44-49.
of the majority in conference assigns the majority opinion, with the Chief 
Justice always being considered the most senior. The assignor can designate 
anyone to write the majority draft, including himself. Any Justice is free to 
write a dissenting or concurring opinion, of course, but the convention of 
opinion assignment is nevertheless important.
The preceding review provides a basic familiarity with the everyday 
operations of the Supreme Court so that the argument that follows can 
proceed. This dissertation is organized into three parts. The first part is an 
historical survey, the goal of which is to highlight some original 
understandings and exercises of judicial power. English, colonial, early state 
and national practices are analyzed. The most discernible break from this 
understanding- from judicial sincerity- is Chief Justice John Marshall’s 
replacement of the then traditional seriatim form of judicial expression with 
the now traditional “opinion of the Court.” The shift in form of 
communication instituted by John Marshall was an example where the 
judicial branch altered the limits of thought and action that represented the 
functions and purposes of the legislative and executive branches of the 
federal government. The second part of the paper will then develop and 
expand upon the trait of judicial sincerity and explore its prominence within 
major strains and individual depictions of legal theory. Although it is 
largely overlooked by legal commentators, most visions of law assume 
sincerity as an essential judicial trait; those that do not do so are weakened by 
the omission. The third and final part connects these discussions to 
American constitutional theory and Supreme Court practice. This section 
includes an analysis of relevant portions of The Federalist as well as a wide 
range of more contemporary arguments which shed light upon the practical 
consequences of the presence of strategy and sincerity in the exercise of 




A Concise History o f Judicial Expression
The primary aim of this chapter is to illuminate the principles and 
attitudes that inform our understandings of American judicial power. The 
goal is to tell several stories and forge a kind of composite. This composite 
will then more clearly demonstrate the tensions within American separation 
of powers theory and judicial independence doctrine. I do not consider here 
whether certain intentions bind American judicial power to a certain 
practice or hierarchy of authoritative sources. This is a difficult question in 
its own right and would only distract the immediate purpose. In this chapter 
our focus will be on English, colonial, and early state judicial practice. The 
picture that emerges is without doubt one where sincerity was central to 
prevailing conceptions of judicial behavior. The central point of the 
narrative which follows is that Anglo-American appellate judges when 
acting in their judicial capacity both understood and comported with a 
behavioral ethic which I have been describing to this point as “judicial 
sincerity.” In some instances in fact, institutional arrangements of state 
judiciaries reflected the value placed upon the ethic. Chapter two will 
review the early years of the national judiciary, and discuss what was in 
effect the critical moment of departure from judicial sincerity as an ideal to 
be striven for within that institution.
England and the Colonies
Historical examination of most American legal practice inevitably 
forces the student back to England. The basic assumption is that early 
seriatim opinion writing is ultimately based upon the procedures of English 
appellate courts. When this assumption is probed, however, the findings are 
somewhat more intricate. For our purposes, three divisions organize our
inquiries. The Privy Council, the House of Lords, and the Common Law Courts 
of England each provide examples of relevant appellate procedures that 
could have influenced American revolutionaries and constitution-makers.1
Colonial lawyers who wished to appeal the decisions of the local courts 
could take their case as far as the Privy Council. In 1641, an Act of 
Parliament left to the Council appellate jurisdiction from without the 
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of law.2 Sir William Holdsworth’s 
majestic, History of English Law notes that from this positive declaration the 
principle developed that the Council heard any appeals from “foreign 
p l a n t a t i o n s .”3 The Council came to its decision according the majority view 
of those present, but the decision was delivered as if unanimous irrespective 
of the individual opinions of the members. “When the business is to be 
carried according to the most voices,” a 1627 Order of the Privy Council 
stated, “no publication is afterwards to be made by any man, how the 
particular voices and opinions went.”4 There are two generally recognized 
reasons for this mode of proceeding. Firstly, any conclusions- however 
definitive- reached by the Council were only in theory “advice” for the
1 From the outset it should be noted that this section which deals with English 
antecedents is indebted to the work of Karl M. ZoBell, “Division of Opinion in the 
Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration,” 44 Cornell Law Quarterly 186 
(1959). ZoBell’s concise article is the most lucid historical exposition of the subject I 
have discovered and was largely responsible for introducing me to further sources on 
English legal history. I would also like to thank Professor Leonard Leigh of the London 
School of Economics and Political Science for sharing his thoughts with me on these 
subjects.
2 See Harold Potter, Historical Introduction to English Law and its Institutions. 
third edition (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 1948), 143-44: “The Act... prohibit[ed] 
‘His Majesty or his Privy Council’ from adjudicating upon questions relating to lands, 
tenements, hereditaments, goods, or chattels of any of the subjects of the kingdom’.”
3 Sir William Holdsworth, A History of English Law, vol. 1 (London: Meuthen & 
Co., 1956), 516 [hereinafter cited as “Holdsworth”]. Harold Potter also explains that 
‘foreign plantations’ was the seventeenth century name for what are now called colonies 
and that, “The principle that all appeals from the plantations should lie to the Privy 
Council appears to have been finally laid down, in 1724, in Fryer v. Bernard.” Potter, 
Historical Introduction to English Law. 144.
4 As quoted by Alexander Simpson, Jr., “Dissenting Opinions,” 71 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 207 (1923). This latent and focused mode of proceeding 
established roots in colonial America as well. See text infra.
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Crown. Because of this time-honored tenet, it was thought that only a
consolidated, focused “recommendation” be submitted. Second, all Council
decrees and writs had no effect whatsoever until the King confirmed them.
It would be logically ambiguous for a King to speak through a writ- which
ran in his name- simultaneously in two voices or m ore. 5
Touching momentarily on the theoretical underpinnings of this
manner of pronouncement, an Order of the Privy Council has a pedigree of
commentary that reaches at least as far back as the early seventeenth
century in writings of Sir Edward Coke.6 Coke emphasized the role of the
councillor as advisor, with the implication being that obligations of secrecy
flowed from the terms of his oath. It is important to notice that the final
product of the Council was seen as something qualitatively different than
other judicial expressions. Notwithstanding the recognized judicial quality
of an Order of the Privy Council,
no common lawyer would have called the Order in Council a judgment, 
even if emitted in a common law cause. In form and flexibility of 
content the Order resembles a chancery decree, and it stands upon a 
similar theoretical footing. In the first case the King is exercising 
directly in Council an ultimate prerogative and expresses his pleasure 
in peremptory form.7
Holdsworth cites only three pre-revolutionary cases in which the Council
ever published dissenting opinions.8 Dissenting or concurring opinion,
then, was, “unknown in the tribunal whose jurisdiction made it the ultimate
arbiter of American causes. ”9
s Ibid.
6 See Joseph Henry Smith, Appeals to the Privy Council from the American 
Plantations (N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1950), 314-17.
7 Ibid., 316-17.
8 1 Holdsworth 519.
9 ZoBell, “Dissenting Opinions,” 189. Interestingly, Felix Frankfurter and John 
Landes, in their study of the business of the U.S. Supreme Court, considered the Privy 
Council a comparable tribunal to the Supreme Court. The Privy Council, they explained 
in 1927, “performs a function for the British Commonwealth of Nations comparable to 
the part played in our federal scheme by the Supreme Court.” Frankfurter and Landes, 
The Business of the Supreme Court (New York: Macmillan, 1928), 307.
\In the eighteenth century, the House of Lords was the court of dernier 
resort for those disputes which commenced in English courts of law and 
equity, and had been established as such two centuries before. Seriatim  
opinions were the conventional practice of the Lords, with each 
participating judge announcing his opinion in order of seniority. The 
reports of Parliamentary debates, however, were not authorized to be 
published until 1848. In fact, one legal historian relates two instances (in 
1698 and 1762) when attempts at reporting cases resulted in a reprimand by 
the house. io The American legal profession surely was aware of the manner 
of proceeding, but the actual opinions of the Lords could not have been 
known.
The reality of colonial judicial machinery, however, left the three 
great Common Law courts- King’s Bench, Exchequer, and Common Pleas- 
with the collective “final word” in most eighteenth century litigation. The 
reports for these tribunals were published as early as the thirteenth 
century, and even a brief examination reveals that opinions were delivered 
seriatim and that reporters generally tried to record and attribute individual 
pronouncements, n  Colonial lawyers would have had access to these reports, 
and it is these courts’ proceedings that were most familiar to them. It is 
important to understand that English practices of judicial pronouncement 
were “brief, oral and optional,” and in that way were markedly dissimilar 
from American judicial practice today.12 This trait is perhaps not that 
surprising, given British constitutionalism’s well-known conventional 
character, but it would be misleading to suggest a very close analogy with
10 T.F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law, fourth edition 
(London: Butterworth & Co., 1948), 192-93.
11 Winfield. The Chief Sources of English Legal History (1925). 145-58. See 
also ZoBell, “Dissenting Opinions,” at note 31, for a full representation of the practice of 
opinion delivery by these courts.




There was an exceptional period in the practice of the Common Law 
courts, however, involving a personality that must be included in a 
discussion of this kind. William Murray, the first Earl of Mansfield, is 
recognized in English history as one of the great parliamentarians and 
perhaps the greatest jurist of the eighteenth century. 13 Bom in 1705,
Murray became Lord Chief Justice of the Court of King’s Bench in 1756 and 
held the place until 1788. Legal historians generally describe the age that 
preceded Mansfield as one of technical obsession and intellectual stasis. 
Mansfield would harness the common law to the ascendant age of industry 
and commerce; he saw his mission as restoring, “the due proportion between 
principle and practice which alone could satisfy the needs of an advancing 
society. The law was to be justified to the litigant.”!4 Substantively,
Mansfield is best known for his. contributions to the law of shipping, 
commerce, and insurance. Also, the law of evidence and the action of 
assumpsit received expansion during his tenure. His intolerance of those 
laws favoring slavery or disfavoring Roman Catholics is also well
documented, is
It is Mansfield’s formal achievements, though, which deserve 
attention here. Mansfield was held in high regard by his contemporaries, 
and was able to coax his fellow judges and alter the court’s traditional 
procedure according to his own ideas. Immediately upon Mansfield’s arrival, 
the way the court did business changed markedly, and many of these reforms 
(which were fully described later in William Blackstone’s Commentaries)
13 The following sources were utilized for general information on Lord 
Mansfield: C.H.S. Fifoot. Lord Mansfield (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936); Edmund 
Heward. Lord Mansfield (Chichester: Barry Rose Ltd., 1979); James Oldham. The 
Mansfield Manuscripts and the Growth of English Law in the Eighteenth Century. 2 vols. 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); J. Campbell, The Lives of the 
Chief Justices of England, vol. 2 (London: John Murray, 1849-57), 398-402.
14 Fifoot, Lord Mansfield. 52.
15 Perhaps the most notable example of these attitudes can be seen in 
Mansfield’s opinion in Somerset v. Stewart. 1 Lofft 499 (K.B. 1772).
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survive with few changes today. 16 One of the procedural modifications
adopted by Mansfield was the use of the “opinion of the court,” which was
usually delivered by him. This innovation, as implemented by Mansfield, was
introduced chiefly as a way to reduce delay or expense. Not only did
Mansfield favor the institutional opinion, but he also made it the practice of
his court that, “he would himself dictate the case and would require its
signature by both counsel before the completion of the trial,” in contrast to
the previous custom of drafting the statement in chambers which allowed,
“lethargic or unscrupulous counsel to adjourn its argument sine die.”*7 A
1759 case. Luke et aT versus L v d e . i s  offers a glimpse of the thinking that
animated Mansfield’s desire to give institutional opinions:
He [Lord Mansfield] said, he always leaned, (even where he had himself 
no doubt,) to make cases for the opinion of the Court; not only for the 
greater satisfaction of the parties in the particular cause, but to prevent 
other disputes, by making the rules of the law and the ground upon 
which they are established certain and notorious : but he took 
particular care that this should not create delay or expence to the 
parties : and therefore he always dictated the case in Court, and saw it 
signed by counsel, before another cause was called ; and always made it 
a condition in the rule, “that it should be set down to be argued within 
the first four days of the term. ”*9
The institutional opinion, then, for Mansfield was one piece of an entirely 
new procedural arrangement that sought to address the deficiencies that 
plagued the Common Law’s adaptation to a new age. Indeed, perhaps 
Mansfield’s greatest accomplishment was to reduce the backlog of cases and 
efficiently handle the increased litigation that came with industry and 
mercantilism. Keeping in mind the influence obviously wielded by 
Mansfield, coupled with the sweeping changes he introduced, it is not
16 Sir James Burrow prints the reforms implemented by Mansfield at 1 Burrow 
9, 52-53, 57-58, 252-58 (1756-1757).
17 Fifoot. Lord Mansfield. 53.
18 2 Burrow 882.
19 Ibid., 887.
surprising that the King’s Bench during his tenure rarely saw dissent. 20 
“During the thirty-two years in which Lord Mansfield was Chief Justice,” 
Mansfield biographer C.H.S. Fifoot explains, “there were not more than 
twenty cases in which a dissenting opinion was recorded and only six 
decisions reversed on appeal.”21 Mansfield was well known and admired in 
America, and no doubt his influence can be seen in similar innovations 
developed by later colonial jurists.
In short, a brief review of the analogous English institutions leaves 
the student begging more questions than at the start. The Privy Council, 
with its executive ties, registered no dissent whatever and issued a single 
“representative” opinion. In the House of Lords, seriatim practice was the 
norm, but there was no wide dissemination of its opinions due its legislative 
affiliation. The judges of the Common Law courts delivered their opinions 
seriatim, though the influence the institutionally-minded Mansfield should 
not be overlooked. In light of these findings, the practice first developed by 
the Supreme Court of the United States seems to bear the mark of a new 
species. Indeed, the judiciary of the Constitution of 1787 may properly be 
said to have no analogous institution; remember that the removal of the 
judiciary from the executive and the construction of its own independent 
department was itself an unprecedented and distinctly American
20 In 1769, 13 years into Mansfield’s tenure, Lord Yates expressed the first 
dissenting voice heard on Mansfield’s bench, in the case of Millar v. Taylor. 4 Burrow 
2303. The suit was brought to protect a copyright, and the majority opinion of Lord 
Mansfield, Lord Willes and Lord Aston decided in favor of the plaintiff. According to 
the reports, Mansfield noted that, “this is the first instance of a final difference of 
opinion in this court since I sat here. Every order, rule, judgment and opinion, has 
hitherto been unanimous. That unanimity never would have happened, if we did not 
among ourselves communicate our sentiments with great freedom; if we did not form our 
judgments without any prepossession to first thoughts; if we were not open to conviction, 
and ready to yield to each other’s reasons.” See 4 Burrow 2395.
21 Ibid., 46-47. James Oldham recently corrected Fifoot’s statistic: “Fifoot 
counted twenty instances, although there were others in unreported cases or in cases 
that were not in the principal reports. Nevertheless, over the thirty active years 
Mansfield served as Chief justice, the degree of unanimity in the decisions was high.” 
Oldham, 1 The Mansfield Manuscripts. 47. As an example of a “non-principal” case, 
Oldham cites Atkins v. Davis. Cald. 315 (1783). Ibid., at note 13.
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manoeuvre.22
It is the belief that American political attitudes were fundamentally 
rethought that informs the whole of Gordon Wood’s classic study, The 
Creation of the American Republic. 1776-1787. Wood’s basic point is that this 
era is where Americans had to actualize those principles and forms they had 
invoked on behalf of revolution.23 Taking his cue from Progressive 
historians, Wood rightly views the Constitution as a somewhat aristocratic 
reaction to democratic excesses of the revolution.24 These reactions and 
inventions- constitutional and jurisprudential- for Wood were decidedly 
American in character, having broken away from the mother country long 
before the Supreme Court first met in the New York City Stock Exchange in 
1790. To put it another way, a formulation that only emphasizes America’s 
ties to Great Britain depends on the premise that early American law had, at 
base, a singular source that was relied upon for certainty and authority. 
Wood describes the situation more accurately as an uncertain and flexible 
jurisprudence being fed by a plurality of sources. Colonial and 
confederation legal development, while composed of a mixture of English 
statute and common law, is viewed as an agent (and even a catalyst) rather 
than a product.25
While law was evolving into an American variant, early American 
political theories were being put into practice. The revolution may have 
promised a new way for men to govern themselves structurally, but the
22 For more on this particular invention within the whole of American 
separation-of-powers doctrine, see W.B. Gwyn, The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: 
An Analysis of the Doctrine from Its Origin to the Adoption of the United States 
Constitution (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), 116-17, 124-25.
23 One of Wood’s many distillations of this general theme can be found in his 
chapter on “Law and Contracts”: “The problem for Americans in the 1780’s then was to 
refine and make effective the distinction between fundamental and statutory law that all 
in 1776 had at least paid lip service to, and this essentially involved making clear the 
precise nature of a constitution.” Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American 




functional know-how had to be tested in an ad-hoc fashion. Edward Corwin, 
in his seminal article on post-revolutionary constitutionalism, asserts that 
revolutionary ardor did not translate into coherent theory. 26 Corwin 
explains:
That the majority of the Revolutionary constitutions recorded recognition of 
the principle of the separation of powers is, of course, well known. What is 
not so generally understood is that the recognition was verbal merely, for 
the reason that the material terms in which it was couched still remained 
undefined; and that this was true in particular of “legislative power” in 
relation to “judicial power”.27
Keeping the views of these historians in mind, the practices of the 
early American states will be given a more positive review. There is 
something intuitively unsatisfactory in summarily establishing this bit of 
American appellate procedure as a European inheritance and moving on. 
This is not to dismiss English background as unimportant, but rather to 
develop a fuller picture of early American jurisprudence by focusing on 
previously neglected areas of the composition. The following review of the 
conventions and procedures employed by the states at this time is one 
attempt to do this, but before we move on, some general remarks should be 
duly noted.
Strict correlations are not possible to achieve given the constraints of 
the materials here. Legal reporting at the close of the eighteenth century 
was an emerging practice that lacked a great deal of accuracy and 
consistency, not to mention technology. The first reporters primarily were 
interested in aiding themselves and their professional colleagues in having 
command of authoritative precedent in a new legal world. Some were 
fortunate later on to fill a much needed void for states who wished to 
establish a more stable and certain system of law. Others would prove still
26 Edward S. Corwin, “The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the
Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention,” 30 
American Historical Review 511-36 (1925).
27 Ibid., 514.
36
more fortunate in being able to cash in on these emerging markets. 28 The 
point of all this history is not to unveil a previously unseen relic or 
statistical proof. The purpose is to compile information that up to this point 
has been lurking in many disparate places and tell a story that is relevant to 
the broader enterprise of American constitutional theory.
Before proceeding, a quick word on selection. States were chosen 
using four main criteria, each relative to the period under consideration, as 
follows: (1) a well developed judicial ‘‘system” or hierarchy (as indicated by 
statutes and constitution), (2) a highly respected bench and bar, (3) the best 
examples of accurate and continuous legal reporting and (4) regional 
(north-south) balance. For each region, three states were chosen. There is 
one state which receives fuller treatment than the other two; the other two 
states are included to supplement or buttress the general points revealed by 
analysis of the two main states. Virginia in the south is our primary focus, 
with North Carolina and South Carolina added for support and comparison.
In the north, Connecticut receives the fullest treatment, with Pennsylvania 
and New York supplementing the study. All six are eminently qualified for a 
study such as this. Some legal historians may question the omission of a few 
of the excluded (i.e. Massachusetts in the North, Maryland in the South), but 
as for the chosen six, dissent should be minimal.2^
The States: Early Practice
It is crucial to understand from the outset that no state at the time of 
the founding had anything resembling a modern American judicial
28 For more general history on early American legal reporting, see Erwin C. 
Surrency, “Law Reports in the United States,” 25 American journal of Legal History 48 
(1981); J. Wallace, The Reporters Arranged and Characterized (4th ed., 1882).
2 9 Of the seven states not chosen, Delaware, Georgia, New Hampshire and Rhode 
Island were clearly inferior with respect to the mentioned criteria. Maryland was 
distinguishable from this bottom tier but still did not reach the threshold of the chosen 
states. Massachusetts and New Jersey were also better, but with the rejection of 
Maryland the decision was made to keep regional balance.
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system.30 Trial and appellate functions were intermingled; hierarchies were 
not so discernible as they are today. Conventional views of law and 
government were also different, which in turn affected the structure of the 
judiciary and legal procedure. With few exceptions, all eighteenth-century 
courts were trial courts, often with multiple judges or a jury engaged in 
“finding” the law. The well-developed hierarchy and clean distinction 
between trial and appellate jurisdictions that is so com m on today was not a 
part of eighteenth-century judicial practice. One legal historian explains 
that, “the basic court system structure in 1787-89, both in the American 
states and in England, was horizontal. There were different levels of courts, 
which by definition means that some were ‘superior" and others were 
‘inferior." All were trial courts.”31
There are other important differences to consider when approaching 
early state judicial systems. In the eighteenth century, doctrines of legal 
formalism were dominant; judges simply “found” the law. Today, legal 
realism reigns supreme; appellate judges through their written opinions 
“make” law, at least interstitially. Lawmaking (mainly appellate) judges 
today painstakingly write opinions that are published in legally sanctioned 
reports. “Appellate” judges in the eighteenth-century, for the most part, did 
not publish their opinions. Most existing reports of the period are the notes 
of a lawyer, not the verbatim opinions of the judges. It wasn’t until the early 
nineteenth-century when state-sanctioned reporting commenced.32 Finally,
30 For a concise explanation about state “judicial systems” in 1789, see Wilfred 
J. Ritz, Rewriting the History of the ludiciarv Act of 1789: Exposing Mvths. Challenging 
Premises, and Using New Evidence, ed., Wythe Holt and L.H. LaRue (Norman, OH: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1990), 27-52.
31 Ibid., 35 [original emphasis].
32 I reprint here a table from ibid., 46-47, showing the origins of “modem”
law-reporting systems in the original thirteen states and the United States. “A modern
system of law reporting is defined as one in which the decisions of a court, and the
reasons for the decisions, are published on a regular and timely basis, so as to be
generally available to all courts, the legal profession, and the public.” Ibid.
State Date of Publication Reporter
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there was no exclusively judicial appellate-review function in the 
eighteenth century. Eighteenth-century notions of sovereignty were such 
that, for the most part, essentially “judicial” functions were performed by a 
combination of legislative, executive and judicial officials. These notions, of 
course, changed rather markedly in the formative years of the republic.
Northern States 
Connecticut:
Alexander Hamilton in 1788 wrote that the state of Connecticut, “has 
been always regarded as the most popular State in the U n io n .  ”33 For 
Hamilton to proclaim Connecticut as the “democratic” example of the time is 
an interesting admission in light of the fact that Connecticut had no 
constitution, only its revised charter of 1662.34 No doubt Hamilton was 
correct in his estimation, as the organic law provided for the governor,
New Hampshire 1819 Nathaniel Adams
Massachusetts 1805 Ephraim Williams
Rhode Island 1847 Thomas Durfee
Connecticut 1815 Thomas Day
New York 1804 George Caines
New Jersey (Law) 1808 William Sanford Pennington
New Jersey (Equity) 183? N. Saxton
Pennsylvania 1809 Horace Binney
Delaware 1837 Samuel M. Harrington
Maryland 1852
Virginia 1807 William W. Hening and William Munford
North Carolina 1818 John Louis Taylor
South Carolina 1819 John Mill
Georgia 1847
United States 1804 William Cranch
33 Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist. Jacob E. 
Cooke, ed. (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961); Federalist 83, at 
574. All subsequent references to The Federalist are taken from the Cooke edition and 
will be made in shortened form including the number of the paper and the page number 
of the edition.
34 The colonial charters of Connecticut and Rhode Island were granted in 1662 
and 1663, respectively. In 1776, these were revised to expunge references to the Crown.
Early state constitutions and organic laws are conveniently located in Francis 
Newton Thorpe, ed., The Federal and State Constitutions. Colonial Charters and Other 
Organic Laws. 7 vols., (Washington, 1909). These are consulted especially for later 
developments of the American judiciary. Otherwise, I am indebted to the notes from the 
section entitled, “Notes on State Constitutions,” in Bernard Bailyn, ed., The Debate on 
the Constitution: Federalist and Antifederalist Speeches. Articles, and Letters During 
the Struggle over Ratification, part 1, (New York: Library of America, 1993), 1117-22.
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deputy governor, and the council (which served as the upper house of the 
General Assembly) to be elected annually by the freemen, while the lower 
house was elected semi-annually by the towns. Further, there was no 
executive veto of legislation and judges were annually chosen by the 
legislature.35 At the apex of the judicial hierarchy was the Supreme Court of 
Errors, which consisted of the governor, lieutenant governor, and the 
council.36 The Supreme Court of Errors as organized in 1784 reviewed writs 
of error from judgements of the Superior Court. The Superior Court had 
quite an extensive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, covering cases 
in law and equity.37
It is a widely accepted lesson of American history that the period 
between the revolution and the framing of the Constitution saw the 
reexamination and refinement of political forms. It is more rare to find the 
application of this lesson to matters of judicial behavior. On the second 
Thursday of May, 1784, the Connecticut General Assembly passed an act titled, 
“An Act establishing the Wages of the Judges of the Superior C o u r t .  ”38 The 
act itself received the endorsement of both Roger Sherman and Richard Law, 
whose efforts aided its p a s s a g e .  39 The law itself is concise; its importance for
35 Bailvn. Debate on the Constitution. 1121-22.
36 Information regarding the Connecticut judiciary here is taken from Thorpe, 
Federal and State Constitutions: Bailyn, Debate on the Constitution; and the volumes of 
law reports produced by the first three reporters for the state. See text infra. They are 
as follows:
Ephraim Kirby, Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Superior Court of the State of 
Connecticut from the Year 1785. to May 1788: with some Determinations in the Supreme 
Court of Errors (Litchfield, Conn.: Collier & Adam, 1789) [hereinafter cited as “Kirby”].
Jesse Root, Reports of Cases adjudged in the Superior Court and Supreme Court of 
Errors, from Tulv A.D. 1789 to Tune A.D. 1793. (1798) [hereinafter cited as “Root”].
Thomas Day, Reports of Cases. Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of 
Errors, of the State of Connecticut. 1802-1813. second edition, 5 vols., (Philadelphia: 
P.H. Nicklin & T. Johnson, Law-Booksellers, 1830) [hereinafter cited as “Day”].
37 1 Root xxxiv.
3 8 State of Connecticut, Acts and Laws of the State of Connecticut, in America 
(New London: Timothy Green, 1784), 267-68.
39 E.C. Surrency, “Law Reports in the United States,” 25 American Journal of 
Legal History 55 (1981), at note 23, citing Charles Warren, A History of the American 
Bar (1911), p. 328.
setting the expectations of Connecticut judicial behavior is immense. After 
the provision regarding compensation, the legislation reads:
Be it further enacted bv the Authority aforesaid. That it shall be 
the Duty of the Judges of the Superior Court, in all Matters of Law by 
them decided, on Writ of Error, Demurer, special Verdict or Motion in 
arrest of Judgment, each one to give his Opinion seriatem. with the 
Reasons thereof, and the same reduce to Writing and subscribe ; to be 
kept on File, that the Case may be fully reported, and if removed by Writ 
of Error, be carried up with greater Advantage ; and thereby a 
Foundation be laid for a more perfect and permanent System of common 
Law in this State. And it shall be the Duty of the Supreme Court of 
Errors, to cause the Reasons of their Judgment to be committed to 
Writing, and signed by one of the Judges, and to be lodged in the Office 
of the Clerk of the Superior Court. 40
Any reader of this law must remember that the Supreme Court of 
Errors was a body deliberately fused with political, legislative 
characteristics, whereas the technically subordinate Superior Court was 
where purely judicial expertise resided. This legislation is a testament to the 
belief that judicial power was expected to be linked to precise modes of 
individual behavior and thought. Drafted just three years prior to the 
Constitution, this law is best viewed as an extension of the enlightenment 
ideas that filled the age.
With the express blessing of the legislature then, it is at this point that 
Ephraim Kirby, esquire, enters the picture and produces, “the first 
comprehensive publication of American law reports, federal, state or 
colonial.”4i “Ephraim Kirby of Litchfield, Connecticut,” of whom the Acorn 
Club of Connecticut described as, “Revolutionary solider, statesman, member 
of the Litchfield County Bar, and First Federal Judge of the territory 
embraced in the Louisiana Purchase, was also the first reporter of decided
The views of these two men on the Constitution are well known. Sherman, a 
participant at Philadelphia and signer of the Constitution, and Law, a speaker at the 
Connecticut ratifying convention, were two of the most respected lawyers in 
revolutionary America.
40 Connecticut, Acts and Laws. 268. Original Emphasis.
41 Ibid., 1296.
41
cases in any court in the United States.”42 In fact, important cases were 
reported before Kirby, but mainly in pamphlets or newspapers and only 
sporadically. Kirby’s volume covers 201 cases for the years 1785 through 
1789, and he also recorded forty-five other cases for the same period that 
were later compiled into a supplement in 1933. The cases for the most part 
offer a summary of counsel’s pleadings and a compact statement of the law 
settled with each decision. It is also clear that Kirby took his responsibility 
seriously, influenced as much by the emerging market for such reports as 
the imprimatur of the General Assembly. Indeed, one historian explains that 
Kirby’s own publication was greatly influenced by the style of Cowper’s 
Reports of King’s Bench rulings produced in the 1770’s.43
The Superior Court of Connecticut in February of 1786, where Kirby 
begins his reporting, consisted of five men, as follows: Richard Law, 
Eliphalet Dyer, Roger Sherman, William Pitkin, and Oliver Ellsworth. The 
first case reported in a comprehensive volume in America, Whiting and 
Frisbie v. Tewel. records that Judge Sherman (the only person who would 
sign all three of the critical documents that led to the formation of the 
national government) dissented from an opinion, “By the Court.”44 
Throughout Kirby’s Reports, institutional opinions for the majority are the 
norm, denoted by “By the Court,” or “By the Whole Court,” in his pages.45 
This form of Kirby’s, in light of the seriatim requirement compelled by the
42 Origen Storrs Seymour, Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Superior Court taken 
by Ephraim Kirby after the time of his reports (Litchfield, Conn.: The Acorn Club, 
1933), preface [hereinafter cited as “Kirby’s Supplement”].
43 Briceland, “Ephraim Kirby: Pioneer of American Law Reporting, 1789,” 16 
American Journal of Legal History 297 (1972), 312-13. Also, for a general explanation 
of the circumstances surrounding Kirby’s venture, see Craig Joyce, “The rise of the 
Supreme Court Reporter: an institutional perspective on Marshall Court ascendancy,” 83 
Michigan Law Review 1291-1391(1985), 1296-1300, passim.
44 Kirby, 1.
45 Of Kirby’s 201 reported cases, 132 were decided by a single institutional 
opinion; 33 had a dissenting opinion in addition to the institutional opinion; 3 included 
three or more opinions, see text infra.; 32 cases either did not get an formal opinion 
written due to jurisdictional concerns or were reported cursorily.
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assembly, is probably due to the purpose he had in mind for his reports. It 
isn’t until August of 1786, in the matter of Stoddard v. Bird.46 where a case 
can be found with more than two opinions rendered. According to Kirby, in 
this case the seriatim form is followed, except that the opinions are given in 
reverse order of seniority, in contravention of the English practice. With all 
five judges writing (or, more accurately for the period, speaking) there are 
three opinions for the majority (Pitkin, Dyer, and Law) and two in dissent 
(Ellsworth and Sherman). This is the only case in Kirby’s Reports where the 
majority divides in this manner, producing a “conversing” effect. In fact, 
with only two other exceptions, all of the cases in Kirby’s Reports are decided 
by one or two opinions.47 Dissent, then, was clearly permitted, but the judges 
apparently combined when in the majority; concurring opinions were 
either not produced or not recorded.4®
Kirby did not produce a second volume, and so it was left to Jesse Root, 
a newly appointed judge of the Superior Court, to assume the task of 
reporting. Unfortunately, Root’s Reports reflect a different philosophy from 
Kirby’s. Covering cases in the Superior Court and Supreme Court of Errors 
for the period 1789-1798, Root’s volumes are loosely reported and often they 
do not record the specific opinions as Kirby tried to do. Many cases are only 
barely sketched; few dissenting or concurring opinions are mentioned at all. 
Instead, the doctrinal judgments of the court are stated simply, often with 
Root casually beginning, “the court said,” or “the court is of the opinion,” or 
the like. Like Kirby, Root is more interested in the court’s ruling than its
46 Kirby, 65.
47 Phenix v. Prindle. Kirby, 207; Gustin v. Brattle. Kirby, 299. Phenix was 
decided 4:1, with Judges Dyer, Sherman, Pitkin, and Ellsworth joining in the court's 
opinion with Judge Law dissenting. Ellsworth also adds an additional opinion that 
seems to be responding to Law’s critique of the majority, bringing the total for the case 
to three. Gustin was accompanied by a “By the Court,” opinion and two separate dissents 
by Judges Law and Dyer.
48 Two instances of concurring behavior can be discerned, but in both cases 
none of the additional remarks were treated as a separate concurrence. See Huntington 
and Others v. Carpenter. Kirby, 45; Kibbe v. Kibbe. Kirby, 119.
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reasoning. Also, Root's Reports give the impression that the Superior Court 
increasingly appears to be citing its own reported precedents. As a result, 
many cases are disposed of summarily with a simple cursory judgement and 
without formal opinion. Root’s two volumes are not very helpful for the 
student of judicial expression.
Seven years after Root, Thomas Day hoped to satisfy the laws of supply 
and demand by publishing cases decided by the Supreme Court of Errors 
beginning with the 1805 term. During that time, he was persuaded, “by the 
advice of several gentlemen, whose opinions he highly respected, to extend 
his plan, so as to publish a volume, comprising the decisions of the three 
preceding years. ”49 Day’s five volumes accordingly account for those cases 
reaching the Supreme Court of Errors for eleven years starting in 1802. 
Preparing the first volume then was really a historical exercise for Day, and 
he was “particularly aided” by notes from a member of the court, briefs from 
counsel, and minutes from a professional friend, in addition to being given 
“free access to the records, from which the statements of the cases have been 
extracted, and the reasons of the Court t r a n s c r ib e d .  ”50 Nevertheless, Day’s 
Reports are still wanting of important information. Day relies heavily on 
the briefs and arguments of counsel, especially from the point of view the 
court will subsequently support. Many times no reasons for the court 
decision are reported. The blame is really not Day’s; in the case of Dickinson 
v. Kingsbury. Day explains the habits of the Supreme Court of Errors, as 
follows: “It was the practice of this Court to assign their reasons in writing, 
in cases of reversal only; but individual members of the Court sometimes 
favored the reporter with their minutes, from which he has been enabled, in 
cases of affirmance also, to state the grounds of decision. ”51 Even in cases of 
reversal, Day gives the impression that the Supreme Court of Errors did not
49 “Advertisement,” 1 Day iii.
50 ibid.
s i 2 Day 11, (1805), at note (g).
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issue separate opinions. Not a single case reported by Day through the year 
1810 contains more than two opinions, and the majority never divides. A few 
pages later, Day helps to confirm this with another glimpse of the court’s 
protocols. In Nichols v. Hotchkiss, the report reads: “By the Court, 
unanimously, the judgement was reversed. Some member was appointed to 
draw the reasons; but this was never done. ”52 The court, it can be inferred 
from this passage, appointed someone to draw up the reasons and reconciled 
diversities of opinion into a single institutional statement.
The organization of the Connecticut judiciary was changed by an act 
of the legislature in 1806. The General Assembly clearly had designs of 
efficiency in doing this, as judges of the branches (who were also judges of 
the court of dernier resort) could conveniently hear arguments on motions 
for new trials and cases stated. The Superior Court was divided into three 
branches- civil, criminal, and chancery- and determined questions of both 
law and fact. Meanwhile, the Supreme Court of Errors was reduced from 
fourteen to nine, and consisted of all the judges of the newly formed 
Superior Court, and had cognizance only of writs of error from the Superior 
C o u r t. 53 This is an interesting action, not the least bit influenced by the 
growth of a viable system of law developed by the state. And if the 
legislature’s action in 1806 was- interesting, its reaction three years later 
speaks volumes for this study. Things change markedly for the judiciary of 
Connecticut in 1810. Day explains, “At the session of the legislature in 
October. 1809, an act was passed, making it the duty of all judges of the 
supreme court of errors to give their opinions in all matters of law by them
52 2 Day 125 (1805): “The reporter has understood, that, when the case was 
under consideration, there was, on the first point, no diversity of opinion, all the Court 
holding, that the declarations of Downey and his wife were inadmissible. On the second 
point, ELLSWORTH, A sst. remarking, that it was competent for Downey and his wife to 
give the evidence offered, as there was no covenant in the quit-claim deed, HOSMER, 
Asst, replied as follows: I do not assent to that proposition....”
53 3 Day 27, 28.
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decided, publicly and s e p a r a t e l y .  ” 5 4  it appears that the Court subscribed to 
the seriatim form, with reverse seniority governing the order of delivery. 
Day’s own reporting does not fully reflect this change, but considering that 
his purposes are really professional rather than public in nature this is not 
s u r p r i s i n g .5 5  What is remarkable about this shift is that it occurs when the 
U.S. Supreme Court under the guidance of John Marshall was in its full stride 
establishing itself institutionally, shifting to a “conclaved” institutional 
statement for its rulings. In fact, Day’s own reports demonstrate that the Bar 
and Bench of Connecticut paid attention to the nationalist Chief Justice. In 
two consecutive 1807 cases, for example, Day writes that counsel for the 
defendants cites the work of John Marshall as a u t h o r i t y .5 6  in the midst of a 
drive for efficiency and stability, and during an era when Common Law 
rules were being fundamentally challenged, it is striking that the Assembly 
opted for a course that would expose the individual divisions of the Bench.
Connecticut’s early judicial practice offers one very important lesson 
to the student of judicial behavior. Right from the veiy beginning, it is 
plain to any student of Connecticut’s law reports that the judges and 
legislators of that state were attempting a new kind of reconciliation of their 
inherited legal and political forms. Specifically, the ancient Common Law 
tradition of their forbears was being harnessed to the newly applied political 
science of the written word. The Common Law tradition (as we will discuss in 
more detail in chapter four) from its inception to its reception in colonies 
like Connecticut was essentially an oral tradition; its reduction and
54 4 Day 130, at note (b) [original emphasis].
55 It should be noted that Day does account for some of cases where three or 
more opinions are at play. In the three years (June, 1810 through June, 1813) covered 
by Day’s volumes after this legislative change, 18 of 116 cases are reported as having 
three or more opinions.
56 See Whittelsev v. Wolcott. 2 Day 337 (1807), at note (r) [citing Marshall’s 
biography, Life of Washington, to explain the intended powers of the newly formed 
presidency]; Sanford v. Dodd. 2 Day 441 (1807), at note (g) [Day: “This was admitted to 
be law by Chief Justice MARSHALL, in the case of Insurance company of Alexandria v. 
Young. 1 Cranch 341.”].
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application to writing would directly serve political and legal values such as 
accountability and comprehensiveness in ways that pre-enlightenment 
republics had never before attempted. What the above review of early 
Connecticut judicial practice begins to demonstrate is that, in order for this 
novel reconciliation of the Common Law to have any chance of success, the 
behavioral expectations of judges- when acting in their judicial capacity- 
needed more explicit definition than had been provided for in the past. The 
common thread which runs through each of the states in this section is that 
judges and legislators were fashioning new attempts and responses as to how 
the ancient tradition of the Common Law would serve the new science of 
politics, and what the consequences of that commitment would mean for 
those who would wield this new reconstruction of judicial power. As the 
judicial practices of Pennsylvania and New York indicate, the commitments 
and the consequences were not uniform.
Pennsylvania:
Citizens of the commonwealth of Pennsylvania were well known for 
their radicalism and innovation during the periods of revolution, 
confederation and constitution-making. Neither, however, of 
Pennsylvania's constitutions of 1776 or 1790 contain explicit provisions 
about the form judicial opinions should take. Judicial officers under the 1776 
constitution had to take two oaths before entering office, the oath of 
allegiance and the oath of office. These oaths together address the values of 
individual faithfulness to the constitutional project of the commonwealth 
and, within that project, the task of individual judicial duty.57 The
57 The “Oath or Affirmation of Allegiance’7 reads as follows: “I  do swear (or
affirm) that I will be true and faithful to the commonwealth of Pennsylvania: And that I
will not directly or indirectly do any act or thing prejudicial or injurious to the
constitution or government thereof, as established by the convention, [emphasis added]77
The “Oath or Affirmation of Office77 reads as follows: “I  do swear (or affirm) that I
will faithfully execute the office of _  for th e  o f  and will do equal right and
justice to all men, to the best of my judgment and abilities, according to law.77 See
Francis N. Thorpe, ed., The Federal and State Constitutions, vol. 5 (Washington, 1909),
AT7
Constitution of 1790 had a similar requirement, proclaiming that all officers, 
legislative, executive or judicial, “shall be bound, by oath or affirmation, to 
support the Constitution of this commonwealth, and to perform the duties of 
their respective offices with fidelity. ”58 Since before the revolution the 
courts of judicature in Pennsylvania were directed by statute to follow the 
example of their English counterparts.59 in general terms as well, after the 
revolution the legislature left it to the discretion of the judges to make rules 
for regulating practice within the courts.60 Matters of law and equity were 
merged in the state since the revolution.
Notwithstanding the oaths of office discussed above, from the very 
beginning it appears as though Pennsylvania’s judiciary was bent toward 
disseminating law by a homogeneous, institutional voice. Unfortunately, the 
only proof of early Pennsylvania judicial practice a student has is the work 
of Alexander J. Dallas, whose reports are well-known for their lack of 
precision. Dallas’ notes covered different tribunals within the 
commonwealth and also recorded the practice of the newly-formed federal 
c o u r t s .61 in courts like Common Pleas and Oyer & Terminer (lesser courts in
3090.
58 Penn. Const. Art. VIII, as cited in John Purdon, Digest of the Laws of 
Pennsylvania. From the Year One Thousand Seven Hundred, to the Twenty-Fourth Day of 
March One Thousand Eight Hundred and Eighteen. With References to Reports of 
judicial Decisions in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: Philip H. 
Nicklin, 1818), xxiv.
59 See, for example, “An Act for establishing courts of judicature in this 
province,” May 22,1722, in Purdon; Digest of the Laws of Pennsylvania. 310.
60 “An Act for the more speedy and effectual administration of justice,” 
September 25, 1786, in ibid., 314.
61 See Alexander J. Dallas, Reports of Cases Ruled and Adjudged in the Courts of 
Pennsylvania. Before and Since the Revolution (Philadelphia: T. Bradford, 1790);
Reports of Cases Ruled and Adjudged in the Several Courts of the United States, and of 
Pennsylvania. Held at the Seat of the Federal Government (Philadelphia: Printed for the 
Reporter at the Aurora Office, 1798); Reports of Cases Ruled and Adjudged in the Several 
Courts of the United States, and of Pennsylvania. Held at the Seat of the Federal 
Government (Philadelphia: Printed for the Reporter by J. Ormrod, 1799); Reports of 
Cases Ruled and Adjudged in the Several Courts of the United States, and of 
Pennsylvania. Held at the Seat of the Federal Government (Philadelphia: Printed for P. 
Byrne, by Fry and Kammerer, 1807).
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the hierarchy), and the Supreme Court (an intermediate bench), the form of 
judicial pronouncement according to Dallas is almost exclusively via an 
“opinion of the court.” The apparent form of judicial pronouncements here 
probably owes more to Dallas’ reporting style than to actual practice. On the 
High Court of Errors and Appeals, the highest court of the judiciary at that 
time, Dallas shows the Chief Justice delivering unanimous opinions of the 
court in most cases, though there are instances of seriatim behavior and 
Dallas refers to it as s u c h .  62
Contemporary reporters of Dallas confirm the charges of inaccuracy 
levelled against him. Both Jasper Yeates and Horace Binney published 
casebooks of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that overlapped with Dallas’ 
v o lu m e s .6 3  Yeates reports demonstrate that the opinion of the court was the 
normal mode of proceeding but that seriatim behavior did occur on occasion. 
Binney’s reports give more of an impression that a separate form was 
followed, but still show institutional expressions delivered regularly. In fact, 
Pennsylvania appears to be the one state where it seemed that the 
institutional voice of the judiciary was an accepted fact of their 
constitutional politics. Though the accounts of reporters may be sketchy 
concerning the manner of judicial pronouncements, in 1806 Pennsylvania’s 
General Assembly was perfectly clear. It was agreed that an “opinion of the 
court” should be “reduced to writing” if either of the parties requested it.64
62 For examples of separate opinion delivery, see Levezev v. Gorgas, 4 Dallas 71 
(1799), and Burd v. Smith. 4 Dallas 76 (1802).
63 Jasper Yeates, Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania: With Some Select Cases at Nisi Prius. and in the Circuit Courts. 4 vols. 
(Philadelphia: JNO. Campbell, 1871) [vols. 1,2] (Philadelphia: T. & J.W. Johnson & Co., 
1889, 1890) [vols. 3, 4] (covers period 1791-1808). Horace Binney, Reports of Cases 
Adjudged in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. 3 vols. (Philadelphia: Kay and Brother, 
1891) (Volume 3 is Philadelphia: Farrand and Nicholas, 1811). [fix citation]
64 “An Act to alter the judiciary system of this commonwealth,” February 24, 
1806, in Purdon, Digest of the Laws of Pennsylvania. 322. The text of the relevant 
section is as follows: “In all cases in which the judge or judges holding the supreme 
court, court of nisi prius, circuit court, or presidents of the courts of common pleas, 
shall deliver the opinion of the court, if either party by himself or counsel require it, it 
shall be the duty of the said judges respectively, to reduce the opinion so given with 
their reasons therefor to writing, and file the same of record in the cause.”
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This recognition (and perhaps the implied legitimation) of the single­
voicedness of a court is exceptional if not unique for this period.
New York:
Citizens of New York were faithful to a written constitution since 1777 
which called for the establishment of a Supreme Court of Judicature and, 
above this in the hierarchy, a Court of Errors. Matters of law and equity 
were separated, and the document prescribed no provision about oaths or 
affirmations for judicial officers or the manner of judicial
pronouncements.65
The behavior of New York’s courts reinforces some of the points that 
have been made previously. In New York’s Supreme Court, an intermediate 
tribunal of mixed jurisdiction, institutional opinions were employed very 
frequently.66 in Weaver v. Bentley, for example, Judge James Kent delivers 
the opinion of the court, the Chief Justice and two Judges concur, and then 
Judge Robert Livingston offers a full dissent.67 There are exceptions,68 but 
when an appellate case is given a full hearing and decided on its merits, an 
institutional opinion appears to be the norm followed by concurrences and 
dissents. In sum, the appearance of the pronouncements are similar to the 
practice of the United States Supreme Court since John Marshall’s arrival.
Cases that proceed to the “Court for the Trial of Impeachments and the
65 See Thorpe, Federal and State Constitutions. 2623. The New York Constitution 
of 1821 did contain an oath or affirmation provision. Ibid., 2639.
66 See William Johnson, Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court of 
Tudicature of the State of New-York: From January Term 1799. to lanuarv Term 1803. 
Both Inclusive: Together with Cases Determined in the Court for the Correction of Errors. 
During that Period. 3 vols. (Vol 1 is New-York: Issac Riley, 1808; vol 2 is same, 1810; 
vol 3 is New-York: C. Wiley, 1812) [hereinafter cited as “Johnson’s Cases”]; George 
Caines, New-York Term Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme Court of 
That State, second edition, 3 vols. (New York: I. Riley, 1813-14) [hereinafter cited as 
“Caines”]. Caines’ reports cover span the years 1803-1805.
67 1 Caines 47 (1803).
68 See, for example, Barnewall v. Church. 1 Caines 217 (1803), where the 
seriatim form was used.
SO
Correction of Errors” during this period illuminate the matter further. 
Though the reports often lack detail, it is clear that diversity of opinion was 
welcomed in New York’s highest court. Though some cases are followed by 
institutional declarations, where there is diversity as to result the Court of 
Errors almost always includes multiple opinions on both sides of a d e c i s i o n .69 
The Court’s own published rules included a general provision stating that its 
practice, “shall be similar to the practice of the court of exchequer chamber 
in England; and that on appeals it shall be conformable to that of the house 
of lords in England, when sitting as a court of appeals.”70 This is seriatim  
practice, in the main.
In the equity courts of the state, there is a final lesson to be learned 
again. Before the revolution, the Chancery Court of New York consisted of 
the Governor and his Council. After 1778, the Court was ruled by a single 
member- the Chancellor- and saw an increase in its business and prestige.
In 1814, an act of the legislature made it, “the duty of the reporter, from time 
to time, to report and publish such decisions of the Court of Chancery, as the 
Chancellor of the State shall deem of sufficient importance to be reported 
and published.”71 The volumes published in pursuance to this act were of 
excellent quality, and make it plain that the Chancellor was perhaps the 
dominant figure in shaping the common law of the state.72 Here was a place 
where an individual was identified with an institution.
Both Pennsylvania and New York make the point I stressed out the 
outset: the history presented here is not at all a one-sided portrayal of the
69 Article Thirty-two of the New York Constitution states that this court 
consisted of the “President of the Senate for the time being, the Senators, Chancellor, 
and Judges of the Supreme Court, or the major part of them.”
70 See New York (state) Court of Errors, Rules of the Court for the Trial of 
Impeachments, and the Correction of Errors (Albany: Jesse Buel, 1818), 8.
71 See William Johnson, Reports of Cases Adjudged in the Court of Chancery of 
New-York. 7 vols. (Albany: E.F. Backus, 1816-24), 1: vi. Johnson’s chancery reports 
cover the years 1814-1823.
7 2 New York finally merged law and equity jurisdiction in 1848.
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dominance of sincerity as a recognized judicial ethic. Because of simple 
institutional facts (such as the division of law and equity matters, the 
particular conception of judicial power envisioned by the legislature of the 
day, or the patent fact that much post-revolutionary judicial practice lacked 
the hierarchy and distinction that would make purely judicial attitudes more 
discernible to the historian) it would be foolish to suggest that early state 
judicial practice was a model of what I call judicial sincerity. It would, 
however, be equally foolish to dismiss or underemphasize the important role 
this fundamental assumption played in the expectations and applications of 
newborn variants of judicial power. Even when taking contradicting data 
into account, the fact remains that each of the three northern states that 
have been the focus of our analysis to this point reveal strong commitments 
to the individual nature of judicial power. Much of the discussion to this 
point has attempted to view expectations of judicial attitude through the lens 
of the legislature; unfortunately, much of the historical record does not 




The Virginia Company of London in 1618 and 1619 forged the early 
governmental machinery for the colony in order to stimulate migration and 
morale. When in 1624 the company lost its charter, the monarchy filled the 
void. The 1620’s and 1630’s saw the king appoint a royal governor, 
incorporate the colony in the royal domain, and recognize the early 
assembly (a remnant of the old company charter). The assembly then, from 
its inception until the revolution, was a creature of executive power. Even 
after the Glorious Revolution, when assemblies would be gradually 
accumulating power at the expense of the executive, the courts were still the
52
domain of the royal governor. This dependence was a feature not just of the 
court’s existence but also their procedure as well.7^  The assembly did have 
some important input of its own,74 but this executive relationship was 
undoubtedly settled in colonial minds until John Adams’ revolutionary 
thinking came on the s c e n e . 75
For much of Virginia’s colonial history, the General Court was the 
“highest and last resort in the colony, and subject only to appeals to 
England. ”76 Two lawyers, Sir John Randolph and Edward Barradall, recorded 
137 cases of the General Court, spanning the years 1728-1741. A review of 
these reports provides some limited but important insight. Perhaps most 
evident to legal scholars is the wide discretion employed by a body made up 
chiefly of laymen. There were few precedents for those causes related to 
English law; none for those based upon colonial statute. Combine with these 
difficulties an increase in workload that was symptomatic of the times, and a 
discomforting situation begins to materialize. Colonial jurisprudence should
73 The early system of Quarter Courts, for example, heeded the advice of King 
James that the judicial proceedings were to be,
made and done summarily, and verbally without writing, until 
it comes to the judgment or sentence, and yet, nevertheless, our 
will and pleasure is that every judgment and sentence 
hereafter to be given in any of the causes aforesaid, or in any 
other of the said presidents and councells, or in the greater 
number of them, within their several limits and precincts, 
shall be briefly and summarily registered into a book, to be 
kept for that purpose, together with the cause for which the 
said judgment or sentence was given; and that the said judgment 
and sentence so registered and written shall be subscribed 
with the hands or names of the said president and councel, or 
such of them as gave the judgment or sentence.
R.T. Barton, ed., 1 Virginia Colonial Decisions: The Reports bv Sir 
John Randolph and bv Edward Barradall of Decisions of the General 
Court of Virginia. 1728-1741. 214-15 [hereinafter cited as “Virginia 
Colonial Decisions”]. The author here is citing William Waller Hening,
The Statutes at Large: Being a Collection of All the Laws of Virginia, 
from the First Session of the Legislature, in the Year 1619. vol. 1 
(Richmond: G. Cochran, 1823), 71 [hereinafter cited as “Statutes at 
Large”].
74 The revision statute of June, 1642 is the best example of this. See Barton, 1 
Virginia Colonial Decisions 215.
73 Gwvn. Separation of Powers, 116-17.
76 Barton, 1 Virginia Colonial Decisions 218.
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be noted most of all for its lack of system.77 The consequences of this 
uncertainty for later constitutional politics in Virginia and elsewhere were 
serious:
Such experience bred among the colonists a profound fear of 
judicial independence and discretion, reflected in their repeated resort 
to written charters and to legislative intervention either by direct 
interference in the process of adjudication or by the correction and 
amendment of court-administered law by statute.7®
The recordings of Randolph and Barradall also interest the student of 
judicial behavior more readily in one key respect. The rulings of the 
General Court were not presented like those of the Privy Council. Dissenting 
behavior was not secretly and collegially eradicated. The notes indicate that 
there were differences of opinion in certain instances, though they were 
not recorded as opinions by the reporters.79 This favoring of the majority 
position is not surprising given that Randolph and Barradall intended to use 
these notes for private advantage rather than publication. Moreover, this 
behavior remained even when the court exercised extraordinary power.80 
The court also exhibits “per curiam” behavior, summarily dismissing causes 
without formal opinion.81 Randolph and BarradalTs reports offer a rough 
skeleton of the practices adhered to by an early Virginia “appellate”
77 See Wood. Creation of the American Republic. 296: “Much of the colonists’ 
law (and no one was sure quite how much) came from outside their society, in English 
statutes, legal authorities, and court precedents, and mingled confusedly with their own 
colonial law in court systems that were, relative to the English courts, remarkably 
undifferentiated.” Also see generally, “Law and Contracts,” ibid., 259-305.
78 Ibid., 298.
79 For some examples of this see the following in Barton, Virginia Colonial 
Decisions: Smith v. Brown. R7; Berryman v. Cooper. R60; Fleming v. Digg’s. R80; Meekins 
v. Burwell. R97; Iones v. Langhorn. R109; Stith v. Soane. B38; Morris v. Chamberlavne. 
B51; Bernard v. Stonehouse. B64; Godwins v. Kinchen. B71; Rogers v. Spalden. B81. 
[Citations here give the case followed by the reporter’s initial and the page number. 
Randolph’s reports are compiled in vol. 1, Barradall’s in vol. 2.]
80 See Churchill v. Blackburn (1730), ibid., R29: “This Judgment is absurd and 
against Common Sense, and can’t possibly be affirmed in this Court, and I pray that it 
may be reversed. And it was reversed by the whole Court except one.” Randolph cites 
and argues the rationale of Coke’s opinion in Dr. Bonham’s case throughout.
81 For examples, see Harwood v. Grice. B45; Taylor v. Graves. B59; Hill v. Hill. 
B60; Burwell v. Qgilbv. B107.
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tribunal.
The Virginia Constitution of 1776 incorporated a revolutionary 
principle, namely that “The legislative, executive and judiciary departments 
shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercises the powers properly 
belonging to the other: nor shall any person exercise the powers of more 
than one of them at the same time.”82 These succinct and powerful 
commands- so widely imitated- were almost immediately at odds with the 
practical understandings of government that withstood the colonial and 
revolutionary periods. Virginia’s political and legal history after 1776 
demonstrates the source of these tensions and ambiguities. Virginia’s 
General Assembly passed laws which created its judicial machinery. One 
such act, passed in October of 1778, deserves attention. 83 it reveals, 
implicitly, the assumed views of those thinking about the role of judiciary. 
The relevant section of the act follows:
FOR establishing a court of appeals for finally determining all 
suits and controversies, Be it enacted bv the General Assembly. That at 
such a place as shall be appointed by an act of general assembly there 
shall be holden a court of appeals, which, in causes removed after 
decision from the high court of chancery, shall consist of the judges of 
the general court, and three assistant judges to be chosen by joint ballot 
of both houses of the Assembly;... three fourths of the members who are 
to be of the said court in any case shall be sufficient to proceed to 
business, the judges also of that court from which the cause is removed 
after decision, shall attend at their places in the hearing thereof, and 
shall there deliver the reasons of their judgments.84
Virginia was far ahead of the rest of the nation in establishing an appellate 
court in the modem sense. Still, notice that “judges” are the operative word 
here rather than “courts” or other institutional terms. Unlike the later 
national appellate process, the Court of Appeals itself would draw judges from 
already existing tribunals. Especially indicated towards the end of the above
82 As cited in A.H. Kelly, W.A. Harbison and H. Belz, The American 
Constitution: Its Origins and Development, seventh edition (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Co., 1991), vol. 1, 72.
83 “An act for establishing a Court of Appeals,” October 3, 1778, in Hening, 9 
Statutes at Large 522.
S4 Ibid., 522-23.
passage, it is clear that judicial power at this time in Virginia was understood 
to be exercised by each individual judge, not an institution. The statutes of 
this period do not explicitly address the issue, but it is plain that the 
procedure and behavior of the judiciary was left to common voluntary 
practice. These views are not extraordinary given the conventional wisdom 
and the practice of the Virginia courts at the time.
In the final decade of the eighteenth century, a future Supreme Court 
Justice was taking notes of cases argued before the newly constituted 
Virginia Court of Appeals for his own personal use. Bushrod Washington 
would eventually publish these, his reports covering cases argued from 1790 
through 1796.85 Much of the internal politics of this tribunal is reflected in 
Washington’s notes; they confirm later dialogue between Thomas Jefferson 
and William Johnson that I will discuss later. The reports also illustrate the 
divide between the political theory and practice of the period. The opinion 
of the judges in the case of Thornton v. Smith, decided in the spring of 1792, 
neatly summarizes the day’s conventional wisdom on the nature of judicial 
power. “In Virginia,” the opinion explains, “we have no Courts, deriving 
their origin from Prescription, or Charter. They are all created by the 
legislative acts, defining their powers, and their j u r i s d i c t i o n s .”86 a  
statement such as this goes a long way towards explaining the gap that 
existed between the rhetoric and understanding of separation of powers 
doctrine.
Washington’s volumes also betray a tribunal dominated by a single 
member- in this case its President, Edmund Pendleton. Pendleton sat on the 
first court of appeals from its inception in 1779 to the year it was dissolved in 
1789. When the new court was constituted later that year, he was
85 Bushrod Washington. Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Court of 




immediately made president and held the post until his death in 1803. One 
member of the bar wrote of Pendleton, “He is said to have resembled lord 
Mansfield, as much in his person and manner, as in the structure of his 
mind; and he certainly entertained a very high respect for the judicial 
opinions of that nobleman, as if he had an innate sense of congeniality.”87 
Somewhat like Burrow’s reports of the Court of King’s Bench during 
Mansfield’s tenure, the prefatory phrase, “The PRESIDENT delivered the 
opinion of the court,” floods Washington’s Virginia reports. For two years 
(Fall Term, 1790 until Fall Term, 1792), of those cases where a formal opinion 
is rendered, Pendleton is the sole conduit of the court’s pronouncements. Of 
126 total cases recorded in Washington’s first volume, only 13 opinions were 
clearly given by someone other than the P r e s id e n t .88 There are no 
dissenting or concurring opinions reported until 1795, when Judge Spencer 
Roane arrives on the bench.89 Described as a man who, “abhorred 
oppression, and the arbitrary assumption of power by courts, or individuals,” 
Roane was a vociferous Jeffersonian who did not shy away from the political 
issues of the day.90 Bernard v. Brewer, argued during Roane’s first Fall 
Term, is the first case reported by Washington to include more than one 
opinion, with judges William Fleming and Peter Lyons offering 
contributions in addition to Pendleton’s.91 After this point cases are usually
87 Taken from the biographical sketch by Daniel Call in volume four of his 
reports of that tribunal. See text infra.
88 The foUowing citations are all Washington’s Cases, volume one: Scott v. Call. 
115; Wilson & McRae v. Keeling. 194; McWilliams v. Willis. 199; Hawkins v. Berkley. 
204; Brown v. Garland. 221; Tavlor v. Peyton. 252; Smith & Moreton v. Wallace. 254; 
Peter v. Cocke. 257; Carry. Gooch. 260; Cole v. Clavborn. 262; Buckner v. Smith. 296; 
Pendleton v. Vandevier. 381; Elliott v. Smock. 389.
89 The judges of the Court of Appeals for the period covered by Washington’s 
cases are as follows: Edmund Pendleton, Peter Lyons, Paul Carrington, William Fleming, 
and James Mercer. On November 12,1793, Henry Tazewell replaces Mercer, and on 
April 13, 1795, Spencer Roane replaces Tazewell. 1 Washington viii.
90 The same account also notes that Roane was, “very well acquainted with some 
of the most popular of the modem reporters, particularly Burrows and Atkvns. [original 
emphasis]” Taken from 4 Call xxv. See text infra., at note 93.
91 2 Washington 76.
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accompanied by several opinions. There are some exceptions, with an 
“opinion of the court,” sometimes appearing in different w a y s ,92 but the 
several opinions are definitely the norm.
Daniel Call picks up reporting where Washington leaves off, 
recording cases decided by the Virginia Court of Appeals for the next twenty 
y e a r s . 93 in addition, a later volume of Call’s includes important cases decided 
by the first Court of Appeals that will be discussed below. Call’s first volumes 
of reports, in concert with Washington’s, prompt an additional observation 
about the Virginia judiciary. Even after Roane displaces the “opinion of the 
court,” it is clear that Pendleton still harnessed the opinions of his brethren 
tightly. Roane’s insistence may have provided for the airing of 
“concurring” types of behavior, but dissenting behavior was still rarely 
seen. Pendleton seems to have managed this generally using two techniques: 
per curiam opinions, or the appending of a final opinion or resolution of the 
court after hearing the judges separately. It is also evident that there was 
little dissent among the members on most issues, but even when there was 
disagreement, much of it was economized away. Of the 159 total cases 
reported in Call’s first volume, only 6 cases include a d i s s e n t . 94 in light of 
their general quality and the fact that Washington and Call both received the 
notes of the judges in preparing their works, these figures seem 
trustworthy. The same pattern holds for the other Call volumes (2, 3, 5 and 6) 
that cover the second Court of Appeals.
92 See Skipwith v. Baird. 2 Washington 165, for an example of an “opinion of the 
court” after 1795. For another variation, see Picket v. Dowdall. 2 Washington 106, 
which includes opinions by Fleming, Carrington, Pendleton, and an “opinion of the 
court.”
93 Joseph Tate, ed., Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Court of 
Appeals of Virginia, by Daniel Call, second edition, volumes 1-3 (Richmond: Peter 
Cottom, 1824); Daniel Call, Reports of Cases Argued and Decided in the Court of Appeals 
of Virginia, volumes 4-6 (Richmond: Robert I. Smith, 1833) [all volumes are hereinafter 
cited as “Call”].
94 For those cases where dissent is voiced, see Gibson v. Fristoe. 1 Call 54; Baird 
& Co. v. Mattox. 1 Call 226; Tollife v. Hite, 1 Call 262; Shaw v. Clements, 1 Call 373; 
Graves v. Webb. 1 Call 385; lones v. Commonwealth. 1 Call 482.
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In Call’s fourth volume, cases determined by the first Court of Appeals 
(1779-1789) are the subject, and two of these cases deserve special attention. 
The first, Commonwealth v. Caton.95 has a well-searched history. Decided in 
1782, and reported in 1827 from surviving records, this was the first case in 
the United States history, in Call’s words, “where the question relative to the 
nullity of an unconstitutional law was ever discussed before a judicial 
tribunal. ”96 At issue was a pardon granted by Virginia’s House of Delegates 
for three convicted traitors. This action did not comport with the Treason Act 
of 1776 which provided for pardons to be granted by the entire General 
Assembly. Apart from the jurisdictional question of whether the case 
reached the Court of Appeals properly, the central questions of the case 
were: (1) could the court declare an act of assembly void if repugnant to the 
“Act for the Constitution of government”; and (2) was the Treason Act of 1776 
contrary to the Virginia Constitution?^ Of the eight judges hearing the 
case, six met these issues squarely.98 Five answered the first question 
affirmatively, and then followed with the second determination that the act 
was constitutional. Breaking down the majority, Call is confirmed in his 
assessment that Chancellor George Wythe’s opinion was the most assertive 
and articulate, while Edmund Pendleton also forwarded a considered view.
95 4 Call 5 (1782). In addition to the report, information on this case was taken 
from Julius Goebel, Jr., History of the Supreme Court of the United States, vol. 1: 
Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971), 125- 
28. Where the two sources did not square with each other, I have relied on the Goebel 
text.
96 4 Call 20 [original emphasis].
97 Specific construction taken from Goebel, Jr, Antecedents and Beginnings to 
1801. 127, citing Force Transcripts, Library of Congress, Washington D.C., 8696-97.
Also see 4 Call 6-7.
98 Judge Bartholomew Dandridge and Judge John Blair, the latter a future U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice, “declined the question,” and “waived the question,” respectively. 
Goebel, Jr, Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801. 127, citing Force Transcripts, Library 
of Congress, Washington D.C., 8715.
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One judge, Peter Lyons, answered question one in the n e g a t i v e . 99 Call’s 
version, an exercise in historical reconstruction, is lacking in many ways, 
but it is clear from his reports that the seriatim practice was the norm even 
in cases of great importance. Indeed, this charge can be levelled at the 
volume as a whole, but when opinions are reported the seriatim practice is 
revealed.
The second case involves a 1788 law that would have required the 
judges of the Court of Appeals to act as district judges in addition to their 
duties. There was no case or controversy before the court; the court instead 
issued a “Remonstrance” in response to what it perceived as a legislative 
threat to judicial independence implicit in the separation of powers, tenure, 
and salary provisions of the constitution. 100 The content of that letter was 
nothing less than a “candid justification of authority to put statutes to a 
constitutional test,” and- given that it was published shortly before the 
Virginia ratifying convention for the federal Constitution- held a special 
resonance at the time.ioi Since the genre of this pronouncement was so 
qualitatively different, a detailed study of who said what is not needed.
Rather, the case is included here because it adds context to Pendleton’s 
forthcoming containment of his brethren’s expression on the second Court 
of Appeals constituted the following year. The reports discussed in this 
section make it fairly clear that Pendleton makes his “switch” towards 
institutionalizing the court’s voice after the court’s reconstitution in 1789. 
The practice of the first Court of Appeals was clearly seriatim. Pendleton’s 
move, then, corresponds quite nicely with the 1788 controversies over
99 Ibid., citing Force Transcripts, Library of Congress, Washington D.C., 8714. 
The act was repealed in 1788 as contrary to the spirit of the constitution. Hening, 12 
Statutes at Large 507.
100 4  Call 135.
101 Goebel. History of the Supreme Court. 129. Also see 4 Call 142, 146.
Goebel also notes that the impact of the “Remonstrance” was further enhanced by
a North Carolina litigation, Bavard v. Singleton. 1 Martin 42 (1787), dealing with the 
constitutionality of a statute. This case will be dealt with in the section devoted to that 
state, infra.
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judicial independence and asserts the dignity and united foundation of the 
newly created tribunal.
The reports of William Hening and William Munford commencing in 
1806 confirm the same norms of behavior reported in C a l l ’s .  102 Hening and 
Munford’s volumes are more reliable than their predecessors, as they 
produced them, “professedly with a view to disseminate the decisions,” to the 
public and that, “the notes of the Judges (which they were so obliging as to 
furnish) have precluded the possibility of any inaccuracies. ”103 With 
Roane’s continuing presence, and without Pendleton’s, it is not surprising 
that the court adhered to the seriatim form as the usual way of pronouncing 
its opinions.
Virginia’s history of judicial practice is important for its early and 
plain recognition that judges carried with them certain expectations and 
beliefs about the power they wielded- about how they should execute judicial 
power. The example of Edmund Pendleton and his extension of Mansfieldian 
procedure as is often used by students of judicial behavior to explain a steady 
historical progression to the institutionalism of John Marshall. Perhaps 
because of the peculiar institutionalism of judicial power that dominates 
appellate judging today, Spencer Roane’s counterweight is largely 
diminished in most conventional narratives. This skewed picture overlooks 
the fact that Pendleton’s institutionalism (like John Marshall’s would be) was 
bom  out of the insecurity and uncertainty correctly sensed by a “judiciary” 
expanding its authority in a truly revolutionary, “independent” direction. 
Interestingly though, at one of the crucial points in this revolutionary 
expansion, the importance of the individual nature of judicial power is 
evidenced by Virginia’s highest judges.
102 William W. Hening and William Munford, Reports of Cases Argued and 
Determined in the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia. 4 vols. (Flatbush, N.Y.: I. 
Riley, 1809) [hereinafter cited as “Hening and Munford”].
103 1 Hening and Munford v, vi. Original emphasis.
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South Carolina:
It is beyond dispute that the judiciaries of the Carolinas were among 
the most respected throughout America’s early constitutional history. 
Consider that in the nation’s first fifteen years, fifteen men were appointed 
to the United States Supreme Court. Both North Carolina and South Carolina 
were home to two of the appointees. 104 It is specifically South Carolina and 
one of its judges, however, which is presently of concern. Elihu Hall Bay was 
one of the Associate Judges of the Superior Courts of South Carolina after the 
revolution and his reports were the first of the kind ever published in the 
state. The reports cover the years 1783-1795 for what was mainly an 
intermediate bench within the hierarchy, taking cases mainly from Courts 
of Common Pleas and General Sessions of the Peace.105 Bay’s publisher notes 
that, “Where there has been occasionally any difference of sentiments on 
the bench,” or when a particularly important case came before the court,
Bay reported, “the opinions of the judges seriatim, as they were 
delivered. wl°6 In these instances though, Bay often relied on all the 
arguments of his brethren only from his own notes.
As this last disclaimer makes clear, an examination of the volume 
shows a rather “homogeneous” picture of the Superior Courts of South 
Carolina. Diversity of opinion was rare, though the opportunity to be heard 
in exceptional instances was available. Considering the pedigree of the court 
and the context of the day this is not so surprising. Bay’s second book is
104 James Iredell and Alfred Moore were from North Carolina. John Rutledge 
and William Johnson were from South Carolina. Only Virginia and Maryland sent more 
(3 each) during this span, and no other state equalled the mark.
105 Elihu Hall Bay, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Superior 
Courts of Law in the State of South-Carolina, Since the Revolution, second edition (New 
York: I. Riley, 1809), vol. 1 [hereinafter cited as “Bay”]*
106 ibid., v.
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more meaningful. 107 it consists of decisions made in the Constitutional Court 
of Appeals from 1796-1804; a court specifically established by an article of 
the state constitution to hear appeals from the Common Law courts. The 
Constitutional Court frequently utilized institutional opinions and high 
levels of unanimity, with occasional instances of diversity via the seriatim  
form. 108 Also notable is the December, 1799 appointment of Judge William 
Johnson to the Court. Even after Johnson comes to the bench, there is only 
one case where the judges delivered their opinions separately. Further, 
Johnson delivers the “opinion of the court” in an instance of unanimity and, 
in a case where there was a sole dissenter, the “opinion of the majority of the 
judges.”109
Another judge’s manuscripts, Joseph Brevard, overlap Bay’s reports 
and seem to contradict his picture of the Constitutional Court, or at least 
temper the view.110 Looking at the intersecting years (1796-1804), these 
reports show a greater usage of the seriatim form than Bay’s reports alone 
would suggest. This would seem to emphasize that Bay was a judge first and a 
reporter second. Institutional opinions are prevalent but the seriatim form 
is shown all the way through Brevard’s manuscripts to the year 1816. 
According to Brevard’s reports in fact, of twenty-one cases heard in 1815 (a 
time when the U.S. Supreme Court under Marshall’s direction is consistently 
delivering homogeneous pronouncements) there is not one instance of an 
institutional or collective opinion.111 Even where only one judge writes and
107 Elihu Hall Bay, Reports of Cases Argued and Determined in the Superior 
Courts of Law in the State of South-Carolina, Since the Revolution, volume two (New York: 
I. Riley, 1811).
108 For example, see Lindsay and others v. Commissioners. 2 Bay 38 (1796).
i°9 See Butler v. Bailey. 2 Bay 244 (1800) and Campell v. Williamson. 2 Bay 272 
(1800), respectively.
110 loseph Brevard. Reports of judicial Decisions in the State of South Carolina. 
3 vols. (Charleston: W. Riley, 1839, 1840) [hereinafter cited as “Brevard”]. Volume one 
covers the period 1793-1805; volume 2, 1805-11; volume 3, 1811-15.
i n  See 3 Brevard 511-552.
the rest concur, there is no indication that the one writer is speaking for the 
whole group. Perhaps this notation is Brevard’s failing, but on the whole it 
appears that Brevard’s reports are worth more trust than Bay’s. Remember 
that the attempt here is to demonstrate that institutional innovations- 
inextricably linked to political and legal theories of the age- are at times in 
conflict with each other and internally inconsistent. During the crucial 
decades of institution building during and shortly after the revolution, some 
states were more radical than others. South Carolina, like other southern 
states generally, appears to have been a furnace of comparably lesser heat, 
but nevertheless sheds more light upon our inquiries.
When we have been speaking of early American law, of course, we 
really mean early American law and equity. In 1721, for example, the South 
Carolina legislature passed an act to establish and regulate a court of 
chancery (responsible for equity matters), holding that, “the said court shall 
proceed. . . as near as may be according to the known laws, customs, statutes 
and usages of the kingdom of Great Britain, and also as near as may be 
according to the known and established rules of his majesty’s high court of 
chancery in South Britain.”!12 English, and thus much of colonial, common 
law had been influenced heavily by Aristotle’s first formulation in The 
Rhetoric. “Aequitas sequitur legem,” and rigidly separated the two spheres of 
law and equity. H3 During the revolutionary period and for some time after 
however, traditional notions of “law” would be seriously challenged.
Professor Gary MacDowell reminds his students that in America at the time of 
the founding the debate was between two intellectual camps: those who 
followed the opinion of Sir Francis Bacon and those who followed that of
112 «An act to establish a Court of Chancery in the Province of South Carolina,” 
September 9, 1721, as found in H.W. Desaussure, Reports of Cases Argued and 
Determined in the Court of Chancery of the State of South Carolina, from the Revolution, 
to December. 1813. Inclusive. 4 vols. (Vols. 1, 2: Philadelphia: Robert H. Small, 1854; 
vol. 3: Columbia, S.C.: Cline & Hines, 1817; vol. 4: Columbia, S.C.: Telescope Press, 
1819), 1: 65, 68 [hereinafter cited as “Desaussure”].
113  “Equity follows the law.”
Henry Home, Lord Kames. Bacon wanted a rigid separation between courts of 
law and equity; Kames thought that separation was specious and sought a 
mixed jurisdiction for courts. 114 Unlike the founders of the United States 
Constitution who chose to follow Karnes’ suggestion, states like South Carolina 
continued to cling to Bacon’s suggestion, and South Carolina only finally 
merged the two jurisdictions in 1868 . 115 These sorts of reminders bear 
significantly on how legal institutions disseminate law.
Henry William Desaussure was the pioneer of equity reporting in 
South Carolina and his four volumes record cases decided by the Court of 
Chancery from the revolution through the year 1813. The concept of 
juridical equity was seen for a long time as a necessary supplement to the 
common law but also a potential source of great arbitrary power. No doubt 
an accurate collection of reports would enhance respectability for the 
system of equity and thus the rule of law generally. The legislature of South 
Carolina recognized this fact, requiring that, “the judges sitting in the courts 
of appeal should give their judgments and decrees in writing, and should 
sign the same; thereby forming a perpetual record of the judgment and the 
grounds thereof.
Courts of equity in England were presided over by a chancellor, a 
person who was at one time the chaplain of the king and “keeper of the 
king’s conscience,” as well as the conduit of writs and orders that ran in his 
name. The historical description is important as, much like the Privy 
Council discussed earlier, it explains the mode of communication that was
114 See MacDowell, Equity and the Constitution. 4-6.
115 South Carolina’s provisional constitution of 1776, its more lasting version of 
1790, as well as legislative enactments passed in pursuance of these documents all 
adhered to a rigid separation of law and equity. Oaths of office were similar throughout, 
explicitly referring to roles of the “Judge” and never institutional fidelity. See for 
example “An Act for Establishing a Court of Chancery,” A.D. 1784, in John Faucheraud 
Grimke, The Public Laws of the State of South-Carolina. from Its First Establishment as a 
British Province Down to the Year 1790, Inclusive (Philadelphia: R. Aitken & Son,
1790), 337.
116 1 Desaussure xxvii.
employed by equity courts. Chancellors gave the “decree of the court” in 
deciding the cases before them. A “decree” conveys a greater sense of 
authority than an “opinion” of law, and rightly so considering the proximity 
of the source. In modem parlance, equity courts can be fairly characterized 
as places where a chancellor “did justice,” in comparison to a Common Law 
judge who “clarified the law.”!*7
Desaussure’s reports show that a single “decree of the court” is given 
in all cases, delivered mostly by the chancellor. Nowhere in the state’s 
common law reports is the term “decree” employed. Before 1776, statutes that 
regulated courts of equity simply pointed towards the English model as a 
g u id e ,  u s it is remarkable that after the revolution, while statutes gave 
judges unprecedented rule-making authority and called for written records 
of facts and reasons of cases to be filed for the first time, the “decree” mode 
of communication was still specifically cited. 119
The first section of the third article of the South Carolina Constitution 
of 1790 reads plainly: “The judicial power shall be vested in such superior 
and inferior courts of law and equity as the legislature shall from time to 
time direct and establish. ”120 The fourth article of the document is equally 
straightforward, declaring that all constitutional officers take the following 
oath: “I do swear, or affirm, that I am duly qualified according to the 
constitution of this state, to exercise the office to which I have been 
appointed, and will to the best of my abilities discharge the duties thereof, 
and preserve, protect and defend the constitution of this state and of the
117 See MacDowell, Equity and the Constitution.
118 See for example, “An act to establish a Court of Chancery in the Province of 
South Carolina,” September 9, 1721; in 1 Desaussure 65.
119 “An act to establish a Court of Equity within this state,” February 19, 1791, 
1 Desaussure 73. Desaussure also lists “Rules of Equity, Established by Order of the 
Judges,” 1 Desaussure 57-63. No where in these rules is there any mention of how the 
court should communicate its pronouncements.
120 s.C. Const, of 1790, art. Ill, § 1.
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United States.”121 There was no requirement of institutional fidelity. The 
exercise of judicial power, granted by the legislature, was a distinctively 
individual act authorized by and beholden to an oath of individual fidelity.
North Carolina:
In 1777, the newly constituted General Assembly of the State of North 
Carolina legislated courts of law and sought to regulate them. It should not 
be surprising by now to learn that North Carolina required an oath to be 
taken by judicial officers. Indeed, the oath of office required of judges is in 
many ways similar to those we have already discussed from other states.122 
Two segments of that oath, however, deserve comment. In the middle of what 
is a lengthy pledge, the prospective judge would reiterate the following: “I 
will not delay any person of common right, by reason of any letter or 
command from any person or persons in authority to me directed, or for any 
other cause whatsoever; and in case any letters or orders come to me 
contrary to law, I will proceed to enforce the law, such letters or orders 
notwithstanding.”123 This seemingly worrisome and unusual addition 
actually serves to emphasize the individual perspective lawmakers had of a 
judicial officer. No weight whatsoever is given to a corresponding 
institutional cognizance or respect. In addition, at the end of the oath, the 
appointed would promise, “in all things belonging to my office, during my 
continuance therein, I will faithfully, truly, and justly, according to the best
121 Ibid., art. IV.
122 See “An act for establishing courts of law, and for regulating the 
proceedings therein (AD. 1777),” in H. Potter, J.L. Taylor, and B. Yancey, Laws of the 
State of North-Carolina. Including the Titles of Such Statutes and Parts of Statutes of 
Great Britain as are in Force in Said State: Together with The second Charter granted bv 
Charles II to the Proprietors of Carolina: The Great Deed of Grant from the Lords 
Proprietors: The Grant from George II to John Lord Granville: The Bill of Rights and 
Constitution of the State, including the names of the Members of the Convention that 
formed the same: The Constitution of the United States, with the Amendments: and The 
Treaty of Peace of 1783: with Marginal Notes and References. 2 vols. (Raleigh: J. Gales,
1821), 1: 283 [hereinafter cited as “N.C. Laws”].
i 23 Ibid.
of my skill and judgment, do equal and impartial justice to the public and to 
individuals....”!24 Do not just brush the passage aside as rhetorical flourish; 
again there is an emphasis on individual fidelity. As we shall soon see, these 
oaths were taken quite seriously at the time.
Twenty years later, Francois-Xavier Martin published a volume that 
included cases heard by the superior courts of the state since 1778.12$ An 
examination of these state reports reveals a varied style of judicial 
pronouncement for a court of mixed jurisdiction. There is the separate form, 
as well as per curiams and unanimous court opinions. Keeping in mind that 
the superior court was not a court of last resort, this is not that surprising. 
Martin tells which judges were present and how the opinions were delivered 
in some detail. If the court was comprised of one judge, Martin notes “alone” 
if an opinion is read by one judge the others feelings are recorded as 
“tacente” or “tacitly assented.” In sum, there is a mixture here, but 
generally the distinctive separate quality of judicial proceedings was 
respected, or at least the option was present.
One of Martin’s cases deserves special treatment. Fifteen years before 
Marburv v. Madison, the superior court of North Carolina ruled that a 
legislative act that was contrary to the constitution was void. Bavard v. 
Singleton is known by legal historians for a substantive ruling that is 
perhaps America’s earliest precursor of the doctrine of judicial review. 126 
Interestingly, just how this ruling was communicated is not as widely 
known. Martin’s transcript is illuminating, stating that the court, “with
124 ibid., 283-4.
125 Francois-Xavier Martin, Notes of a Few Decisions in the Superior Courts of 
the State of North-Carolina. and in the Circuit Court of the U. States, for North-Carolina 
District. To Which is Added a Translation of Latch’s Cases (Newbern: Francois-Xavier 
Martin, 1797) [hereinafter cited as “Martin”]. In addition to state and federal cases, 
included is Martin’s translation of John Latch’s reports of selected cases heard at the 
Court of King’s Bench during the first three years of the reign of Charles I- first 
published in Norman-French by Edward Walpoole in 1661. Martin’s was the first 
English translation of Latch’s reports and demonstrates clearly the reliance upon 
English law at the time.
126 1 Martin 48 (1787).
much apparent reluctance, but with great deliberation and firmness, gave
their opinion separately, but unanimously for overruling the
aforementioned motion for the dismission of the said suits.”127 Considering
the boldness of this ruling, and the year of its delivery, this is a meaningful
choice of communicative style. At a time when such an assertion of power
would be aided by an institutional, single-voiced, authoritativeness, the
Superior Court of North Carolina maintained an individualist posture. Martin
goes further and explains the rationale behind the decision:
the Judges observed, that the obligation of their oaths, and the duty of 
their office required them in that situation, to give their opinion on 
that important and momentous subject; and that notwithstanding the 
great reluctance they might feel against involving, themselves in a 
dispute with the Legislature of the state, yet no object of concern or 
respect could come in competition or authorize them to dispense with 
the duty they owed the public, in consequence of the trust they were 
invested with under the solemnity of their oaths. 12$
Even when they were testing the very bounds of their authority, judicial
power as exercised by the state of North Carolina was not exhibited
collectively, but rather flowed as several individual expressions in
pursuance of coherence.
In 1799 the legislature acted again, creating a “Court of Conference” 
that would hear appeals of matters heard on newly formed circuits as well as 
holding an original jurisdiction in certain cases of fraud. 129 Judges of the 
superior courts were to come and discuss the gaps and inconsistencies of 
North Carolina’s law. The explicit goal of the legislation was to increase 
uniformity and efficiency throughout the j u d i c i a r y ; x30 the very purpose of
127 1 Martin 49.
128 Ibid.
129 “An act directing the judges of the superior courts to meet together to settle 
questions of law or equity arising on the circuit, and to provide for the trial of all 
persons concerned in certain frauds (1799),” 2 N.C. Laws 887-9. The Court of 
Conference was renamed the Supreme Court in 1806.
130 Ibid., 887 [“Whereas great inconveniences have arisen, and much delay in 
the administration of justice has been occasioned, from the want of a speedy and uniform 
decision of all questions of law or equity arising on the circuit, either from difference 
of opinion in the judges, or from a desire of further consideration, or from a want of a 
competent number of judges as the law exists at present: to the end therefore that these
fiq
creating an additional layer at the top of the hierarchy points to this. It is all 
the more remarkable then that the legislature refused to abandon tenets of 
individual judicial accountability. The same act requires that, “each and 
every judge at their said meeting shall give their final opinion in every case 
in writing,” and for a book to be kept by the clerk to hold their views. 131 in 
fact, the language used throughout the statute always refers to “judges” 
rather than any institutional nomenclature. Five years later, in a law that 
would continue the 1799 enactment, the legislature went further, 
commanding, “That the judges of the said court of conference shall not only 
reduce their opinions to writing, and file the same in the clerk's office, as 
heretofore directed by law, but that the judges of the said court shall 
likewise, when their opinions are made, deliver the same viva voce in open 
court. ”132 xhe legislature emphasized the line of thinking again in 1810 for 
the renamed Court of Conference, the Supreme Court of North C a r o lin a .  !33 it 
can not be highlighted too often that these demands of the legislature were 
made at a time when the uncertainty of the law was, as one superior court 
judge then put it, “the most fruitful source of contention. ” 134 Even when 
reforming the judiciary in a “certain” or homogeneous direction, individual 
accountability was reaffirmed.
The judges of the Court of Conference teach more still. In a short span
inconveniences may be remedied, and that decisions shall be had on all suits and 
controversies at present depending or hereafter to depend in the superior courts of law 
and equity, with as much despatch and uniformity as possible...”].
131 Ibid., 888.
132 “An act to continue in force an act passed in the year one thousand eight 
hundred and one, entitled ‘An act to continue longer in force and to amend an act passed 
in the year one thousand seven hundred and ninety-nine, entitled ‘An act directing the 
judges of the superior courts to meet together to settle questions of law or equity arising 
on the circuit, and to provide for the trial of persons concerned in certain frauds 
(1804),” 2 N.C. Laws 1020.
133 “An act to regulate the supreme court (1810),” 2 N.C. Laws 1169-70.
134 John Louis Taylor, Cases Determined in the Superior Courts of Law and 
Equity of the State of North Carolina (Newbem: Martin & Ogden, 1802), iii. Taylor was 
a superior court judge.
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of time, there is a shift in its mode of communication that coincides with the 
ascendance of Chief Justice Marshall on the U.S. Supreme Court. In 1800- the 
year before Marshall is sworn in- there were twelve cases decided upon their 
merits by full opinions. Ten of these were determined via the seriatim  
form. *35 just six years later, eight of nine cases that were decided upon their 
merits and received full opinions were communicated via “the opinion of the 
court. ”136 By the time John Louis Taylor publishes his Supreme Court reports 
in 1818, the opinion of the court is a well established norm of judicial
expression. !37
What lessons can be gleaned from this brief review of early state 
judicial practice? There are two main themes which stand out when the 
actions and arguments of the legislators and judges of the period are studied. 
Firstly, it is abundantly clear that the new application and reconciliation of 
revolutionary principles was especially problematic in the case of judicial 
power. Legislators in many instances concluded that (in the particular 
construction of oaths and regulatory statutes) the individual accountability 
of officials acting in their judicial capacity was an essential ingredient of 
judicial power. This legislative concern remains present even during times 
of great uncertainty and disorganization concerning legal precedent and 
judicial system. This may seem to be a rather mundane theme to garner from
135 See Duncan Cameron and William Norwood, Reports of Cases Ruled and 
Determined bv the Court of Conference of North-Carolina (Raleigh: J. Gales, 1805), 3- 
113 [hereinafter cited as “Cameron & Norwood”]- There was a total of forty cases heard 
in 1800. Two of the twelve cases, Armstrong v. Beaty and Spendlove v. Soendlove. 
included a single combined opinion of two of the three judges present. Twenty-six cases 
received a per curiam or “By the Court” summary, and they were matters the court 
considered largely settled or unimportant. One case was dismissed before reaching the 
merits, and one case saw the court grant a writ cursorily.
136 See A.D. Murphey, Reports of Cases Argued and Adjudged in the Supreme 
Court of North-Carolina. 3 vols. (Raleigh: J. Gales & Son, 1822), 1: 102-147. One case 
was delivered seriatim. Seventeen cases were disposed of via “By the Court” summaries.
137 See I.L. Tavlor. Cases Adjudged in the Supreme Court of North Carolina 
(Raleigh: J. Gales, 1818). Taylor’s reports cover the court from July Term, 1816 
through January Term, 1818.
71
an effort of historical scholarship; perhaps the most obvious truths do not 
always receive the emphasis they deserve. Secondly, and perhaps more 
importantly, the judges- the actors who performed the bulk of the 
innovation and invention which proved central to the redefinition of the 
bounds of judicial power and how it will serve a new kind of constitutional 
democracy- are often transparent when performing their official duties in 
their belief that judicial power requires individual, sincere judgment. 
Furthermore, exceptional deviations from this pervasive judicial attitude 
(such as Edmund Pendleton’s in Virginia) are clearly motivated by defensive 
concerns from legislative assaults upon this qualitatively new acquisition of 
judicial power. To overstate the meaning of such deviations and incorporate 
them into a new, different theoretical understanding of what constitutes 
judicial power is to declare the exception to be the rule. Again, the history 
presented here is far from dispositive. As I said earlier, there are great 
many obstacles, differences, and constraints that face a historian of this 
subject. Nevertheless, the overriding lessons of this review of early state 
judicial practice should also not be cursorily dismissed. The conventional 
narrative regarding American judicial power overemphasizes its 
institutional, coherent character. The fact remains that the essentially 
individual nature of judicial power was heavily emphasized, providing a 
more balanced, complex picture of the subject.
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Chapter Two:
The National Judiciary and the Break from Sincerity
This chapter, the culmination of our historical inquiries, will be 
divided in half. The first part covers the federal judiciary from its inception 
in 1789 until 1801, when John Marshall arrives on the scene. From that 
point until the early 1820’s is the domain of the second part.1
Tohn lav and Oliver Ellsworth
There is an important (though often overlooked) aspect of the 
national judiciary’s constitutional development, the roots of which can be 
traced to the Chief Justiceship of John Jay. The Jay Court early on provided a 
solution to the uncertain problem of in whose name judicial writs would run. 
Chief Justice Jay suggested and initiated the practice that writs would run in 
the President’s name until the Court was told not to do so. Melvin Urofsky 
explains that Jay read Article III broadly and assumed that, when presented 
with a specific legislative grant of power, the Court “could use all 
appropriate means to execute that power in the absence of enabling 
legislation. The Court has, on numerous occasions since, acted or refused to 
act in certain ways, thus informing Congress, as it did here, that it may 
change the Court’s procedure bv statute or confirm it bv inaction. ”2 Jay 
acted on the assumption that Section 14 of the Judiciary Act, which gave the
1 Few authors have addressed the issues confronted in this section. Those that 
have addressed them provided both valuable guidance and confirmation of my own work 
along the way. Generally, in addition to those noted below, I have been particularly 
aided by three sources, as follows: Julius Goebel, Jr., History of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, volume 1: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1971), 96-142, 196-250, 457-607, 662-813; George L. Haskins and 
Herbert A. Johnson, History of the Supreme Court of the United States, volume 2: 
Foundations of Power: John Marshall. 1801-15 (New York: Macmillan, 1981), 107-204, 
373-406; Donald G. Morgan, “Mr. Justice William Johnson and the Constitution,” 57 
Harvard Law Review 328-61 (1944).
2 Melvin I. Urofsky, A March of Liberty: A Constitutional History of the United 
States (New York, Alfred A  Knopf, Inc., 1988), 137.
7^
Court power to issue writs, also gave it power to determine the style of the 
process. Jay’s reasoning in this example quite obviously has large 
consequences for the departmental dynamics that the Constitution 
encourages. This line of reasoning will be returned to later in part three of 
the paper.
On August 11, 1792 the Supreme Court of the United States handed down 
its first case that included a full opinion, State of Georgia v. Brailsford.3 The 
first opinion delivered was by Justice Thomas Johnson who dissented from 
the majority composed of Justices James Iredell, John Blair, James Wilson, 
and Chief Justice John Jay.4 For nearly the whole of the first decade of the 
Supreme Court’s existence, the seriatim form was the established convention. 
The influence of England was confirmed by Jay three days earlier when he 
stated that, “The Court considers the practice of the courts of King’s Bench 
and Chancery in England, as affording outlines for the practice of this court; 
and that they will, from time to time, make such alterations therein, as 
circumstances may render necessary. ”5 When the Georgia case was later 
reargued on different grounds, Iredell dissented, explaining that he was, 
“bound to decide, according to the dictates of my own judgment. ”6 Both of 
these cases were examples of a “conversing” demeanor exhibited by the 
Court. Seriatim opinions were the mode of proceeding for some of the 
formative cases of American constitutional law, including Chisholm v.
3 2 Dallas 402.
4 Ibid., 405. Justice William Cushing also dissented from the majority.
5 2 Dallas 413-14. Dallas’s notes are confirmed by Maeva Marcus, ed., 1 The 
Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States. 1789-1800. part one 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 582.
6 Georgia v. Brailsford. 2 Dallas 415 (1793). Blair, though in agreement with 
majority, engaged in concurring behavior due to different reasoning. Jay spoke for the 
others; Johnson was absent.
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Georgia.7 Ware v. Hvlton.8 and Calder v. Bull9 among others.
There are three possible rhetorical effects of any judicial 
pronouncement- what I term “homogeneous”, “dissentient”, and 
“conversing” results. Homogeneous results demonstrate unanimity in both 
result and reasoning, and may be communicated by a singular utterance to 
avoid repetition. Dissentient results occur when one member or bloc speaks 
against the majority. There is only one voice for each conclusion provided 
by the majority and the minority; by definition, dissentient results are 
exclusively a two-voice colloquy. Conversing results are produced by a court 
when those who agree on the result differ on rationale. Conversing 
behavior occurs only within a plural majority or minority, not between the 
divide. Of course, a case may be classified as both dissentient and conversing, 
or even “double conversing”, depending on the circumstances; 
homogeneous classifications are exclusive. With these parameters in mind, a 
review of the reported cases by Alexander J. Dallas for the years 1790-1800 
produces interesting d a t a .10 Dallas’ reports offer 43 bone fide cases which 
can be clearly classified. Of these, there are 30 occurrences of homogeneous 
behavior, 6 examples of dissentient behavior, and 12 examples of conversing 
behavior.
7 2 Dallas 419 (1793). Decided by vote of 4 to 1; opinions by Iredell (in 
dissent), Blair, Wilson, Cushing and Jay.
8 3 Dallas 199 (1796). Decided by vote of 4 to 0; opinions by Chase, Paterson, 
Wilson and Cushing. Iredell later submitted an opinion for the record, dissenting in 
part and concurring in part. Chief Justice Oliver Ellsworth did not participate.
9 3 Dallas 386 (1798). Decided by vote of 4 to 0; opinions by Chase, Paterson, 
Iredell and Cushing. Ellsworth and Wilson did not participate.
10 See Appendix 2, infra. The cases reported by Dallas for the sixteen active 
terms between 1790 and 1800 are not indicative of the total number heard and disposed 
of by the Court. See Warren, Charles. The Supreme Court in United States History, 
volume one (Boston, Little Brown, 1928), 158 at note 2. The Supreme Court’s smooth 
docket book lists 86 or 87 appellate cases entered before 1801. The Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Devise History Project explains in detail how cases are to be counted and why 
some are excluded from this number. See Goebel, Jr., 1 History of the Supreme Court of 
the United States. 795-801. The Dallas material which can clearly be classified (43 
cases) is a fair-sized sample (50 percent) of the total material that came before the 
Court at this time.
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Almost no scholarship exists on the rhetorical effects of judicial
pronouncement, and that which does exist tends to present such findings
with a rather skewed, almost professional slant. A dissertation by Beverly
Wall is a good example of this latter point.11 Dr. Wall in her paper seeks to
analyze Supreme Court opinions from a rhetorical perspective, choosing six
well-known cases that span across American history. Two of Wall’s cases,
Chisholm v. Georgia and McCulloch v. Maryland, were decided by the
Supreme Court early in its history and illustrate what Wall calls
the parameters of a rhetorical problem that has persisted throughout 
the Court’s history: the conflict between the functions of the texts as 
deliberative forums and governmental instruments, between the 
individual roles of justices and their collective institutional identity, 
and between the justices’ multiple voices and the Court’s single judicial 
voice in a culture of argument.12
Many of Wall’s observations are helpful. Supreme Court opinions, she 
explains, are genetically identifiable as a certain kind of “discourse 
performance” because they (1) are “negotiated texts”, (2) serve 
“fundamentally instrumental” purposes, (3) provide public forums for 
debate, (4) combine written and oral traits, and (5) address multiple, non- 
hierarchical audiences.!3 These sorts of characteristics are important 
indeed, but Wall is like many who approach law from a rhetorical 
perspective in that she is content to approach her subject very flexibly and 
not concern herself with any foundational issues concerning judicial 
expression. For Wall and many other rhetorically-minded students, the way 
in which the Court communicates is one of endless possibility, unburdened 
by concerns that the constitutional structure of which the Court is a part 
might prove more effective or legitimate if one way was chosen rather than 
another. This is a very general criticism of rhetorical approaches to law,
11 Beverly C. Wall, Supreme Court Rhetoric: Explorations in the Culture of 




one that is uncomfortable with treating legal action reduced to writing as 
just another form of literature. People give their lives to change the law; the 
same cannot be said about poetry.
But it is Wall’s analysis of cases like Chisholm which is more 
disturbing, for it betrays an institutional prejudice that is shared by many 
students of the law. As noted earlier, the Court’s decision in the Chisholm 
case was expressed via seriatim opinions; five opinions provided explanation 
for a decision that was unanimous save one. Wall’s careful analysis of the 
history surrounding the case and the Justice’s opinions leads to a startling 
conclusion. “We do get a fascinating judicial rehearsal of a variety of 
possible roles and generic structures for this new community of argument,” 
Wall says of the Chisholm opinions, “but the final result is a text filled with 
five voices neither instrumental nor deliberative in their effect. ”*4 This 
sort of response to the Court’s judicial expression of Chisholm is both 
anachronistic and simply mistaken; the example Wall chooses actually works 
against her. How can a case that led directly to the push for and eventual 
addition of the Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution be described as 
lacking instrumental or deliberative effect? It is the overwhelming opinion 
of historians that the Eleventh Amendment was one of only two 
constitutional amendments (the other being the Sixteenth) ever adopted 
explicitly to repudiate a decision by the Supreme C o u r t .  15 The seriatim form 
was clearly not the obstacle to effectiveness (deliberational, instrumental, or 
otherwise) that Wall would have us believe.
“Haybum’s case,” as it has come to be known, is actually not a case at
14 ibid., 47. Immediately preceding this passage, Wall also suggests that the 
seriatim conversation of Chisholm does not “necessarily” fulfill an institutional goal. 
This sort of conclusion can only be acceptable by someone who holds a (now dominant) 
narrow conception of the institutionalism of the Court and American judicial power.
1 5 See, for example, The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 1992 ed., s.v. “Eleventh Amendment,” by John V. Orth.
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all, but a controversy arising from a 1792 Act of Congress. 16 Nevertheless, 
Hay b um ’s case is helpful in demonstrating early American understandings 
of judicial power. The law Congress enacted would have required the U.S. 
Circuit Courts to hear disability pension claims by war veterans. Three 
separate letters, as the Justices were then sitting as judges of the three 
circuit courts, were sent to President George Washington. Each letter 
explained that the legislation violated the principle of the separation of 
powers by imposing nonjudicial duties on the tribunals. The letters are 
usually cited as an early though perhaps vague example of federal courts 
declaring unconstitutional and refusing to enforce a statute passed by 
Congress. What is not usually noted is that each letter refers to the 
responsibilities of judges and not an institutional judiciary when discussing 
concerns of judicial determinations and independence. 17 Like the 
“Remonstrance” of the Court of Appeals in Virginia discussed earlier, the 
letters in Haybum’s case are another indication of latent assumptions that 
were linked to thinking regarding judicial power. Or consider the Court’s 
opinion in United States v. Tudge Lawrence, when the Attorney General, 
Edmund Randolph, asked for a writ of mandamus to compel a U.S. District 
Judge to issue a warrant. 18 Rebuffing Randolph, the Court’s unanimous 
opinion noted that, “the District Judge was acting in a judicial capacity,” and 
that, “we have no power to compel a Judge to decide according to the dictates 
of any judgment, but his own.”19 Less than six years later, John Marshall’s 
view of the “judicial capacity” of his brethren would allow for a different 
sort of compellance.
Before Marshall, however, Connecticut’s Oliver Ellsworth comes into
16 2 Dallas 409 (1792).
17 See Ibid., 410, at note 2. Jay, Cushing and U.S. District Judge Duane signed 
one letter. Wilson, Blair and U.S. District Judge Peters signed another. Iredell and U.S. 
District Judge Sitgreaves signed the third.
is  3 Dallas 42 (1795).
19 Ibid., 53-54.
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view again. After Jay left to run for Governor of New York and a one year 
stint by John Rutledge, Ellsworth was sworn in as Chief Justice on February 
4, 1796. By the time he reached the Supreme Court Ellsworth was already a 
respected jurist, a member of the Philadelphia convention and, while a 
United States Senator, the principal drafter and steward of the Judiciary Act 
of 1789. His tenure was less than four years, and illness prevented him from 
presiding during a substantial portion of it including almost all of his first 
term. Ellsworth is generally credited with bringing leadership to the 
position of Chief Justice. The Ellsworth Court, for our purposes, is most 
conspicuous for its limited utilization of per curiam opinions delivered by 
the Chief Justice. This development of the Ellsworth Court, though not used 
in important cases, is rightly viewed as a transitional stage that leads to the 
full-blown practice of institutional opinions by the Marshall Court. 20 The 
introduction of this institutional voice led to further unprecedented 
behavior on the Supreme Court. During the August Term of 1796, Justice 
Wilson forwarded the first sole dissent from the Court’s opinion in Wiscart v. 
D’Auchv.2! Less than a year later, in Brown v. Van Braam. Wilson executes 
another first when he delivers the opinion of the Court, the first time 
someone other than the Chief Justice does so.22 Further organizing the 
earlier data on Dallas’ reports by Chief Justice, a remarkable trend emerges.
20 A clear example of the Ellsworth innovation can be seen in Brown v. Barry. 3 
Dallas 365 (1797).
Charles Warren was the best known scholar of the Supreme Court to assert that it 
was Ellsworth rather than Marshall who was the originator of the practice of having the 
opinion of the Court be delivered by the Chief Justice. Warren bases this claim 
exclusively on the words of Justice Samuel Chase in his opinion in Bas v. Tinev. 4 Dallas 
37 (1800), when he said: “The judges agreeing unanimously in their opinion, I presumed 
that the sense of the court would have been delivered by the president; and therefore I 
have not prepared a formal argument on the occasion.” See Warren, 1 The Supreme Court 
in United States History 654, at note 1.
21 3 Dallas 321, 324. Ellsworth actually responds to Wilson’s dissent 
afterwards, clarifying the rule he announced previously in the court’s opinion. In 
lennines v. Perseverance. 3 Dallas 336 (1797), the decision in Wiscart v. D’Auchy was 
affirmed, with Justice Paterson adding his subsequent support to Wilson’s opinion 
though he was silent on the actual occasion the previous term.
22 3 Dallas 344 (1797).
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The Ellsworth Court data produces 27 examples of homogeneous behavior, 3 
instances of dissentient behavior and 7 occurrences of conversing 
behavior.23 Even with the limited sample set Dallas offers, these figures at 
least point towards a homogeneous direction while still leaving freedom of 
expression in important cases.
There are two elements of early American judicial practice that 
deserve brief comment here. The Judiciary Act of 1789 constructed a 
hierarchy of national courts and required the Justices of the Supreme Court 
to “ride circuit” and sit on these inferior tribunals. Scholars have 
previously pointed to the Justices’ behavior while on circuit as a purposeful 
quasi-judicial function intended by Federalist statesmen.24 Jury charges 
delivered by the Justices during the infancy of the federal judiciary are 
especially highlighted as evidence of the intended judicial function of 
inculcating “constitution-thoughts” in a new citizenry. The role of 
“republican schoolmaster,” was an important function deliberately 
embedded in the judiciary by those who forged American government, so 
this reasoning goes. These sorts of arguments conflict with more 
“conventional” authors who contend that the national judiciary, unlike the 
legislative and executive branches, was to be fairly similar to the analogous 
institutions as then existed in Great Britain and the states.25 Any instances of 
novel deportment by the members of the judiciary, these arguments follow, 
are purely extra-judicial and a rather grotesque intermingling of law and 
politics. In light of the large gaps of information regarding intention on
23 See Appendix 3, infra.
24 Prominent examples include the following: Ralph Lemer, “The Supreme Court 
as Republican School-master,” Supreme Court Review (1967), 127; Stephen Presser, “The 
original misunderstanding: the English, the Americans, and the dialectic of Federalist 
constitutional jurisprudence. (Roads not Taken: Undercurrents of Republican Thinking 
in Modem Constitutional Theory),” 84 Northwestern University Law Review 106-85 
(1989).
25 See George Anastapolo, “The Supreme Court is Indeed a Court,” in Robert A. 
Licht, ed., Is the Supreme Court the Guardian of the Constitution? (Washington D.C.:
AEI Press, 1993), 22-33.
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this matter (admitted by both camps) it is up to the student to decide after 
thoroughly engaging the existing material- including the speeches, 
pamphlets and treatises of the era- which view is most persuasive. Chapter 
seven will expend more energy on these sorts of inquiries, but it is sufficient 
for now to declare my belief that the judiciary was indeed intended to be 
“special” and different from any analogous institution then existing on 
either side of the Atlantic. What follows from this commitment to the 
distinctiveness of the judiciary is an examination into the judicial function 
itself and how it may comport with a conception of law and a constitutional 
philosophy. It is the labor of the student who attaches to this commitment to 
explain how the judiciary was to be distinctive and what effects that 
distinctiveness would be expected to produce. A preexisting genus may give 
rise to a new species; distinctiveness is not a license to disregard history.
Tohn Marshall
The fourth Chief Justice of the Supreme Court was responsible for 
altering the form of judicial expression which prevailed upon his arrival by 
instituting the “opinion of the Court.” Because of this, and because no other 
event in the Court's history matches it, Marshall's ascendance is rightly 
identified as the point at which American judicial power decisively broke 
from its constitutional tradition of sincerity.
After the election of 1800, both the legislative and executive branches 
of the government were in the hands of Thomas Jefferson's Republican 
party. One of the “midnight judges” of the outgoing president, John Adams, 
John Marshall found himself an inhabitant of the only federal branch 
controlled by his Federalist party. After taking the oath of office on 
February 4, 1801 Marshall quickly convinced his brethren of the threat 
posed by the Jeffersonians. Marshall absolutely dominated the highest court 
in the land; the statistics are striking. From 1801 through 1815 Marshall
fti
delivered 209 (or 55 percent) of the 378 opinions of the court. Of 31 opinions 
on constitutional law over the same period, Marshall gave 12, 6 were seriatim  
opinions or per curiam summaries, with the remainder spread over the 
associate justices- each giving no more than 3. Of 127 total opinions on 
courts and procedure for these years, Marshall delivered 70, or 55 percent.2^  
From 1805 until 1833, of 974 majority opinions rendered by the Court, 
Marshall wrote 450, in comparison with Joseph Story’s 176 (who arrived in 
1812) and William Johnson’s 113 (who arrived in 1804).27 In Marshall’s 34 
years, he delivered 519 of 1100 majority opinions while on the bench, and 
only dissented 8 times. 28
There are important disclaimers to keep in mind when considering 
figures such as these. There is some evidence to support the notion that 
delivery of an opinion does necessarily imply authorship.2^  Seniority seems 
to have guided who was to deliver the Court’s opinion, but little documentary 
evidence exists to confirm the role of the individual justices in preparing 
opinions of the court. These admissions notwithstanding, it is abundantly 
clear that Marshall, “was the individual most responsible for the alteration 
in internal arrangements that provided a period of general unanimity after 
the exceptionally divisive time of the Jay C o u r t .  ”30 Indeed, as one legal 
historian has shown, Marshall at times compromised his own Federalist 
principles substantially in order to maintain unanimity. 31 Even with 
Presidents Thomas Jefferson and James Madison altering the makeup of the
26 Statistics taken from Haskins and Johnson, History of the Supreme Court of 
the United States II. 652-64.
27 As compiled in Morgan, “Mr. Justice William Johnson,” 332.
28 As compiled in Donald M. Roper, “Judicial Unanimity and the Marshall 
Court- A Road to Reappraisal,” 9 American Journal of Legal History 119 (1965).
2 9 See Haskins and Johnson, History of the Supreme Court of the United States II. 
383-89.
30 Ibid., 388.
31 Donald M. Roper, “Judicial Unanimity and the Marshall Court- A Road to 
Reappraisal,” 9 American Journal of Legal History 118-34 (1965).
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Court with appointments of Johnson, Brockholst Livingston, Thomas Todd, 
Story and Gabriel Duvall, Marshall still channelled an ideologically divided 
bench toward single-voiced expression through compromise. Remember 
that Marshall inherited a tribunal whose place was uncertain in the overall 
scheme of American government.32 The political maneuvering of the early 
1800’s is in many ways still unmatched in American history. It makes sense 
that, “Marshall’s quest for unanimity was, in its way, an essential part of his 
concept of the judicial function, which along with nationalism and the 
preservation of property rights, must be considered as basic non-legal tenets 
in the composition of his opinions. ”33 Marshall believed that the best way 
for the Court to ward off congressional attempts at reducing the judiciary to a 
secondary player was to enhance its prestige whenever possible. Federalist 
principles, in this way, could be assured of constitutional expression. The 
mode of communication employed by the Court was an effective way to 
achieve such enhancement. 34
There is no doubt, in any event, that Marshall’s stratagem was noticed. 
Jefferson’s famous letter to Thomas Ritchie, written a year after the Supreme 
Court’s nationalist decision in McCullough v. M a r v la n d .35 spoke harshly of 
Marshall’s Court, describing its members as, “the subtle corps of sappers and 
miners constantly working under ground to undermine the foundations of 
our confederated f a b r i c . ”36 Jefferson goes on in his dispatch to Ritchie to 
record his feelings regarding the manner of the Court’s communication 
specifically. The relevant portions concerning this point are worth
32 On this see generally, George L. Haskins, “Law versus politics in the early 
years of the Marshall Court,” 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1-27 (1981).
33 Roper, “Judicial Unanimity and the Marshall Court,” 119.
34 See generally, John R. Schmidhauser, judges and Justices: The Federal 
Appellate ludiciarv (Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown & Co., 1979), 110-16.
55 4 Wheaton 316 (1819).
36 Thomas Jefferson, “Letter to Thomas Ritchie, December 25, 1820,” Writings. 
ed. and comp. Merrill D. Peterson (New York: Library of America, 1984), 1446.
reference:
They are construing our constitution from a co-ordination of a 
general and special government to a general and supreme one alone. 
This will lay all things at their feet, and they are too well versed in 
English law to forget the maxim, “boni iudicis est ampliare 
iurisdictionem.” We shall see if they are bold enough to take the daring 
stride their five lawyers have lately taken.37
Jefferson’s assault on the miners and sappers continues, hoping that other 
federal statesmen who are like-minded will,
lay bare these wounds of our constitution, expose the decisions 
seriatim, and arouse, as it is able, the attention of the nation to these 
bold speculators on its patience. Having found from experience, that 
impeachment is an impracticable thing, a mere scare-crow, they 
consider themselves secure for life; they sculk from responsibility to 
public opinion, the only remaining hold on them, under a practice first 
introduced by Lord Mansfield. An opinion is huddled up in conclave, 
perhaps by a majority of one, delivered as if unanimous, and with the 
silent acquiescence of lazy or timid associates, by a crafty chief judge, 
who sophisticates the law to his mind, by the turn of his own reasoning. 
A judiciary law was once reported by the Attorney General to Congress, 
requiring each judge to deliver his opinion seriatim and openly, and 
then to give it in writing to the clerk to be entered in the record. A 
judiciary independent of a king or executive alone, is a good thing; but 
independence of the will of the nation is a solecism, at least in a 
republican government.33
So Jefferson in 1820 was clear on the issue of the “opinion of the 
court.” His preference was for the earlier seriatim form; he attributes the 
rise of the “opinion of the court,” to Marshall. Two years later, in a 
correspondence to his own appointee to the Court, Justice William Johnson, 
Jefferson addressed the point further. “The subject of my uneasiness,” he 
wrote, “is the habitual mode of making up and delivering the opinions of the 
supreme court of the US. ”39 Jefferson presented some of the historical 
trends and influences that accompanied the practice of the “making up and
37 Ibid. Note that Jefferson correctly applies the erroneous maxim, “boni 
judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem. [it is the duty of a judge to extend this 
jurisdiction.]” Lord Mansfield, in R. v. Phillips. 1 Burrow 292, explained that the true 
maxim should substitute the word “justitiam” for “jurisdictionem.” See Herbert Broom, 
A Selection of Legal Maxims, tenth edition (London: Sweet & Maxwell Ltd., 1939), 44- 
48.
3 8 Ibid.
39 Thomas Jefferson, “Letter to Justice William Johnson, October 27, 1822,” 
Writings. 1461.
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delivering” of opinions, telling Johnson,
You know that from the earliest ages of the English law, from the 
date of the year-books, at least, to the end of the lid George, the judges 
of England, in all but self-evident cases, delivered their opinions 
seriatim, with the reasons and authorities which governed their 
decisions. If they sometimes consulted together, and gave a general 
opinion, it was so rarely as not to excite either alarm or notice.4*)
Jefferson believed that Lord Mansfield was the true revolutionary for
bringing “the habit of caucusing opinions,” to the Kings Bench. The
practice was short-lived however, for upon Mansfield’s retirement Lord
Kenyon ended the practice, and rightly so in Jefferson’s mind.41 Jefferson
then refers to what he sees as an analogous situation in post-revolutionary
America, noting that,
Mr. Pendleton was, after the revolution, placed at the head of the court 
of Appeals. He adored Ld. Mansfield, & considered him as the greatest 
luminary of law that any age had ever produced, and he introduced into 
the court over which he presided, Mansfield’s practice of making up 
opinions in secret & delivering them as the Oracles of the court, in 
mass. Judge Roane, when he came to that bench, broke up the practice, 
refused to hatch judgements, in Conclave, or to let others deliver 
opinions for him.42
However accurate Jefferson’s historical account may be, it seems clear 
that he grasped some of the important effects and implications that 
accompany the style and manner of the judiciary’s communication. 
“Conclaving” is referred to negatively by Jefferson in both letters. To 
Ritchie, Jefferson mentioned the appearance of unanimity as undesirable; to 
Johnson, in addition to reiterating the negative, he offered a description of 
what he believes to be the positive effect of seriatim opinions. Jefferson
40 ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 ibid. Jefferson’s post-revolutionary example, however, is noteworthy in 
another respect. The juxtaposition of Roane and Pendleton is not an accidental one. 
Jefferson wrote his letter to Johnson during a time when questions of the authoritative 
supremacy of constitutional interpretation- the “WHO” questions of American 
constitutionalism- were at the fore. Only two years after this communication Justice 
John Gibson- nearly an ideological twin of Judge Roane- of the supreme court of 
Pennsylvania would write his famous dissenting opinion in Eakin v. Raub. 12 S. & R. 330 
(Pa., 1825), a straightforward argument for legislative supremacy. See generally Walter 
Murphy, James E. Fleming, and William F. Harris, II, American Constitutional 
Interpretation (New York: Mineola, 1986), 184-254.
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preferred the seriatim form for good reasons, namely that,
Besides the light which their separate arguments threw on the subject, 
and the instruction communicated by their several modes of reasoning, 
it shewed whether the judges were unanimous or divided, and gave 
accordingly more or less weight to the judgement as a precedent. It 
sometimes happened too that when there were three opinions against 
one, the reasoning of the one was so much the more cogent as to become 
afterwards the law of the land.4^
In the process of castigating this new convention of Marshall’s, 
Jefferson discussed the very nature of the requirements asked of a Supreme 
Court Justice. “The Judges,” he continued, “holding their offices for life are 
under two responsibilities only. 1. Impeachment. 2. Individual reputation. 
But this practice compleatly withdraws them from both.”44 The opinion of 
the court, as Jefferson saw it operating in these new Federalist surroundings, 
“shielded” the Judge from each of the only two responsibilities asked of him. 
The surroundings are not just an aside here, as it should be remembered that 
the national government as a whole was still in its infancy. Indeed, the 
situation in which Jefferson found himself only buttressed, he thought, his 
criticisms:
Some of these cases too have been of such importance, of such 
difficulty, and the decisions so grating to a portion of the public as to 
have merited the fullest explanation from every judge seriatim, of the 
reasons which had produced such convictions on his mind. It was 
interesting to know whether these decisions were really unanimous, or 
might not perhaps be of 4. against 3. and consequently prevailing by 
the preponderance of one voice only.45
Justice Johnson replied to Jefferson less than two months later. His
lengthy reply speaks volumes on the working life of the early Marshall
Court, explaining the impediments to free expression that he confronted:
While I was on our State-bench I was accustomed to delivering seriatim 
Opinions in our Appellate Court, and was not a little surprised to find 
our Chief Justice in the Supreme Court delivering all the opinions in 
Cases in which he sat, even in some Instances when contrary to his own 
Judgement and Vote. But I remonstrated in vain; the Answer was he is 
willing to take the trouble and it is a Mark of Respect to him. I soon 




could not be got to think or write- Paterson was a slow man and 
willingly declined the Trouble, and the other two ((Marshall and 
Washington)) are commonly estimated as one Judge. Some Case soon 
occurred in which I differed from my Brethren, and I felt it a thing of 
Course to deliver my Opinion. But, during the rest of the Session I heard 
nothing but Lectures on the Indecency of Judges cutting at each other, 
and the Loss of Reputation which the Virginia appellate Court had 
sustained by pursuing such a Course. At length I found that I must 
either submit to Circumstances or become such a Cypher in our 
Consultations as to effect no good at all. I therefore bent to the Current, 
and persevered until I got them to adopt the Course they now pursue, 
which is to appoint some one to deliver the Opinion of the Majority, but 
leave it to the rest of the Judges to record their Opinions or not ad 
Libitum.4^
Less than eight months later, Jefferson was again in contact with 
Johnson, the man history would deem “the first dissenter.” Towards the end 
of, by Jefferson’s own admission, quite a long letter to Justice Johnson the 
President congratulated the Republican jurist on his insistence to produce 
and record his own view on cases before the Court. Jefferson’s complaints 
were similar in this message, saying that accountability to the public and the 
true presentation of unanimity or not were duties owed by the Justices to the 
American people.47
Some students of early nineteenth century American history and 
politics might want at this point to claim Jefferson was afflicted, regarding 
the general operation and decisions produced by the Court, by something 
like sour grapes. A Federalist Court led by Marshall was inhibiting 
Jefferson’s grand designs for the new nation. After all, history records 
Jefferson’s protests over the formal manipulations of the Marshall Court 
only after its substantive rulings. In light of this, they may wish to dismiss 
these comments as merely partisan pyrotechnics. If the manner and style of 
reaching and publishing decisions by the Supreme Court was so important, 
surely another besides Jefferson had attempted to address and reconcile the 
question before. Jefferson notes correctly that there was such an attempt.
46 Letter to Thomas Jefferson, December 10, 1822, Jefferson Papers, Library of 
Congress, Washington D.C., as quoted in Morgan, “Mr. Justice William Johnson,” 333-4.
47 “Letter to Justice William Johnson, June 12, 1823,” in Jefferson, Writings. 
1476-77.
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Edmund Randolph, Attorney General during the Federalist administration of 
George Washington, was asked by Congress to, “digest the judiciary laws into 
a single one, with such amendments as might be thought proper. He 
prepared a section requiring the Judges to give their opinions seriatim, in 
writing, to be recorded in a distinct volume. ”48 Actually, the section of 
Randolph’s Report Jefferson is referring to reads as follows: “it shall be the 
duty of each justice of the Supreme Court, present at the hearing of any 
appeal or writ of error, and differing from a majority of the court, to deliver 
his opinion, in writing, to be entered as aforesaid; and that each judge shall 
deliver his opinion in open court. ”4^  Jefferson goes on to explain 
regretfully that “Other business” stymied the progress of the bill. Federalist 
and Republican alike, it seems, .had thought carefully about the cultures 
within the institutions they created and swore to uphold.
The Ascendance of Strategy
Competing historical and theoretical visions of judicial review have 
been the touchstones of constitutional inquiry for quite a long time. With 
the subject of judicial expression, I propose a new one. Chief Justice John 
Marshall’s replacement of the traditional seriatim opinion with the “opinion 
of the court,” in 1801 seems to contain similar properties as judicial review.
48 “Letter to Johnson, 1822,” ibid., 1462. Randolph’s Report has received a 
limited treatment so far. Exceptions include Wythe Holt, “Federal courts as the asylum 
to federal interests: Randolph’s report, the Benson amendment, and the ‘original 
understanding of the federal judiciary,’” 36 Buffalo Law Review 341-72 (Spring, 1987); 
Akhil Reed Amar, “The two-tiered structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789,” 139 
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1499-1567 (1990). Even these imaginative 
efforts do not mention his concern for the style and manner of the Court’s 
communication.
49 H.R. Rep., 1st Cong., 3d Sess. (December 31, 1790), reprinted in American 
State Papers. W. Lowrie & W. Franklin eds., 1: 31 (1834). Furthermore, Randolph leaves 
the oath of office to be taken by a Supreme Court Justice as required by the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 unchanged. The 1789 wording of the oath follows: “I do solemnly swear that 
I will administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and 
to the rich; and that I will faithfully and impartially discharge all the duties incumbent 
upon me... according to the best of my abilities and understanding, agreeably to the 
constitution, and laws of the United States.”
Moreover the institutional opinion was created for clear partisan political 
reasons by a single actor. This switch in the method of judicial 
communication is an exemplar for the belief that institutions, and the rules 
that regulate them, matter.
Some may wish to declare that my own rendering of the history 
surrounding issues of the style and manner of the Court’s utterances serves 
as an indicator just why the touchstone of Talbot v. SeemanSQ (the first case 
where Marshall delivers an institutional opinion) has not been taken as 
seriously as the touchstone of Marburv v. Madison.51 Firstly, this case was 
not in fact the critical break for the practice of seriatim opinions.
Jefferson’s own testimony reflects that there were occasions that pre-dated 
Marshall’s tenure when an opinion of the court was used. How can a 
touchstone be proclaimed if its own historical practice is uncertain? The 
most succinct reply to this charge would be to note that other practices 
instituted by the court that claim to emerge from definite moments in 
history- clearly invoked as touchstones by those who study them- are in fact 
just as nebulous as the one I have proposed. A great deal of scholarship on 
judicial review makes this abundantly clear. Marburv v. Madison as 
touchstone is invoked because the practice: (1) was detailed more clearly at 
that time than it had been previously, and (2) that decision represented, 
with the benefit of history as a guide for comparison, a distinct departure 
from the known meaning and range of exercise the convention had 
possessed to that point.52 Marshall’s instituting the “opinion of the Court”
so 3 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1 (1801).
51 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
52 Sylvia Snowiss makes clear the importance of these two criteria in her work 
on the development of judicial review. See Snowiss, Tudicial Review. More directly, it is 
commonly accepted that the doctrine of judicial review was “proclaimed” before 
Marburv. only that Marshall had done so most firmly. See, among others, Havbum’s 
Case. 2 U.S. (Dallas) 409 (1792), and Calder v. Bull. 3 U.S. (Dallas) 386 (1798). Finally, 
Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist no, 78 is the classic formulation of judicial authority 
over unconstitutional legislation. Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, Federalist Papers. 436- 
42.
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then, with the aid of historical comparison, fulfills the criteria to be invoked 
as a touchstone in its own right. The more powerful objection to something 
like Talbot v. Seeman as touchstone is that the practice under discussion is 
just a small segment of a larger institutional sphere. Per curiam decision­
making, so the argument goes, is just one of many conventional rules with 
which the Supreme Court must concern itself if it seeks to be an institution 
worthy of the powers bestowed upon it and the admiration and respect of the 
people who ultimately ratify its maintenance. My inquiries now turn to 




Sincerity and Judicial Power
On the one hand there is the duty placed upon the Supreme Court to 
instruct, educate, and guide; this is the “ideal” or “principled” position. On 
the other hand there is the need for the Court- as a constitutionally mandated 
institution- to present an edifice of strength and unity that will contribute to 
the support of its very authority and legitimacy; this is the institutional side, 
or the position of “realism” or “expediency” in American law.i It is in the 
reconciliation of this tension where the duly constituted, “judicial Power of 
the United States. . .  vested in one Supreme Court,” derives is actual 
m eaning.2 To put it another way, if it is true that “It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,” then the 
institutional conventions and constraints within which the Court operates 
that are significant in formulating the Court’s utterances deserve our full 
attention. I also would contend that these institutional procedures should 
comport with those fundamental principles and forms that comprise our 
constitutionalism, since the powers assigned to those branches are granted 
through the vehicle of an admittedly openly textured document.
I am by no means the first to expound upon the tensions faced by the 
Court as communicator, though the subject has not received the treatment it 
deserves.3 An effort by Joseph Goldstein is something of an exemplar for my 
own work. The principal question of his book, The Intelligible Constitution.
1 I borrow the continuum between principle and expediency from Alexander 
Bickel. Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch. 65-72.
2 U.S. Constitution, Article III, § 1.
3 See, for example, Richard Hodder-Williams, The Politics of the US Supreme 
Court (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1980), 93-108; David M. O’Brien, Storm 
Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics. 3rd edition (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Co., 1993), 272-410. For similar treatment of the British judiciary, see JA.G. Griffith, 
The Politics of the ludiciarv. fourth edition (London: Fontana Press, 1991), 38-41, 42- 
73, 251-329.
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is one of mine: “By what criteria, by what canons of style, should [the 
Court’s] opinions be assessed as communications about the Constitution, 
whether they be majority, concurring, or dissenting?”4 Like Goldstein’s 
book, this paper is not concerned with whether a Justice “finds” or “makes” 
law. Indeed, it is one aim of this paper to show that, no matter what view one 
takes of judging or the enterprise of law, issues of judicial communication 
will be conspicuous and sincerity remains a critical behavioral postulate.
The message here is that these problems should not be dismissed, as one well 
known American judge has suggested, as “time and motion” studies that do 
not warrant the same level of attention as those expositions dealing with 
interpretive theory or doctrinal/historical analyses of certain particles of 
the Constitution’s text.5 Latent practices and purposes of constitutional 
institutions deserve careful interrogation and demand our consideration.
The Supreme Court of the United States, then, is an institution that 
includes latent conventions and strives toward latent objectives that are in 
tension. For quite a long time, the existence of these latent procedures have 
been noticed and discussed. For the most part, their existence and value has 
been received warmly by those who studied such matters. Karl Llewellyn,
4 Joseph Goldstein, The Intelligible Constitution: The Supreme Court's 
Obligation to Maintain the Constitution as Something We the People Can Understand 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 3-4. Goldstein is clearly inspired by what 
he sees as the confusing ramifications of the style and manner of certain modes of 
communication chosen by the Court. His citation of the headnote of the case, Webster v. 
Reproductive Health Services. 492 U.S. 490 (1989), is a telling motivation for Goldstein. 
I cannot resist in reproducing it here:
“REHNQUIST, C.J., announced the judgement of the Court and delivered the 
opinion for a unanimous Court with respect to Part II-C, the opinion of the Court with 
respect to Parts I, II-A, and II-B, in which WHITE, O’CONNOR, SCALIA, and KENNEDY, 
JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Parts II-D and III, in which WHITE and 
KENNEDY, JJ., joined. O’CONNOR, J., . . . and SCALIA, J., . . . filed opinions concurring 
in part and concurring in the judgement. BLACKMUN, J., filed an opinion concurring in 
part and dissenting in part, in which BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., joined. . . . 
STEVENS, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. . . .” Webster. 
ibid., at 498, quoted in Goldstein, Intelligible Constitution. 17-18.
In the same vein, see Burke Marshall’s foreword where his citation of the 
headnote in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991), demonstrates a similar 
motivation. Burke Marshall, foreword to ibid., xi.
5 See Frank Easterbrook, “Ways of Criticizing the Court,” 95 Harvard Law 
Review 802 (1982).
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the well known legal realist, in his monograph The Common Law Tradition. 
for example, includes a list of “Steadying Factors,” which courts should 
consider when deciding appeals, and he clearly imparts a positive tone 
regarding the worth of such devices.6 I choose Llewellyn's discussion of 
“Steadying Factors” because I believe the tone and explicit defense of such 
strategic devices is emblematic of the consensus among the legal community 
today. With instructing fellow lawyers in mind, Llewellyn offered fourteen 
clusters of factors that, as he claimed, “bear with much regularity on the 
way in which appellate cases get decided, and which combine to produce a 
significant steadiness in the work of a court.”7 Of these fourteen steadying 
factors, I only wish to briefly note three. These are as follows: an opinion of 
the court, group decision, and what Llewellyn calls general period-style.
It is heartening for someone who proposes the manner and style of 
communication as a sort of touchstone for constitutional inquiry that 
Llewellyn's sixth steadying factor is an opinion of the court. The opinion of 
the court, according to Llewellyn, has traditionally been characterized by 
four features. The first of these is the tendency of another steadying factor- 
“the single right answer”- to dominate the form of the opinion. Next is a 
“forward-looking function,” where an opinion’s content must include some 
demonstration as to how similar cases in the future are to be decided. Third, 
an opinion of the court is an effort of group expression, and as such it aids in
6 See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co., 1960). See also William Twining, Karl Llewellyn and the Realist 
Movement (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), 203-69; Amo C. Becht, “A Study of 
‘The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals’,” Washington Law Quarterly (February, 
1962): 1-34.
In The Common Law Tradition. Llewellyn admittedly exerts his energies in 
uncovering and explaining institutional factors of the judiciary with the hope of 
imparting to a colleague just how, “. . .  this appellate tribunal arrive[s] at the particular 
and concrete answer which it reaches in the particular and concrete case... in order that 
he may apply the knowledge in advance to a particular concrete tribunal in the next 
s p e c i f i c  appeal with which he will be concerned.” [original emphasis] Llewellyn, 
Common Law Tradition. 16.
7 Ibid. For a list of the “Major Steadying Factors in Our Appellate Courts,” see 
ibid., 19.
levelling, “the unevenness of individual temper and training into a moving 
average more predictable than the decisions of diverse single judges. *8 This 
third feature then, by extension, leads to the fourth. The possibility for the 
failure of group expression conveys an added mechanism embodied in the 
dissent. “In real measure,” Llewellyn explains, “if breach threatens, the 
dissent, by forcing or suggesting full publicity, rides herd on the majority, 
and helps to keep constant the due observance of that la w . ”9 One other note 
on this factor: Llewellyn, in 1960, noted with some regret, “the growing 
tendency of our busiest courts to substitute in many cases memoranda or 
mere announcements of result for the old-style full opinion.”^  I would 
suggest that this development is best understood as a furtherance of the 
continuum described to this point regarding the manner and style of 
communication for the judiciary. Quite obviously, the same motivations that 
inspire a sacrifice of sincerity are at work in the increase of such summary 
dismissals. If a single institutional voice makes the law appear inexorable, a 
summary memorandum goes one step further by implicitly bringing into 
question whether the dispute was all that controversial in the first place.
On the second factor, group decision, Llewellyn really stresses only 
one admittedly trite feature. Succinctly, “wider perspective,” and “fewer 
extremes,” are more likely to result in a group than the individual.11 It is 
Llewellyn’s additional observations that are remarkable- those instances 
when courts have been dominated by one individual whose exploitation of 
those institutional conventions has harmed the “reckonability-effects” of 





12 Ibid., 32. I will not go into the definition and import of the Llewellyn’s term, 
“reckonability,” here. For a concise discussion, see ibid., 17.
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consequences for straying far along the “expedient” end of the continuum.
General period-style is a large subject for Llewellyn; a large portion of
his energies are devoted to its exegesis and application. Analogous to
economy types or sociological spirals, period-style,
is the general and pervasive manner over the country at large, at any 
given time, of going about the job, the general outlook, the ways of 
professional knowhow, the kind of thing the men of law are sensitive to 
and strive for, the tone and flavor of the working and of the results. ^
Llewellyn speaks of two distinct period-styles: the Grand style and the
Formal style. John Marshall is cited as a practitioner of the Grand style,
whose “type-thinking,” was identified by a “constant re-examination and
reworking of a heritage,” where precedents were viewed as persuasive
though not inviolable.14 Llewellyn sought a return to the Grand style for the
bench. For our purposes, this very brief review of period-style, as well as
the steadying factors of group decision and an opinion of the court, is
valuable if only for its candor. The acknowledgement or disregard of such
institutional conventions carries substantial consequence. Professional or
political motivations are embedded in the fabric of factors such as those
Llewellyn describes. While these concerns may seem desirable for certain
important realms of the legal universe, they seem altogether unsatisfactory
when invoked virtually without challenge in matters of constitutional
importance in a court of last resort.
Whether or not these mechanisms are effective is a question that must 
be secondary to the critical inquiry of whether or not such mechanisms do 
indeed comport with the American conception of constitutionalism. Lawyers 
and judges may appreciate Llewellyn for helping to guide their present and 
future conflicts with some degree of predictability and routinization.
However important professional duties may be, they must be subordinate to 
the responsibility to preserve the foundations upon which the American
13 ibid., 36.
14 ibid.
polity rests. The style and manner of the Court’s communication needs to 
comport with American values that animate our particular version of 
constitutionalism before it responds to the needs and desires of lawyers and 
judges. Authority and prestige are important institutional interests no doubt, 
but these need to be weighed against equally important values of judicial 
accountability and law as principle.
Indeed, the success and influence of movements like legal realism and 
political behavioralism lies primarily in the fact that the scholars who filled 
its ranks provided a clear sense of direction for inquiries about law and 
political institutions. The trappings and theoretical justifications of law and 
politics, in the main, were to be eschewed; the tangible and visible products 
of these enterprises were the primary material for the realist/behavioralist. 
The realists, in fact, were reacting to the formalist justifications that 
dominated these disciplines, and their measured retrenchments were a 
welcome corrective. In 1964 Walter Murphy published The Elements of 
Tudicial Strategy, a book that has come to be regarded as a classic in the 
realist tradition. *5 Murphy sought to understand, given a realistic appraisal 
of the limitations imposed by American legal and political systems, how the 
behavior of a Supreme Court Justice could be legitimately maximized so as to 
further his policy objectives. Murphy’s project was a study of judicial 
power, “in the sense of the capability of an individual Justice of the Supreme 
Court of the United States to shape, through the peculiar kinds of authority 
and discretion inherent in his office, the development of a particular public 
policy or set of public policies. ”16 Examining the internal practices of the 
Court, Murphy’s Elements provides a sophisticated plan for any Justice to
"1 5 Walter F. Murphy, Elements of Tudicial Strategy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1964). Four years earlier, E.E. Schattschneider published his 
sophisticated realist view of party and interest group conflict in America. In fact, 
Murphy’s Elements is really an application of similar insights to the politics of the 
judiciary. See The Semi-Sovereign People: A Realist’s View of Democracy in America 
(New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), especially, 47-61, 62-77, 97-113.
1 6 Ibid., 2.
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better realize his own agenda. Murphy’s book was a capability analysis only; 
his analysis was careful not to profess that such capabilities were morally or 
philosophically right for a judge to exercise. 17 Unfortunately, a great many 
of the descendants of the realist tradition have elevated Murphy’s capability 
analysis into a normative standard. Law, on this pervasive neo-realist view, 
is no different than politics, so judges should behave strategically like any 
other political official.
Tensions between principle and expediency are further complicated 
by allotted room for evolution within the institutions constructed by the 
Constitution. A branch of the federal government one day may be called 
upon to meet demands that at an earlier time may have been considered 
beyond the scope of exercise for that institution. To rephrase the point, “The 
judicial Power of the United States,” today may not today envision the same 
bounds surrounding its exercise that it once did; it may not (nor is it required 
to) mean the same thing at two different points in time. Some of the best 
thinking on such temporal considerations for constitutionally mandated 
institutions can be found in a concise treatise by Jeffrey Tulis, The 
Rhetorical Presidency. Tulis’ work is also uncommonly helpful here since it 
takes on board the importance of communication, though differing both in 
degree and kind with the judiciary’s brand of communication, in the history 
of the institution being studied- in this case the executive. 18 Perhaps most 
fundamental to Tulis is the insistence that ideas are not epiphenomenal, that 
thought constitutes politics. Indeed, though his central claim is that shifts in 
uses and occasion of rhetoric by the chief executive represents a 
transformational break rather than developmental shift of the institution, 
Tulis makes it plain that, “To comprehend this sort of change- indeed, to 
identify it as a change- one must be prepared to treat the political order as an
17 ibid., 202.
18 Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1987).
arena where ideas matter.”^  That is precisely why dealing with subjects of
constitutional communication are so complicated. Tulis explains that,
The relation between fundamental doctrines of governance and 
presidential rhetoric is more complex than simple cause and effect 
because rhetoric is not only the result of various ideas, but also the 
medium for their expression. Rhetorical practice is not merely a 
variable, it is also an amplification or vulgarization of the ideas that 
produce it. 20
In sum what I am suggesting here is that Tulis’ observation need not be 
confined to presidential rhetoric; it holds equally for the style and manner 
of communication employed by the judiciary. Indeed, Tulis’ observation 
applies to any communicative practice conducted by a constitutionally 
mandated institution, and is a very good fit for an institution so closely 
linked to the law.21 Judge Richard Posner supports the variation I am 
suggesting when he explains that, “The reason why rhetoric or style is 
important in law is that many legal questions cannot be resolved by logical 
or empirical demonstration. . . .Maybe the art of judging is inescapably 
rhetorical, and a failure to appreciate this fact is a shortcoming of the school
19 Ibid., 16-17.
20  ibid., 13.
21 Tulis also employs a second vehicle in his book, reducing his explanation of 
an institution founded by a text but expected to govern for generations as being, 
“buffeted by two ‘constitutions.’” Ibid., 17. As this is a major component of Tulis’ work 
however, the theme is expressed throughout. Also see generally on this and other 
observations, Joseph M. Bessette and Jeffrey K. Tulis, eds., The Presidency in the 
Constitutional Order (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981). This 
expansion or duplication is a device employed by many who ponder constitutional 
matters. David P. Franklin, for example, argues for a constitution as both “concept and 
construct.” See Franklin, Extraordinary Measures: The Exercise of Prerogative Powers 
in the United States (Pittsburgh, PA.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991). Chief 
Justice Vinson’s dissent in the famous steel seizure case also reflects the application of 
something like a theory of duality. Vinson in this case read the Constitution as a 
document coated with litmus, where certain portions of the text may become highlighted
depending upon the elements in which it finds itself surrounded. Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer (C.J. Vinson, dissenting), 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
At some point, duality or not, students of the Constitution on this subject are all 
trying to legitimate latent institutional practices by demonstrating their adherence (or 
lack thereof) to those principles and forms that animate the American version of 
constitutionalism.
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of legal formalism. ”22
American Constitutional Power. Illustration and Definition
Viewing the Constitution as a plan of government that was 
overwhelmingly concerned with organizing and regulating power is a 
difficult proposition. How is one to identify such powers or to assess their 
meaning or import? This kind of inquiry is ultimately tied to the basic query 
of what kind of thing a constitution is. Most of the formalism that pervades 
much of American legal education is unhelpful. It is now assumed that the 
Constitution has an obvious and precise utility; early in our constitutional 
history, this was not the case. Moreover, what counts as constitutional 
“material” is still not a settled question. Zeroing in on a specific clause of the 
constitutional text, a pervasive tactic today, operates under the assumption 
that these sorts of questions be reconciled.
A 1798 case, Calder v. Bull.23 offers important lessons for students of 
the Constitution in these respects. The legislature of the state of Connecticut 
enacted a law granting a new hearing in a probate trial, setting aside a 
decree of a court which had refused to record a will. The new hearing 
resulted in an approval and recording of the will. The Calder family, who 
would have inherited the property had the will been disapproved, 
challenged the legislature’s action as a violation of Article I, Section 10 of 
the U.S. Constitution, which banned ex post facto laws. The state superior 
court and the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors rejected Calder’s
22 Richard Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood Relation (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), 286, 292. Posner’s sixth chapter, “Judicial 
Opinions as Literature,” as a whole elaborates this point. To only apply ‘scientific’ 
standards to judicial expression, for Posner, would result in consigning Justices 
Marshall and Holmes to the dustbin.
23 3 U.S. (Dallas) 386 (1798). Facts of this case and subsequent citations are 
taken from the selected portions of the opinions in Murphy, Fleming, and Harris, 
American Constitutional Interpretation. 82, 86-90. For a brief summary of the 
historical importance of Calder. see Kermit L. Hall, ed., The Oxford Companion to the 
Supreme Court of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 114-15.
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argument. Calder then obtained a writ of error from the U.S. Supreme Court.
The legacy of Calder has been controversial, but most agree that those 
participating in the case are divided by the rationales illustrated in the 
opinions of Justices James Iredell and Samuel Chase. For Iredell the text of 
the state and federal constitutions was paramount, for a textual manifestation 
of constitution allowed the people that comprise the United States, “to define 
with precision the objects of legislative power, and to restrain its exercise 
within marked and settled boundaries.”24 The nature of social contracts and 
republican principles notwithstanding, the corollary to Iredell’s rationale of 
textual paramounce was that if products of legislatures were passed, “within 
the general scope of their constitutional power, the court cannot pronounce 
it to be void, merely because it is, in their judgement, contrary to principles 
of natural justice. ”25 When Iredell looked at the Constitution, he saw a 
document.
For Chase, on the other hand, the text was epiphenomenal; where 
Iredell saw the Constitution as a document, Chase saw it as a polity. “There 
are certain vital principles,” Chase explained, “in our free republican 
governments which will determine and overrule an apparent and flagrant 
abuse of legislative power. ”2& Chase saw the Constitution as including a kind 
of codification of certain principles of natural justice. The next immediate 
move for Chase was to proclaim the clear paramounce of principles over the 
forms that enshrine them. To put it tersely, when you codify principles of 
natural law, what is it that binds you- the codification, or those principles? 
Chase voiced his preference towards the latter, declaring, “An act of the 
legislature (for I can not call it a law), contrary to the great first principles 
of the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative




authority.”27 If the Constitution (momentarily) was seen as a dollar bill, 
then Iredell preferred a gold standard while Chase was more comfortable 
with monetary instruments gaining their value by fiat.
Whatever one may think of these two views, it is clear that with 
respect to constitutional interpretation, they are nearly polar opposites. For 
those not familiar with the case, it may then be surprising to learn that on 
August 8 ,1798, the Supreme Court decided unanimously to affirm the decree 
of the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors. Justices William Paterson and 
William Cushing along with both Chase and Iredell (Chief Justice Oliver 
Ellsworth and Justice James Wilson did not participate) rejected Calder’s 
argument. The brand of formalism that pervades American legal institutions 
might approach Calder with this unanimity in mind, holding that all four 
agreed that the Constitution's Ex Post Facto Clause was limited to criminal 
statutes. The response must be made here that Calder v. Bull was not only 
about matters ex post facto, perhaps not even chiefly. Chase and Iredell both 
vote the same, but the visions and rationales that compelled their decision 
were radically dissimilar. Indeed, the argument could be put rather cogently 
that Chase’s reasoning does not even require the existence of an Ex Post Facto 
Clause. 28 It is one of the central claims of this paper that the sort of 
competition and juxtaposition of reason that took place between Chase and 
Iredell in Calder v. Bull was, distinctively, “The judicial Power of the United 
States.” In matters constitutional, both lawyers and laymen alike know that 
reasons bind the future even more firmly than the votes that are compelled
27 ibid.
2 8 i  am not here finding a superior position for Chase’s opinion, as some may 
fairly add that a rationale like Chase’s does not even have need for a constitutional text. 
Both Iredell and Chase have difficulty reconciling the tension that seems to exist a 
priori in the world of American constitutionalism- between competing values of 
“positivism” and “structuralism.” I borrow these terms from William F. Harris, II, 
“Bonding Word and Polity: The Logic of American Constitutionalism,” 76 American 
Political Science Review. 34-45 (1982). Also see idem, The Interpretable Constitution 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993).
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by them. At a more macroscopic level than most legal commentary appears 
to countenance, the tension between principle and expediency reveals itself 
plainly in the conversation between Chase and Iredell; their colloquy is the 
underemphasized, principled end of judicial power.
The seemingly inexorable way to view judicial power and law today is 
to pursue an expedient claim of institutional protection and supremacy for 
the judiciary. The Court speaking whenever possible in one voice surely 
addresses this expedient end, in one way lending a weight of legitimacy by 
displaying a minimum of dissent as to both result and the rationale which 
“compels” it. The cost of this, however, is to the principled half of the 
tension. This sort of sacrifice is not to be taken lightly, nor in my view does 
it serve the Court’s best interests. The conventional wisdom seems to operate 
according to a principle that a minimum of dissent conveys a reciprocal 
sense of consent for the institution. This sort of thinking is flatly misguided; 
it fails to comprehend the different qualities that generate legitimacy for 
specific governmental institutions. Owen Fiss highlighted this distinction, 
explaining that, “The legitimacy of particular institutions, such as courts, 
depends not on the consent- implied or otherwise- of the people, but rather 
on their competence, on the special contribution they make to the quality of 
our social life. ”29 If Fiss is right about this, then the competent judge should 
prepare himself for the task of adjudication. Undoubtedly, fashioning a 
vision of just what law is and acquiring knowledge of the qualities that 
characterize adjudication would be important parts of that judge’s 
preparation.30 These are subjects to which we shall now turn.
29 Owen M. Fiss, “The Supreme Court 1978 Term- Foreword: The Forms of 
Justice,” 93 Harvard Law Review 38 (1979). This comment has special relevance for the 
judiciary and style and manner of its communication. Fiss makes plain that, “the 
judge’s obligation to participate in a dialogue,” is one of two special traits that lend to 
the judicial branch the weight that gives it the authority to, “constantly strive for the 
true meaning of the constitutional value.” Ibid., 12-13.
30 Another component of that preparation might be for the judge to gain an 
understanding of the relationships and dynamics of power within the legal-political 
system in which he finds himself. The phenomenon of power is a topic that deserves,
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Visions of Law
Many of the disputes in jurisprudence that concern lawyers and 
academics in the United States and Great Britain stem from a dichotomous
and has received, far more treatment than I will give here. Power has proved itself so 
unwieldy as a topic of discussion precisely because in the language of science, 
discussions of power tend toward circularity. Roderick Bell explains that, to overcome 
the obstacle of circularity, “At least one of the factual words must be ‘primitive,’ in the 
sense that is undefined within the theory. Its meaning must be given ostensively; it 
must be part of our experiential vocabulary.” Furthermore, these primitive words must 
offer as “unequivocal” an experiential meaning as possible; otherwise, the 
“intersubjectivity of the theory is threatened.” See Bell, “Political Power: The Problem 
of Measurement, in Roderick Bell, David V. Edwards, and R. Harrison Wagner, Political 
Power: A Reader in Theory and Research (New York: The Free Press, 1969), 13-27.
Keeping this in mind, the following restatement here of the formulation of power 
put forth by Robert A. Dahl is helpful: “A has power over B to the extent that he can get 
B to do something that B would not otherwise do.” “The Concept of Power,” Behavioral 
Science 2 (July, 1957): 202-3. Dahl’s idea of power is a relation among people, and as it 
is really a view of political power it is more precisely a relation among certain political 
actors. Moreover, Dahl’s view informs the student of power of one of the pluralist 
school’s central guidelines: power means “participation in decision-making,” and 
studies of power should be focused on specific issue areas and actual behavior.
Dahl’s formulation seems to overcome the difficulty of circularity. Dahl’s 
formulation of political power, however, is unsatisfactory in an important way.
Basically, Dahl’s theory of power carries with it the assumption that the American 
polity is explained accurately by a theory of representative democracy, and this is its 
crucial flaw. This sort of criticism is levelled at Dahl most succinctly by Peter 
Bachrach and Morton Baratz, who posit an additional component of power that seems to 
fit the constitutional democracy of the United States quite well. Actual decision-making 
can not be viewed as a proper indicator of power because there are institutional 
constraints that limit the scope of such decision-making. Certain mechanisms exist that 
may be at work before such actual participation in decision-making takes place. 
Bachrach and Baratz suggest that a student consider, “the dynamics of non­
decisionmaking: that is he would examine the extent to which and the manner in which 
the status q u o  oriented persons and groups influence those community values and those 
political institutions. . . which tend to limit the scope of actual decision-making to ‘safe’ 
issues.” By asking first about the particular “mobilization of bias,” in the institution 
under scrutiny, as Bachrach and Baratz suggest, the student of power can distinguish 
between “key” and “routine” political decisions. See Peter Bachrach and Morton S. 
Baratz, “Two Faces of Power,” 56 American Political Science Review 952 (1962).
Finally, with these notes and recommendations in mind, I would posit a 
formulation of political power that is best suited for American constitutionalism. This 
is an idea of power based upon the relations among constitutionally mandated 
institutions of government:
“‘A’ has power over ‘B’ to the extent that ‘A’ can alter the limits of
thought and action that represent ‘B’s’ functions and purposes.”
Where “democracy” was Dahl’s “primitive term,” of choice, this view of 
power would choose “constitution” as the place where our empirical 
vocabulary provides the ultimate source of scientific meaning. It follows 
naturally that a theory of power that places the source of its empirical 
meaning in such a term suffices only for the regime under which those 
empirical perceptions exist. This theory above is therefore best described 
as a theory of American power, or American constitutional power. This 
conception of power lies behind the arguments of the pages that follow.
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view concerning the genre of la w .3 i  This split occurs both between and 
among various schools of legal theorists. The first view- forwarding an 
essentially external view of law- is concerned primarily with the certainty 
and stability of law. On this view law is a phenomenon that dispassionately 
and impartially acts upon some individual or group. Penal laws are often a 
favorite example of the externalist, though other types of law also serve. The 
law for the externalist is distinct from other forms of social coordination 
because it is generated by an institution which, during singular moments 
when the procedures of the law are properly in motion, is detached (even if 
only fictionally) from the persons who are subject to it and engages in 
unilateral communication. This detachment is critical to the externalist; it 
provides the theory with a solution to the possible conflation of law with 
other influences upon human behavior and in that way bounds law’s 
content. There is also an important correlative property of the law 
according to this view: just as action upon a subject is a necessary condition 
for confirmation of law, the absence of such action necessarily confirms 
law’s non-existence.
The opposing view- recognizing law as essentially an internal sense - 
is mainly concerned with the integrity and aspiration of law. Seen in this 
way law is not essentially an event but rather an enduring practice or 
enterprise for both the individual practitioner and the community. The 
inevitable penumbral emanations which accompany the historical and 
empirical substance of “externalist” law are the internalist’s primary 
material (with Common Law principles being a good example). The 
internalist seems to thrive from the fact that efforts of social coordination 
have never been able to completely and systematically write down- that is,
31 This encapsulation is much indebted to debates among scholars of legal 
theory at various points in time. See for example H.L.A. Hart, The Concent of Law. 
second edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 56-7, 88-91, 242-3; L.L. Fuller, The 
Morality of Law, revised edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), 3-9, 33-38, 
41-44, 95-118.
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prospectively plan and announce- the rules of the ensuing social 
coordination. Even further, the internalist would view such effort as 
detrimental to the very purposes of law. An inherent participatory and 
interactive quality of all legal communication is the hallmark of the 
internalist. Whereas the external view seems well suited to deal with 
problems of legal identification, the internal view seems more capable of 
answering questions of legal adaptability.^2
The heart of the matter, of course, is that in disputes about law both 
identification and adaptability are problems of a similarly high rank.
Human societies use law both to identify the relationship and regulation of 
their social coordination as well as adapt that same relationship and 
regulation to novel and fluid conditions. This is why specific concepts of law 
forwarded by purely external and internal proponents are ultimately 
equally unsatisfactory. “Law inherently has an open texture which leaves a 
discretion,” as a pivotal notion within an externalist’s theory is as 
conceptually indeterminate and unpalatable as the essential internalist 
position that, “law is created by elements of purposive i n t e r a c t i o n .  ”33 in 
fact, it is the reconciling of these two views that is the basic task of our legal 
institutions. Indeed, there is a great deal of promise for legal theory if the 
underpinning assumptions and animating principles of these institutions 
are uncovered and philosophically explained. For it seems clear that a legal 
system (and particularly the legal system of the United States) sets up 
different institutions to perform this reconciliation precisely because each 
institution performs different tasks and starts from a distinct authoritative
32 John Finnis provides a similar description to mine: “So it is that legal order 
has two broad characteristics, two characteristic modes of operation, two poles about 
which jurisprudence and ‘definitions of law’ tend to cluster. They are exemplified by 
the contrast between Weber’s formal definition of law and his extensive employment of 
the term ‘legal’; and they can be summed up in two slogans: ‘law is a coercive order’ and 
‘the law regulates its own creation’.” John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), 270.
33 I am, of course, paraphrasing two pivotal distinctions made by H.L.A. Hart 
and L.L. Fuller, respectively. See Hart, Concept of Law: Fuller, The Morality of Law.
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basis. As the opening salvos of this thesis well indicate, the legal function 
under analysis here is adjudication. Basically, the larger conceptual claim 
being argued is that judicial authority is not compatible with certain 
behavior and in fact requires adherence to a specific culture of conduct that 
flows from the foundation of that authority. This culture can be elicited 
from the nature and function of adjudication itself, and may vary according 
to the general view of law to which one adheres.
The Qualities of Adiudication
There are five main distinguishing characteristics of adjudicative 
behavior which present themselves when analyzing Anglo-American judges 
and the institutions in which they reside. The first of these is the 
particularity of adjudication. Judges, though they are indeed law-makers. 
must make law gradually, within the confines of a set of particular facts 
(“interstitially,” Oliver Wendell Holmes explained). Unlike the generality 
that may characterize other executive or legislative tasks of law, judicial 
officers deal with matters inherently contextual. Secondly, adjudication is a 
function that resolves actual, that is to say “live” disputes. As opposed to the 
abstract theorizing and assumption-making that may accompany any sort of 
legislative or executive decision, the “liveness” of adjudication is central.
This does not deny the existence of such theorizing by judges, only that they 
must immediately apply such visions to an actual set of disputants. These two 
characteristics then combine to produce a third: the mandatory hearing 
(and, as will be developed more fully, the corollary of an articulate response) 
a judge must provide in any case that comports with the criteria of 
adjudicative forms. It is often taken for granted that, excepting issues of a 
prejudicial nature, judges may not “skip” or otherwise rule themselves out of 
a case because of its difficulty or explosiveness. Indeed, this is a very sharp 
double edge that judges must traverse. On the one hand, a judge who recuses
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himself unnecessarily is viewed to have shirked his judicial responsibility; 
on the other, participating in cases where a conflict of interest or similar 
circumstances may be present is also cause for criticism because of the 
importance of impartiality in judicial behavior. Fourth, adjudication (and 
especially appellate adjudication) provides guidance for other (and 
especially lower) courts. The fact that a superior tribunal decided a similar 
case in a certain way for certain reasons provides a reason for other courts 
to do same. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it is the hallmark of 
adjudication that it is not enough to only produce a result when deciding a 
case; a judge must also provide a rationale. When a legislator casts his vote 
on a matter of public policy he may defend his behavior by simply saying, “I 
felt like it,” or, “it was incumbent upon me to do so,” or even make no 
defense at all. There is no penalty (except, perhaps, the future wrath of the 
constituency he serves) for simply producing a legislative result exclusive of 
any animating rationale. A judge qua judge must meet an additional
requirement.34
These five qualities of adjudication are essential; in their absence, a 
judge is no longer adjudicating but doing something else. Different authors 
emphasize different consequences of these qualities, and I no doubt will 
continue that tradition here. “The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,” by Lon 
Fuller for example, is an analysis of adjudication which originates from the 
proposition that, “the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication lies in 
the fact that it confers on the affected party a peculiar form of participation 
in the decision, that of presenting proofs and reasoned arguments for a 
decision in his favor. ”35 Rather than place primary focus on the manner of
34 This characteristic of adjudication is a controversial one for the legal 
academy, as it marks a divide between those who believe (like Fuller) that law is a 
reasoned process and those who claim law is merely fiat (like the Critical Legal Studies 
movement). See generally Herbert Wechsler, “Toward Neutral Principles of 
Constitutional Law,” 73 Harvard Law Review 1-35 (1959), 15-16.
35 Fuller, “Forms and Limits,” 364. [emphasis added]
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participation engaged by the affected parties, I would designate the office of 
the judge as the distinguishing characteristic of adjudication. Fuller 
anticipated students who would do this, and offers a reply to the judge- 
centered view. The problem with placing the central focus upon the office 
of the judge for Fuller is the slipperiness of the term “judge.” “[Tjhere are 
people who are called ‘judges’ holding official positions and expected to be 
impartial who nevertheless do not participate in an adjudication,” Fuller 
explains, and he gives examples of so-called “judges” at an agricultural fair 
or art exhibition as e x a m p le s .36 The key distinction between these “judges” 
and true adjudicators is that, “their decisions are not reached within an 
institutional framework that is intended to assure the disputants an 
opportunity for the presentation of proofs and reasoned arguments. ”37
There are two basic replies to Fuller’s objection I would enter at this 
juncture. Firstly, Fuller’s strict reliance on the conventional language of 
“judge” is troubling. It is true that instances of decisionmaking may be 
performed by someone called a “judge” who does not engage in 
“adjudication,” as either Fuller or I would use the term. This may be due to 
the fact that the contestants are not in need of an actual judge, but still might 
refer to the decision-maker as a “judge” because the behavior of that 
individual may closely approximate that of an actual judge. There are many 
types of behavior that characterize the role of a judge that are not essential 
or even necessary to the process of adjudication. Fuller simply casts his net 
too widely; this is unnecessary and actually confuses the i s s u e .3 8
A second response that I believe is more important directly attacks 
Fuller’s adherence to the key distinction of participating in an
36 Ibid., 365.
37 ibid.
38 i draw a formal distinction between adjudication represented by a delegated 
governmental power and adjudication derived from the consent of the litigants, like 
arbitration. I believe these are two generically different forms of adjudication, whereas 
Fuller for the purposes of his discussion does not.
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“institutionally defined and assured” decision. Where is one to find the 
institutional definition and assurance that a court provides? There is only 
one storehouse of institutional accretion, context and history (or “tosh” as 
Fuller calls it) that can provide even the genesis of an answer: the office of 
the judge.39 Fuller seems content to ground his definition of adjudication in 
instrumental terms. As he puts it, adjudication is a “device which gives 
formal and institutional expression to the influence of reasoned argument in 
human affairs. "40 It should be clear by now that this bedrock of formal and 
institutional expression in fact rests upon the acceptance of parameters of 
acceptable judicial behavior. Fuller himself reveals the accompanying 
context of his grounded definition when he later exclaims that, “The proper 
province of adjudication is to make an authoritative determination of 
questions raised by claims of right and accusations of guilt.” At bottom then, 
Fuller’s “proper province” for adjudication is partial, emphasizing its 
authoritative aspects while obscuring the discursive, educational elements.
In fact, Fuller’s entire analysis provides only a vague distinction 
between the office of the judge and that of the parties. The article as a whole 
seems to nearly equate the importance of the two, since both are necessary to 
provide the essential characteristic of institutional expression of reasoned 
argument. The parties offer a “reasoned argument;” the judge a “principled 
decision.” But, from these assumptions, where does the judge (for Fuller) 
acquire what is a qualitatively different sort of authority? Initial authority 
may be conferred upon a judge by an act of appointment or election, but how 
is his authority continually maintained? Indeed, an answer to these kinds of 
questions must (and Fuller in fact does) rely on expectations of proper 
judicial behavior. Fuller, for one, posits the valid argument that even in the
39 See generally Owen M. Fiss, “The Supreme Court 1978 Term- Foreword: The 
Forms o f Justice,” 93 Harvard Law Review 1-58 (1979). This point carries even greater 
weight within a government characterized by, to borrow Professor Neustadfs phrase, 
separated institutions sharing powers.
40 ibid., 366 [emphasis added].
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absence of clear, definite rules, adjudication can still be initiated and 
effective. Surely this must point towards a social consensus that exists apart 
from the formal, institutional expression of adjudicative ideals.
To place the primary emphasis of adjudication in the role of the judge 
means that the analysis must turn to an elucidation of judicial conduct. Most 
scholars (and Fuller, for one, is. no exception)41 point out that the ideal of 
impartiality very quickly surfaces as essential adjudicative behavior. Fuller 
asks some basic questions of adjudication, each of which reveals the 
centrality of impartiality. Those relevant inquiries, followed by his basic 
responses to them, may be paraphrased as follows:42
1. May the judge act to initiate a case on his own? No.
2. Must the decision be accompanied by a rationale? Not necessarily.
3. May the judge rest his decision on a rationale not argued by the parties? 
No.
Fuller’s argument for each of these questions points toward the 
central ideal of impartiality. The problem with this argument as a whole is 
that it is conventionally unsatisfactory and that it in the end demonstrates 
that “impartiality” proves to be too rigid a term to perform its central task. 
Take Fuller’s first question. “It is generally impossible to keep even the bare 
initiation of proceedings untainted by preconceptions about what happened 
and what its consequences should be,” Fuller explains, and therefore the 
judge should not initiate an adjudication.^ How can Fuller reconcile this 
animating rationale with the current practices of the United States Supreme 
Court, for example? The reality of an almost wholly discretionary agenda- 





the possibility of “impartiality.”44 What good is it to be “impartial” on the 
merits if the large majority of high-level appellate adjudication is activated 
by a discretion which must inevitably “taint” the proceedings on Fuller’s 
terms?
On the second question, Fuller does not fully subscribe to the idea that 
a judge qua judge must provide a rationale in addition to a result. This 
largely can be attributed to the fact that Fuller includes matters of 
arbitration derived from relationships of reciprocity as falling within 
matters of “adjudication,” a broader definition which, as discussed 
previously, does more harm than good. Though this may preserve the 
characteristic of “impartiality,” the role of the judge in its ideal sense still 
seems to suffer. Not providing a rationale allows for an unacceptable 
discretion for the parties when future actions are considered and gives the 
appearance of adjudication as operating on the basis of a judge’s preferences 
rather than her judgments.4^  It is most surprising that Fuller- who seems 
elsewhere to prize lawfulness as an ideal we continually strive towards46- 
would ever permit the judge to command a result without providing a 
motivational standard.
Finally, Fuller maintains that only the arguments of the parties should 
(ideally) realize the rationale of a judge. This ideal, however, is problematic 
as well, and Fuller realizes this when he provides the observation that, “An 
issue dealt with only in passing by one of the parties, or perhaps by both, 
may become the headstone of the arbiter’s decision.”47 Indeed, judges often
44 It should be inserted here that Fuller is aware of, and the whole of the 
previous chapter points out, a useful distinction between matters of law and equity. But 
this distinction is not consistently heeded by Fuller for the problems of “equity 
adjudication” seem to unravel any workable concept of “impartiality.”
45 There will be more to be said of the distinction between preferences and 
judgments later. See text infra.
46 See generally Fuller, “Positivism and Fidelity to Law- A Reply to Professor 
Hart,” 71 Harvard Law Review 630 (1958).
47 Ibid., 387.
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provide lawyers with a ratio decidendi neither expressly nor even remotely 
tied to their arguments. At times these holdings are characterized as random 
because of this- at others, brilliant. Either way these instances do 
demonstrate that judges are indeed “partial” as to emphasis, at the very least.
What I am trying to show (and what Fuller at times appears to 
concede) is that “impartiality” as our essential standard of conduct for 
appellate judges is a failure. We. do not ask our judges to attain this quite 
rigid ideal. For a constitutional democracy like the United States, that seems 
to pride its awareness of all the ingredients that must be considered in 
matters of government, this undue emphasis and lack of realism will not 
do.48 More recent trends in the field of jurisprudence seem to acknowledge 
this, as they point to emblems of “integrity,” or “fidelity” when 
characterizing the nature of law. If we are going to critique our judges, we 
should at the very least be clear as to what we demand of them. Our next task 
then is to formulate more precise demands. The actual process of appellate 
adjudication is a good place to begin.
Just as with Fuller’s discussion of adjudication in “Forms and Limits,” 
most views do not account for the fact that appellate adjudication is 
essentially a process of group decision-making. In 1982 professor (now 
Judge) Frank Easterbrook, by drawing upon Kenneth Arrow’s Impossibility 
Theorem, suggested that because of its inherent collective properties of 
decisionmaking, the Supreme Court should not be expected to behave 
consistently.49 Before embarking upon a discussion of group adjudication
48 Fuller is aware of this too. He comments in another section that “partiality” 
is all too common in adjudication: “I refer to the situation where the arbiter’s 
experience of life has not embraced the area of the dispute, or, worse still, where he has 
always viewed that area from some single vantage point.” Fuller goes on to criticize the 
court decisions in commercial cases for such a “lack of judicial ‘feel’ for the problems 
involved.” Ibid., 391.
49 Frank H. Easterbrook, “Ways of Criticizing the Court,” 95 Harvard Law 
Review 802 (1982). I am indebted to Sanford Levinson of the University of Texas at 
Austin for pointing out Easterbrook’s article to me. For the original explanation of the 
Impossibility Theorem, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1951).
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according to Arrow via Easterbrook, I should disclose at the start that my 
entire argument about judicial behavior rejects at a very basic level the 
approach taken by public choice theorists. This rejection will become very 
plain shortly, but for the moment I suspend my rejection in order to explain 
that, on their own terms, public choice theorists place an extremely high 
value upon individual decisionmaking, given certain realistic institutional 
conditions that are evident in appellate judicial decisionmaking.
Easterbrook’s discussion was the first to discuss in detail the ramifications of 
collective decisionmaking for appellate adjudication if appellate adjudication 
is conceptualized as an exercise in preference aggregation. Because of 
Easterbrook’s cogency, below I lay out verbatim his brief explanation of 
Arrow’s Theorem:
Arrow’s Theorem, for which he won the Nobel Prize, considers a 
system of pooling individuals’ conclusions to produce a collective 
decision that obeys the following five conditions:
1. Unanimity: If all people entitled to a say in the decision prefer one 
option to another, that option prevails.
2. Nondictatorship: No one person’s views can control the outcome in 
every case.
3. Range: The system must allow every ranking of admissible choices, 
and there must be at least three admissible choices with no other 
institution to declare choices or rankings out of bounds at the start.
4. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: The choice between 
options A and B depends solely on the comparison of those two.
5. Transitivity: If the collective decision selects A over B and B over C, 
it also must select A over C. This is the requirement of logical 
consistency.
The theorem proves that no voting system can satisfy the five 
conditions simultaneously.50
Easterbrook’s application of the theorem to judicial behavior leads 
him to the conclusion that the condition of Transitivity must “drop out” 
because the other four conditions are each highly desirable for the Court to 
satisfy. Indeed, for Easterbrook, the first two conditions “appear to be 
essential parts of any method of judicial decisionmaking.”51 They may
50 ibid., 823.
51 Ibid., 824. Easterbrook does remark that the Supreme Court, as per Article 
III of the Constitution, could only have one Justice. If this were the case, the 
Nondictatorship condition would not hold and the other four conditions could be 
satisfied. In the same vein, Easterbrook also later adds that a critic could expect
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appear to be, but does the second condition of Nondictatorship in fact hold 
for the Supreme Court when considering appellate adjudication in its 
fullness as producing both outcome and rationale? The presence of 
conventions such as opinion assignment must negate this condition, at least 
on the “rationale aspects” of judicial power. A Chief Justice (and John 
Marshall’s career, for one, is proof of this) could control or at least 
significantly manipulate the rationale outcome in every case by 
strategically placing himself in the majority so as to manipulate such 
conventions. Easterbrook commits himself to a rather “result-oriented” view 
of the subject in his declaration.
The third condition is explained as holding (persuasively) because 
most legal disputes do conform to a multi-peaked ordering of at least three 
broad choices. Also, the appointment process of Justices as well as our 
normative view of the Supreme Court as a “parameter-setting” institution 
implies that the institution itself should not rule certain (or most) choices 
out of bounds from the s ta r t .5 2  The fourth condition is as basic a 
requirement for Easterbrook as the first two: “In any judicial system, 
irrelevant alternatives should be d is r e g a r d e d .  ”53 Easterbrook treats this 
condition rather summarily and again without a great deal of realism. A case 
can surely be made that there are many instances where the Court is 
accounting for irrelevant alternatives in Arrow’s sense. Specifically, 
“institutional considerations” such as prestige and appearance are most 
definitely irrelevant alternatives in light of the essential characteristics of 
adjudication. The fourth condition in many instances of Supreme Court 
history has not held. Easterbrook is right that it should; that is exactly the
consistency from an individual Justice for the same reason. For Easterbrook then, by 
adding Justices to the Supreme Court there is a commitment to collective choice. See 
Ibid., 824 at note 51, 832.
52 For Easterbrook’s specific discussion of why the Range condition does and
should hold, see ibid., 825-30.
53 Ibid., 825.
1 1 R
point! 54 The question in light of this realization is to ask how a process can 
be “institutionalized” without the ensuing institution itself becoming a 
“relevant alternative” or consideration?55
We leave this last question for later, for in any event, Easterbrook’s 
analysis is quite persuasive on the applicability of Arrow’s conditions to the 
Supreme Court if his assumptions are allowed to stand momentarily. This 
leaves the student in the disappointing position that the Court should not be 
expected to meet the Transitivity condition; “cycling,” “path dependence,” 
and “strategic voting” are unfortunate but probable consequences of 
collectivizing adjudication.56 Does this mean that the Court can not behave 
consistently? Easterbrook’s answer to this, again with help from Arrow, is 
plain: “Transitivity is the condition of logical ordering plus path 
dependence: if value A dominates B and B dominates C, then A must dominate 
C. Without transitivity, consistency is i m p o s s ib l e .  ”57 Now this is a serious 
charge, and- as Easterbrook himself recognizes- if true would disarm not 
only many of the Court’s critics but also prominent legal theorists who 
seemingly depend upon the transitivity condition for their explanations of 
adjudication and la w .5 8  Fortunately for them, Easterbrook’s connection 
between transitivity and consistency, and thus between collectivity and
54 Easterbrook specifically notes that forms of “strategic voting” such as 
logrolling could negate the fourth condition. Ibid. There is no reason to exclude 
considerations of coalition-building generally from such a list.
55 it is my contention that a proper philosophical understanding of common law 
adjudication achieves this end if it is permitted to do so. As will be discussed later, the 
genius of American political theory was to incorporate this understanding into a polity 
characterized by many-voicedness.
56 Cycling: “Majority voting systems may be unstable when there are more than 
two possible outcomes and different voters do not rank the outcomes in the same order.” 
Path dependence: “the sequence in which issues are decided frequently controls the 
outcome of the process.” Strategic voting: “any voting system can be manipulated by 
people who do not honestly state their positions.” See “Criticizing the Court,” 815-23.
57 ibid., 830.
58 Easterbrook in a footnote names Ronald Dworkin and Lon Fuller as two such 
theorists whose work would be undermined if the “no consistency without transitivity” 
proposition were to hold.
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consistency, was shown to be erroneous. Cursorily citing additional public 
choice literature Easterbrook contends that, “no voting system can be 
designed that is proof against strategic voting and the problems it c a u s e s . ”59 
The inevitable result is that- as many a social scientist has learned- there is 
no ideal voting procedure. Easterbrook, it would appear, leaves a critic of the 
Court in an awkward position; the force of any charge of institutional 
inconsistency is diminished because inconsistency is inevitable in any such 
institution.
Fortunately, there is a rebuttal to Easterbrook’s rather grand 
manoeuvre. In 1986, Lewis Komhauser and Lawrence Sager sought to 
address the ramifications of collective choice on consistency and authored 
an article on group a d j u d ic a t io n .60 i n  “Unpacking the Court,” Komhauser 
and Sager distinguish three types of group decisionmaking, termed 
“preference aggregation,” “judgment aggregation,” and “representation.” 
For our purposes, the notable claims of Komhauser and Sager are as follows:
(1) appellate adjudication is an enterprise in “judgment aggregation,” and
(2) a court of multiple judges can behave consistently- if not coherently. 
Both claims directly respond to Easterbrook, as the authors intend. To 
understand the force of either of these claims however, a brief review of 
Komhauser and Sager’s arguments is necessary.
Preferences are defined concisely by Komhauser and Sager as 
“limited and sovereign claims,” which means that they are value-laden and 
final when pronounced. Judgments, on the other hand, forward “a 
proposition to which all other right-thinking persons who confront the 
issue must adhere.” Judgments, unlike preferences, are neither limited nor 
sovereign. The two individual preferences, “I [person A] prefer skiing; I
59 “Criticizing the Court,” 822.
60 “Unpacking the Court,” 96 Yale Law journal 82 (1986). I am indebted to 
professor Ronald Dworkin of Oxford University for pointing out Komhauser and Sager’s 
work on multi-judge appellate adjudication to me.
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[person B] prefer football,” are thus different from those same two 
individuals’ judgments, “[A:] skiing is the healthier activity; [B:] football is 
the healthier activity.” The latter claims are incompatible and give the 
speakers reasons to reconsider their judgment, whereas the former claims 
can rest finally and unproblematically in opposition to one another. “At the 
core of the distinction between expressing a preference and rendering a 
judgment,” Komhauser and Sager explain, “lies the proposition that some 
questions have ‘right’ or ‘correct’ answers.”61 This firm separation of 
preferences and judgments is of course at odds with philosophical schools 
which claim more or less of a fusion of the two. The separation is vital for a 
theory of adjudication and is well defended by Komhauser and Sager.62
Representation, to complete the triad even though it is not especially 
relevant for us here, as a type of group decisionmaking overlaps the 
previous two types, and is characterized by an active group making decisions 
for a (usually larger) reference group. Representative decisions can be 
either preferences or judgments.
These three types of group decisionmaking have, as Komhauser and 
Sager explain, different principal measures of performance because of their
61 Ibid, 85. This “correctness” as Komhauser and Sager point out, “need not be 
objectively true or depend upon some ultimate view of the real world; it may depend only 
upon intersubjective agreement over criteria for resolving disputes.” Ibid., 85-6.
62 Komhauser and Sager anticipate and effectively respond to two objections 
specifically: (1) “that preferences are simply a common subspecies of judgment, 
distinguished only by their personal subject matter,” and the nearly opposite rebuttal, 
(2) “that normative ‘judgments’ are, at their roots, matters of preference.” They cite, 
respectively, R. Guess, The Idea of a Critical Theory 45-54 (1981), and J.L. Mackie, 
Ethics 15-49 (1977) as proponents of these objections. A great deal of ink has been 
spilled by sceptics and relativists advancing these arguments, and I will not add to that 
debate here. Even if the reader is uncomfortable with the somewhat rigid separation of 
preferences and judgments, at the very least the arguments of this thesis require 
adherence to a “middle road” view which Komhauser and Sager describe as follows:
“If some or all normative discourse is understood to rest upon a 
foundation of presupposed, arbitrary values, it remains the case that 
such root normative preferences can support large structures of 
contingent truths of the form ‘Given my presupposition A, it follows 
that B.’ Such contingent truths, of course, are matters of judgment, 
despite their preference-based predicates, because they claim the 
assent of all right-thinking persons, persons who share criteria for 
evaluating the truth of such contingent claims.” Ibid., 87.
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distinct purposes. For preference aggregation, the principal measure of 
performance is “authenticity,” defined by Komhauser and Sager as, “the 
ability of a particular process to reflect correctly the preferences of the 
members of the decisionmaking group.” “Accuracy,” or more precisely, “the 
tendency of a group decisionmaking process to reach ‘correct’ results,” is 
the principal measure of performance for judgment aggregation. Lastly, the 
principal measure of performance in a representative decisionmaking 
process is termed “fit” by Komhauser and Sager: “By fit we mean the 
tendency of the active decisionmaking group to arrive at results that would 
have been reached by the process’ reference group. ”63 Viewing these 
purposes and measures then, Komhauser and Sager view adjudication as an 
enterprise of judgment aggregation and “understand most plausible schools 
of jurisprudence to embrace this v i e w . ”64 This recognition is crucial and I 
entirely agree. In fact, the aim of this paper is to demonstrate the 
widespread adherence to judgment aggregation and explain what- on their 
own terms- the implications of this embrace must mean for various schools 
of jurisprudence. In the most straightforward terms, a view of appellate 
adjudication as judgment aggregation opposes strategic behavior bv i u d g e s .65 
Furthermore, when included within a system of government characterized 
by the forms and principles of American constitutionalism, this view of 
adjudication prohibits such conduct by judges.
Komhauser and Sager then ask, given this view, how does increasing
63 ibid., 91. It is important to note that these measures are not the only ones. 
Komhauser and Sager also discuss the qualities of “reliability” and “appearance.” For 
our purposes here however, the principal measures are sufficient.
64 ibid., 89, 96. [“We understand that prominent, competitive views of the 
judicial decisionmaking process- legalism, positivism and legal realism- unite in 
demanding or at least encouraging the judgment aggregation view of adjudication.” Ibid., 
116.]
65 Komhauser and Sager agree with this, though they admit their article does 
not treat the subject directly: “We think that, while strategic voting and vote trading 
may well occur, they are at odds with a judgment aggregation view of adjudication.”
Ibid., 114 at note 41.
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the number of judges in the enterprise improve the product? Accessing the 
lessons of Condorcet among others, a strong case is made for the positive 
relation between the number of judges and improved accuracy- the stated 
principal measure of judgment aggregation.66 To this point I am in complete 
agreement with Komhauser and Sager, but it should be remarked that their 
discussion and demonstration to this point is still rather “outcome-oriented.” 
For it is the addition of the rationale which allows for a public maintenance 
of that essential feature of adjudication, “a particular, substantive 
relationship between the decisions of individual cases. ”67 Komhauser and 
Sager provide a careful description of this relationship, and in so doing 
respond to Easterbrook’s work in this area. For the relationship aspires to 
achieve two ideals, “consistency,” as well as “coherence.” “Consistency is 
simply the state of non-contradiction,” the authors explain, whereas, 
“coherence is a quality of conceptual unity. ”68 Let us consider each of these 
traits in turn.
There are two ways for a court to be inconsistent, Komhauser and 
Sager explain. Concurrent inconsistency is when two contradictory rules 
exist simultaneously; consecutive inconsistency occurs when a later rule 
which is contradictory to an already existing rule is introduced.69 
Komhauser and Sager explain that consistency is a value that is both
66 See ibid., 97-100. Komhauser and Sager utilize Condorcefs theorem given a 
set of reasonable circumstances for adjudicated controversies. These are, briefly, that 
(1) only two possible outcomes exist, (2) each judge’s mean competence exceeds fifty 
percent, (3) all judges are equally likely to choose the correct outcome, (4) the voting 
procedure in effect is simple majority rule and (5) the aggregation procedure is non- 
deliberational. “Adjudication” under these circumstances then resembles a marble bag 
draw with marbles of two colors mixed in proportion to the mean competence value. 
Adding judges then “adds draws,” which increases the likelihood that more than half of 
the “correct” marbles will be drawn.
67 ibid., 102.
68 ibid., 103, 105.
69 Ibid., 105. Komhauser and Sager also point out here that concurrent 
inconsistency, “presumably can only be the product of error,” while consecutive 
inconsistency, “can well be intentional,” and can be done to aid in achieving greater 
coherence.
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desirable and not that difficult to achieve for multi-judge courts. This is in 
opposition to Easterbrook’s claim that multi-judge courts could not behave 
consistently due to the application of Arrow’s Theorem. Now this refutation 
of Easterbrook by Kornhauser and Sager is important because the authors 
rely upon a premise that is central to our inquiries. Komhauser and Sager 
demonstrate that, “Assuming that each judge on a multi-member court 
decides cases consistently, then the court as a whole will decide cases 
consistently.”70 The example they provide is a three-judge court with each 
judge being “firmly committed to a different rule,” of interpretation of the 
First Amendment. The court is faced with three separate First Amendment 
challenges to state laws banning speech in different ways. I have 
reproduced Komhauser and Sager’s hypothetical situation below:71 
3 JUDGES:
Judge A: commercial speech is unprotected by the First Amendment; 
regulations of other speech are constitutional only if they are content- 
neutral and supported by legitimate governmental concerns.
Judge B: all speech is absolutely protected.
Judge C: non-commercial speech of natural persons is absolutely protected; 
commercial speech is subject to reasonable regulation; speech of juridical 
entities is unprotected.
3 LAWS:
Law 1: bans “false or misleading” advertisements.
Law 2: bans leaflets in any public place (because of Utter).
Law 3: bans corporate participation in legislative referendum campaigns.
VOTING PATTERN:
LAW: False Advertising Public Places Referenda 
JUDGE
A OK OK BAD
B BAD BAD BAD
C OK BAD OK
PANEL OK BAD BAD
The court’s rule, Kornhauser and Sager’s example shows, is perfectly
consistent. It wiU approve of laws banning false advertising, hold
unconstitutional those banning leafleting in public places and corporate




any similar laws should come before this court, the court will decide the same 
consistent way. All that is needed is for each judge to apply her own rule 
consistently for the court to do so.72 What is important to notice for our 
purposes is that Komhauser and Sager's example assumes that the ratio of 
each judge is one of definitive singular meaning. There is no compromise on 
this, no “purchasing” of rationales, no purposefully vague language or 
other strategic behavior. Interestingly, the authors themselves reveal that, 
“though this court lacks a majority rationale, it has a consistent rule. ”73 
Both Komhauser and Sager and Easterbrook in their discussions of 
consistency are plain about ignoring strategic behavior by judges. Indeed, 
this prior assumption is important for the whole of their analyses that 
follow.
Coherence, the requirement that the premises of a system “form or 
reflect a unitary vision of that portion of the world modeled by the system,” 
is more difficult for multi-judge courts to achieve across time, like  
consistency it is a desirable goal for adjudication towards which to aspire. A 
coherent legal system, Komhauser and Sager explain, “serves the same goals 
as treating persons subject to the adjudicatory process fairly and enabling 
such persons to anticipate legal outcomes,” and thus allows for a more 
sophisticated settling of expectations.74 Unlike consistency, Komhauser and 
Sager explain that court coherency will not result just because each of the 
individual judges (like in their hypothetical example) act coherently.
Not only is coherence difficult to achieve, but once incoherence is 
present in a system of adjudication, coherence and consistency are
72 ibid., 109 [“If each of our three judges applies her rule consistently, the 




potentially in conflict.75 Because of this unavoidable fact, Komhauser and 
Sager conclude that, “adjudication that seeks to be faithful to the 
requirements of consistency and coherence will display the quality of path- 
dependence; that is, adjudicated outcomes may vary depending on when they 
are decided.”76 Path-dependence is “endemic” to systems of adjudicated 
outcomes according to Komhauser and Sager because of this “trade-off” 
between coherence and consistency. Deciding on the type of voting 
procedure itself will cause a different result in many cases. The dominant 
“outcome-voting” procedure, where a court sums the votes of its members as 
to the outcome of the case overall, will in many instances provide a different 
result than “issue-voting, ” which is done by summing the votes of the 
members on each recognized issue within a case and then combining those 
results. Legal scholars will confront a “doctrinal paradox” where depending 
on how the relationship between outcome and rationale is viewed (and what 
voting procedure is chosen to reflect this) will determine the result of the 
vote. The “doctrinal paradox” is the result of an imprecision as to 
adjudication’s fifth defining characteristic; deciding a case “on the merits” 
does not sufficiently refine the relationship between outcome and rationale.
It is at this point- deciding what to do about the doctrinal paradox- that 
Komhauser and Sager begin to look as dismal as Easterbrook. The fact of the 
matter is that there is a simple way out of the endemic path dependence of 
voting systems that both Easterbrook (because of Arrow) and Komhauser 
and Sager (because of the tension between consistency and coherence) 
decry. The solution is not to “vote” or act strategically with the rationales 
that animate the results of adjudication. If the rationales to be promulgated
75 Kornhauser and Sager cite Judge Skelly Wright’s opinion in Tavins v. First 
National Realty Corp.. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert, denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970), as an 
example of aspiring towards coherence at the cost of consecutive consistency. Ibid., 
105-6 [“In Tavins. Skelly Wright could be consistent by following well-established 
precedent in landlord-tenant law, or coherent by bringing landlord-tenant law into line 
with promissory relationships generally. He could not be both.”].
76 ibid., 107.
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are individualized, then the problematic effects of the tension between 
consistency and coherence are mitigated in two important ways. Firstly, 
both inconsistent and incoherent positions are easily identifiable and 
accountable. Secondly, there is a temporary dilution of the impact of the 
ratio which lower courts can decide later, though a result for the live 
disputants is still rendered immediately. Or to put this second point another 
way, for the moment the legal impact of the total adjudicated product is fully 
consistent and coherent though no longer institutionalized. Easterbrook 
himself writes that path-dependence can be avoided through plurality 
decisions, but that cycling is still unavoidable.77 But Komhauser and Sager 
dispel that claim of Easterbrook by properly viewing adjudication as an 
enterprise in judgment-aggregation (rather than Easterbrook’s 
“preference-aggregation” view) which is fundamentally at odds with 
strategic behavior.
Later efforts have tried to reconcile the “doctrinal paradox” of 
coherence and consistency by arguing for adherence to “outcome-voting,” 
(also referred to as “case-by-case voting”) “issue-voting,” or even the 
introduction of a “metavote” to decide between the two voting types.78 The 
Supreme Court’s own recent behavior has brought the paradox more to the 
forefront, by more explicitly opting for one or the other approach in cases 
such as Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.. where it engaged in issue-voting.7^
77 “Criticizing the Court,” 820.
78 See John M. Rogers, “‘I Vote This Way Because Pm Wrong’: The Supreme Court 
Justice as Epimenides,” 79 Kentucky Law Toumal 439-75 (1990-91) [arguing for
“outcome-voting”]; David Post and Steven C. Salop, “Rowing Against the Tidewater: A 
Theory of Voting by Multijudge Panels,” 80 Georgetown Law Toumal 743-74 (1992)
[arguing for “issue-voting”]; Lewis A. Kornhauser and Lawrence G. Sager, “The One and
the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts,” 81 California Law Review 1-59 (1993)
[arguing for a “metavote,” where a member of the court would vote for a particular 
method after discussing various factors of the case- like whether the outcome or 
rationales are more important].
79 491 U.S. 1 (1989). There are many examples of such behavior. See, for 
example, National Mutual Insurance Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.. 337 U.S. 582 (1949) 
foutcome-votingl: NLRB v. Wvman-Gordon. 394 U.S. 759 (1969) [issue-voting]; United 
States v. Vuitch. 402 U.S. 62 (1971) [issue-voting]; North Dakota v. United States. 495
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The Court itself has not straightforwardly recognized the existence of the 
paradox though, and this only provides fuel to the arguments of legal realists 
and indeterminists.80 But this, generally spealdng, is a debate where the 
assumptions which support the dominant arguments are not fully 
appreciated. The problem stems from a rather biased assumption about our 
fourth characteristic of adjudication- providing guidance. American jurists 
and legal academics take (and for quite some time, have taken) a very  
hierarchical, almost authoritarian view of this adjudicative quality. There is 
nothing about appellate adjudication that requires coherence to be achieved 
immediately upon the case’s disposal. John Rogers, in his defense of an 
outcome-voting approach, begins to reveal this when he notes that, “it is not 
difficult for lower courts to apply ‘incoherent’ law.”8i a  less hierarchical 
view may lead to further questions of how to decipher the ratio of a court 
characterized by plurality opinions, and no doubt it does leave greater 
“discretion” for lower tribunals than they would otherwise have. But this is 
not a dispositive reason for taking such a hierarchical view of the 
dissemination of legal rationales, or even a very persuasive one.
There is another assumption at work here as well, one that rests upon 
a more solid foundation. But it should be stated rather more 
straightforwardly than it usually is in the literature. Adjudication in the 
Unites States (as evidenced by the dominance of case-by-case or outcome- 
voting) respects the primacy of judicial result or verdict over rationale.82 To
U.S. 423 (1990) [outcome-voting].
80 See Komhauser and Sager, “The one and the Many,” 57 [“The Supreme Court, 
in particular, has been unmindful of the paradox, even when confronted with cases 
whose dispositions turn on the choice of alternative voting protocols.. . .  When 
individual Justices have departed from case-by-case voting, their decisions to do so 
have been left unexplained and have gone largely unremarked upon by their 
colleagues.”].
81 Rogers, “Supreme Court Voting,” 470.
82 Post and Salop, “Voting by Multijudge Panels,” 758-9 [“According to this 
[outcome-voting] view, courts fundamentally are in the business of deciding individual 
cases for the individual litigants before them, and only as a secondary matter are they
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say this is to put more flesh on the bones of the second (“liveness”) and fifth 
(“rationale-providing”) qualities of adjudication discussed earlier. This 
assumption then combines with the hierarchical view of the fourth 
assumption to produce a kind of fusion between adjudicative result and 
rationale which provides for a more strategic culture of conduct for the 
individual Justice. This primacy of result over rationale seems to give an 
edge to outcome-voting processes, but these processes result in a path- 
dependence that is undesirable.
A “metavote” that would decide which type of voting procedure the 
Court would engage in would be clearly unsatisfactory.83 Allowing a Justice 
to weigh the different results of the two possibilities only invites further 
strategic behavior that undermines a judge’s authority. Moreover, the 
introduction of this type of institutional practice would invite the parties to 
the dispute to argue the merits or demerits of an otherwise irrelevant 
consideration and provide an immediate excuse for defeat. Imagine if some 
of our landmark cases were subjected to a metavote. The instability and lack 
of confidence that would result from the decisions of the final constitutional 
interpreter would be alarming. All of the benefits of the metavote could be
concerned with creating legal precedent or resolving abstract issues of law. A 
preference for outcome-voting captures this functional hierarchy by refusing to 
‘sacrifice’ the rights of the individuals in the case to the ‘abstraction’ of the issues 
raised.”].
Post and Salop’s article is a defense of issue-voting, and respond to this premise 
of “result primacy” in a number of ways. See ibid., 758-62. Ultimately, issue-voting 
positions must rely on arguments of long-term coherence and the view that appellate 
adjudication’s basic function is to clarify the legal doctrine of a system. David Leonard 
even goes so far as to argue that, in certain cases, to give primacy to majority reasoning 
over majority result would violate the requirement of due process. David P. Leonard, 
“The Correctness Function of Appellate Decision-Making: Judicial Obligation in an Era 
of Fragmentation,” 17 Lovola Law Review 299, 326-36 (1984).
Finally, there is another argument that a deviation of outcome-voting by an 
individual Justice in deference to a differing majority is proper when the Court’s 
jurisdiction is the issue. See U.S. v. Vuitch. 402 U.S. 62 (1971) [Harlan and Blackmun, 
Js., concurring]. But this sort of position has difficulty discriminating between 
“jurisdictional” and “non-jurisdictional” issues. See Rogers, “Supreme Court Voting,” 
473 at note 122; Crowell v. Benson 285 U.S. 22, 92-93 (1932) [Brandeis, J., dissenting].
83 Komhauser and Sager, “The One and the Many,” 1-59, argue for a “metavote” 
to resolve problems of the doctrinal paradox.
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accrued by simply stipulating (and manufacturing the Court’s institutional 
rules to reflect) proper- that is sincere- judicial behavior in its plainest 
sense. For some reason, most lawyers who discuss judicial behavior allow 
“institutional considerations” to count as sincere conduct. Easterbrook and 
Komhauser and Sager both allow for a definition of sincere behavior to 
include institutional considerations such as deference to join a majority 
opinion.84 “A judge is entitled, indeed obliged, to deflect her conduct in 
deference to her colleagues,” Komhauser and Sager contend. They are right 
to describe strategic behavior as, “a transgression of the underlying aim of 
the voting enterprise,” but maintain such a “conclaved,” broadly collegial 
view of the enterprise that their definition is in effect a net with gaping
holes. 85
The primacy of place accorded to the result is certainly defensible; 
any system of adjudication is ultimately judged by what that system actually 
does to people rather than the theoretical abstractions that serve to maintain 
it. If this primacy of result is desirable though, then the only way to avoid 
the evils of outcome-voting such as path dependence is to strictly monitor 
the behavior of judges. Sincere behavior of judges is the only way to 
achieve both consistent and- over time- coherent adjudication. More 
fundamentally than that, sincere judicial behavior is a necessary 
prerequisite in order for essential adjudicative ideals as well as the political 
ideal of accountability to have any purposeful and significant meaning.
Furthermore, sincerity as a fundamental value of judicial behavior 
has been emphasized by many of the great legal thinkers of the Anglo- 
American tradition. Each of the major schools of Anglo-American
84 See Easterbrook, “Criticizing the Court,” 821; Komhauser and Sager, “The 
One and the Many,” 52-3.
85 “The One and the Many,” 53. Any judge who sits on a panel for Komhauser 
and Sager are a priori collegial officials. This broad-based assumption is ultimately 
rooted in controversial if not erroneous history. See ibid., 12-13, at notes 23-24. Cf. 
chapters one and two, supra.
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jurisprudence rely upon or presuppose the value of judicial sincerity. In 
chapters four through six, this common concern will be demonstrated.
Before this is done though, there is one last colloquy among legal theorists 
that sheds more light upon the subject of judicial sincerity and is worth 
including in these remarks. Easterbrook was careful in his presentation not 
to foreclose arguments based upon “first principles” even though he sought 
to challenge “the performance of the Court as an institution.” This bright 
line between these two general ways of criticizing the Court is actually not as 
luminous as Easterbrook would have us believe. To criticize institutionally is 
to criticize from first principles.
Principled Process and Institutional Virtues
In 1959, a very important article on constitutional law was based upon 
the following premise: “the main constituent of the judicial process is 
precisely that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every 
step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite 
transcending the immediate result that is achieved. ”86 This formulation was 
Herbert Wechsler’s, and his demand for a “principled” judicial process has 
had a great impact upon American constitutional law. By principled process 
Wechsler had in mind the idea that the judicial process should represent and 
personify the essential qualities of law and adjudication. “A principled 
decision,” Wechsler explained, “is one that rests on reasons with respect to 
all issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality 
transcend any immediate result that is i n v o l v e d .  ”87 For Wechsler then, 
generality and neutrality were essential legal qualities that the judicial 
process must strive to embrace when performing its (inevitably) value­
laden function.
86 Herbert Wechsler, “Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law,” 73 
Harvard Law Review 1-35 (1959), 15.
87 ibid., 19.
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Wechsler’s argument for the application of “neutral principles” in 
constitutional law was the product of a colloquy between himself and Judge 
Learned Hand. Hand doubted that the power of judicial review was 
purposefully included or intended to be a part of the constitutional scheme of 
distributed powers. Judicial review, on his reading of the Constitution, was 
not a “logical deduction” that could be plainly discerned from the text.
Rather, he saw judicial review as a “practical condition,” a plausible 
mechanism to help ensure that the operation of the scheme as a whole would 
s u c c e e d . 88 As Wechsler points out, Hand’s particular understanding of 
judicial review led directly to his view of how judicial power should be 
exercised. Hand declares plainly that the judicial power of the United States, 
“need not be exercised whenever a court sees, or thinks that it sees, an 
invasion of the Constitution. It is always a preliminary question how 
importunately the occasion demands an a n s w e r .  ”89 it is at this point where 
Wechsler deviates from Hand, believing that Hand’s “preliminary question” 
is not properly “judicial” at all because of its lack of principle. Hand’s 
discretionary preliminary step would introduce “policy” into a forum where 
principle should reign. Wechsler’s understanding of judicial review and of 
judicial power generally is taken from many sources (including the authors 
of The Federalist), but the position he settles on is best compared with 
Marshall’s famous passage in Cohens v. Virginia:9Q
It is most true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not:
but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The
88 See Hand. The Bill of Rights (1958), 15, quoted in Wechsler, “Principles of 
Constitutional Law,” 5.
89 ibid.
90 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). Marshall quotes Federalist 80 in his 
opinion, where Hamilton contends that “Thirteen independent courts of final 
jurisdiction over the same causes, arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government, 
from which nothing but contradiction and confusions can proceed.” Federalist 80, at 
535. No doubt Marshall pictured the Court (as did Hamilton) as a vehicle for national 
legal uniformity. There is no willful manipulation of Publius or the Constitution on this 
point. But it is quite a different matter to assert that same desire for uniformity within 
that single tribunal.
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judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because it 
approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by 
because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, 
a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before us. We 
have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is 
given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other 
would be treason to the constitution.
Marshall in Cohens stated a “principled” characterization of judicial 
power in the plainest words, denying that the Court- in cases properly 
within its jurisdiction- could include an agenda-manipulating adjunct as 
within the ambit of judicial power. This assertion does not deny to the Court 
the discretion to either accept or deny cases by judicial grace. Nor does it 
mean that the Supreme Court does not have the option to defer decision­
making to another branch; there are no problems with a doctrine of 
“political questions.” The distinction that is essential here is that these sorts 
of decisions are wholly different than a broad discretion that would enable 
the Court to withhold judgment.^1 The exercise of judicial power, in cases 
which satisfy jurisdictional requirements, is an inescapable obligation for 
Marshall- and for Wechsler as well. “For me, as for anyone who finds the 
judicial power anchored in the Constitution,” Wechsler insists, “there is no 
such escape [as Hand suggests] from the judicial obligation; the duty cannot 
be attenuated in this w a y .  ”92
It is not all that difficult to see how Wechsler’s principle of “neutral 
principles,” can be adapted and extended more generally to fit a study of 
judicial expression such as this. Wechsler’s argument presupposes sincere, 
individual judicial behavior. By his own terms, for adjudication to be 
“principled” it must be founded upon reasons, reasons which can not be 
selectively avoided or enhanced because of extra-judicial concerns. Reasons
91 See Wechsler, “Principles of Constitutional Law,” 9 [“the only proper 
judgment that may lead to an abstention from decision is that the Constitution has 
committed the determination of the issue to another agency of government than the 
courts.... what is involved is in itself an act of constitutional interpretation, to be made 
and judged by standards that should govern the interpretive process generally. That, I 
submit, is toto caelo different from a broad discretion to abstain or intervene.”].
92 ibid., 6.
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for Wechsler are not elements of judicial strategy. Reasons are the tools of 
obligation for any judicial exercise properly so called. Furthermore, 
Wechsler’s argument only makes practical sense if principled judicial 
behavior is demanded of individual judges, not institutions. How can any 
multi-judge appellate court act in a principled fashion if the selection, 
emphasis, and overall expression of those neutral principles are 
compromised or negotiated? How can such a court fashion anything 
resembling a “neutral” (read: consistently applied) principle that accounts 
for such a decision? It can not, because these sorts of concerns bv definition 
do not “transcend” the immediate result of the case. There is no “generality 
or neutrality” to those institutional conventions and norms which generate 
institutional expressions. Of course, one can imagine a case where a multi­
judge bloc or even a unanimous court acted in a principled fashion. Again, 
agreement alone does not imply a lack of principle. But there is a thin line 
between principled persuasion or agreement and a judicial pronouncement 
which is inextricably tied to the immediate result, and therefore 
unprincipled.
Wechsler’s suggestion that, at bottom, judicial power must be 
principled has attracted many adherents and opponents. Legal formalists of 
different stripes tend to fall into the former category, and various neo- 
realists (such as those within the Critical Legal Studies movement today) 
congregate in the latter group.. Alexander Bickel, in his seminal book on the 
Supreme Court and judicial review, The Least Dangerous Branch, insisted 
upon taking a third r o u t e .93 Bickel was certainly not a neo-realist; he spent 
a good deal of time attacking their methods and beliefs, accusing them 
ultimately of “o v e r k i l l .”94 Neither, though, was he a formalist; he was 
transparent that the early realists who exploded the notion that judges
93 Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the 
Bar of Politics (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962).
94 Ibid., 75-84.
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merely “find” the law provided an important c o r r e c t i o n .95 Bickel situates 
the Court squarely in the middle of what he perceives to be the emblematic 
dilemma of American democracy. American democracy is indeed committed 
to principle, and in those instances when the Court invalidates legislative 
policy Bickel insists that it “must act rigorously on principle, else it 
undermines the justification for its p o w e r .  ”96 Bickel continues in the same 
vein later in the book when he says that, “the integrity of the Court’s 
principled process should remain unimpaired, since the Court does not 
involve itself in compromises and expedient a c t io n s .  ”97 Inasmuch as these 
sentiments reflect a commitment to principle, Bickel very much resembles 
Wechsler.
Bickel also contended that Wechsler’s insistence to abide strictly by 
principle could prove disastrous as well. He declared that, “No society, 
certainly not a large a heterogeneous one, can fail in time to explode if it is 
deprived of the arts of compromise, if it knows no ways of muddling 
t h r o u g h .  ”98 Wechsler’s vision, according to Bickel, is flawed because it 
offers two rigid and equally unpalatable alternatives for the role of the 
Supreme Court. The Court for Wechsler is either, “a third legislative 
chamber or is imposing on the country an absolute rule of absolute 
principle,” Bickel e x p la in s .9 9  Bickel finds Wechsler’s formulation 
problematic because, in short, it is unrealistic. Given that Wechsler and most 
of his partisans find the first choice unattractive, the second choice for 
Bickel is an unrealistic picture of American democracy, as it constructs an
95 ibid., 74-75.
96 ibid., 69.
97 Ibid., 95. Bickel also sharply criticizes the Court for its decision in Shelton 





illusory division between matters left to the neatly separated realms of 
principle and expediency. Bickel instead employs a kind of pragmatism (he 
attributes this philosophy to Abraham Lincoln) which he believes best 
describes American constitutional practice. It is his foundation for all that 
follows; Bickel: “Our democratic system of government exists in this 
Lincolnian tension between principle and expediency, and within it judicial 
review must play its role. Mr. Wechsler’s dilemma is a false one.”100 
To this characterization of American democracy Bickel adds his 
perception of judicial review. Bickel notes that the Court, by the exercise of 
judicial review,
wields a threefold power. It may strike down legislation as inconsistent 
with principle. It may validate, or in Charles L Black’s better word, 
“legitimate” legislation as consistent with principle. Or it mav do 
neither. It may do neither and therein lies the secret of its ability to 
maintain itself in the tension between principle and expediency.101
Following Hamilton’s observation that the judiciary lacks both the force and
will to enforce its principled institutional product, Bickel places the Court in
a position where it should act according to principle only in those instances
when such action will gain public acceptance. On his own terms then,
Bickel’s task is to shore up this third aspect of his conception of judicial
power- “doing neither”- so that the Court can maintain its important
position in American democracy. To do this, Bickel introduces and explains
“The Passive Virtues,” a set of strategic techniques that the Court may
employ to avoid constitutional adjudication on the merits of a case. Examples
of these tools and artifices include jurisdictional procedures, doctrines of
vagueness, delegation, and political questions, concepts like desuetude and
methods of statutory and constitutional construction. Bickel’s passive
virtues, by providing the Court acceptable reasons for “staying its hand,”
and thus letting it neither “invalidate” nor “legitimate”, serve his ultimate
100 ibid., 68.
101 Ibid., 69 [original emphasis].
1 ^
objective of avoiding the Scylla and Charibdis of unprincipled and principle- 
ridden adjudication. lO2
As Gerald Gunther points out, Bickers “third way” is more an illusion 
than a solution, for he is more like Wechsler than he ad m its.^  Moreover, 
Gunther’s evaluation ultimately concludes that Bickers theory of judicial 
review and judicial behavior is unacceptable because of its intrinsic 
insincerity. Gunther’s article makes two main points: (1) Bickel’s 
conception of American democracy (as a Lincolnian tension) and his vision 
of the Supreme Court’s role within that conception are questionable; (2) 
Bickel’s ultimate commitment (like Wechsler) to principled process is 
undermined irreparably by his passive virtues.104 From these two 
observations Gunther neatly sums up Bickel’s thesis with the unsatisfactory 
slogan, “100% insistence on principle, 20% of the t i m e . ” i05 On the first 
charge, there is no question that Bickel proceeds from a Hamiltonian point of 
view and places the Court in a position of supremacy. This position often 
contradicts other statements Bickel makes about the importance of 
institutional colloquy. These sorts of criticisms are important, but it is 
Gunther’s second charge which is most relevant for a study of judicial 
behavior.
Gunther’s second charge, that the passive virtues are really “a 
surrender of principle to expediency,” rests on two claims. Firstly, Gunther 
accuses Bickel of willfully enlarging certain techniques so as to serve his 
“underlying premises and overriding purposes.”1^  Jurisdictional 
techniques like the handling of appeals and certiorari writs are examples of
102 ibid., 111-198.
103 Gerald Gunther, “The Subtle Vices of the ‘Passive Virtues’: A Comment on 
Principle and Expediency in Judicial Review,” 64 Columbia Law Review 1-25 (1964).




this.lO7 Gunther explains that Bickel’s explanation of these devices is 
plagued by one serious error, “a tendency to blur the fact that jurisdiction 
under our system is rooted in Article III and congressional enactments, that 
it is not a domain solely within the Court’s keeping. ”108 More importantly, 
Gunther faults Bickel for falling prey to “the neo-Brandeisian fallacy” in his 
discussion of his passive virtues.109 In Ashwander v. Tennessee Valiev 
Authority. Justice Louis Brandeis explained that the Court had developed “for 
it own governance... a series of rules under which it has avoided passing 
upon a large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for 
decision.”110 Brandeis listed seven such rules.111 The general purpose of 
Brandeis’ “Ashwander rules,” Gunther explains, “go to the choice of the 
ground of decision of a case.”112 Even though Brandeis says that the 
Ashwander rules are for the Court’s own institutional governance, they are 
clearly questions which must be considered and resolved individually. The 
Ashwander rules, as Gunther makes plain, are inextricably connected to the 
ground of decision chosen; they are in this way “internal” considerations 
that generate the very rationale of an opinion. Brandeis put forth the 
Ashwander rules in a concurring opinion which differed from Justice 
Frankfurter’s opinion of the Court because he (and those who agreed with
107 Ibid., 11-16; Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch. 126-127, 132-143.
108 ibid., 16.
109 Ibid., 10, 16-20.
110 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (J. Brandeis, concurring).
111 The “Ashwander rules” are, briefly, as follows: (1) the Court “will not pass 
upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding”; (2) it 
will not “anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of 
deciding it”; (3) it will not “formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is 
required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied”; (4) it will not rule on 
constitutionality if there is another ground for deciding the case; (5) it will not 
determine a statute’s validity unless the person complaining has been injured by it; (6) 
it will not invalidate a statute “at the instance of one who has availed himself of its 
benefits”; and (7) the Court will always ascertain whether any reasonable interpretation 
of a statute will allow it to avoid the question of constitutionality. See Ibid., 346-48.
112 Gunther, “Judicial Expediency,” 17.
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him) resolved these sorts of questions in such a way. Of the seven rules, 
Gunther rightly explains that four them (rules 2, 3, 4, and 7) permit 
avoidance of some or all of constitutional questions argued. n 3 The other 
three simply detail situations where there is no “case” or “controversy” and 
so are merely heuristics for judges so that they may better comport with 
Article I I I . i w  Bickel instead employs the Ashwander rules “to assert an 
amorphous authority to withhold adjudication altogether,” and to stake out “a 
general discretion not to adjudicate though statute, Constitution, and 
remedial law present a ‘case’ for decision and confer no discretion. ”H5 
BickePs move here is what Gunther terms the neo-Brandeisian fallacy.
BickePs enlargement of the scope of devices like the Ashwander rules 
is an ingenious attempt to outline and detail Judge Hand’s “preliminary 
question”; the passive virtues would enable the Court to ask “how 
importunately the occasion demands an answer.” Like Hand’s question, 
BickePs virtuous formulation is not principled. Bickel constructs a 
discretion so broad that it undoes any insistence that constitutional 
adjudication must be principled. Gunther’s concluding observation of 
BickePs passive virtues illuminates the matter further. Using BickePs own 
words, he explains of BickePs prescriptions that they “lead either to a 
manipulative process, whose inherent, if high-minded, lack of candor raises 
issues of its own, or to the abandonment of principle. ”n 6 In short, Gunther 
faults Bickel precisely because his theory of judicial review and judicial 
behavior is purposefully insincere.
Early in his book Bickel articulates an important conception of 
American constitutional practice that differs markedly from most of the
113 ibid., 16.
114 ibid., 17.
1*15 ibid., 10, 16; see Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch. 70-72, 111-13, 119-20.
116 ibid., 25, quoting Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch. 200.
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assertions that dominate his project. Describing the institutional dynamics
of American constitutionalism, Bickel writes:117
In the interplay between the Supreme Court and the political 
institutions, all is or should be in the open. Men are not required to 
disguise to themselves or to others what each is doing. The system 
justifies and encourages each institution in acting as it does- on 
principle in one institution, often on interest and expediency in the 
others- for it thrives on the tension among them. And the integrity of 
the Court’s principled process should remain unimpaired, since the 
Court does not involve itself in compromises and expedient actions.
This passage is striking as it is one of the most accurate normative
descriptions of American constitutional practice given an essential
institutional trait of the judiciary. That essential institutional trait is what I
have been calling judicial sincerity. In conveying the nature of the Court’s
principled process here, Bickel reveals a normative commitment to judicial
sincerity. Bickel, of course, did not write the above passage to highlight the
importance of matters of “voice” in judicial decision-making, and his passive
virtues- each of them disguises- blunt the force of his own ideal vision.
Bickel attempts to operationalize a theory of principled and strategic judicial
behavior; the attempt fails because his ideal of principled judicial power is
frustrated by elements of strategy. If “disguising” is institutionalized,
constitutional interplay is harmfully unbalanced.
Cass Sunstein in a recent article has provided more shape and 
perspective to the project of judicial prudence which so interested Bickel.U8 
Sunstein observes that judges sometimes deliberately leave things unsaid; 
they choose to traverse a course of “decisional minimalism. The 
premeditated employment of the “constructive uses of silence” can promote 
democratic goals. Sunstein explains: “minimalism can be democracy-
117 Bickel, Least Dangerous Branch. 95 [emphasis added].
11 8 Cass R. Sunstein, “The Supreme Court, 1995 Term - Foreword: Leaving 
Things Undecided,” 110 Harvard Law Review 4-101 (1996).
119 Ibid., 6-7 [“We might describe the phenomenon of saying no more than 
necessary to justify an outcome, and leaving as much as possible undecided, as 
‘decisional minimalism.’”].
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forcing, not only in the sense that it leaves issues open for democratic 
deliberation, but also and more fundamentally in the sense that it promotes 
reason-giving and ensures that certain important decisions are made by 
democratically accountable actors. *120 Sunstein also suggests that the path 
of minimalism also (usually) makes sense when legal issues are presented 
which possess (legally relevant) moral uncertainty or a substantial deficit of 
information because the costs of “decision” and “mistake” are at levels 
which judges should not risk.121 Of course there is much to be said in 
response to the minimalist position, and Sunstein supplies much of the 
needed counterargument against minimalism,122 but it needs to be 
emphasized that the recognition of the legitimacy of judicial minimalism 
does not in any way oppose or weaken the postulate of judicial sincerity. 123 
Moreover, an argument for sincerity is not at all an endorsement of judicial 
“maximalism,” where a judge provides full theoretical grounding and a 
complete statement of the governing rule of decision in a case. Maximalism, 
as Sunstein rightly contends, can also be “democracy-forcing,” but either of 
these two ends of the spectrum require beforehand that the judge sincerely 
deliver a singular judgment.124 Sunstein is right to point out that sometimes
120 ibid., 7.
121 ibid., 7-9, 15-28.
122 ibid., 28-33. Cf. Michael Foley, The Silence of Constitutions: Gaps.
* Abeyances7, and Political Temperament in the Maintenance of Government (London: 
Routledge, 1989). Foley’s argument proposes that American constitutionalism itself 
contains a general commitment to minimalism or even subminimalism, where 
controversies are left “in abeyance,” and purposefully opaque.
123 Sunstein admits as much from the outset of his article. “Minimalists 
enthusiastically respect the obligation to offer reasons; they attempt to offer reasons of 
an unambitious kind.” Ibid., 7 at note 2. Furthermore, Sunstein also appears to concede 
early on that the standards of minimalism and maximalism are individually determined. 
Ibid., 6 at note 1.
124 Actually, Sunstein’s “rough continuum” is as follows:
Reasonlessness— ►Subminimalism— ►Minimalism— ► Ambitiousness— ►Max­
imalism. Reasonlessness and subminmalism are not available, consistent options for an 
appellate judge in the American constitutional tradition. Ambitiousness is a vague and 
largely unhelpful term, serving only to better designate by distance the opposing 
choices of minimalism and maximalism. Ibid., 15.
there may be instances when an individual judge may be justified in saying 
the equivalent of “I don’t know,” or even “I see it more than one way” in 
response to difficult legal questions. There is also something to be said for 
the individual judge who, in effect, says “I know the answer and here is the 
full theory and complete rule which animates it.” In both cases, the 
common, more fundamental ingredient of all these responses is the presence 
of the first-person singular pronoun. Minimalism certainly may be 
employed in the service of strategy, but the judge that does so within an 
institution which prizes sincerity will do so in the light of day and will face 
comparison with other sincerely expressed judgments.
For a very long time, a single question has divided many students of 
government: what is the difference, if any, between a judge and a 
legislator? When doctrines of legal formalism were dominant, the answer to 
this question was a “what-centered” reply. The difference between the two, 
the response would go, is that what these respective officials did was 
distinctive. The products of their efforts- the legislator made law, the judge 
applied or interpreted law- were different. With the coming of legal realism 
and its progeny, the “what-centered” answer has lost traction. Judges indeed 
make law, even if interstitially, so there is little difference between the two 
products. Both are law-makers. “Who-centered” responses have had some 
adherents, and legal formalism as well tried to provide a firm grounding for 
such claims by focusing on the professionalism and training of the judge.
The role of legal education itself was an important contribution. But, on the 
whole, the “Who-centered” reply has been secondary to the “What-centered” 
and never established itself as enough of a justification. What alternative, 
then, is left to provide an answer? The most promising route- in light of the 
climate of neo-realism and the apparently dominant consensus among the 
legal academy that law simply is politics- is to focus on “How-centered”
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distinctions. The fundamental difference between a judge and a legislator, 
on this explanation, is the wav in which they arrive at and express their 
(admittedly, sometimes creative) legal decisions.
Chapter Four:
Classical Natural Law &  Common Law Theory
The next three chapters will each analyze the viewpoints of four 
distinct strains of legal theory. Important expositors of natural law theory, 
Common Law theory, legal positivism, and a melange of “post-positivist* 
theorists will be the foci. Each of these reviews will emphasize those aspects 
of legal and judicial communication which are relevant to our inquiries and 
in that way will appear considerably different than orthodox reviews of 
these schools. The main point of the next three chapters is to suggest that, in 
the way in which prominent legal theorists discuss and depict the nature of 
adjudication and judicial power, highly influential variants of legal theory 
assume or implicitly depend upon what I have been calling the ethic of 
judicial sincerity. The fact that an ethic of judicial sincerity lies at the heart 
of theories which often stand in opposition to one another in academic 
debate is an important characteristic of Anglo-American law. Furthermore, 
this analysis will show that allegiance to a particular conception of law has 
consequences for how tolerant (or intolerant) the adherent would be to the 
presence of judicial strategy. This chapter will analyze two strains of legal 
theory which have been strongly influential in the development of Anglo- 
American legal doctrine and institutions. Natural law and Common Law 
views are naturally compatible because of the former’s direct influence 
upon the latter, and their combination will highlight important underlying 
characteristics about judicial behavior. Furthermore, the two are best 
viewed together because they both stand in opposition to the twin theses of 
legal positivism, which will be examined in the next chapter.
The bold assertion that there are “basic forms of human flourishing,” 
and “basic methodological requirements of practical reasonableness,” both 
of which being self-evident from the nature of our universe and discernible
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by the reasoning ability of man has proved to be the ultimate bedrock upon 
which natural law theories have rested for more than 2,500 years.1 Since the 
time of the ancient Greeks at least, a rational foundation for moral judgment 
has buttressed many an argument about law and justice. This section will 
explore those lessons of natural law theorists that are relevant to our 
inquiries into the style and manner of judicial expression. In the next 
chapter, a similar review of important common law theorists will be 
conducted because of their extension of natural law theory as well as their 
historical importance to the constitutional evolution of the colonies and 
eventually the United States. Our investigation here focuses on the two 
towering figures of the natural law tradition- Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas- 
and therefore can be said to be concerned exclusively with ‘‘classical” 
natural law theory. A good portion of this chapter is an exploration of John 
Finnis’ philosophical reconstruction of the insights of these two writers.
First, though, I wish to highlight some brief observations Aristotle makes 
about the subjects of law and rhetoric.
A great deal of scholarship has been devoted to Aristotle, and I do not 
intend to add substantially to that sum. There are, however, some important 
comments of Aristotle’s which deal with judicial behavior which have not 
had (to my knowledge) a proper airing. Aristotle is well known for his 
thoughts on subjects of politics, law and justice. Aristotle also wrote a 
seminal treatise on the subject of rhetoric, however, and this will be our 
starting point.2 It should be remembered that the subject of rhetoric was 
first given serious consideration by Aristotle, who thought it was a part of 
the master subject of politics and fit into each of Aristotle’s four subdivisions
1 The key phrases used here are stated and developed in John Finnis, Natural 
Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980).
2 Aristotle, On Rhetoric, trans. George A. Kennedy (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991).
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of intellectual activity.3 Later Roman writers largely adopted Aristotle's 
observations on the subject, and it has been persuasively argued that 
rhetoric was an unchallenged humanist segment of the western curriculum 
until the emergence of a more purely rationalist response evidenced in the 
work of Hobbes.4 Aristotle divided rhetoric into three species: deliberative, 
judicial and demonstrative. The species is determined by the class of the 
audience and it is judicial rhetoric that we will be briefly concerned with 
here. Towards the end of a treatise devoted to the subject of judicial rhetoric, 
Aristotle interestingly reveals that “Speaking in the law courts requires 
more exactness of detail, and that before a single judge even more, for it is 
least of all a matter of rhetorical techniques; for what pertains to the subject 
and what is irrelevant is more easily observed [by a single judge], and 
controversy is gone, so the judgment is clear. ”5 Now this is an important 
though admittedly indirect view of proper judicial behavior. A lawyer’s 
success is predicated least of all upon techniques of rhetoric because the 
recipient of the rhetorical output (the judge) is to be a singular source of 
fact and law. This singularity of source provides the best chance of avoiding 
strategic behavior like Aristotle’s rhetorical techniques. Towards the 
beginning of On Rhetoric Aristotle also forwards the notion that a 
practitioner of judicial rhetoric needs to “gain over the hearer; for the 
judgment is about other people’s business and the judges, considering the
3 See Nic. Eth.. I. 2: 1094*19- b12; VI: 1138b15- 1145*11. Aristotle, The 
Nicomachean Ethics, trans. David Ross, rev. J.L. Ackrill and J.O. Urmson (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1980).
Aristotle divided intellectual activity into the theoretical sciences (examples of 
which include physics and theology), practical arts (politics, ethics), productive arts 
(medicine, fine arts) and methods (logic, dialectic). George Kennedy explains and 
demonstrates that Aristode viewed rhetoric as falling within all four of these, shifting 
his focus throughout On Rhetoric. Different scholars at different times emphasized one 
over the other. See G.A. Kennedy, trans., On Rhetoric. 7-13.
4 See generally Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of 
Hobbes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Also, see section dealing with 
Hobbes in chapter five, infra.
5 On Rhetoric. Ill, 12, 5: 1414a.
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matter in relation to their own affairs and listening with partiality, lend 
themselves to [the needs of] the litigants but do not judge [objectively].”6 So 
a lawyer’s success is least of all a matter of rhetorical technique, yet the 
lawyer would do well to “gain over” the judge or judges involved. These 
opposing pieces of advice are reconciled only by returning to the principle 
of singularity of source in matters judicial. Aristotle assumes this for his 
suggestions dealing with judicial rhetoric depend upon the unity of mind 
that only an individual judge can bring to a case.
The lessons of On Rhetoric certainly do not end the inquiry; in fact, 
they only sharpen it. What standards should we expect in matters of 
adjudication? Are judges somehow different than other law makers? In the 
fifth book of his Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle explains of adjudication 
generally that,
when people dispute, they take refuge in the judge; and to go to the 
judge is to go to justice; for the nature of the judge is to be a sort of 
animate justice; and they seek the judge as an intermediate, and in some 
states they call judges mediators, on the assumption that if they get 
what is intermediate they will get what is just. The just, then, is an 
intermediate, since the judge is so.7
Now on first glance it may appear to some that Aristotle seems to be 
conveying a sentiment that would approve of a “compromised” ratio in 
deciding adjudicative matters. If getting “what is intermediate” is getting 
“what is just,” it might seem logical to accept a single compromised, 
moderated ratio from a bank of judges. This interpretation is misleading and 
ignores the key lesson to be derived from Aristotle here. Notice that Aristotle 
first equates the position of judge and justice for the disputants; both are 
found in the same place. Next, Aristotle’s clearest description of a judge’s 
nature is to be “a sort of animate justice.” Now these two points take our
6 On Rhetoric. I, 1, 10: 1354b. It is worth inserting here the reminder that in 
Aristotle’s time, “in democratic states there was no official judge in the modern sense of 
one who presided over a trial and instructed the jury about the law; thus, in most legal 
procedure judge and jury were identical.” G.A. Kennedy, trans., On Rhetoric. 109.
7 Nic. Eth.. V. 4: 1132*2-25.
inquiries some distance. Remembering that throughout his writings the just 
for Aristotle is a sort of mean to be striven for, and a mean itself being a 
singular point of balance between two extremes rather than a mixture of 
several points, it becomes clearer that Aristotle is placing considerable 
importance upon the singular quality of judging. The final passage then 
goes most of the way to answering the preliminary objection we started with: 
the just is an intermediate since the judge is so. The essential focus of justice 
for Aristotle is located in the office of the judge.
But there is more to judgment than justice for Aristotle. In fact, many 
times “the just” stands in need of correction by “the equitable.” Equity for 
Aristotle is simultaneously the same as and superior to legal justice.
Aristotle's notion of equity of course is fundamentally influential to later 
legal systems and his discussion of it deserves some review. He explains that 
where the law is “defective owing to its universality,” equity is required.
“In fact,” Aristotle continues, “this is the reason why all things are not 
determined by law, viz. that about some things it is impossible to lay down a 
law, so that a decree is needed. ”8 This is an important passage and deserves 
some probing. Firstly, the word “decree” is not trivial; Aristotle’s term is the 
same word used to describe the pronouncements of chancery courts both in 
England and America throughout their histories. A decree is to be 
distinguished from an opinion.9 The very essence of the word’s meaning 
conveys a sense of its content being foreordained or, simply, given. If 
equity is to be a corrective of law owing to defects in the law’s quality of 
universality, that correction for Aristotle must be made by decree. A device 
containing foreordained, self-evident qualities is needed to override the 
universal characteristic of law- law that is not only desirable but for the 
most part fully capable of serving the requirements of justice.
8 Nic. Eth.. V. 10: 1137b8-34.
9 See chapter one, supra.
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Interestingly, at the same time he describes the qualities of equity, Aristotle 
here also offers a clue as to the very nature of law and its mode of operation. 
An equitable decree is needed in those cases where “it is impossible to lay 
down a law.” It follows from this that for Aristotle the law, when it is laid, 
does not include “decree-like” qualities. A positive portrayal of “law-laying” 
is not altogether clear from this passage, but it is plain that it is not done by 
decree, that is by presenting the law as foreordained or self-evident.
Later in the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle discusses the intellectual 
virtue of “judgement” and provides some further clarification of our subject. 
“What is called judgement, in virtue of which men are said to ‘be 
sympathetic judges’ and to ‘have judgement’, is the right discrimination of 
the equitable. ”io Now when this sort of statement is combined with our 
previous discussion, a reasonably clear picture of judgement emerges. Just 
as equity is characterized by a singular “decree-like” quality, so too should 
judgement. This is a crucial point; the failure to appreciate it results in 
conflating the essentially separate implications for law and judgement. 
Judgement for Aristotle is an intellectual virtue which proceeds and 
concludes as though foreordained or self-evident. Indeed, Aristotle shortly 
after this passage explains that judgement is a natural endowment.11 Law, 
again, is neither judgement nor equity. This foreordained quality is not 
conferred upon law. Law for Aristotle is best viewed as “a rule proceeding 
from a sort of practical wisdom and reason,” while at the same time having 
compulsive power.12 Because law emanates from these areas, it contains a 
natural comprehensiveness which is accessible to the human mind and is
10 Nic. Eth.. VI. 11: 1143*13-31.
11 Like the intellectual virtues of understanding and intuitive reason, Aristotle 
includes judgement as a natural endowment: “while no one is thought to be a 
philosopher by nature, people are thought to have by nature judgement, understanding, 
and intuitive reason. This is shown by the fact that we think our powers correspond to 
our time of life, and that a particular age brings with it intuitive reason and judgement.” 
Nic. Eth.. VI, 11: 1143*31- t>17.
12 Nic. Eth.. X. 9: 1180*14-b3.
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not as burdensome or obscure as a more rigid, self-evident object which is 
characteristic of both equity and judgment.
In the thirteenth century St. Thomas Aquinas sought to reconcile the 
teachings of Aristotle with the lessons of Christian Scripture and in so doing 
provided an important extension of natural law theory. Together Aristotle 
and Aquinas form the bedrock of classical natural law theory. Because of 
later critiques by primarily positivist commentators (a school we will 
examine later) of contemporary versions of natural law theory, a great deal 
of the original wisdom of Aristotle and Aquinas became distorted. The most 
regularly cited example of this is the “is/ought distinction” articulated by 
David Hume in 1740. A recent restatement of classical natural law theory by 
John Finnis sought to remedy these distortions and put forward an account of 
the classical theory in modern language. 13 Much of Finnis’ restatement 
finds its basis in Aquinas, though Aristotle is also utilized heavily. Because of 
the quality of Finnis’ account and the difficulty of discerning Aquinas’ 
teachings from the original texts, Finnis’ Natural Law and Natural Rights 
will be examined as a substitute and will further clarify our focus on proper 
judicial behavior according to classical natural law theory. I do not pretend 
that there is a kind of identity between Finnis and Aquinas or Finnis and 
Aristotle. Finnis’ rendering of these thinkers is the most sophisticated, most 
operational theory of classical natural law that exists in the field. For a 
student of this tradition, there is no better secondary text.
First Finnis’ basic argument will be reviewed, for his task is to present 
“the first principles of natural law.” It is Finnis’ belief that these principles 
do in fact “lay down for us the outlines of everything one could reasonably 
want to do, to have and to be,” and in so doing presuppose no moral
13 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1980).
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judgements whatsoever.14 For Finnis discovering such principles is a two- 
step process. Firstly, Finnis asks the practical (as opposed to Aristotelian 
“speculative’' reason) question of what are the basic forms of human 
flourishing? Finnis explains that these forms are essentially “pre-moral,” 
or self-evident for human beings. The seven forms listed by Finnis are as 
follows: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability (friendship), 
practical reasonableness, and “religion. These seven for Finnis are 
“basic” human goods because they are (1) each “self-evidently a form of 
good,” (2) unable to be “analytically reduced to being merely an aspect of 
any of the others,” and (3) each basic good, “when we focus on it, can 
reasonably be regarded as the most important. Hence there is no objective 
hierarchy among them.”1^
The sixth basic good, practical reasonableness, then ushers in the 
second step toward discovery of a derived foundation of morality. Practical 
reasonableness is defined by Finnis as, “being able to bring one's own 
intelligence to bear effectively... on the problems of choosing one's actions 
and lifestyle and shaping one’s own character,” and is a complex value 
toward which Finnis devotes much attention.17 There are “basic 
requirements of practical reasonableness,” that aid human beings in 
determining that a decision is practically reasonable and in so doing aid in 
pursuing or “participating in” the basic human goods. In sum, Finnis’ 
second step is to, “express the ‘natural law method’ of working out the 
(moral) ‘natural law’ from the first (pre-moral) ‘principles of natural 
law .’”18 Finnis discusses nine methodological requirements of practical
14 Ibid., 97. Finnis’ subject, in perhaps the most succinct description made by 
the author, concerns “the evaluative substratum of all moral judgements.” Ibid., 59.





reasonableness, including “commitment, reasonable efficiency, and 
following one’s conscience.” The limits of space do not permit a full 
treatment of them here.19
What then does all this have to do with law, or even those authoritative 
conventions that regulate judicial behavior that are our subject? The two 
preceding paragraphs were laid out because for Finnis- in a philosophical 
reconstruction of the Thomistic position- morality not only affects the law 
but its “substratum” as well, which can be reasonably discerned to provide 
an ultimate foundation for both rulers and r u le d .  20 The requirements of 
practical reasonableness are the source from which positive law derives part 
of its force; as such, they are the standards with which legal systems must 
comport. Finnis understands that to settle social coordination problems, a 
community has two choices only: unanimity or authority.21 Since the 
former is often difficult to achieve, the requirements of practical 
reasonableness are helpful in locating a u t h o r i t y .22 Authoritative 
coordination is then legally authoritative for Finnis when certain distinctive 
features are present. Jumping off from Max Weber’s definitions of legal 
coordination (but showing how these are really just extensions of Aristotle’s
19 They are, briefly, as follows: (1) a coherent plan of life, (2) no arbitrary 
preferences amongst values, (3) no arbitrary preferences amongst persons, (4) 
detachment, (5) commitment, (6) reasonable efficiency, (7) respect for every basic value 
in every act, (8) favouring and fostering the common good of one’s communities, and (9) 
following one’s conscience. On these, see ibid., 100-127.
20 Ibid., 290: “The act of ‘positing’ law (whether judicially or legislatively or 
otherwise) is an act which can and should be guided by ‘moral’ principles and rules; 
that those moral norms are a matter of objective reasonableness, not of whim, convention, 
or mere ‘decision’; and that those same moral norms justify (a) the very institution of 
positive law, (b) the main institutions, techniques, and modalities within that 
institution (e.g. separation of powers), and (c) the main institutions regulated and 
sustained by law. [emphasis added]”
21 Ibid., 232.
22 “Authority (and thus the responsibility of governing) in a community is to 
be exercised by those who can in fact effectively settle co-ordination problems for that 
community. This principle is not the last word on the requirements of practical 
reasonableness in locating authority; but it is the first and most fundamental.” Ibid., 
page 246.
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notions), Finnis’ features of legal order enable his students, “to distinguish 
law from politics, conventions, manners, etiquette, mores, games, and indeed 
from every other form or matrix of communal interaction- and to 
distinguish it with complete adequacy even in the absence of any problem of 
recalcitrance and hence of any need for coercion or sanctions. ”23 There are 
five such distinctively legal features which can be summarized as f o l l o w s : 24
(1) Law brings definition, specificity, clarity, and thus 
predictability into human interactions, by way of a system of highly 
interrelated rules and institutions.
(2) Whatever legal rule or institution has been once validly 
created remains valid, in contemplation of law, until it determines 
according to its own terms or to some valid act or rule or repeal.
(3) Rules of law regulate not only the creation, administration, 
and adjudication of such rules, and the constitution, character, and 
termination of institutions, but also the conditions under which a 
private individual can modify the incidence or application of the rules.
(4) The law brings what precision and predictability it can into 
the order of human interactions by a special technique: the treating of 
past acts as giving, now, sufficient and exclusionary reason for acting 
in a way then “provided for”.
(5) As a reinforcement of the other four characteristics of law 
already mentioned, there is the fictitious working postulate that every 
present practical question or co-ordination problem has, in every 
respect, been so “provided for” by some such past juridicial act or acts.
Importantly, Finnis realizes that these five distinctive features of law 
do not convey their true worth without a simultaneous reckoning of “the 
relation between these formal features and the requirements of justice and 
the common good. ”25 The further requirements of what is commonly 
referred to as the Rule of Law serve to “instantiate” the five formal features. 
Borrowing from scholars such as Fuller and Joseph Raz, Finnis lists eight
23 ibid., 267. It is in statements like these where Finnis reveals his 
estrangement from others in the natural law tradition. By distilling the core lessons of 
Aristotle and Aquinas, Finnis is right to put to one side matters of recalcitrance. What 
counts for Finnis are those distinctive qualities of the authoritative coordination under 
examination. “It will be evident from the list [of distinctive legal features] that the 
ways in which law shapes, supports, and furthers patterns of co-ordination would be 




“desiderata” of the Rule of Law which must be fulfilled.26 The Rule of Law 
desiderata for Finnis serve to remind us that a legal system “subsists in time, 
ordering the affairs of subsisting persons.” What this means is that each of 
the desiderata “involve qualities of institutions and p r o c e s s e s .  ”27 When 
Finnis further probes the requirements of the Rule of Law, they ultimately 
reveal a primacy of place to be accorded to the judiciary. Each of the 
desiderata, as Finnis concludes, “involves certain qualities of process which 
can be systematically secured only by the institution of judicial authority 
and its exercise by persons professionally equipped and motivated to act 
according to l a w .”28 This is an important claim Finnis makes, and should be 
examined carefully. For upon closer examination Finnis is on to something 
that- if formulated in a more refined manner- touches on basic 
requirements of “practical judicial reasonableness.”
Take “coherence,” for example- the fifth desiderata of the Rule of Law. 
Finnis explains that “coherence” can not simply mean that there be an,
“alert logic in statutory drafting.” More comprehensively, the value of 
coherence demands, “a judiciary authorized and willing to go beyond the 
formulae of intersecting or conflicting rules, to establish particular and if 
need be novel reconciliations, and to abide by those reconciliations when 
relevantly similar cases arise at different times before different 
tribunals. ”29 Now in a way the problem we are confronting throughout the 
whole of this paper can be reposited to ask just how a judiciary should
26 a  legal system comports with the Rule of Law to the extent (and only in a 
matter of degree) that its rules are (1) prospective not retroactive, (2) not impossible to 
comply with, (3) promulgated, (4) clear, (5) coherent one with another, (6) sufficiently 
stable, (7) applied in limited situations with relative generality, and (8) made and 
administered by officials who (a) are accountable for their compliance with rules 
applicable to their performance and (b) actually administer the law consistently and in 





perform the task of meeting this comprehensive demand of coherence. For 
if Finnis means that a judiciary should provide an institutional (univocal, 
homogeneous) response when performing such reconciliations, then I 
believe he is mistaken. Just because the coherence of the law is to be striven 
for does not mean that the appearance of incoherence should be rapidly 
obliterated.
In fact, Finnis does not mean to convey this, for if he did it would be 
directly at odds with the very reason why he finds the Rule of Law to be a 
“virtue of human interaction and community.” The five formal features of 
law as well as fundamental notions which underlie constitutional 
government have a positive goal as well as the avoidance of negatives like 
tyranny or despotism. “Individuals,” Finnis declares, “can only be selves- 
i.e. have the ‘dignity’ of being ‘responsible agents’- if they are not made to 
live their lives for the convenience of others but are allowed and assisted to 
create a subsisting identity across a ‘l i f e t i m e ’. ”30 A reciprocal relationship 
between ruler and ruled as both a means to certain ends and for its own sake- 
this is at bottom the only plausible way to make sense of slogans like “a 
government of laws and not of men.”3i There can be no doubt that a rigidly 
hierarchical and “institutionalized” view of the judiciary must at the very 
least work against the improvement of this relationship if not transform it 
beyond recognition. Or, to put this idea positively, a human community is 
enhanced the more we allow for the individual self to take part in the 
naturally interactive identity-creation that is law.
Classical Common Law Theory
30 Ibid., 272.
31 Interestingly, Finnis writes that often times establishing and maintaining 
this sort of relationship comes, “at the expense of some certainty about the precise 
location of authority.” Ibid.
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Common Law theory is of course the place where what is today called 
the school of legal formalism draws its lifeblood. Writing about Common Law 
theory as the twenty-first century approaches is often cursorily dismissed or 
not taken very seriously by critics because of the present influence (or 
perhaps more accurately, dominance) of legal realism. This is a mistake for 
two reasons. Attempts at a comprehensive understanding of the 
philosophical underpinnings of the Common Law have shown much 
criticism to be misplaced or at least an exaggeration of its fundamental 
premises. One commentator has even argued recently that only Common Law 
theory (and not modern jurisprudential trends which utilize economics or 
moral philosophy) can explain the elaboration of private law p r i n c i p l e s . 32 
More importantly in the present context, Common Law theory was 
undoubtedly one of the major strands of thought which influenced the 
political science of the United S t a t e s .33 The Constitution, a text considered so 
revolutionary because of its public accessibility, so relies upon the Common 
Law strand that its ability to be even superficially understood requires the 
reader to be basically acquainted with the Common Law.
It is not surprising that Common Law theory as classically expounded 
by English jurists promotes the thesis that is being presented. The Common 
Law jurists we will examine here each support a theoretical position that 
requires a certain institutional “structure” as well as specific philosophical 
underpinnings, such as the role of custom in Common Law thinking. What is 
surprising is that, of the seminal explanations of Common Law theory, no 
previous author has explicitly adopted the position that this institutional 
“structure” is in fact a necessary component to fulfill the philosophical 
aspirations of Common Law theory. There is a good reason for this, for as we
32 Charles Fried, “The Artificial Reason of Law or : What Lawyers Know,” 60 
Texas Law Review 35-58 (1981).
3 3 See Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution 
(Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1967).
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shall soon see the “institutionalism” constructed by Common Law theory is 
purposefully incomplete.
Because of the range and difficulty of the materials of the period, I 
will be relying substantially upon two secondary texts which can be treated 
as complementary to each other. Brian Simpson’s 1973 essay on Common Law 
theory was considered by him to be a first attempt to analyze the Common 
Law through the lens of legal theory and develop what he saw as its 
theoretical commitments.34 Professor Gerald Postema admits to Simpson’s 
essay being of great influence in his widely acclaimed monograph, Bentham 
and the Common Law Tradition: part one of Postema’s book will serve as a 
guide for a basic review of those elements which are central to Common Law 
theory.33 This reliance is certainly not exclusive,36 but I do believe that 
these two authors provide in a sophisticated manner the basic lessons of 
Common Law theory and a reconstruction from scratch on my part would 
only diminish the force of the arguments I wish to convey.
The portion of Common Law theory that concerns our inquiries is 
referred to by scholars as “classical Common Law” and can be said to begin 
with Sir Edward Coke in the sixteenth century. Before Coke the Common Law 
of England was dominated by the tradition of natural law, with Fortescue and 
St. German being leading expositors. There are two general conceptions of
34 A.W.B. Simpson, “The Common Law and Legal Theory,” in Oxford Essays in 
Jurisprudence. 2nd Series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973), 77-99.
35 Postema, Gerald J. Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986), 3-143. Postema’s book received more attention for his 
treatment of Bentham than the first part devoted to Common Law theory. His analysis of 
the philosophical underpinnings of Common Law theory is more detailed than Simpson’s 
and I believe is unrivalled in the literature. On his recognition of Simpson’s influence, 
see ibid., 7 at note 11. Postema’s book, upon which I rely heavily both in this section 
and the following one on legal positivism, was brought to my attention by Alan Beattie of 
the London School of Economics.
36 Also very helpful were J.G.A. Pocock, The Ancient Constitution and the 
Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); James R. Stoner, Jr., Common Law and 
Liberal Theory: Coke. Hobbes, and the Origins of American Constitutionalism 
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992); D.E.C. Yale, “Hobbes and Hale on Law, 
Legislation and the Sovereign,” Cambridge Law Journal 121-56 (1972B).
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the Common Law that begin with Coke that are central. These two
conceptions are intimately related to one another but the tasks performed by
each are distinct enough to warrant such a separation. The first conception
concerns itself, in the main, with identifying the contents of the Common
Law. Coke provides the “contents conception” of the Common Law with
perhaps his most famous excerpt from his Institutes of the Laws of England:
For reason is the life of the Law, nay the Common Law it selfe is nothing 
else but reason, which is to be understood of an artificiall perfection of 
reason gotten by long studie, obseruation and experience and not every 
mans naturall reason, for n e m o  n a s c i tu r  a r t i fe x  [no one is bom  
skillful]. This legall reason e s t  s u m m a  ra tio  [is the highest reason]. And 
therefore if all the reason that is dispersed into so many severall heads 
were united into one, yet could he not make such a Law as the Law of 
England is, because by many succession of ages it hath beene fined and 
refined by an infinite number of graue and learned men, and by long 
experience grown to such a perfection for the gouerment of this 
Realme, as the old rule may be justly verified of it N e m in e m  o p o r te t  e sse  
s a p ie n t io r e m  legibusr. No man (out of his owne private reason) ought to 
be wiser than the Law, which is the perfection of r e a s o n .3 7
The contents or material of the Common Law according to Coke are the 
result of an artificial method- the “perfection of reason”- which is only 
discernible through a certain kind of experience. It is perhaps such an 
obvious point that commentators have not stressed it, but it is worth stressing 
that Coke’s conception is intrinsically individualistic. Coke’s conception does 
not explain a collective “artificial reason”; courts or other collectives are not 
mentioned at all in connection with this central idea. It is precisely because 
the Common Law is built upon the successive wisdom of an “infinite 
number” of individual human minds that sees it prevail over a momentary 
concentration of (individual or collective) reason. Both Postema and 
Simpson provide useful supplements to aid in understanding Coke’s contents 
conception. Common Law principles, Postema explains, “are the products of 
a process of reasoning, fashioned by the exercise of the special, professional 
intellectual skills of Common Lawyers over time refining and coordinating
37 sir Edward Coke, 1 Institutes 97b, as in Stoner, Common Law and Liberal 
Theory. 23.
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the social habits of a people into a coherent body of r u le s .  ”38 Because the
Common Law is conceptualized this way, the distinction between legality and
rationality becomes blurred. Simpson noticed this when he remarked that,
“In the common law system no very clear distinction exists between saying
that a particular solution to a problem is in accordance with the law, and
saying that i t  is the rational, or fair, or just s o lu t io n .  ”39 This close proximity
of the legal and the rational or the just may look somewhat problematic to
the modem reader. Indeed, Hobbes is rightly seen as a kind of positivist
challenger to Coke’s ideas on precisely this point, but Coke himself accepts
this near-identity because he believes that the reasonableness of the law is
why people should obey it, rather than what may be its social utility or
foundations of consent.4**
This leads to the second conception of Common Law and is best
expressed by a later luminary of the tradition, Sir Matthew Hale. This is the
genre conception of the Common Law, or what kind of thing the Common
Law is. The second conception provides that the Common Law is best
understood as immemorial custom. 41 As Hale, referring to the Common Law
as “Leges non Scriptae,” wrote:
[Tjheir Authoritative and Original Institutions are not set down in 
Writing in that Manner, or with that Authority that Acts of Parliament 
are, but they are grown into Use, and have acquired their binding 
Power and the Force of Laws by a long and immemorial Usage, and by
38 Postema, Bentham and the CLT. 7. Coke’s idea that law was a product of 
intellectual reason was in conflict with the Hobbesian notion that law was a product of 
an authoritative will. See D.E.C. Yale, “Hobbes and Hale on Law,” 124-6. More on this 
difference and the consequences for the proper administration of judicial power will be 
said below. See text infra.
39 Simpson, “Common Law and Legal Theory,” 79.
40 i am fully aware of the differences that existed among prominent Common 
Law theorists (such as Coke and Blackstone) concerning this conception of 
reasonableness. The Cokean version is what Postema refers to as the “particularist” 
version of reasonableness found in Common Law theory. See Postema, Bentham and the 
CLT. 30-38. Also see text infra.
41 See generally Pocock, Ancient Constitution. 30-55.
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the Strength of Custom and Reception in this Kingdom.42 
The very existence and authority of the Common Law is dependent upon both 
its historical pedigree and its having been generally used, accepted and 
adapted. The contents and genre conceptions of the Common Law mutually 
support each other. The only legitimate test of reasonableness- the heart of 
the Cokean contents conception- for Common Law theory is to stand the test 
of time. The notion of “time” varied among Common Law thinkers, and the 
views of Coke and Hale diverged markedly on this point. For Coke, the 
authority of the Common Law rested on what he believed the ability to trace 
specific Common Law provisions back to ancient Saxon eras. Hale- who is 
credited with forwarding the dominant view- focused instead on the 
continued reception of a Common Law that was in a state of perpetual 
development. “The key,” Postema says, clarifying Hale’s idea of time, “is not 
identity of components but a steady continuity with the past. ”43
There is an additional point worth making about the combination of 
these two conceptions. Common Law theory, as constructed by the two 
central conceptions of Coke and Hale, is a practical theory in the sense that it 
ultimately concerns itself with and is shaped most by the practice of its rules. 
Coke’s notion of reasonableness is, as Postema describes, “entirely concrete 
and particular, inseparable from the particular situations brought to the law 
and resolved by it.... the reason of the law is guaranteed not by any external 
principles or criteria of rationality to which it allegedly conforms, but
42 Sir Matthew Hale, The History of the Common Law of England. Charles M.
Gray, ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), 17. Hale’s History of the 
Common Law was published posthumously and received three printings (1713, 1716, and 
1739). The Gray edition is a reproduction of the third printing of 1739.
William Blackstone in his well known Commentaries also echoes these 
conceptions of Coke and Hale and cites them often. See Blackstone, Commentaries on the 
Laws of England. 4 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), vol. 1: 17, 18, 63- 
86 [hereinafter cited as, for example, “1 Blackstone 17.” 1 = volume 1, 17 = page 17.].
43 Postema, Bentham and the CLT. 6. Also see James Boyd White’s treatment of 
Hale’s “Time” in Acts of Hone: Creatine Authority in Literature. Law, and Politics 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 124-152.
i ^ 7
rather by its own internal coherence and completeness. 7,44 This is why the 
Common Lawyer makes such use of analogical reasoning. 4$ This practical 
quality grips Hale’s conception at least as firmly, for the historical pedigree 
of the law is not enough without the continued acceptance of it; “the 
immediately evident formal or institutional aspects of law [including 
adjudicative bodies, judicial decisions, resolutions and practices]... have their 
legal significance because they are grounded in an invisible substratum, the 
custom and practice, the common life, of the community at large.”46
Indeed, Hale’s practical view may seem to pose problems for the thesis 
of this paper with his suggestion that the judicial power should be wielded 
only in certain ways. If a community having continually accepted a 
conventional practice is the most important basis of authority for the 
Common Law, then an institutional accretion like the “opinion of the Court,” 
appears to pass the test. The traditional biases of Common Law theory that so 
irritated positivist writers seems to thwart any movement for reform in this 
area. This appearance, though, is in fact illusory. The “opinion of the 
Court,” and the institutional practices of an appellate tribunal which 
undermine the sincerity postulate are not legally significant according to 
Common Law thinking precisely because they are not in any sense 
“grounded” in the community’s common life. Indeed, the adherence of 
judges to the sincerity postulate ensures that any such decision or practice
4 4  Ibid., 31. Postema also adds that Hale “seems to endorse” Coke's 
“particularism conception of reason. Coke’s conception is contrasted by Postema against 
what he calls Blackstone’s “rationally scientific” conception of reason. See generally 
ibid., 30-38.
45 See generally Fried, “Artificial Reason of the Law.”
46 Postema, Bentham and the CLT. 27. Hale, in conveying his idea that pedigree 
is really only secondary to the continued practice of Common Law, compares English law 
to the voyage of the Argonauts: “But tho’ those particular Variations and Accessions 
have happened in the Laws, yet they being only partial and successive, we may with just 
Reason say, They are the same English Laws now, that they were 600 Years since in the 
general. As the Argonauts Ship was the same when it returned home, as it was when it 
went out, tho’ in that long Voyage it had successive Amendments, and scarce came back 
with any of its former Materials.” Hale, History. 40.
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has the opportunity to take root in the “invisible substratum,” by allowing
for (or, equally as important, not allowing for) a certain kind of continued
acceptance that Common Law theory demands. Hale’s use of organic
metaphor is unexceptional in Common Law writing but signals something
noteworthy. In contrast to the mechanical and deductive passages of
positivism, the Common Law is essentially organic. Just how the Common
Law does grow, or what Postema calls “the texture” of the Common Law’s
acceptance, is as important for our inquires as these two central conceptions
of the Common Law. Fundamental to Common Law theory is that the two
above conceptions (what Postema calls notions of reasonableness and
historical appropriateness and what I term conceptions of content and
genre) ultimately reside within a culture of public participation. Postema
explicates this idea most clearly:
the use and acceptance of the Common Law rests on a shared sense of its 
reasonableness and historical appropriateness. The fact that it is 
shared, mutually recognized, is essential. It is not enough that each 
member of the community believes that the rules are reasonable, good, 
or wise; they must also believe that others in the community believe 
this as well... For it is only the public demonstration of the suitability of 
the rules over time that qualifies them for status as law.4?
This shared sense is what appears to be at work when some of the 
historical and institutional properties of the Common Law are considered. It 
is important to remember that Common Law theory arose as a response to the 
ideologies of royal absolutism and rationalism that were in vogue both in 
England and on the Continent. Common Law theory was a decentralizing 
political force.^ Jurists like Coke were initiating what was in essence a 
reassertion of a medieval idea which held that law, “is the expression of a 
deeper reality which is merely discovered and publicly declared by,” legal 
o f f i c i a l s . 4^ The judiciary is thus a critically important means of expressing
47 Ibid., 8 [original emphasis].
48 See generally, Pocock, Ancient Constitution. 
48 Postema, Bentham and the CLT. 4.
law, but it does not create law. Coke’s oft-cited adage in Calvin’s Case, ju d e x  
e s t  l e x  lo q u e n s , only conveys its true force if we remember that, “the judge is 
the mouthpiece of a law which transcends the judiciary. ”50 The only reason 
why judges’ opinions are to be accorded authority is because the judge is to 
be seen as “an expert reporting his or her findings, not the final or formal 
authority of an official whose saying makes it so.”5i The opinion of a judge 
should be respected and treated as authoritative because the judge, within 
the bounds of the law, is privy to the numerous situations, analogies and 
conversations that are material to the present dispute before h e r .52
It is remarkable how many scholars- almost without noticing- discuss 
this aspect of Common Law theory by employing the individual term “judge” 
and not “court” or “judiciary” or the like. Simpson, for one, noticed the 
inherent quality of the Common Law that resisted a singular authoritative 
statement of law but instead thrived upon the “many-voicedness” of the law: 
“[T]he common law system [does not] admit of the possibility of a court, 
however elevated, reaching a final, authoritative statement of what the law 
is in a general abstract sense. It is as if the system placed particular value 
upon dissension, obscurity, and the tentative character of judicial
50 ibid., 9 [emphasis added]. See also Hale, History. 45-46; 1 Blackstone, 69,
71.
51 Ibid. Postema also adds parenthetically: “The holding has such final 
authority, but the formulation of the law on which the holding is supposed to rest does 
not.” Ibid. See also 1 Blackstone 71 f“the law, and the opinion of the judge are not 
always convertible terms, or one and the same thing; since it sometimes may happen that 
the judge may mistake the law.”].
52 See generally ibid., 31-33 [“The judge, through the long study and practice 
within this fund of concrete knowledge and experience, is able to situate the dispute or 
problem at hand in the complex body of experience.”]. See also Hale, “Reflections by the 
Lrd. Cheife Justice Hale on Mr. Hobbes His Dialogue of the Lawe,” in William 
Holdsworth, 5 A History of English Law 499-513 (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1924), 
501-6. The idea that the foundation of a judge’s authority lies in the fact that he is a 
type of “deeply situated agent” resembles closely some thoughts of modern “post­
positivist” legal theorists. See text'infra.
utterances. ”53 Postema makes a similar point when he says that, “Common 
Law is a form of legal thought and practice which vigorously resists 
regimentation to a structured system flowing logically from a set of first 
principles. ”54 phis is perhaps the most important theoretical explanation for 
the rather chaotic jurisdictional and appellate “structure” that has always 
(at least relatively) characterized the English system of adjudication. “What 
is involved,” Simpson explains of Common Law study, “is basically an oral 
tradition, still only imperfectly reduced to writing. ”55 Adjudication for the 
Common Law judge is an inescapable, inexorable search and struggle for 
authenticity. This is the only kind of participation which can provide the 
best expression of law.
There is good reason for the emphasis I have insisted upon here, 
focusing on the classical conceptions of Coke and Hale. But a section on 
Common Law theory with an eye towards application to our problem of 
judicial behavior would be incomplete without at least a brief mention of 
William Blackstone. Blackstone’s influence upon the revolutionaries and 
constitution-makers in late-eighteenth century America was second to none. 
Back at home, his Commentaries on the Laws of England placed legal training 
for the first time within reach of university gentlemen in addition to the 
Inns of Court. The Commentaries rely heavily upon Coke and the classical
53 Simpson, “Common Law and Legal Theory,” 90. Simpson also cites the Law 
Lords practice of seriatim opinions in a telling illustration of the Common Law’s 
inherent vagueness: “When, after long and expensive argument the Law Lords deliver 
themselves ex cathedra of their opinions- and this is the best we can do- they either 
confine themselves to laconic agreement or all sav different things, and this even when 
they claim to be in complete agreement. It would hardly be worth their while to deliver 
separate opinions if this were not so.” Ibid [original emphasis].
54 Postema, Bentham and the CLT. 10. Postema here is cogently presenting the 
implications of Simpson’s observation that Common Law formulations are best 
comprehended as “grammarians’ rules, which both describe linguistic practices and 
attempt to systematize and order them.” Because of the genre of Common Law 
formulations, “there is no way of settling the correct text or formulation of the rules, so 
that it is inherently impossible to state so much as a single rule in what Pollock called 
‘any authentic form of words’.” Simpson, “Common Law and Legal Theory,” 94, 89.
55 Simpson, “Common Law and Legal Theory,” 97.
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conceptions of Common Law. They also, however, make an attempt to 
reconcile classical liberal politics and the sovereignty of Parliament within 
the confines of that “system” (or, as some have argued, to alter the Common 
Law so as to serve an agenda of liberal thought and the ascendancy of the 
House of C o m m o n s ) .56 Consequently, his outlook is more starkly positivist 
than his predecessors and sought to paint Common Law as more of a rational 
s c i e n c e . 57 This aspect of Blackstone may seem to damage much of the 
discussion of Common Law theory to this point, especially considering his 
influence. This sort of objection, though, is in truth a red herring. As 
Postema explains, the Cokean conception, even for Blackstone, remains in a 
position of primacy because of the nature of judicial power. Even if 
Blackstonian views are accepted and the Common Law is to made into a 
science based on first principles, “the principles are uncovered through 
reflection on the particular cases... and not through a priori reasoning.... 
General principles- ‘theory’ we might say- are needed in adjudication, but 
‘theory’ is always driven by cases, and not decisions and cases by t h e o r y .  ”58 
Hale’s customary conception comes into view here as well in this explanation 
by Postema, as the particularity that unavoidably characterizes judicial 
power produces a reason that is time and context-sensitive. The peculiar 
institutionalism of the Common Law, it would appear, is emblematic of the 
“theory” which “generates” it.
56 The best analysis and discussion of Blackstone and his Commentaries is still 
Daniel Boorstin’s 1941 dissertation. See Boorstin, The Mysterious Science of the Law:
An Essay on Blackstone’s Commentaries Showing How Blackstone. Employing Eighteenth- 
Century Ideas of Science. Religion. History. Aesthetics, and Philosophy. Made of the Law 
at Once a Conservative and Mysterious Science (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1996).
57 See “Blackstone’s Liberalized Common Law," in Stoner, Common Law and 
Liberal Theory. 162-175; Postema, Bentham and the CLT. 33, 34.




Ever since Thomas Hobbes published his Elements of Law in 1640 there 
has been a strong scholarly response to the philosophical underpinnings of 
both natural law and Common Law theory. Followed by the expositions of 
Jeremy Bentham, John Austin and Herbert Hart, legal positivism has always 
first emphasized the social thesis of law while trying secondarily to 
incorporate or explain away the normative thesis. For a positivist, the 
answer to the question “What is law?” is almost wholly captured by the term 
“Rules.” These rules are determinate, clear; a legal practitioner is either 
acting in accordance with these clear rules or is acting “extralegally” or 
employing her own “discretion.” It should not be surprising that because of 
this fundamental assumption legal positivism prefers to explain law on the 
model of legislation rather than adjudication; still less so when considering 
the historical roots of British positivism as a reaction to Common Law theory 
and its adjudication-based model. To the extent that positivism does grapple 
with adjudication, more than any other school of legal theory it tends toward 
a strategic explanation of legal officials and, thus, is of great importance for 
our inquiries. It tends toward such an explanation both because of the 
“natural” consequences which flow from its commitments and because of 
unnecessary extensions of these commitments made by legal positivists.
Legal positivism then is correctly understood to lend itself to a strategic 
explanation of official legal behavior and has been manipulated by its 
adherents so that this feature is exaggerated even further. These are 
crucially important characteristics of positivism, and especially so when one 
considers that legal positivism is considered by many scholars and 
commentators of legal theory today to be the “ruling theory of law,” in both 
the United States and Great Britain.
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Hobbes is commonly regarded as the originator of many ideas. The 
first important philosopher to write in English, Hobbes is accorded the 
distinction of being the original liberal, rationalist and legal positivist. 
Hobbes’ work is a natural attraction for those interested in American law and 
government because of his explicit claim to be laying out a scientia civilis. or 
civil science. This sort of claim rings familiar to those who have read 
important authors of American constitutionalism such as Publius.1 Much of 
what Hobbes explicitly says about law we will wait to discuss later in this 
section, when we come to the writing of John Austin who rigorously 
expounds upon Hobbes’ original imperative theme. Our principal concern 
with Hobbes here really concerns his providing an alternative to the 
dominant classical mode of moral and political (and, by extension, legal) 
reasoning. Hobbes throughout his writing seeks to transform language 
generally into a more certain and deductive form, eschewing its inherent 
indeterminacy. This point is not a very controversial one among students of 
Hobbes, so a few short examples should suffice. Chapter five of the first part 
of The Elements of Law, for instance, is devoted almost exclusively to such 
linguistic considerations. Hobbes notes that many names we give to objects 
“bring into our minds other thoughts than those for which they were 
ordained. And these are called EQUIVOCAL.” This equivocation was not 
desired by Hobbes, who believed it was, “a great ability in a man, out of the 
words, contexture, and other circumstances of language, to deliver himself 
from equivocation, and to find out the true meaning of what is said.”2 To 
successfully perform this feat, for the receiver to gain the proper 
conception caused by the speech, was Hobbes’ very definition of
1 Publius' aspiration to devise a science of politics was typical of writers who 
shaped the founding era. For other such authors, see generally Adams, Willi Paul. The 
First American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the Making of the State 
Constitutions in the Revolutionary Era, trans. Rita and Robert Kimber (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1980).
2 Hobbes, The Elements of Law Natural and Politic. J.C.A. Gaskin, ed. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), 37, 38.
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understanding.3
Later, in chapter thirteen, titled “How By Language Men Work Upon
Each Other’s Minds”, Hobbes visits the subject again, this time showing a bit
more of a normative inclination. Hobbes sees language as having a primary
purpose, namely, “the expression of our conceptions, that is, the begetting in
another the same conceptions that we have in ourselves.”4 This edifying,
instructive use of language is what was essential for Hobbes, and to defeat
this purpose as a speaker is to deny an essential component of your own
humanity. Hobbes is plain that he has little taste for such a speaker:
Forasmuch as whosoever speaketh to another, intendeth thereby to 
make him understand what he saith; if he speaketh unto him, either in 
a language which he that heareth understandeth not, or use any word 
in other sense than he believeth is the sense of him that heareth; he 
intendeth also to make him not understand what he saith; which is a 
contradiction of himself.5
Hobbes is even clearer about the “abuses” of speech in his fourth chapter of
Leviathan: he lists four principal abuses, as follows:
[1] when men register their thoughts wrong, by the inconstancy of 
their signification of their words... [2] when they use words 
metaphorically; that is in other sense than that they are ordained for; 
and thereby deceive others... [3] when by words they declare that to be 
their will, which is not... [4] when they use them [words] to grieve 
[harm] one another... it is but an abuse of Speech, to grieve him with 
the tongue, unlesse it be one whom wee are obliged to govern; and then 
it is not to grieve, but to correct and amend.6
Hobbes, in short, is transparent throughout all of his important 
philosophical work that he is deeply concerned about how to advance moral 
and (in the broadest sense) political propositions. The important writers of
3 Ibid.; also see Hobbes, Leviathan. C.B. Macpherson, ed. (Harmonsworth, 
England: Penguin Books, 1968), part I, ch. 4, pp. 108-9.
4 Hobbes, Elements of Law, ch. 13, no. 2, page 73. See also Leviathan, part I, ch.
4, pages 100-110.
5 Hobbes, Elements of Law. Ch. 13, no. 10, page 77. Also see Leviathan, part I, 
ch. 5, page 116-7. Cf. Cooke, ed., Federalist 37, at 236-7 [Madison decrying the 
insurmountable problem of the opacity of language for any speaker].
6 Hobbes, Leviathan, part I, ch. 4, page 102. Hobbes continues on the same 
theme in the next chapter when he discusses the “cause of Absurd conclusions,” one of 
these being “the use of Metaphors, Tropes, and other Rhetorical figures, in stead of 
words proper.” Ibid., ch. 5, page 114.
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classical antiquity as well as Common Law theorists all forwarded the notion 
that a dialogical mode of inquiry and proceeding was the best way to advance 
moral and political propositions. By a dialogical mode I mean that the way 
public decisions were made was to deliberately engage in a dual conversation 
or argument of the issue at hand. Moreover, both Common Law theory and 
practice suggest that this dialogical mode should hold not only for the 
arguing of a case but even as a possibility of that case’s resolution. That the 
possibility existed for a “conversing” or dialogic form of resolution is 
something central and perhaps emblematic of the theory; the possibility was 
not to be foreclosed. In fact, a fair reading of Common Law theory even 
suggests further that it was this dialogical mode that was so highly valued 
that it was “institutionalized” for adjudicated disputes. The dialogical mode 
was considered the best way to advance moral and political arguments (and 
even legal arguments and resolutions) within a polity.
What Hobbes did most fundamentally in his writings was to challenge 
the dominance of the dialogical mode for advancing moral and political 
propositions and provide an alternative, monological mode for doing this. 
This is the central thrust of Quentin Skinner’s detailed assessment of Hobbes 
in his recent monograph, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes. 
Hobbes, while he was positing a rather sophisticated political philosophy, 
was choosing a side in a debate that had consumed writers since classical 
antiquity: whether or not it was possible to separate the content and form of 
human speech. The classical authors conceived of scientia civilis as 
composed of the two essential ingredients of reason and rhetoric. Skinner 
explains how Cicero- the archetypal expounder of the classical notion of 
scientia civilis- insisted in his De inventione that what was required of a v ir  
civilis (the ideal image of the citizen for classical writers), “is ratio atque 
oratio. powerful reasoning allied with powerful speech. We can thus be sure 
that cities were originally established not merely by the ratio of the mind
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but also, and more readily, by means of eloquentia. ’ ”7 Skinner explains of 
the classical writers’ conception of the dialogical mode that it was grounded 
in a commitment (and illustrated by such examples as the Roman orator 
Carneades) that, “in moral and political debate, it will always be possible to 
speak in utramque partem [on either side of the case], and will never be 
possible to couch our moral or political theories in deductive form. ”8
By contrast, Hobbes, on Skinner’s view, had great faith in man’s 
ability to distill the certainty and transparency of language and sought to 
present a sophisticated political theory in purely deductive form, without 
using the classical accoutrements of rhetoric or eloquence which were 
usually employed to advance such theories. 9 Hobbes then, on Skinner’s 
view, was initially opposed to a fundamental conception of moral and 
political debate which was first forwarded by the classical writers and 
practiced by the Renaissance humanists of Hobbes’ childhood. This position 
characterizes Hobbes’ early efforts in matters of scientia civilis. with 
Elements of Law being Skinner’s prime example. However, by the time 
Hobbes writes Leviathan. Skinner tells us, he had come to believe that 
rhetoric should be employed in the service of advancing science; science 
alone could not take root in the minds of men due to their prior interests. 10
7 Quentin Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric in the Philosophy of Hobbes (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 83-4; see also ibid., 2, 106-7, 351-62.
8 Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric. 15. For the example of Carneades, see ibid., 98.
9 Ibid., 298. Indeed, Skinner tells how the title of Hobbes’ first major work, The 
Elements of Law, intentionally followed that of the English translation of Euclid’s 
deductive treatise, The Elements of Geometrie.
10 See generally Skinner, Reason and Rhetoric, 1-18, 250-375, 426-437.
On the separate issue of how we should read history, I am fully aware of the
controversy caused by Skinner and other practitioners of “Cambridge contextualism.”
By asking “what he was doing” when Hobbes sat down to write, Skinner is seeking to 
situate Hobbes’ texts in its intellectual and historical context, noting that he may not 
have been just acting but reacting as well. See Quentin Skinner, Meaning and Context: 
Quentin Skinner and His Critics, ed. James Tully (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), 259-88.
Many who are interested in philosophy or historiography would argue that 
Skinner’s question is unnecessary and even dangerous, as it displaces attention from 
what they see as the crucial (and perhaps only) use of writers like Hobbes: the
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In the end, Hobbes concluded, form was needed to supplement the content of 
speech. This change of mind by Hobbes is important. If students of 
American history and government emphasize the Hobbesian aspects of the 
American founding (as many in fact do, usually in contrast to the Lockean 
nature of the periods of revolution and confederation), then Hobbes’ 
ultimate (though begrudging) commitment to the necessity of eloquence in 
matters of scientia civilis must also be underscored. If rhetoric is essential to 
convey propositions of politics and law then the rhetorical environment is 
inescapable; the presence of rhetoric can not legitimately operate without 
the opportunity to speak in ultramque partem. This line of analysis leads 
further to a more immediately relevant question: in light of this 
understanding, which mode(s) of expression were envisioned for 
(American) constitutional institutions?
An extension of Skinner’s observations can now even be stated more 
positively than has been done so far; one that applies to our principal 
concern of judicial behavior. Hobbes’ initial commitment to a monological 
mode of advancing political propositions allows for- much more readily than 
the dialogical model- a strategic inclination on behalf of legal officials.
There are two basic reasons why I believe this is so, and both of these are 
reflected in the working practice of the United States Supreme Court today. 
The first reason is that a monological mode of expression places central 
importance on who is doing the sneaking, even more so than the dialogical 
mode. With the dialogic approach, the intended audience of a speech act 
which seeks to resolve a plurally faceted problem will expect to hear 
counter-arguments. Because of this, there is greater opportunity to ensure
distillation, refinement and understanding of philosophical propositions that owe no 
debt to context. Whatever view one takes regarding this controversy, Skinner’s work is 
undoubtedly relevant here, as it highlights the crucial importance placed on the method 
of political argument. Skinner himself underlines this relevance when he says that, “by 
focusing on the historical juncture at which the shift from a dialogical to a monological 
style of moral and political reasoning took place, I may have succeeded in raising anew 
the question of which style is more deserving of our intellectual allegiances.” Reason 
and Rhetoric. 16.
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that the diversity of a problem is covered more completely. In contrast, 
within a monological mode of political or legal or moral discourse there is 
greater urgency to be in control of the means of expression for that singular 
utterance, so there is more incentive (interest) to strategically acquire that 
control. In this way, a monological mode of legal/political discourse will 
probably produce concerns of being heard at all and will encourage 
strategic action if such options present themselves. No doubt the ability to 
dissent in matters of appellate adjudication is reflective of just these kinds of 
concerns. To only focus on cases of substantive, resultant disagreement, 
however, would miss the larger point, which brings us to the second reason 
why strategic behavior would be more likely to occur within an 
environment of monological expression. If the mode of discourse is 
monological, and if the officials within that system entertain any notions at 
all about the opacity of language, than the later phases of application and 
incorporation of legal rationales will almost certainly encourage strategic 
behavior by those officials responsible for such tasks. A dialogical mode of 
advancing legal propositions, by contrast, has the possibility of foreclosing 
some or much of this strategic action, especially when the speakers are in 
agreement as to the legal result or intended legal objective at issue. 
Furthermore, in matters of appellate adjudication- a task which is essentially 
distinguished from other law making activity by a concern for not only 
right results but right rationales- agreement as to result does not settle 
agreement as to rationale. In a rigid hierarchy of courts adhering to a 
monological mode of “rationale-giving,” there is clear incentive for officials 
within that system to affect the rationale which animated the result.
More than a century after Hobbes wrote, in 1776 Jeremy Bentham set 
out upon what appears to be a similar project: “to construct an account of 
law and government from independent rational principles, as opposed to
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relying on the particular local traditions of authority which a group or 
country might happen to possess. Frustrated and unsatisfied with the 
explanations of government by common lawyers like Blackstone, Bentham 
would prove (and is still proving) to be one the most sophisticated expositors 
of legal positivism. Bentham, of course, was primarily arguing (and would 
continue to argue consistently throughout his life) for a utilitarian calculus 
to be applied to matters politic, and in fact Bentham’s legal positivism is 
really in the service of the principle of utility. He explains immediately at 
the start of his Fragment on Government is that utility is defined simply by, 
“this fundamental axiom, it is the greatest happiness of the greatest number 
that is the measure of right and w r o n g . ” 12 Much has been written about this 
connection, but Bentham’s work serves a purpose somewhat less grand as 
well. Notwithstanding his prolific, diffuse, and often strained writing on 
subjects of law and adjudication, Bentham’s thoughts on judicial behavior 
are important for any review of the subject. In fact, as will be seen shortly, 
Bentham presented a serious and sophisticated utilitarian, positivist theory 
of law and a close reading of certain aspects of his theory will reveal an 
acknowledgement that a large danger of judicial power lies in its strategic 
exercise. This recognition led Bentham to seek and construct structural 
constraints on judges to prevent strategic behavior. In the simplest terms 
Bentham, perhaps consciously, took steps to ensure judicial behavior was 
more sincere.
Before we begin, there is an important fact of studying Bentham 
which should be admitted. Bentham is a relatively new discovery for legal
11 Jeremy Bentham, A Fragment on Government. J.H. Bums and H.L.A. Hart, eds., 
Ross Harrison, intro. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), xiii-xiv.
12 ibid., 3 [original emphasis]. Bentham credits David Hume with having 
invented the doctrine of utilitarianism, and intervening utilitarians Beccaria and 
Helvetius are referred to by Bentham in his Fragment. See ibid., xiv, 51. “[T|t is not the 
invention o f utilitarianism for which Bentham is important,” Ross Harrison explains in 
an introduction to the Fragment. “Rather, it is for showing in much greater detail than 
before how it might be applied.” Ibid., xiv.
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theorists and his work has not yet received the wide secondary treatment it 
deserves because a good deal of it remains in original manuscript form. This 
obstacle to accessibility is being overcome presently, but the fact remains 
that there are very few scholars who have painstakingly studied Bentham’s 
work in a fullness which would permit general observations to be 
confidently made. And even when devoted students take the time to sift 
through the manuscripts, on some subjects Bentham was what Tolstoy would 
call a fox, not a hedgehog. “Nowhere,” Gerald Postema says for example, “do 
we find a complete, unified statement of his [Bentham’s] theory of 
a d j u d i c a t i o n . I n  fact, Bentham’s writings on adjudication, judicial 
behavior, and law generally highlight different things at different times in 
his career and even conflict. Fortunately, Postema has provided what is 
perhaps the authoritative explanation of Benthamite legal theory; his 1986 
volume, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition, will be relied upon heavily 
in this section. Let me be clear: Postema’s work is only one possible 
philosophical reconstruction of Benthamite legal theory, but it is the best 
comprehensive rendering of his thinking available and presents a unified 
“Benthamite” position which (regardless of authenticity) offers excellent 
insights for our particular inquiries.
There are some rather large assumptions that accompany Benthamite 
legal theory which must be laid out before our review can proceed. First, 
there should be further emphasis on the notion of utility; for Bentham it is 
the only legitimate principle of decision. “Justice and utility are not in deep 
conflict, in Bentham’s view,” Postema explains, “because justice properly 
understood is reducible to u t i l i t y .  ”14 This principle of utility permeates all of 
Bentham’s discussion of law and adjudication; it is the bedrock of his legal 
project, and the fundamental tool of legal practice. “Bentham’s strategy,”
13 Postema, Bentham and the CLT. 340.
14 Ibid., 155.
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Postema writes towards the end of his detailed analysis, “was to maintain the 
principle of utility as the basic decision principle for both the lawmaking 
and the adjudicating f u n c t i o n s . B e c a u s e  of the central importance of 
utility for Bentham, he believed that the law should firstly and foremostly 
secure the expectations of people who come together to interact and 
coordinate their actions with each other and lay the foundations of civilized 
society. Postema writes that security of expectations is a sort of “primary 
good” for Bentham, that, “security is the primary focus of his utilitarian 
theory of law, and the first deputy of his sovereign principle of utility. ”16 
Bentham suggests two main ways the law secures expectations. The law is an 
“expectation-creator” by providing a set of clear public rules, and the law is 
also an “underwriter” of expectations already in existence (by earlier 
agreements or custom for example) by making these expectations more 
public, by elucidating and enforcing them.17 But it would be a mistake to 
read Bentham as viewing law only instrumentally. “In Bentham’s theory,” 
Postema says, “law plays the social role that [David] Hume assigns to 
property. Its task is to lay the foundations of society, to constitute a
people. ”18
Flowing from these sorts of commitments is the further Benthamite 
drive to view law on the model of legislation and to view the legislature as 
the central institution to perform the tasks of law. A clear code of rules 
would best focus the expectations of the community, Bentham believed. The 
law of common law judges, Bentham believed, was incapable of properly 
focusing and channelling rules of coordinated action so that expectations 
could be secured. Even more generally, Bentham believed that the
15 ibid., 407.
16 Ibid., 162, 168.
17 Ibid., 188.
18 ibid., 160; also see ibid., 183, 189.
179
legislature was the place for true legal reform to emerge, a radical notion at 
the time Bentham wrote. Most conservatives and progressives of Bentham’s 
era thought that the needed legal reforms could only come from the courts 
and that Parliament was a helpless and incompetent institution. 19
This view of Bentham as pitted against an established clique is itself an 
important contextual fact to remember as well. Bentham was first motivated 
to write against Blackstone and the Common Lawyers because he felt their 
lessons instilled a, “submission to authority... in judgment.” which Bentham 
found intolerable.20 Bentham felt that “the right of private judgment” was 
fundamental, the “basis of every thing that an Englishman holds dear.”2i 
The importance Bentham ascribed to private judgment and the idea of the 
self that is “rationally self-directed” really cannot be overstated, as it 
actually forms the seedbed out of which Bentham’s conception of law can be 
best understood. Contrary to the standard appraisal of a Benthamite 
conception of law as “managerial” or “hierarchical,” Postema explains that 
Bentham’s conception of law more closely approximates the “interactive” 
theory articulated by Lon Fuller in the mid-twentieth century. 22
Finally, before we go over certain points of Bentham’s legal theory in 
more detail, it is worthwhile to keep in mind the basic outline of Bentham’s 
theory of adjudication, according to Postema’s reading of his dispersed 
thoughts on the subject. This summary highlights five main points, and I
19 Ibid., 197-8.
20 ibid., 165 [“His aim,” Postema adds of Bentham in this same vein, “in these 
works, and throughout his life, was to emancipate ‘the judicial faculties’ of the public 
from the shackles in which the established legal and political tradition had bound it.”].
21 Bentham. Fragment. 16. Also see Postema. Bentham and the CLT. 165-7.
22 Postema, Bentham and the CLT. 168. Fuller believed that the existence of 
enacted law itself depended on the development of “stable interactional expectancies” 
between lawgiver and subject. For a thorough discussion of Fuller’s “interactive” and 
“facilitating” view of law, see Kenneth I. Winston, ed., “Human Interaction and the Law,” 
in The Principles of Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon Fuller (Durham, N.C.: Duke 
University Press, 1981), 211-246. Also see Fuller, The Morality of Law, revised edition 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), passim.
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include a paraphrased version of it in a footnote below. 23
With a good deal of equipment now on board, we can proceed. Two of 
the areas which illuminate some of BenthanTs thinking on judicial behavior 
are the matters of judicial legislation and the importance of the doctrine of 
stare decisis. On the latter, Bentham’s view of precedent looks very similar to 
that of the Common Lawyers. Bentham values stare decisis for two reasons: 
(1) “to keep the judge from assuming the province of the Legislator,” and (2) 
so “that men may have a certain rule to guide them and know what they 
have to expect. ”24 But Bentham’s notion of precedent is far different from 
the Common Lawyers’ because of his positivist inclination. Judicial decisions 
should strive for uniformity and thus prior judgments should be given a 
degree of deference because of their authority, not their wisdom. 25 This is in
23 For Postema’s complete text, see ibid., 405-7. The five-part outline of 
Bentham’s complete theory of adjudication follows:
(1) The legislature is the ultimate source of lawmaking. Laws are to be expressed in the 
form of a completely systematic, comprehensive code. The code must meet standards of 
publicity, simplicity and completeness.
(2) The judge’s duty is to resolve all disputes that arise in the jurisdiction once the code 
is promulgated. Decisions about whether to proceed from mediation to adjudication and 
such decisions on the merits are to be made by balancing utilities in the case at hand.
In this way, the code is treated as the best guide to the relevant utilitarian 
considerations to be taken into account, but utilitarian considerations may “trump” the 
code.
(3) In no circumstances will any judicial decision be deemed to have precedential effect. 
The judge is a particular “justice-doer,” not a general “law-clarifier.”
(4) Discretion is checked by maximizing responsibility of judges. Attention to 
utilitarian considerations are focused by procedural and constitutional arrangements 
which maximize the publicity of both their decisions and the reasoning for them.
(5) Judicial lawmaking by interpretation or “emendation” of the code is allowed, but as a
separate operation from the original adjudication and according to the process set out by
the legislature, which retains veto power. There is thus, a “two-stage” process for any
case which raises a serious interpretational question of the law.
24 Bentham Manuscripts in the University College, London Library, box lxiii,
49, and box 1, 124, respectively, quoted in Postema, Bentham and the CLT. 193
[hereinafter University College manuscripts notes written as “UC, lxiii, 49.” lxiii = box
63,49 = page 49.].
25 See Bentham, A Comment on the Commentaries and a Fragment on Government.
eds., J.H. Burns and H.LA. Hart (London: University of London, 1977), 196. Cf. 1
Blackstone 71.
A quick note on the positivist inclination of Bentham: Postema writes that (with
only one exception in Bentham’s entire corpus) Bentham “never inclined to conceive of
law in any way except as the expression of will of a sovereign lawgiver.” Postema,
Bentham and the CLT, 189.
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marked contrast to the Common Law theory that says, as Postema puts it,
“judges are bound, not to past decisions, but to the rules and principles
implicit in t h e m .  ”26 Bentham’s rigid view of precedent is not surprising
given his affinity for securing expectations and maximizing utility. Indeed
for Bentham, judicial legislation is to be avoided because expectations will be
defeated.27 As Postema points out though, a new statute will also disturb
expectations, but Bentham’s arguments are directed only at judicial
lawmaking, not the legislature. So the importance of expectations alone is
not enough of an explanation. In fact, the real weight of Bentham’s position
rests on an institutional argument. For Bentham, Postema reveals,
There is something special about attempting to set aside old rules and 
establish new ones- that is, something about legislation- when 
performed by a judge “in his judicial capacity”. There is something 
peculiar in the role or office of the judge (or at least a judge in a 
Common Law system) which makes judicial legislation inevitably result 
in partial good at the price of universal e v i l .  28
The problem was not that the judge was ill-equipped or unprepared,
but rather that the functions of lawmaking should be kept distinct. “The
problem lies not in judges exercising legislative power, but rather in their
doing so in the course of adjudicating particular cases.” Postema s a y s .2 9  And
this argument for separation does not rest on what today is the familiar
“anti-majontarian” objection. Bentham, Postema explains, instead grounded
his position in functional terms:
only the legislator (more properly, the code-writer) can take a 
sufficiently general view of the entire field of action and of law needed 
for rational and effective legislating.... It is only the codifier- equipped 
with the conceptual and theoretical tools Bentham himself forged- that
26 Postema, Bentham and the CLT. 194.
27 ibid., 198.
28 Ibid., 200. It is passages like these which illuminate Postema’s larger claim 
that early in his career Bentham was working for radical legal reform within the 
confines of a Common Law system already in place; he did not seek to displace the 
system as a whole. See generally ibid., 191-217.
29 Ibid., 201. Also see UC, clix, 263, quoted in ibid., 200 [“‘Tis the 
provinces/functions that should be distinct and not the persons.].
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can survey the entire field of action and propose sweeping radical 
reform for the defects of existing l a w .30
The insistence of Bentham on such a rigid distinction of functions is 
ultimately grounded in a commitment to judicial sincerity, or- more 
precisely- a commitment to eliminating strategic judicial behavior. It is 
clear from the above passage that, for Bentham, only the legislator or code­
writer has the opportunity to strategically achieve radical, coherent reform 
because only the legislator has the “general view” of the whole field of both 
legal and non-legal action. The adjudicator does not and should not have this 
view, and thus should not even attempt such a wholesale manoeuvre.
Moreover, the legislator is in an even more advantageous position as 
to lawmaking “because as a matter of fact the expression of his will is taken 
as law.” while the judge, “is able to make his choice of a rule law only by 
showing that it already is law. ”31 Here Postema uncovers another important 
assumption of Bentham’s on the subject of lawmaking. “The assumption 
seems to be that for something to become law it is necessary that it come to be 
regarded as law,” he w r ite s .3 2  And unlike statutory law, Bentham maintains 
that there is no practice of recognizing the product of judicial action as law. 
Because of this, there are two obstacles which attempts at judicial lawmaking 
must overcome. Postema: “[Jjudicial decisions intended to have ‘legislative’ 
effect depend for this effect upon concurrence by both the body of active 
judges and the p u b l i c . ”33 This need for concurrence produces a consequence 
that will directly affect judicial behavior. Because a Benthamite judge’s 
decision must be seen to be right and taken as law, and given that the same 
judge will come to a determination based upon the expectations of both his 
fellow judges and the community, for judicial legislation to be successful
30 Ibid., 202; see ibid., at note 17, for citations of primary material.
31 Ibid., 205.
3 2  i b i d .
33 ibid., 206; also see Bentham, UC, lxix, 6.
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according to Bentham the judge must not only be utilitarianly correct, he 
must also strategically co-ordinate his behavior. “Thus, effective, law- 
establishing adjudication under standard conditions in a Common Law 
system, requires not (only) that the judge get his utilitarian sums right, but 
(more importantly) that he co-ordinate his decision-activities with the 
expectations of both the public and his colleagues on the bench,” Postema 
concludes.34
There is a third aspect of Bentham’s legal theory that is also relevant 
here. It is in many ways related to the first two but deserves its own separate 
mention not only because it is a principle which ranks only below utility in 
importance, but because it focuses squarely on adjudication and judicial 
behavior as well. Adjudication for Bentham to be legitimate must be a “a 
process of public deliberation and demonstration. Although the principle of 
expectations governs every decision, for a decision to be correct, it is not 
enough to be, in fact, in accord with that principle, but it must be possible to 
show publicly that it is. ”35 This faith of Bentham’s in the principle of 
publicity was not just a rhetorical flourish; it flowed from his basic 
conception of legitimate power and provided the basic replies for questions 
of judicial behavior. For example, even though Bentham believes that judges 
should base their decisions upon the balance of competing utilities in cases 
before them, he opposes judges determining these expectations by placing 
themselves in the same situations. These sorts of intuitions for Bentham 
were objectionable, Postema tells us, “not because the decision is likely to be 
wrong or arbitrary, but because the intuitions are by their nature 




distinguish appeals to intuition from prejudice or bias.”36 Public
government was accountable government for Bentham, and ultimately the
only legitimate exercise of power. Postema elucidates this point:
The exercise of power is legitimate and beneficial, according to 
Bentham, only if it seeks to direct behaviour through rational 
persuasion. This legitimate “influence of understanding on the 
understanding” must be sharply distinguished from the prevalent 
governing technique of the “influence of the will on the will”. 
Government by the latter technique is unavoidably government by 
sinister interest, Bentham held, because it is government that cannot 
operate in full public v ie w .3 7
According to Bentham, an example of government which utilized the “will 
on will” technique was the Church of England. Through what Bentham felt 
was a blend of coercion over its unwilling subjects and delusion over its 
willing, the Church preserved its power. In a revealingly worded 
observation, Postema explains that the result for Bentham of this type of 
governing technique by the church, “was that the unwilling are sentenced 
to perpetual insincerity, complying without conviction, and the willing are 
led into an irrational c o m p l ia n c e .  ”38
For Bentham then, oxygen was the best disinfectant; the principle of 
publicity was absolutely crucial for his legal theory. Publicity gave shape to 
law’s primary task of securing expectations. Postema captures the 
importance of Bentham’s publicity principle when he writes that,
“according to Bentham, security is a function of the public conviction of 
order and justice (the ‘appearance’ of justice) not of its reality, and that 
conviction is most firmly embedded in the public mind when it is seen that
36 ibid., 213. For others who include this same type of commitment to publicity 
in their legal theory, see Ronald Dworkin Taking Rights Seriously, seventh impression 
(London: Duckworth, 1994), 159-168 [Dworkin, arguing for his “constructive” model of 
coherence: “it assumes that the men and women who reason within the model will each 
hold sincerely the convictions they bring to it, and that this sincerity will extend to 
criticizing as unjust political acts or systems that offend the most profound of these.”]; 




justice is regularly and consistently meted out by the c o u r t s . ”39 The 
principle of publicity was essential in Bentham’s view to assure 
accountability in a judge. And Postema is clear that, on Bentham’s view, the 
judge must be accountable for not only for the “destination” of a particular 
exercise of judicial power, but the “journey” as well: “Not only must all 
actions be open to public view, but also the judge is under strict obligation to 
fully justify his decision and actions to the people.”40 It is because this 
principle of publicity has the potential to be used in different ways that 
positivism lends itself to a strategic explanation of official legal behavior.
To this point we have been discussing in some detail three aspects of 
Benthamite legal theory. The first- Bentham’s insistence on a rigid 
separation of legal functions of provinces- disclosed an implicit commitment 
to sincere judicial behavior, or at least to less strategic behavior by judges. 
The second- Bentham’s assumption that judicial rule-making is in need of 
two different kinds of concurrence- uncovers a contrasting commitment 
which suggests that judges must behave strategically in order to legislate 
effectively from the bench. And the third- that legitimate adjudication is a 
process of public deliberation and demonstration- seems to provide further 
support for judges to behave sincerely, though it would seem that this aspect 
of his theory could be rather easily manipulated to serve the purposes of a 
strategic judge or judiciary. What conclusions can we draw from these 
findings? As I said in the introduction to this section, legal positivism more 
than any other school displays a natural tendency toward strategic behavior 
of legal officials. This is because the positivist sees law- and Bentham is a 
classic example- as resting at bottom upon convention. Conventions 
themselves are invented by people because of the existence of strategic 




fact” by persons who discuss matters of legal theory. This is a correct but 
only partial definition. A convention also provides reasons for actors to act 
in certain specified ways.41 Because of this view of law as resting on 
convention, and because law is distinguished by most positivists (as well as 
most “conventionalists,” as Ronald Dworkin calls them) from other forms of 
social interaction as an interdependent form of social interaction, the 
inevitable result is to characterize legal situations and problems 
strategically. What legal positivists tend to do when providing their account 
of law- to borrow Postema’s terms- is conflate the different levels of 
coordination problems faced by the law. There are, Postema writes, “three 
points of intersection of law and social life at which significant problems of 
coordination seem to arise. ”42 Law is utilized to help solve problems which 
arise independently of law, and these are what Postema calls “Level 1 ” 
coordination problems. He continues, explaining that, “‘Level 2 problems 
arise between officials and citizens; ‘level 3 ’ problems arise among law 
applying officials themselves. ”43 The thesis I have been exploring obviously 
is concerned then with what Postema calls “Level 3 ” problems, as well as 
“Level 2 ” problems. Most positivists (like Postema) for some reason seem to 
neglect the possibility that conventions which provide for the construction 
and maintenance of legal institutions may seek to eliminate strategic 
behavior by certain law applying officials. Postema includes Level 3 
problems as having the same “structural property of strategic interaction” 
that Level 1 and 2 problems have. The functional and institutional concerns 
of some positivists however, and Jeremy Bentham is an excellent example of 
this, would seem to be at odds with this kind of conflation. The conflation of 
what are actually different kinds of coordination problems- and these
41 See Postema, Gerald J. “Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of 




problems are different precisely because the conventions which govern 
some and not others of them have been institutionalized- is too crude and 
ultimately naive. Though Postema would have law applying officials be 
cognizant of the lessons of von Neumann, Morgenstem and Nash, his 
positivism in the end “regards lawmaking and law applying by officials as a 
matter of eliciting a trained response of habitual obedience in those subject 
to the law. ”44
This puts the point in a slightly different way than did the previous 
section on Common Law theory. There is nothing about legal positivism 
itself which requires the conventions which are relevant to legal officials 
(guiding Level 3 problems) to include similar political principles as those 
conventions which are relevant to Level 1 and Level 2 situations. In fact, 
given legal positivism’s rather strong emphasis on the institutional 
character of la w , 45 it seems wholly plausible to envision a legal system 
which included an institution of law application that was governed by a 
convention of strategic s i n c e r i t v .46 More affirmatively, a system of 
interdependent social interaction among Level 1 and Level 2 situations 
(citizen-citizen and official-citizen interactions) where those participants 
are strategic actors can be more efficiently maintained and utilized when the 
participants have at their disposal an institution that does not behave 
strategically. This “sincere” problem-solver does not rob the law of its
44 ibid., 187. Postema, in committing himself to a vision of “law as strategic 
social interaction,” actually becomes something like the legal Platonist he abhors. By 
construing “the beliefs, attitudes, forms of thought, and characteristic patterns of 
reasoning of participants in the enterprise,” in such an exclusive, narrow way, he begins 
to construct an “external reality defined independently” of law. This does a disservice 
to his rather sophisticated treatment of law as objective fact.
45 See generally, J. Raz, The Concept of a Legal System, second edition (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1980).
46 in fact, it could be argued that BenthanTs theory of adjudication anticipated 
this by fashioning a two-step process for the “adjudicating” and “lawmaking” functions. 
This is a moderating institutional procedure which tempers Postema’s strategic 
interpretation. The less “fused” (or more separated) the adjudicative result is from the 
lawmaking rationale, the less strategic a judge can be. The more fused (or less 
separated; like it is today in the Untied States), the more strategic a judge can be.
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dynamic character; on the contrary, it permits that character to flourish. It 
is only when the political principle of “institutional coherence” is conceived 
as a kind of master purpose for law that a wholly strategic institutionalism 
should be employed.47 Otherwise, arguments grounded in a formalist 
institutionalism stand as a substantial check against the “strategic 
coordination” variant of legal positivism. This variant of legal positivism, 
which Postema explicates comprehensively, at bottom is fuelled by a political 
program of judicial “authoritativeness” (read: supremacy) which prejudices 
its project of social coordination. Postema combines two judicial obligations. 
One is a judge’s rather formalist professional obligation which calls for a 
recognition of the interdependence of law, and the other is an obligation of 
political responsibility which calls for a judge to fashion a “general public 
theory. ”48 Both of Postema’s renderings of these obligations are so 
politically partial that they trivialize options that would meet these 
obligations more effectively on his own terms. There is no reason why an 
appellate judiciary (especially at the apex of a hierarchy) could not induce a 
range of expectations which stress a greater degree of interpretive 
symmetry. There is nothing about law according to positivism (or the 
Constitution for that matter) which demands a priori that citizens are 
“entitled” to expect Level 2 or Level 3 coordination, or that judges should 
conform to such a demand. Postema suggests otherwise. The history of 
Common Law institutions actually suggest that their particular brand of 
institutionalism was supported by expectations quite different than 
Postema’s.
They were the kinds of expectations that would permit Bentham
47 Postema: “Thus, if the activity of law applying is to achieve the ends of law 
in a reasonable efficient manner, it must be possible to view the activity of law applying 
as governed by some reasonably coherent pattern. This requires that judges seek to 
coordinate their law-applying activities in order to achieve something tolerably close to 
a norm of what I have called ‘institutional coherence/” This creates Postema’s Level 3 
coordination situation. “Coordination and Convention,” 193, 195-7.
48 Postema, “Coordination and Convention,” 196-7.
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initially to contemplate his task of radical legal reform within the Common 
Law system in which he found himself. Much about his legal program can 
be painted in the uncompromising terms that fit radical agendas and tactics, 
and Bentham’s positivism did not in the end seek to preserve Common Law 
institutions. Nevertheless, Bentham’s institutionalism can not be cast in the 
same stark terms as can his utilitarianism or his commitment to publicity as a 
principle. We must be careful not confuse a difference in governmental 
principles with a difference in governmental forms, and it was on principles 
of government where Bentham’s differences with the Common Lawyers 
were glaring, not on the forms. His institutional concerns for law compared 
with the Common Lawyers are strikingly similar to the dichotomy that 
emerged during the founding period in America and would persist still today. 
That institutional schism is about whether a “protective” or “developmental” 
institutionalism would best secure the chosen governmental principles and 
aims previously agreed upon.4^  In the main (with certain important 
political theorists there are important differences), a “protective” 
institutionalism is one where the constructed governmental structure seeks 
to, as James Madison put it, “control the effects” of those potential evils 
which would undermine the social order. The institutionalism is not viewed 
as a good in and of itself but rather as a necessary and effective check 
against an unavoidable evil. A “developmental” institutionalism, on the 
other hand, aspires to “remove the causes” of those same evils, and sees such 
a construction as a positive good in its own right.
The important point to take away from all this (one which Postema’s 
analysis supports) is that Bentham’s legal institutionalism was a 
“developmental” variant. This foundation would enable Bentham “to reject
49 These two terms are taken from P. Dunleavy and B. O’Leary, Theories of the 
State: The Politics of Liberal Democracy (London: MacMillan, 1987), 16. See also Cooke, 
ed., Federalist 10, at 56-65.
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the ‘incrementalism’ of Blackstone and the Common Lawyers generally,”50
who were undoubtedly “protective” in their approach. Postema summarizes
Bentham’s theoretical approach to problems of government in a passage
which sounds a rather Jeffersonian tone:
The most effective way to secure against corruption and abuse of power 
in government officials, and especially judges, is not to constrain them 
by fixed and rigid rules, which deprive them of doing good, as well as 
evil, but rather to arrange the institutional context within which 
judicial action and deliberation take place such that only motives of 
concern for the general or common good have freedom to operate.51
Specifically on the subject of law, Bentham betrays a markedly
“developmental” attitude. Bentham explains that if laws were truly based on
reason, “they would infuse themselves, so to speak, into the minds of the
people: they would form part of the logic of the people; they would extend
their influence over their moral nature... obedience to the laws would come
to be hardly distinguishable from the feeling of liberty.”52 The wav these
laws would “infuse themselves” was for officials to engage in an open
colloquy with both citizens and themselves on specific legal questions and
issues. This is the contribution (which is itself valuable for Bentham), for
example, of the publicity principle. The developmental institutionalism
Bentham adhered to served the instrumental value of “addressing the
understanding of citizens,” rather than intolerably subordinating their will.
Postema goes on to suggest that Bentham was fully aware of this attitude, and
drew an important implication from it- one that directly concerns the
subject of a judge’s behavior. Bentham articulates this implication in his
Essay on Promulgation:
I am so convinced of the necessity of this exposition of reasons, that I 
would not dispense with one of them at any price. To confide in what is
50 Postema, Bentham and the CLT. 202.
51 Ibid., 391-2. This passage which Postema claims encapsulates Bentham’s 
institutionalism is in marked contrast with the unavoidable and uncompromising 
“strategic egoism” he presupposes for governmental officials. See text below...
52 Bentham, Bowring. i, 161, quoted in ibid., 369.
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called a feeling of justice, a feeling of truth, is a source of error. I have 
seen upon a thousand occasions, that the greatest mistakes are 
conceded in all those feelings which are not brought to the touchstone 
of examination. If this feeling, this first guide, the avant courier of the 
mind, be correct, it will always be possible to translate it into the 
language of reason. Pains and pleasures, as I have repeatedly shown, 
are the only sources of ideas in morals. These ideas may be rendered 
familiar to all the world. The catechism of reasons is worthless, if it 
cannot be made the catechism of the p e o p l e .53
It is not enough for judges to give reasons for their actions; they must do by 
employing a publicly accessible language.
Reinforcing his dedication to a “developmental” institutional 
arrangement, it should be noted that Bentham’s overriding concern with 
ensuring decisions in accord with the greatest happiness principle did move 
him to provide explicit standards of behavior to which government officials 
should adhere, including judges. Bentham felt a judge should possess three 
kinds of “official aptitude”: the active, the intellectual and the moral.54 of 
the three, Postema is clear that the most important for Bentham of the 
official aptitudes was the moral aptitude. “For in the absence of sufficient 
moral aptitude,” Postema says, “the others are not simply useless, they are 
likely to be p e r n i c i o u s .  ”55 just what is this moral aptitude? In some 
instances, it would appear that Bentham defines the moral aptitude as a 
negative virtue, as in being impartial or free from bias. Postema, though, 
goes on to say that the moral aptitude is more than the absence of prejudices, 
“rather these factors are causes of moral inaptitude- failure of moral 
aptitude. Moral aptitude is something more p o s i t i v e .  ”56 Postema presents 
this positive sense of moral aptitude most succinctly in a passage of 
Bentham’s: “disposition to contribute, on all occasions and in all ways, to the
53 Bentham, Bowring. i, 163, quoted in ibid., 370
54 Postema: “The active aptitude is the power or ability to act decisively on 
one’s judgment. The intellectual aptitude involves both appropriate knowledge and 




greatest happiness of the greatest number. ”57 Postema explains two 
implications which follow from this formulation of the moral aptitude, the 
second of which is quite helpful. To possess the moral aptitude for Bentham 
means that a person must possess, “the disposition to be moved to do what one 
judges to be in the universal interest.... Thus, the moral aptitude is directly 
linked to the motive... of sympathy.”58 Now, although it would be stretching 
it to say that Postema’s positive interpretation of the moral aptitude is 
another definition of sincerity, it seems reasonable to suggest that someone 
who had this sort of disposition would not be inclined to act strategically. 
“Keeping your eye on the prize,” and not allowing alternatives external to 
the performance of the task of judging to sway a judgment are qualities 
within the ambit of Postema’s discussion here.
Finally, this brief treatment of some of Bentham’s thoughts on 
“developmental” institutional constraints should conclude with the reminder 
that, like Hume before him, Bentham adopted what Postema calls a “strategic 
egoism” for his general political theory. When considering how political 
institutions are to be constructed, Hume started from the presumption that 
men will generally act in their own self-interest. It has been the point of 
this discussion to suggest that if institutions are constructed with the 
understanding that certain actors will behave in certain ways to satisfy their 
self-regarding motives, then the procedures, conventions and constraints- 
whether “protective” or “developmental” to that institution- which shape 
and channel that behavior should be essentially maintained. Bentham 
recognized this.
The arguments and pre-commitments of both Hobbes and Bentham’s 
legal positivism became popularized by John Austin in the nineteenth
57 Bentham, Bowring. ii, 273, as quoted in ibid., 360.
58 Ibid., 361.
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century. Austin’s legal positivism borrowed a great deal from Hobbes and 
Bentham and during his career Austin articulated what legal positivists still 
consider to be- notwithstanding Herbert Hart’s improvements- the classic 
definition of a “law properly so called.” To this point our unorthodox tour of 
legal positivism has uncovered a few of the important assumptions and 
implications of legal positivism which are relevant to our concerns of 
judicial behavior. Because so much of what Austin did was first formulated 
by Hobbes and Bentham, our examination of his work will be quite brief.
Our brief interest in Austin is due to some of his specific thoughts on 
“those essentials of a law proper.” In the fifth lecture of his magnum opus, 
The Province of Turisprudence Determined. Austin stated three such 
e s s e n t i a l s .59 These essentials really flow from a singular central point, that, 
“Laws properly so called are a species of commands. ”60 Immediately after 
Austin forwards his idea of law as an essentially imperative notion, he 
forwards what is an important consideration for inquiries on the subject of 
judicial behavior, refining that initial claim by saying that, “being a 
command, every law properly so called flows from a determinate source, or 
emanates from a determinate author. In other words, the author from whom 
it proceeds is a determinate rational being, or a determinate body or 
aggregate of rational beings. ”61 The stress Austin places here on the 
determinate quality of law properly so called is repeated throughout the 
lecture. Whenever Austin says “imperative” or “command” there is almost 
always the accompanying phrase, “and therefore proceeding from a
59 John Austin, The Province of Turisprudence Determined. Wilfrid E. Rumble, 
ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 117-8 [hereinafter cited as “PJD”]. 
The three essentials are, briefly, as follows: (1) laws properly so called are a species of 
commands, (2) proper sanctions are annexed to commands, and (3) a duty presupposes a 
command.
60 Ibid., 117. Actually, thq full imperative theory which Austin forwarded in 
PTD stated that these commands were issued by a sovereign lawgiver, but discussions of 
sovereignty would only be distracting in light of our purposes.
61 Ibid., 117-8 [original emphasis].
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determinate source.” What exactly does it mean for a source to be 
determinate? Austin supplies a cogent response to this question, specifying 
that, “If a body of persons be determinate, all the persons who compose it are 
determined and assignable, or every person who belongs to it is determined 
and may be indicated. ”62
Austin in his lecture adopts much of Hobbes’ thinking (and language) 
on this subject. A quick digression would be helpful in illustrating this. It 
was Hobbes who in his discussion “Of Persons, Authors, and things 
Personated,” in Leviathan spoke of the identifying marks of a u t h o r i t y .63 
According to Hobbes, of those persons who speak or act in matters of 
government, some may be “natural persons,” if they act or speak on then- 
own behalf. Others, those who represent the actions or words of another, are 
“artificial persons.” Of these artificial persons, those who “have their words 
and actions Owned by those whom they represent,” are termed “Actors” by 
Hobbes; “he that owneth his words or actions,” are called “Authors” by him. 
From these distinctions Hobbes concludes that by “Authority” one means “a 
Right of doing any act.” Hobbes later contends that authority is a rather 
special reserve. Specifically, Hobbes stipulates that, “things Inanimate, 
cannot be Authors, nor therefore give Authority to their Actors: Yet the 
Actors may have Authority to procure their maintenance, given them by 
those that are Owners, or Govemours of those t h in g s .  ”64 Hobbes then 
continues and explains how a “multitude of men are made One Person,” 
through the act of representation. And the key to a successful 
representation can be found in “the Unity of the Representer... that maketh 
the Person One.... And Unity, cannot otherwise be understood in M u lt i t u d e .”65
62 ibid., 127 [original emphasis].




It is from these assumptions that Hobbes goes on to explain the importance of 
extracting the singular authoritative unity from a representative multitude 
by taking “the voyce of the greater number, [which] must be considered as 
the voyce of them all.” Austin reiterates the thrust of Hobbes’ lesson in his 
discussion when he writes that a men’s club- which is a determinate body of 
individuals- “signifies” their preferences by vote. Remembering that such 
signification of a preference can only be achieved by a determinate 
individual or body or individuals, is important to point out that the example 
of voting chosen by both Hobbes and Austin is not an exclusive means of 
“signifying collective pleasure.”66 Appellate judges must signify in a 
different way; the explanation of the difference between preferences and 
judgments we considered earlier in chapter three makes this point clearly 
enough. Austin makes little room for an institution which “signifies” 
through judgments; in this way he tips his hand and reveals the positivist 
tendency to view law on a model of legislation.
From this rather brisk discussion, an argument in positivist terms for 
what I have been calling sincere judicial behavior becomes a bit clearer.
The language of Hobbes and Austin on the subject of authoritative legal 
sources that we have been reviewing here can not fit the role of the common 
law appellate judge on a multi-member court. Judges are individual authors 
which make up a determinate (not representative) source of law. In 
Hobbesian terms it could even be said that the effect of the transformation of 
the judiciary that took place during the revolutionary and founding periods 
of American history was to alter the perceived role of the judge from that of 
an actor to an a u t h o r .67 Later, Chief Justice John Marshall’s transformation 
of the national judiciary was that of an author to an actor. Moreover, it is 
understandable why legal positivists tend to paint judges as strategic actors.
66 See Austin, PJD, 118, 122-5.
67 See Wood. Creation of the American Republic. 453-63.
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It is because they mistake the appellate judge as one actor of a multitude that 
should be aspiring toward an ideal unity rather than as an individual author 
of the law who already possesses such unity. Those who hold the strategic 
view actually attempt to perform what for Hobbes was the impossible task of 
instilling authority in an inanimate i n s t i t u t i o n .68 This may add a sense of 
authority to an institution which is unrivalled; it ultimately does nothing for 
the authority of the law and even serves to undermine its primacy of place 
in the constitutional order.
Today many lawyers, and most legal positivists, who work in Anglo- 
American legal systems would say that Herbert Hart’s description of law as 
recorded in his seminal treatise, The Concent of Law, comes closest to “fitting 
the facts” of their day-to-day p r a c t i c e .69 Hart’s achievement was to restate 
Austin’s imperative theory of law in such a way as to improve upon and 
further emphasize the conventional basis of law. Austin’s theory, according 
to Hart, suffered from four important defects which brought into question its 
completeness and suitability to provide an answer to the question of law’s 
essence.70 Hart describes law as the union of two different kinds of rules.
68 As I said in chapter one, I do not mean to suggest for one moment that the 
Supreme Court has been acting without authority during its history or that the means of 
expression employed by the Court ultimately renders suspect its legitimacy. The 
message here is a more moderate one; the authority of political and legal institutions is 
not a stark choice of “either/or.” Again, the point is that authority for the law of any 
community can be achieved through more or less effective means. We should choose the 
more effective.
69 H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, second edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1994).
70 Ibid., 1-78. Hart summarizes his four points of attack on Austin’s theory of 
law on page 79, which can be further condensed as follows: (1) a criminal statute best 
conforms to Austin’s imperative theory but still deviates from it in that “it commonly 
applies to those who enact it and not merely to others,” (2) other varieties of law confer 
public legal powers or create private legal relations and cannot semantically fit 
Austin’s theory of law as orders backed by threats, (3) some legal rules “are not brought 
into being by anything analogous to explicit prescription,” and thus cannot semantically 
fit Austin’s theory, and (4) Austin’s use of the term “sovereign” was unsuitable because 
(a) it could not “account for the continuity of legislative authority characteristic of a 
modem legal system,” and (b) “could not be identified with either the electorate or the 
legislature of a modem state.”
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The first kind, what Hart calls duty-imposing rules, “concern actions 
involving physical movement or changes,” while the second type, what Hart 
calls power-conferring rules, “provide for operations which lead not merely 
to physical movement or change, but to the creation or variation of duties or 
obligations. ”71 The most important of these latter power-conferring rules is 
the rule of recognition which provides for the criteria of validity for other 
secondary rules (which Hart terms “rules of change” and “rules of 
adjudication”) and “conclusive identification” of primary, duty-imposing 
rules. Hart’s legal theory, with the rule of recognition at the core, subtly 
alters Austin’s imperative theory of law by founding law- at bottom- upon 
the deep and wide social consensus which accepts those conventions of 
behavior that, when complied with, place their distinctive imprimatur upon 
legally authoritative actions. Hart’s theory, as one of his theoretical 
antagonists, Ronald Dworkin, puts it, identifies legal propositions, “in virtue 
of social conventions that represent the community’s acceptance of a 
scheme of rules empowering such people or groups to create valid law.”77
This conventional bedrock is precisely why legal positivism has been 
so relevant to our questions of proper judicial behavior. Positivism- of 
which Hart’s theory expounds so elegantly- sees those unwritten, 
unchallenged (and seemingly unchallengeable) directions of legal activity 
as ultimately emanating from the consensus of the community. It would 
seem to follow that conventions that regulate the tenor and direction of the 
behavior of legal officials and institutions can only change when the 
popular consensus which animates that convention changes on those sorts
71 Ibid., 81.
72 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (London: Fontana Press, 1991), 34. Hart, 
when discussing the “minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence of 
a legal system,” echoes this idea of the conventional bedrock which undergirds those 
rules of recognition and suggests the consequences of this for legal officials. The 
secondary rules of recognition, change and adjudication, he says, “must be effectively 
accepted as public standards of official behavior by its officials.... They must regard 
these [secondary rules] as common standards of official behavior and appraise critically 
their own and each other’s deviations as lapses.” Concept of Law. 116-7.
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of questions. This view tends to look at law as only a receptor of the norms 
and ideas of the community. The refined “interdependent positivist” (such 
as Bentham or Hart) position on the other hand sees a sort of two-way 
exchange between community norms and power-conferring rules; this is the 
essence of what Hart himself calls the “internal point of view” and what 
separates him from positivists like Austin. 73 Social rules, for Hart, 
essentially include the existence of both feelings and observable physical 
behavior by community members to hold that rule as a “general standard” 
towards which to strive. Hart is what legal theorists call a “soft-positivist” 
because he permits (through his discussion of the rule of recognition and 
the internal point of view) moral and other value-laden attitudes and 
judgments to be within the ambit of law identification, but it is the 
interactive quality of his vision which is most relevant here.74 This 
interdependent quality of Hart’s positivism places an emphasis (more 
explicitly so than Bentham before him) upon the dialogue between the social 
rule as an ideal and those who strive to conform to it. Participants in a 
system of Hart’s social rules have a “reflective critical attitude” they bring to 
bear on their behavior and rules they follow. 75
One area where Hart’s theory of law intersects closely with concerns 
over judicial behavior is in his discussion of judicial discretion.76 The legal 
landscape for Hart is wholly distinct from issues of morality since laws can 
be identified by their institutional imprimatur. Again, under Hart’s model 
the content of rules has nothing to do with recognizing them as legal 
propositions; only comporting with criteria of legal validity as set out by
73 For a succinct summary and comparison of Hart’s and Austin’s positivism, 
see R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously. 17-22.
74 in this way a student of legal theory sees most clearly that Jeremy Bentham 
provides a sort of intellectual bridge between Hart and Austin. See generally Hart’s 
“Postscript,” Concept of Law. 238-76.
75 Hart, Concept of Law. 55-58.
76 ibid., 141-7.
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secondary rules or being accepted as primary rules determines that 
existence. Because legal systems order human societies, there may come a 
time when certain disputes give rise to legal questions which have not been 
contemplated by the system. In these instances, according to Hart, there are 
“gaps” in the law and in systems where these gaps are to be resolved by 
adjudication the only option is for the judge to exercise a careful discretion. 
There are two points worth making here. Firstly, Hart's thesis that at certain 
points there will be gaps in the law to be filled by a judge's discretion would 
seem- in conjunction with any political theory that placed value on a 
principle of accountability- to call for a principle of judicial sincerity to be 
included (tacitly or otherwise) in a secondary rule of adjudication. Honesty, 
candor, and generally not using strategically the unavoidable gaps in the 
law to forward personal preferences seems a reasonable requirement to ask 
of a judge. Strategy would make a charade out of the “critical reflective 
attitude” that is so important to Hart. Secondly, the secondary rules of 
recognition, change and adjudication would appear in our example of the 
Supreme Court of the United States to be so uncertain on this question of how 
the law is to be expressed that it brings into doubt the very basis of 
acceptance on which this secondary rule must rest. Marshall's move in 1801, 
and the subsequent “acceptance” of that move, would appear to grant such a 
high level of original initiating force to both judges and secondary rules 
that this should be incorporated in the very notion of secondary rules.
Either the seriatim procedure or Marshall's “opinion of the Court,” was a 
deviant practice according to any plausible official self-critiques of the 
applicable secondary rule in 1801. The only available (and unsatisfactory) 
positivist conclusion appears to be that of power acquiring authority ex post 
facto. To hold that a rule of recognition rests only upon community 
acceptance of that rule either misrepresents the degree of autonomy that 
rule possesses or defines the “open-textured” quality of such a rule so
1 Q2
obtusely as to  be o f n o  use.77
77 Ibid., 127-36, 145-7.
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Chapter Six: 
“P ost-P ositiv ist” Legal Theory
This final section of Part Two concerns itself with views of law that 
were fashioned after Hart’s version of positivism. Each of the theoretical 
explanations of law which follow are reactions to seeing law as a collection 
of determinate, clear rules; each questions the foundationalism so central to 
positivism. The immediate problem faced by any student who wishes to study 
such a pack of writers under a single heading is to adequately label the pack. 
Others who have studied these internalists identify them by using terms such 
as “anti-foundationalists,” “pragmatists,” or “postmodernists.”
Unfortunately, each of these stamps of identification only muddies the water 
either because they fail to recognize where these visions deviate from past 
groups who were called the same (as in the case of the first and second 
example) or are so superficially unintelligible that they defeat the very 
purpose of labelling at all (as in the case of the third). Moreover, the views 
of the authors below are by no means united in their effort; there are 
substantial differences between authors that the above labels would disguise. 
These authors, then, are best linked by their synchronous emergence and 
the initial target they each trained their sights upon; they are each “post­
positivists.”! Each forwards a conception of law as an enterprise in 
contradistinction to the positivist conception of law as a collection of 
determinate rules. For the post-positivist, the predominant conventions of 
current legal practice generate obligations for judges and ensure the central 
influence of law in judicial decision-making. It should be stated up front
1 I first came across this term in a paper by Howard Gillman delivered at the 
1995 annual convention of the American Political Science Association. Gillman in 
employing this term has in mind any legal theory which stresses a non-ontological 
conception of law. See Gillman, “Judicial Behavioralism’s Problematic Jurisprudence: 
On the Relationship Between Legal Philosophy and Social Science Methodology” (Paper 
delivered at the 1995 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Chicago, Illinois, August 31-September 3, 1995).
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that this section does not include one group of scholars that some may 
consider a natural member of post-positivist jurisprudence: the more vocal 
members of the critical legal studies movement such as Roberto Unger and 
Duncan Kennedy.2 Critical legal thinkers do not maintain a distinction 
between law and politics, legal judgment and political preference. Each of 
the post-positivists in this section, at the end of the day, does maintain these 
kinds of distinctions and separations within their theories of law. Post­
positivists, in fact, are remarkable additions to the field of jurisprudence 
precisely because of this ability; they can fit and operate these kinds of 
distinctions within a phenomenological legal framework.
Returning to the subject at hand, what is also remarkable about these 
post-positivist legal theorists is that, upon close examination, each of them 
forwards a conception of law which logically includes a commitment to 
sincere judicial behavior. Interestingly, this commitment is largely 
overlooked and often holds the key to understanding portions of their legal 
vision.
The bulk of this chapter will be focused on one “post-positivist” in 
particular. Ronald Dworkin’s assault upon the tenets of legal positivism and 
his own interpretive account of law are seminal readings for the student of 
jurisprudence. Dworkin’s early essays, written as early as 1966 and 
published under one cover in 1977, maintained the position that law was 
something other than political preference while at the same time 
illuminating significant problems of the positivist concept of la w .3  It was 
the dominance of positivism (which Dworkin dubbed “the ruling theory of
2 See, for example Roberto M. Unger, Law in Modem Society: Toward a Critique 
of Social Theory (New York: Free Press, 1976); Unger, “The Critical Legal Studies 
Movement,” 96 Harvard Law Review 561 (1983); Duncan Kennedy, “Form and Substance 
in Private Law Adjudication,” 89 Harvard Law Review 1685 (1976); Kennedy, “The 
Political Significance of the Structure of the Law School Curriculum,” 14 Seton Hall Law 
Review 1 (1983).
3 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, seventh impression (London: 
Duckworth, 1994).
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law”) which Dworkin complained had fostered a sort of Hobson’s choice 
regarding theoretical questions of law. Either accept the positivist 
rendering of a mechanical jurisprudence or be left with the “nominalist” 
(read: neo-realist) assertion that law was merely charade, a disguise for the 
implementation of a judge’s preferences. Dworkin believed that neither of 
these options accurately reflected legal practice and sought to illustrate a 
third choice. In “The Model of Rules I,” Dworkin examined the positivist 
belief that law is a set of rules and found it to be deficient. Specifically, 
Dworkin sought to correct the positivist’s assertion that, “if someone’s case is 
not clearly covered by such a [legal] rule... then that case cannot be decided 
by ‘applying the law.’ It must be decided by some official, like a judge, 
‘exercising his discretion,’ which means reaching beyond the law for some 
other sort of standard to guide him.”4 Dworkin exploded this assertion by 
showing that, in actual practice, legal principles exist in the law which do 
not take the form of rules but still provide a sense of obligation for legal 
officials. Legal principles have a “dimension of weight or importance,” 
while legal rules have an “all or nothing character.” In a case where a legal 
principle is at work, “it states a reason that argues in one direction, but does 
not necessitate a particular decision,” Dworkin explains. A legal rule on the 
other hand is either valid in a particular case or not; “If two rules conflict, 
one of them cannot be a valid rule,” Dworkin writes.5
Dworkin’s introduction of legal principles puts him immediately at 
odds with both legal nominalists and positivists. Dworkin marks out his 
differences with these two camps even further in his discussion of 
discretion.6 Dworkin distinguishes between two types of discretion, what he 





exercises weak discretion for Dworkin that just means that, “for some reason 
the standards an official must apply cannot be applied mechanically but 
demand the use of judgment,” or that an official has final decision-making 
authority.7 As was pointed out earlier in chapter three, Dworkin’s legal 
theory assumes that there is an important distinction to be made between 
judgments and preferences. These two senses of weak discretion should be 
separated from another context, where an official may said to have strong 
discretion. “We use ‘discretion,’” Dworkin says, “sometimes not merely to say 
that an official must use judgment in applying the standards set him by 
authority, or that no one will review that exercise of judgment, but to say 
that on some issue he is simply not bound by standards set by the authority 
in question.” Dworkin’s point is to show that the two senses of weak 
discretion may indeed be recognizable in law, that they are different in 
character from strong discretion, and that strong discretion is not a legal 
option that fits our practice. 8
Dworkin separates himself from the positivists still further. In his 
article titled, “Hard Cases,” Dworkin explains another important distinction 
to be made between arguments of policy and arguments of principle.
Dworkin writes of arguments of policy that they, “justify a political decision 
by showing that the decision advances or protects some collective goal of the 
community as a whole.” Arguments of principle, for Dworkin, on the other 
hand, “justify a political decision by showing that the decision respects or 
secures some individual or group right.” These two are not the only grounds 
of political justification for Dworkin (he suggests arguments of generosity or 
virtue as other examples) but they are the dominant ones.9 Unlike the 
positivist insistence that judges actually legislate when gaps are found in the




landscape of legal rules, Dworkin argues that judges deciding hard cases base 
(and, further, should base) their decisions on arguments of principle and 
avoid arguments of policy. 10 This policy /principle dichotomy enables 
Dworkin to construct the institutional office of the “judge” that does not 
legislate in instances where “the rules run out.”11 And this (controversial) 
distinction between arguments of principle and arguments of policy forms 
the bedrock of Dworkin’s “rights thesis,” his affirmative response to 
positivist legal theory. Finally, for the purposes of this brief sketch of 
Dworkinite legal theory, the rules and principles which are the judge’s tools 
won’t “run out” because Dworkin’s view of the legal landscape is that of a 
“seamless web” where a judge (like Dworkin’s ideal judge Hercules) will 
construct “a scheme of abstract and concrete principles that provides a 
coherent justification for all common law precedents and, so far as these are 
to be justified on principle, constitutional and statutory provisions as well.”12
What is important to notice about Dworkin’s view of law for our 
purposes is that, from the outset, it is committed to what I have been calling 
sincere judicial behavior. That is, Dworkin’s legal theory does not allow for 
compromised or strategic behavior among judges of an appellate tribunal. 
When Hercules, for example, constructs his seamless web of what legislation 
or judicial precedent requires, Dworkin is transparent that, “he will, of 
course, reflect his own intellectual and philosophical convictions in making 
that judgment.”13 Furthermore, Hercules does not become a tyrant in doing
10 Ibid., 82-105.
11 T.R.S. Allan writes (quoting Lord Scarman in A.-G. v. BBC. [1980] 3 All ER 
161, 182) that the policy/principle distinction, “is fundamental to the separation of 
powers. It underlines the conviction, basic to the rule of law, that ‘the judicial power of 
the state exercised through judges appointed by the state remains an independent, and 
recognisable separate, function of government’.” See Allan, Law. Liberty, and justice: 
The Legal Foundations of British Constitutionalism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993),
58. Institutional separation is thus ensured through the exercise of official power by 
individuals.
12 Taking Rights Seriously. 116-7.
13 Ibid., 118.
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this, or a kind of deputy legislator as the positivist would contend, because 
those convictions are not independent of the law, but simply manifest in 
him. The seamless web of principle, furthermore, cannot be revealed by an 
institution, given its complexity; only Hercules- an individual judge- can 
hope to perform such a feat. Only an individual human mind can hope to 
achieve the “articulate consistency” Dworkin suggests constrains all legal 
officials. Dworkin reveals just such a commitment in the following 
anecdote:!4
Suppose a Congressman votes to prohibit abortion, on the ground that 
human life in any form is sacred, but then votes to permit the parents 
of babies bom  deformed to withhold medical treatment that will keep 
such babies alive. He might say that there is some difference, but the 
principle of responsibility, strictly applied, will not allow him these two 
votes unless he can incorporate the difference within some general 
political theory he sincerely holds.
Dworkin does say that the demand for “articulate consistency” is weak when
“policies are in play,” and the example of the Congressman may actually
diminish the force of Dworkin’s claim here. In cases of principle- the
proper province of the judge- however, this demand hardens. Dworkin
firmly insists that in such cases the doctrine of “political responsibility,”
which articulate consistency serves, “does not allow for the idea of a strategy
that may be better served by unequal distribution of the benefit in
question. ”!5 Dworkin is emblematic of what I described earlier as a legal
internalist; the consequence of portraying judicial obligation as a function
of the internal constraints of an unperforated enterprise is that the
individual mind of a “principled” actor- a judge- is the only means of
reflecting and constructing accepted legal conventions.
To supplement these claims, consider for a moment one of our 
previous discussions about appellate adjudication in chapter three. If
14 Ibid., 87 [emphasis added].
1 5 ibid., 88. Dworkin: “Consistency here, of course, means consistency in the 
application of the principle relied upon, not merely in the application of the particular 
legal rule announced in the name of that principle.” Ibid.
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Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem is applied (roughly) to Dworkin’s theory of 
adjudication, it would appear that Dworkin is in somewhat of a bind. Given 
the value he places on the Transitivity condition, which of the other four 
conditions drops, as Arrow requires so that Dworkin’s theory remains 
viable? As Easterbrook suggested in his article, 16 and as I have been trying 
to say here, Dworkin’s theory only works under the assumption that only an 
individual human mind can make the attempt to comport with demands such 
as articulate consistency and political responsibility. This causes the 
Nondictatorship condition to drop out, preserving the other four. This is one 
of the key lessons of Arrow’s work; if you believe that the Impossibility 
Theorem can be applied to matters of “judgment” (that is, if judgments are 
really only preferences), and that the three conditions of unanimity, range 
and the independence of irrelevant alternatives are desirable, then only 
“Dictatorship” or an individual personified actor will be able to preserve any 
semblance of consistency (Transitivity).17
Dworkin further underscores his pre-commitment to the essentially 
individual nature of judging when he asserts his “right answer” thesis- that 
hard cases where complex questions of political morality surface can be 
resolved by a judge’s single right answer. Some students of legal theory, 
because of the right answer thesis, have accused Dworkin of succumbing to a 
kind of formalism and have rebutted that there is no “right answer” in hard 
cases, only “answers.” These sorts of objections are mistaken. Dworkin is 
not a formalist and his right answer thesis does not assume a positivist
16 See text supra.
17 I am convinced that Arrow’s Theorem is not an appropriate model in which to 
analyze judicial decision-making, for the reasons set out by Kornhauser and Sager, 
“Unpacking the Court,” 109-110, note 37.
18 See Dworkin, “Hard Cases,” and “Can Rights be Controversial?,” in TRS. 81- 
130, 279-90; “Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?,” in A Matter of Principle 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), 119-45; “Pragmatism, Right Answers, and True 
Banality,” in Michael Brint and William Weaver, eds., Pragmatism in Law & Society 
(Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, 1991), 365-66.
ontology of transcultural, transhistorical truth. Dworkin is perfectly 
transparent about this, saying of his right answer thesis that, “It is a claim 
made within legal practice rather than at some supposedly removed, 
external, philosophical level. ”19 This is a crucial move of Dworkin’s as it 
underlines his commitment to foundations of law and that these foundations 
are best understood as conventional or institutional, not as metaphysical.
The importance of this claim for Dworkin’s view of legal practice is well 
captured by Howard Gillman, when he writes that, “a judge’s willingness to 
approach a case as if there is a right legal answer is designed to replace 
positivism’s emphasis on determinate rules as the measure of whether a 
judge is acting in accordance with the la w . ”20
Dworkin’s legal theory should not only be viewed as a confrontation 
with positivism; in a book first published in 1986 he clearly articulated his 
model of law and defended it against other popular models as most deserving 
of our allegiance.2i Dworkin’s concept of “law as integrity” is testimony to a 
working assumption of this paper that legal meaning is inextricably tied to 
its manner of expression. Dworkin first suggests that law is best understood 
as “an interpretive concept,” to be distinguished from “semantic” concepts 
of law like (once again) positivism. Dworkin labels positivism a semantic 
concept of law because positivists claim that apparent disagreements about
19 See “Pragmatism, Right Answers, and True Banality,” 365. Howard Gillman 
writes of Dworkin that he, “has indicated repeatedly that his argument about right 
answers is meant to be conventional rather than metaphysical.” Gillman, “Judicial 
Behavioralism’s Problematic Jurisprudence,” 12.
The embedding of arguments (whether moral, political or interpretive) within a 
practice is perhaps the most telling characteristic of Dworkin’s writing on subjects of 
law. The examples we have been dealing with so far have shown how Dworkin does 
distance himself from positivists and formalists. Dworkin also makes the same move to 
deal with the challenges of skeptics and localists as diverse as Mark Tushnet and 
Stanley Fish. See Dworkin, “On Interpretation and Objectivity,” in A Matter of 
Principle. 171-7. A similar version was also published in the 1982 issues of Critical 
Inquiry and the Texas Law Review. 9 Critical Inquiry 179 (1982): 60 Texas Law Review 
527-50 (1982).
20 Gillman, “Judicial Behavioralism’s Problematic Jurisprudence,” 13.
21 Law’s Empire (London: Fontana Press, 1991).
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law are ultimately “borderline drawing” exercises about the penumbral and
core meaning of the word “law.” This positivist portrayal of legal argument
for Dworkin is a betrayal to the actual rich fertility of our legal practice.
Unlike the positivist who sees legal argument as exclusively empirical,
Dworkin maintains that “much disagreement in law is theoretical rather
than empirical.” In addition to the borderline cases, Dworkin adds that there
are “pivotal or testing cases” where disagreement about law is a
disagreement about “the grounds of law,” the very criteria for deciding
when a legal claim is valid .22 That is to say, disagreement about law can be
deeply (foundationally) theoretical, not only a semantic exercise. Dworkin
contends that the semantic legal concept of positivism is impoverished
because it clings to,
a certain picture of what disagreement is like and when it is possible. 
They [the positivists] think we can argue sensibly with one another if, 
but only if, we all accept and follow the same criteria for deciding when 
our claims are sound... You and I can sensibly discuss how many books I 
have on my shelf, for example, only if we both agree, at least roughly, 
about what a book is.... Either, in spite of first appearances, lawyers 
actually all do accept roughly the same criteria for deciding when a 
claim about law is true or there can be no genuine agreement or 
disagreement about law at all, but only the idiocy of people thinking 
they disagree because they attach different meanings to the same
sound. 23
This “crude” picture of what disagreement is like “fits badly” with our actual 
practice, according to Dworkin, where in many cases lawyers dp argue about 
the criteria for deciding when our claims are sound- the grounds of law.
Dworkin, in making these sorts of observations, brings an 
“interpretive attitude” to law, emphasizing two e l e m e n t s . 2^ The first 
interpretive element is that the practice of law, “does not simply exist but 
has value, that it serves some interest or purpose or enforces some principle- 
in short, that it has some point- that can be stated independently of just
22 See generally ibid., 31-4-6.
2 3  ib id ., 4 5 .
24 See generally ibid., 46-86.
describing the rules that make up the practice. ”25 The second element that is 
characteristic of the interpretive attitude one takes toward a practice is that 
the behavior of the person within that practice “must be sensitive to its 
point [as conceived in the first element], so that the strict rules must be 
understood or applied or extended or modified or qualified or limited by that 
point.”26 Dworkin uses the example of a community’s practice of courtesy to 
illustrate the point. Though at first such a practice, “has the character of 
taboo,” and the rules are “just there,” after a while an interpretive attitude 
will be taken by members of the community towards the practice and they 
will have in mind both of the elements that are characteristic of the 
interpretive attitude. I think it is fair to say, as I intimated in the 
introduction and chapter three, that for most members of the interpretive 
community of law the manner by which the judicial power is expressed or 
exercised remains unquestioned and generally characterized by, in 
Dworkin’s terms, the “preinterpretive attitude.” One of the main purposes of 
this thesis, in Dworkin’s terms then, is to bring the interpretive attitude to 
this aspect of the law- to make members aware of and sensitive to “the point” 
of the mode of judicial expression.
With the understanding that law is essentially an interpretive 
concept, Dworkin sets to construct and defend his theory about “the proper 
grounds of law.” Dworkin’s theory of law is carefully crafted because he 
realizes that he is carving a path between formalism and skepticism.
Dworkin refines his observation that law is an interpretive enterprise and 
makes the comparison of the legal enterprise to one of literary 
interpretation. He does this because he feels that law is most like literary 
interpretation in its reply to two important questions for any interpretive 




between a “creator” and an “interpreter” of the enterprise cooperative or 
non-cooperative, and (2) do members of the enterprise regard the “point” 
(which is of course the hallmark of its being an interpretive enterprise at 
all) of the enterprise as controversial or uncontroversial? It of course 
follows that, using these two questions of interpretive disciplines, there are 
four possible results. Dworkin’s observation can be seen more easily if the 
questions are arranged graphically, with sample disciplines filling each of 
the four possible combinations:27
Cooperative Non-Cooperative
Uncontroversial: Conversation Scientific Interp.
Controversial: Literary Interp. History
Law then is like literary interpretation because Dworkin sees them both as 
enterprises which are “cooperatively-collaborative” and “purposefully- 
controversial.” Is law always that kind of enterprise? Is law no longer an 
interpretive enterprise on occasions (which make up much of the life of the 
law) where it is actually “purposefullv-uncontroversial?” On many 
occasions doesn’t the law look a lot like conversation, and yet still have an 
important interpretive job to do? Dworkin prefers to view the creatively 
interpretational enterprise of law as “not conversational but constructive... 
essentially concerned with purpose not cause,” but in fact this rather rigid 
classification does a disservice to l a w .28
In any event, Dworkin’s comparison between legal and literary
27 See “How Law is Like Literature,” in A Matter of Principle. 146-66; Law’s 
Empire. 49-76, 225-8. However, I am indebted to professor Dworkin for spelling out 
this particular formulation (both the examples and the graphic presentation) in a 
jurisprudence seminar given at Oxford University during Hilary Term, 1996.
28 Law’s Empire. 52. In fact this classification does a disservice to Dworkin’s 
own theory of “law as integrity,” which is a view of law that “insists that legal claims 
are interpretive judgments and therefore combine backward- and forward-looking 
elements; they interpret contemporary legal practice as an unfolding political 
narrative.” Ibid., 225 [emphasis added]. Dworkin puts forth “law as integrity” so as to 
escape “the ancient question whether judges find or invent law; we understand legal 
reasoning, it suggests, only by seeing the sense in which they do both and neither. Ibid 
[emphasis added].
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interpretation leads to his “banal suggestion” about what it is members of
this kind of interpretive enterprise are doing when they interpret a text.
Dworkin calls this suggestion the “aesthetic hypothesis,” and it follows,
verbatim: “an interpretation of a piece of literature attempts to show which
way of reading (or speaking or directing or acting) the text reveals it as the
best work of art.”2^  It follows for Dworkin that for a judge to decide a hard
case at law he must interpret the relevant, antecedent materials (which
include the principles of political morality which animate them) in such a
way as to make them the best coherent explanation of the enterprise. Or, to
use Dworkin’s terms, a judge must first comport with “the dimension of fit,”
which will admit of possibly several different interpretations. Then the
judge must choose which of these readings, “makes the work in progress
best, all things c o n s i d e r e d .  ”30 Given that a community’s legal enterprise is
to continue beyond the lives of a single generation of both officials and
citizens, the judge will most likely find himself engaged in a kind of “chain
novel” project (which, in fact, Dworkin interestingly characterizes in Law’s
Empire as a “seriatim” e x e r c i s e 3 i ) .  Unlike other critics of Dworkin, who
dismiss the aesthetic hypothesis as either trivial (“people’s views about what
makes art good art are inherently subjective”) or that it confuses the
important difference between “interpretation” and “criticism,” I would
suggest instead that on its own terms the aesthetic hypothesis can only be
satisfied by an individual judge acting sincerely. Dworkin’s discussion of the
judge’s strange project reveals such a commitment:
Any judge forced to decide a lawsuit will find, if he looks in the 
appropriate books, records of many arguably similar cases decided over 
decades or even centuries past by many other judges of different styles 
and judicial political philosophies, in periods of different orthodoxies of 
procedure and judicial convention. Each judge must regard himself, in 
deciding the new case before him, as a partner in a complex chain
29 A Matter of Principle. 149. Also see Law’s Empire. 45-86, 225-32.
30 Law’s Empire. 230-1.
31 Ibid., 229.
enterprise of which these innumerable decisions, structures, 
conventions, and practices are the history; it is his job to continue that 
history into the future through what he does on the day. He m u s t  
interpret what has gone before because he has a responsibility to 
advance the enterprise in hand rather than strike out in some new 
direction of his own. So he must determine, according to his own 
judgment, what the earlier decisions come to, what the point or theme 
of the practice so far, taken as a whole, really i s .32
It would appear from comments like these that Dworkin has in mind a
certain behavioral context when he employs the term “best” in his aesthetic
hypothesis. A fair interpretation of the hypothesis (especially considering
Dworkin’s earlier distinction between arguments of principle and policy) I
think eliminates the opportunity for a judge to compromise her “best”
rendering of the relevant materials. This means that either the “internal”
compromises that would aid in majority- or unanimity-gathering or the
textual compromises that would soften the force of that “best” rendering are
not relevant considerations. If these sorts of considerations were relevant,
they would rob the aesthetic hypothesis of any explanatory or interpretive
power. Early in I.aw’s Emnire. Dworkin writes that he purposefully omits,
the practical politics of adjudication, the compromises judges must 
sometimes accept, stating the law in a somewhat different way than 
they think most accurate in order to attract the votes of other judges, 
for instance. I am concerned with the issue of law, not with the reasons 
judges may have for tempering their statements of what it i s .33
This broad denial will not do, and Dworkin’s explication of what it is judges do
with the law will not admit of such strategic compromises for they would
immediately doom the sophisticated internal theory of adjudication that
Dworkin provides as an alternative to rival theories of law. For a theorist
who takes on diverse competitors from fields of law, philosophy and literary
theory, this initial omission is an important admission. No matter what
period (each characterized by “different orthodoxies of procedure and
judicial convention”) in which a judge may find himself one aspect of
orthodox procedure and judicial convention must remain constant.
32 A Matter of Principle. 159 [emphasis added].
33 Law’s Empire. 12.
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Specifically, that aspect where an individual judge must sincerely determine
what the enterprise demands of him regarding the case at hand. Whatever
else may change over time in the interpretive enterprise of law, this
characteristic must remain or the aesthetic hypothesis says too much and,
therefore, says little. That is why it is most disturbing when, towards the end
of Law’s Empire. Dworkin seems willing to destroy all that he has created.
“An actual justice,” Dworkin says, in contrast to Hercules,
must sometimes adjust what he believes to be right as a matter of 
principle, and therefore as a matter of law, in order to gain the votes of 
other justices and to make their joint decision sufficiently acceptable to 
the community so that it can continue to act in the spirit of a 
community of principle at the constitutional l e v e l .3 4
The importance of the very real constraints of judging- time, docket and 
language, to name just three- should not be underemphasized. Neither 
though should they assume such a position of paramountcy that matters of 
principle are in the end either strategically avoided or compromised away in 
due deference to the constraints. What is Dworkin trying to tell us by 
inserting such a caveat? Can a community of principle at the highest level 
only be preserved by willful insincerity? Dworkin himself seems to reject 
this conclusion only ten pages later when he discusses the Supreme Court’s 
remedy of “all deliberate speed” in the desegregation c a s e s . 35 American 
legal history as well as current English legal practice demonstrates that the 
ideal Dworkin is suggesting does not have to be abandoned so soon.
When Dworkin further elaborates his theory of law, this pre­
commitment to individual, sincere behavior is again evident. He introduces, 
for example, the “catch phrase” of treating like cases alike, to be considered
34 ibid., 380-1.
35 ibid., 390-391 [Explaining that a judicial remedy which aimed for the ideal 
of law as integrity, “is not simply or directly consequentialist the way a flat decision of 
policy would be,” Dworkin writes that a Herculean effort must, “search out the most 
effective and immediate enforcement of substantive constitutional rights consistent with 
the interests of those who claim them but must not otherwise defer to or try to 
accommodate the interests of people who want to subvert those rights.”].
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along with other political ideals of justice and fairness. This ideal, Dworkin 
explains, “requires government to speak with one voice, to act in a 
principled and coherent manner toward all of its citizens, to extend to 
everyone the substantive standards of fairness and justice it uses for 
some. ”36 This slogan of treating like cases alike does not capture fully the 
virtue Dworkin wishes to convey- the virtue of “political integrity”- which 
he characterizes as the (interpretive) attitude that exists when persons act, 
“according to convictions that inform and shape their lives as a whole 
rather than capriciously or w h i m s i c a l l y .  ”37 The virtue of political integrity 
is divided by Dworkin into two principles, legislative integrity and 
adjudicative integrity. Legislative integrity, Dworkin asserts, “asks those 
who create law by legislation to keep that law coherent in principle,” while 
adjudicative integrity, which is the impetus for Dworkin’s own conception of 
law,
asks those responsible for deciding what the law is to see and enforce it 
as coherent in that way.... It explains why judges must conceive the 
body of law they administer as a whole rather than as a set of discrete 
decisions that they are free to make or amend one by one, with nothing 
but a strategic interest in the r e s t .38
What is suggested throughout Dworkin’s discussion of integrity is that 
integrity presupposes sincerity as I have been speaking about that virtue. 
Perhaps the best illustration of this is in Dworkin’s discussion of “internal 
c o m p r o m i s e s . ”39 Why, Dworkin asks, can we not adopt a “Solomonic model” 
to deal with problems of justice and fairness? Why, when a community is 
divided on the question of abortion is it not acceptable to adopt a kind of 
“checkerboard statute,” which would make abortion criminal for pregnant
36 ibid., 165.
37 ibid., 166.
38 ibid., 167 [emphasis added]. It is worth noting that Dworkin rejects a rival 
conception of law (“conventionalism”) because he believes that “consistency in 
principle, and not merely in strategy, must be at the heart of adjudication.” Ibid., 135.
39 Ibid., 178-86.
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women who were bom  in even years but not for ones bom  in odd years?
This sort of solution is often employed for issues like zoning; why not 
abortion? When matters of principle are stake, Dworkin rightly observes 
that,
We follow a different model: that each point of view must be allowed a 
voice in the process of deliberation but that the collective decision must 
nevertheless aim to settle on some coherent principle whose influence 
then extends to the natural limits of its authority. If there must be 
compromise because people are divided about justice, then the 
compromise must be external, not internal: it must be compromise about 
which scheme of justice to adopt rather than a compromised scheme of 
justice.40
This picture of how to (and how not to) resolve problems of justice is 
precisely the picture of sincerity of which I have been speaking- precisely 
that is, except for one point in need of emphasis. Any “external 
compromise” that Dworkin’s ideal of integrity permits must be a bona fide 
attempt to arrive at a coherent scheme of justice and can not purposefully 
utilize the inherent elasticity of language to present the facade of 
coherence. This minor amendment is really only needed to emphasize a 
point that is latent in Dworkin’s legal theory, as preceding considerations 
make plain. Dworkin rightly points out that this ideal has even been 
somewhat constitutionalized, by interpretation of the equal protection clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, for example.41
Finally, consider Dworkin’s particular view of state and community 
“personification” that political integrity assumes, one where “we need to 
treat group responsibility as logically prior to the responsibilities of officials 
one by one.”42 Now all this talk about integrity brings us to an observation I 
believe to be essential. Whether in the form of “catch phrase” or political 
virtue, the legal coherence that the integrity principle should express is an 
ultimate political ideal. Coherence may be an ultimate hermeneutic virtue, a
40 ibid., 179 [emphasis added].
41 Ibid., 184-6. See also Allan, Law. Liberty, and Justice. 44-7.
42 ibid., 175.
p in
way for citizens and officials to make sense of their rights, their duties, their 
community. This is all fair enough; in the final analysis human civilizations 
need to act with purpose in order to survive and flourish. What needs to be 
remembered is that this ultimate end can be (and, given a fair reading of 
American constitutional theory and history, should be) attained through 
governmental machinery which includes a judiciary which is not 
institutionally coherent but individually so. Dworkin’s treatment of 
integrity is couched in the terms of a monological mode of legal 
development. In this way, Dworkin’s conception of “law as integrity” leaves 
no room for the conversation of law. Even worse, it ignores what Dworkin 
himself considers “the most important lesson” the chain-novel view of law 
teaches: each interpretive claim of the enterprise must be earned and 
defended through open argument and justification. 43 Dworkin, at times, 
seems content to rest upon a monological mode of legal discourse for the 
enterprise of law. This result is not defended by Dworkin as the best possible 
reading of the enterprise, and makes no room for the competing, alternative 
mode of dialogue.44
It should be reiterated that it is a matter of degree as to whether the 
characteristic of sincerity is present; it is surely still present in American 
law today, even in many instances when hard cases reach the highest court 
in the land. Again, I have not for a moment wished to indicate that the 
Supreme Court- because of certain conventions which act against the ideal of 
sincere, individual behavior by judges- is somehow acting extra-legally or 
that it no longer deserves respect as an authoritative legal interpreter. All I 
have been trying to do here is expose what is an embedded “preinterpretive
43 ibid., 237-8.
44 Frank Michaelman, in a well-known article, expresses similar thoughts about 
Dworkin and what I have been calling judicial sincerity. Michaelman’s article is a 
valuable addition in that his arguments are expressed on behalf of a desire to achieve a 
“dialogue” of republicanism between rulers and ruled. See Michaelman, “The Supreme 
Court, 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-Government,” 100 Harvard Law Review 66- 
73, 76-77 (1986).
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attitude” regarding matters of judicial (and thus constitutional) expression. 
Any government which holds dear the principle of the separation-of-powers 
must sooner or later confront such issues of communication.
Like Dworkin’s legal theory, the essays of Stanley Fish offer a 
conception of law as an enterprise; a conception that contrasts with the 
ontological, determinate conception of the positivist. Since he first wrote Is 
There a Text in This Class?. Fish has advanced the proposition that the 
historically- and culturally-contingent assumptions of any “interpretive 
community” will constrain the behavior of embedded participants.^ Fish is 
also well known for his antagonism to Dworkinite legal theory as well as for 
a special brand of antifoundationalism or “localism” that puts him at 
loggerheads with many apparently similar skeptical theorists. Perhaps the 
hallmark of Fish’s theory is that by his own admission the acceptance of an 
antifoundationalist critique of interpretation “has no consequences” for the 
practice of the “interpretive community” being critiqued.4^  Many authors 
have commented upon traits of Fish’s work such as these, and Dworkin and 
Fish have been writing against each other for over a decade.47 Fish’s ideas 
about law are useful for a more tailored purpose; Fish is a great believer in 
the constraining effect of sincere judicial behavior.
Fish is a consistent proponent of what I have called the internal view 
of law. He denies that any text or rule can have any constraining force upon
4 5 See Stanley Fish, Is There A Text in This Class?; The Authority of 
Interpretive Communities (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980).
46 See, for examples of this, ibid., 370; “Interpretation and the Pluralist 
Vision,” 60 Texas Law Review 495-505 (1982).
47 Fish’s direct responses to Dworkin’s writing on the subjects of 
interpretation, the “chain-novel” enterprise, and law as integrity can be found in, 
“Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature,” “Wrong Again,” and 
“Still Wrong After All These Years,” in Doing What Comes Naturally: Change. Rhetoric, 
and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (Durham, N.C.: Duke University 
Press, 1989), 87-102, 103-119, 356-371. Also see “Almost Pragmatism: The 
Jurisprudence of Richard Posner, Richard Rorty, and Ronald Dworkin,” in Michael Brint 
and William Weaver, eds., Pragmatism in Law & Society. 47-81.
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a practicing participant before the act of interpretation, or that the meaning 
of a text is somehow timeless or “external” to the interpreter. It is only the 
interpretive assumptions and beliefs of the reader approaching a text that 
can produce meaning. Without these previously acquired tools, texts would 
be incapable of delivering any meaning at all because they would be only be 
arbitrarily produced marks on paper.48 Remarks such as these would seem to 
indicate that Fish adopts a realist view of law that claims that judges simply 
forward their own personal preferences when deciding cases. Fish is no 
realist however; he is more properly viewed as a “localist,” and his point that 
the culturally-contingent assumptions and purposes of a practicing 
participant within an “interpretive community” are very real constraints 
upon interpretation is crucial to understand.4^  Even though texts can not 
possess a universally shared meaning in and of themselves, Fish’s point is 
that the behavior of readers is still very much constrained because 
interpreters only encounter texts in highly specific contexts. No phrase gets 
to the root of Fish’s localism quicker than his admission that, “life is lived 
not at the general level but in local contexts that are stabilized (if only 
temporarily) by assumptions already and invisibly in p la c e .  ”50 in this way 
Fish is very much like Dworkin (though by‘their colloquies you wouldn’t 
know it) in that he seems to have a distaste for theorists who adjust their 
thoughts for metacritical concerns. “Readers and texts,” Fish writes,
48 See Fish, “Play of Surfaces: Theory and the Law.” In Leyh, Gregory, ed.
Legal Hermeneutics: History. Theory, and Practice (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1992), 299-300; idem, Is There A Text in This Class?. 322-37.
49 For an excellent brief review of Fish’s post-positivism, see Gillman,
“Judicial Behavioralism’s Problematic Jurisprudence,” 13-17.
50 Fish, “Play of Surfaces,” 307. Fish has reiterated this basic point 
throughout his career. I can not resist reprinting another of his attempts to emphasize 
the essentially local character of language: “Words are intelligible only within the 
assumption of some context of intentional production, some already-in-place 
predecision as to what kind of person, with what kind of purposes, in relation to what 
specific goals in a particular situation, is speaking or writing.” “Don’t Know Much 
About the Middle Ages: Posner on Law and Literature,” in Doing What Comes Naturally. 
295.
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are never in a state of independence such that they would need to be 
“disciplined” by some external rule. Since readers are already and 
always thinking within the norms, standards, criteria of evidence, 
purposes, and goals of a shared enterprise, the meanings available to 
them have been preselected by their professional training; they are 
thus never in a position of confronting a text that has not already been 
“given” a meaning by the interested perceptions they have become.si
Notice Fish’s local characterization of the text as an unavoidably “interested” 
perception. It is my contention that, as far as the interpretive community of 
Common Law judging is concerned, Fish’s inherently local characterization 
of texts can only be accepted upon the assumption that a practicing 
participant within the community can not strategically manipulate the 
locally-generated “interested perceptions.” If such a strategic avenue is 
available, then the participant is no longer “disciplined” by the standards of 
the “shared enterprise.” In fact, the enterprise would no longer be “shared” 
by the participant; local meaning would not be meaning at all without a 
sincere participatory approach to the texts of the community.
A reply to this assertion might be that I am including as “locally 
generated” an assumption of legal practice that is simply not there, an 
assumption that I am simply inserting for my own purposes of reform. On 
Fish’s terms, the answer undoubtedly must be yes and no. Though I do not 
deny that, for example, the current practices of the Supreme Court do not 
reflect the highest ideals of sincerity and at times sacrifice the prestige and 
importance of law for the prestige and importance of the judiciary, the fact 
remains that such norms are present to some degree and that without them 
Fish’s characterization of law makes no sense. Fish’s reliance on “an 
enriched notion of practice,” which is a fancy way of saying that practice is 
not influenced by theory, is ultimately as uninfluential for practice as he 
claims theory to be if such a notion is not constrained by a sincere approach 
to participating within the practice. Fish intimates such a commitment
51 “Fish v. Fiss.” In Doing What Comes Naturally. 133.
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when he notes that a local characterization of an enterprise means that an 
embedded participant will think w ithin a practice, in contrast to thinking 
with a practice (which he accuses Dworkin’s chain-novel characterization 
of doing). Fish elucidates the difference between the two types of thinking, 
saying that,
To think w ithin a practice is to have one’s very perception and sense of 
possible and appropriate action issue “naturally’’- without further 
reflection- from one’s position as a deeply situated agent. Someone who 
looks with practice-informed eyes sees a field already organized in 
terms of perspicuous obligations, self-evidently authorized procedures, 
and obviously relevant pieces of evidence. To think with a practice- by 
self-consciously wielding some extrapolated model of its working- is to 
be ever calculating just what one’s obligations are, what procedures are 
“really” legitimate, what evidence is in fact evidence, and so on. It is to 
be a theoretician.52
What can it mean for a “deeply, situated agent” to bring a “natural”
disposition to problems of the enterprise if the prior assumption that such a
disposition should be sincerely held is not already in place? The agent does
not deeply situate himself to sabotage the enterprise. Fish may be right that
Dennis Martinez (a professional baseball pitcher) may not be conscious of all
that informs his deliberations on pitching, but there can be no doubt that
Martinez when engaging in his practice sincerely believes there is a single
wav he should conduct himself in the performance of his task. Any
“natural” disposition must incorporate internal feelings of fidelity to such a
disposition. Moreover, if such allegiance is present, it must be allegiance to
something, some single view (however unreflective) of what the enterprise
demands of its participants. This is why Fish has such disdain for Dworkin’s
aesthetic hypothesis and chain-novel metaphor for participants of an
enterprise; there is no such thing as a judge acting “according to the best
interpretation,” but only for a judge to act like a j u d g e .5 3  Fish might insist
52 “Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory.” In Doing What Comes Naturally.
386-7.
53 See ibid., 391-2. Also see “Almost Pragmatism: The Jurisprudence of 
Richard Posner, Richard Rorty, and Ronald Dworkin,” in Michael Brint and William 
Weaver, eds., Pragmatism in Law & Society. 73-80. Howard Gillman summarizes the 
Fishian view of a judge when he says that, “Part of what it means to be a judge is to act in
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that Supreme Court Justices today simply do not reflect upon the current 
mode of expressing themselves; which includes strategically compromising 
their language and forming coalitions. These sorts of unreflective actions 
and dispositions, to continue this line of thinking, make up what it means to 
be Supreme Court Justice in 1996. To be judge means to engage in such 
compromises; this is what the enterprise demands. If, on the other hand, this 
view is not simply to slide into a behavioralist-realist view of law (and this is 
not what Fish argues for at all) then Fish’s “enriched notion of practice” 
must cling to a kind of perceptual formalism that allows a judge to present 
his decision according to a sincere view of what the practice requires.54 
Notice how Fish says that to think with a practice is “to be ever calculating” 
what one’s obligations are as a participant. In the case of a judge, such 
calculations (or strategies) could not only alter the content of those 
obligations but affect the product- law- as well. At the heart of this 
perceptual formalism is the sincere execution of a task the interpretive 
community asks the participant to perform. Fish’s admonishment that all 
interpretation is local, however, leaves the outside theoretician only able to 
argue substantive political agendas of reform or entrenchment.
Fish is clear in his belief that law is at bottom an extraordinary kind of 
rhetorical activity, “creating arid recreating itself out of the very materials
a way that is consistent with the prevailing understanding of a judge’s duties and 
obligations...what makes a decision ‘legal’ rather than narrowly partisan or 
idiosyncratically personal is not the discipline of a determinate rule but the discipline 
of a practice- the discipline of a discipline- if you will.” Gillman, “Judicial 
Behavioralism’s Problematic Jurisprudence,” 14-15.
54 Fish: “A preference is something one cannot have independently of some 
institution or enterprise within which the preference could emerge as an option, and an 
institution or enterprise is itself inconceivable independent of some general purpose or 
value... I may be a judge deciding a case involving voter fraud who ‘personally’ prefers 
one political party to another (it would be hard to imagine a judge of whom this would 
not be true), but if I am thinking of myself as a judge. I automatically conceive of my 
task as a judicial one and comport myself accordingly.” “Still Wrong After All These 
Years.” In Doing What Comes Naturally. 366-7 [emphasis added]. Also see “Force,” in 
ibid., 520.
and forces it is obliged, by the very desire to be law, to push away. ”55 in one 
of his articles, however, Fish displays what can only be called a remarkable 
bias about the rhetoric of law, which causes him to incorrectly claim that 
any such theoretical view “has no consequences” for the practice of law. In 
his critique of the legal theory of James Boyd White, Fish agrees with much 
of White’s observation about law (specifically, that law is essentially 
rhetorical), but decries his “antifoundationalist theory hope,” which is the 
suggestion that “by becoming aware of the rhetoricity of our foundations we 
gain a [nonrhetorical] perspective on them that we didn’t have before. ”56 
That is to say that Fish agrees with White’s portrayal of the subject but denies 
that such a picture could generate any practical change in the law. It is 
Fish’s understanding of both rhetoricity and the enterprise of law, however, 
which is skewed. Chiding White for claiming that the awareness of certain 
rhetorical features (such as the commitment to “many-voicedness”) of the 
law can improve our practice, Fish writes that, “it is hard to see what place 
[such features] could have in a process that demands single-voiced 
judgments, even if that voice can be shown to be plurally constituted. ”57 At 
the very least Fish here misunderstands both the function and possibility of 
the rhetoricity of law; he appears here (as earlier discussions reveal) to have 
an almost oxymoronic idea of rhetoric as well as a rigid “result-oriented” 
view of legal practice. Both characterizations are surprisingly partial given 
Fish’s general attitude toward institutional structures.5^  More importantly, 
White’s thesis of law’s rhetoricity, despite what Fish thinks, potentially does
55 See “The Law Wishes to Have a Formal Existence,” in There's No Such Thing 
as Free Speech, and It’s a Good Thing. Too (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 
156.
56 ibid., 172. For more on the legal theory of James Boyd White, see text infra.
57 ibid., 174.
58 For just such a general statement by Fish, see, “Appendix. Fish Tales: A 
Conversation with ‘The Contemporary Sophist/” in, There's No Such Thing as Free 
Speech. 297.
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have consequences for legal practice. It is precisely because White- like 
Fish and unlike many others who Fish correctly castigates- sees law as 
essentially rhetorical that our current practice can be affected. By Fish’s 
own admission, the goals of the law are achieved through “winning an 
argument or crafting an opinion.” These, “result-oriented activities,” as 
Fish calls them, would no longer be only result-oriented if White’s 
observations became accepted as “natural.” Theory which is sensitive to the 
rhetorical nature of law- perhaps only such theory- can generate 
consequences for a rhetorical legal practice.
Finally, this review of post-positivist legal theory will briefly touch 
on some of the writing on the subject of law forwarded by the “Law and 
Literature” school of legal theory. Two prominent authors will be discussed: 
James Boyd White and Joseph Vining. The Law and Literature school prefers 
to characterize law as a language, a constitutive discourse, a “set of resources 
for thought and argument. ”59 In his best known book, When Words Lose 
Their Meaning, professor White sets out a particular “way of reading” legal 
texts so that a person can be sensitive to the rhetoricity that is law. This 
“way” focuses on “four fundamental questions” that a reader should have in 
mind when trying to best understand and analyze a t e x t .  60
Those who view law as White does make a great deal of room for the 
centrality of the human mind- the individual human mind- in the legal
59 Heracles' Bow: Essays on Rhetoric and the Poetics of the Law (Madison, WI: 
The University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), 33.
60 James Boyd White, When Words Lose Their Meaning: Constitutions and 
Reconstitutions of Language. Character, and Community (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1984), 3-23. White’s “way of reading” is too subtle and (not surprisingly) 
rhetorical to be capable of an effective summary. In White’s sequel to When Words Lose 
Their Meaning, he offers “three interrelated points of attention” which characterize his 
approach: “[T]he language and culture within which the writer works; the art by which 
he reconstitutes his use of it; and... the kind of community he establishes with his 
readers in the experience he offers them.” White, justice as Translation: An Essay in 
Cultural and Legal Criticism (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 
99.
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endeavor.61 This is because White sees language as having, “an ineradicably 
individual character.... I do not mean that meaning is completely private, 
which would obviously make social and linguistic life impossible, but that for 
each of us there is always an element or dimension of meaning... that is 
irremediably personal. ”62 White’s view of language, not surprisingly, 
directly influences his characterization of the judicial opinion. One of the 
most important features of this particular form of law, White explains, is that 
“In every judicial opinion the judge gives himself a character or 
personality, demonstrating by performance certain intellectual and ethical 
qualities which he of necessity asserts to be appropriate to his role. ”63 These 
sorts of characterizations of language point toward another commitment of 
White and his Law and literature colleagues- a normative commitment to the 
conversation of law. We should strive for this conversing ideal in law, White 
says, because it is the only way forward for any legal practice whose 
currency is human language; what is needed to improve any legal practice is 
not, “more theory, but more practical criticism.”64 Unlike Fish’s radical 
localism, White takes a moderated position as he believes that texts can 
deliver shared meaning among readers because he sees language and texts 
not only as created bv communities but also as constitutive of those 
communities.
White’s specific discussion of the difference between “British” and 
“French” methods of constitutional expression stands out for our p u r p o s e s .63 
The distinctively British contribution is that discourse on constitutional 
values must be discussed all at once in combination, as opposed to a chain of




65 See White, When Words Lose Their Meaning. 192-230.
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singular values in line. Using the writings of Edmund Burke as his
exemplar, White explains that British constitutionalism’s true aim,
is not the isolated definition of values but their combination, their 
composition into a whole. . . .The central characteristic of this language. 
. . is its integrative force: it is a language that unites fact, value, and 
reason; thought and emotion; the family and the crown; the social and 
the natural worlds; ethical motives and material r e s u l t s .66
“French” methods are notable for “a theoretical, single-value
discourse,” which leads to such undesirables as detachment, chaos,
disintegration, and d i s s o l u t i o n .67 it is both clear and correct that White links
American constitutionalism to her British roots regarding such m e t h o d s . 68
White’s illuminating, while somewhat artistic, point is that a constitutive
language that values integration and combination can not be read by
utilizing a serial mode of scientific inquiry and judgment. In a language
that employs “many-voicedness,” and “‘comprehending contraries,’. . . the
interesting question is not what the main idea is but how it is given meaning
by the text, and given meaning in particular by the oppositions that are its
life,” White s a y s .6 9  in hoping to demonstrate how certain latent institutional
practices may comport with constitutional principles and forms, White’s
discussion is valuable. In his own words, White explains how such a
constitutive language, incorporated in law, “is profoundly against monotonal
thought and speech, against the single voice, the single aspect of the self or
culture dominating the rest. ”70
We conclude this tour of “post-positivist” legal theory with a very
brief mention of the work of one of White’s colleagues. Joseph Vining, in
The Authoritative and the Authoritarian, echoes many of the same themes as
66 ibid., 201, 208.
67 ibid., 201-2.




does White about the law. Like his colleague, Vining emphasizes the legal 
enterprise as centrally dependent upon the human mind. “[T]he method 
lawyers use,” Vining is plain, “involves a presupposition of mind.”7* Some 
may notice that, like Vining, I too have been inserting terms like “mind” in 
this discussion of legal theory and terms like these need proper definition. 
Vining is right to reply to such persons that want prior definitions that, “To 
try to specify what we mean by mind would be to fall into the very way of 
thinking and talking that it should be our purpose above all to bypass....
What good would it do to try to define what we mean by ‘tragic’? Our 
meaning will come clear only in discussion.”72 Perhaps when I have been 
suggesting in these pages- that latent in much of legal theory is a 
commitment to judicial sincerity- would also be conveyed by saying that at 
the core of legal theory there is mind. Without mind, there is no law.
The main reason I have taken this brief moment to discuss Vining is 
because he is preoccupied with the same question that has gripped these 
pages. Listen to the question that Vining says will guide his inquiries 
throughout his monograph:
Sometimes lawyers, judges, officials, and citizens say they speak 
“in the name of the law.” When they say this they invoke the authority 
of the law. It is not too literal to ask what the law’s name is and whether 
it can have a name.... Our inquiry is guided, as will be seen, by a 
question that can be raised today about, the American Supreme Court: 
whether it will become a bureaucratic institution, and if so what that 
will mean.73
For Vining, law will become authoritarian if its practitioners insist on 
making law into some kind of machine, erasing its presupposition of mind. 
The peculiar institutionalism that has surrounded our legal practice, Vining 
claims, will ultimately rob law of its authoritative purchase upon us. Vining 
is a kindred spirit in this suggestion; he is concerned with the eroding
71 Vining, J. The Authoritative and the Authoritarian (Chicago: University of 




quality of the Court’s work which he attributes to such internal features as 
the proliferation of the influence of law clerks. It is also Vining’s purpose to 
suggest that our legal practice would do better to search for (and create and 
maintain) an authoritative center of legal meaning rather than for a 
hierarchical apex which ultimately will be transformed into an 
authoritarian phenomenon of impersonal process. This is the great 
confusion of many scholars who suppose that “judiciary” and “law” are 
convertible terms; there can be a Supreme Court at the apex of an 
institutional hierarchy and yet still retain an authoritative center for law.
In one sense, it is the aim of this paper to affirm Vining’s protests.
American law has been marching down the hierarchical, bureaucratic path 
for a very long time, and there was a particular moment when the pace of 




Judicial Sincerity and Its Absence
In addition to any historical or jurisprudential arguments which 
might bolster claims of relevance for an argument on behalf of judicial 
sincerity, there needs to be an exploration of whether authoritative 
constitutional theory adds any support to such a thesis, and what some of the 
important practical consequences might be if the judiciary reflected such a 
behavioral standard. This is the primary task of the third and final part of 
the paper. Each of the chapters which follow are concerned with either the 
important practical consequences of conceiving of “the judicial Power of the 
United States" as entailing a prior commitment to sincere behavior, or 
whether American constitutional theory speaks to such a commitment.
The thesis which has been presented to this point would be well served 
by a brief chapter which spells out in a more concise, systematic way what I 
have been arguing for and how I understand- practically speaking- the idea 
of judicial sincerity and its application to the United States Supreme Court. 
The ideal of judicial sincerity would manifest itself in the everyday 
operations of an appellate court like the Supreme Court in two basic ways. 
Specifically, two main elements would exist which reflect the importance of 
the value of individual sincere judgment: (1) a set of institutional 
conventions, and (2) an set of discourse ethics. The following summary of 
these two elements is conducted with the U.S. Supreme Court in mind.
Institutional conventions which reflect the value of judicial sincerity 
would, in the first place, have to not only permit but harbor no animosity 
whatsoever against a dissenting opinion of a fellow judge. The role of dissent 
of any kind has really been at the heart of the discussion; judicial sincerity 
values dissenting opinion of any kind. As I have been trying to show, the 
theories which underpin Anglo-American common law traditions actually
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treat dissent much differently than it usually is treated by legal theorists.i 
Any rule, convention or attitude which displays any degree of preference 
for plurality, majority or unanimous opinion has no place in a forum of 
principled legal judgment in the Anglo-American tradition. Conventions of 
opinion assignment and construction which are operative within the 
present Court would be abolished. It is not enough for option of dissent to be 
present. Individual and plurality opinions should be accorded equal 
institutional respect even if a plurality opinion may become the law of the 
land. One (political) value reflected by a common law tradition which prizes 
judicial sincerity is that dissent- and the ability to accommodate it- reflects 
strength in both the law and the polity which is governed by it.
Ethics of discourse among the judges of a sincere court would also 
develop. In one sense they can be understood to be derivative of the 
institutional conventions of the court, but in another sense they can be seen 
as reinforcing and altogether separate from a court’s institutional 
conventions. These discourse ethics would be important reminders to a judge 
that there is a line between persuasion and strategy which should not be 
traversed. There would be appropriate ways to persuade colleagues, and 
there would be inappropriate ways. Of course there would be disputed limits 
of these discourse ethics, but over time the day to day operations of a sincere 
appellate court would be characterized by an understanding that certain 
kinds of persuasion were simply unacceptable.
It is important to point out that to a degree these two elements are 
discernible within the present Supreme Court. Though I have been arguing 
in these pages that strategic behavior plays a large role in the exercise of
1 Kent Greenawalt, for example, argues that it is important for the Justices to 
avoid separate opinions in important cases because separate opinions with different 
rationales make both the Court and law appear less principled than a singular majority 
statement. This is the essence of the consensus view about dissent generally: dissent 
reflects weakness. Greenawalt, “The Enduring Significance of Neutral Principles” 78 
Columbia Law Review 982 (1978), 1007.
judicial power today, strategy has not yet annihilated sincerity as a judicial 
value. The opportunity to dissent and the nonexistence of certain kinds of 
strategic dialogue certainly speaks to the notion that the terms strategic and 
judicial are not entirely synonymous, at least in the American context.
Nevertheless, some of the Court’s current conventions themselves 
create a general dynamic of text negotiation and compromise from the time 
the opinion is first assigned, throughout the many phases of drafting until it 
is finally handed down. Majorities are often strategically “purchased” 
through a compromise of language; sometimes even unanimity is a 
consideration for compromising the opinion of the Court. The remedy of “all 
deliberate speed” in the school segregation cases forever symbolized by 
Brown v. Board of Education is perhaps the most famous example of the price 
of unanimity.2 Crucial passages of opinions are made ambiguous 
intentionally so as to secure a majority foothold. It seemed hardly 
problematic, for example, that much of Chief Justice Rehnquist’s rationale in 
his opinion in National League of Cities v. Userv was simply not compatible 
with Justice Blackmun’s concurring rationale.3 Rehnquist’s opinion would 
not have been the “opinion of the Court” without Blackmun’s vote, so 
articulate, comprehensible principles of federalism need not get in the way. 
Another patently strategic result was produced in the creation of the Court’s 
opinion for the 1941 migration case, Edwards v. California.4 Justice James 
Byrnes effectively acquired the right to write the Court’s unanimous opinion
2 See Brown v. Board of Education. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) r Brown 11: 349 U.S. 294 
(1955) [ Brown II ]. The remedy of “all deliberate speed” is from Brown II. 349 U.S. at 
301.
3 See 426 U.S. 833 (1976). The ambiguity of the Rehnquist opinion and its 
superficial compatibility with the Blackmun opinion did not stand the test of time.
National League of Cities was overruled in the 1985 case, Garcia v. San Antonio 
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, when Justice Blackmun switched his vote.
4 314U.S. 160.
by threatening dissent. The important doctrinal effect of Byrnes7 
procurement was that the Court’s opinion in the case would be based upon 
the Interstate Commerce Clause of Article I, instead of the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 Let me be clear: a legal 
community which valued judicial sincerity as I have been arguing for it 
would have to conclude that, at the very least, both Justice Byrnes and Chief 
Justice Harlan Stone engaged in improper judicial behavior.6 Stone, who 
because of convention had the prerogative to assign the opinion, allowed a 
consideration of institutional prestige to grossly manipulate legal doctrine. 
The strategy of Byrnes and Stone effectively prevented what could have 
been an important colloquy about the nature and parameters of the 
Privileges and Immunities Clause. Some may claim that such a conversation 
occurred anyway, but there can be no doubt that the salience and intensity 
of the disagreement was considerably muted by the appearance of 
unanimity.
In other instances, the Court deliberately clouds its language so as to 
avoid possible ill reactions from the citizenry. The Court’s notorious 
substitution of the term “desegregation” for “integration” in Cooper v. 
Aaron is perhaps the most famous example of this tactic.7 Finally, even on 
occasions when the Justices try to render individual judgment, the 
institutionalism of today’s Court effects the final product negatively and all 
that results is confusion in a blur of multiple, overlapping opinions. The 
landmark affirmative action case, Regents of the University of California v.
5 See Abraham, The ludiciarv. 40-41.
6 In the wake of this shell game, Justice Robert Jackson added a concurring 
opinion based upon the Privileges and Immunities Clause, which was joined by three 
others.
7 See 358 U.S. 1 (1958). Justice Brennan is regarded as primarily responsible 
for the change of terms.
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Bakke is most often cited by students of the Court as producing precisely this 
effect.8
It is this general atmosphere, this culture of decisionmaking, that is 
most at odds with a distinctive judicial f u n c t i o n .9  Since the days of the 
Marshall Court, the push for single-voiced pronouncements has led to an 
institutionalism that increasingly negotiates, compromises, and dehumanizes 
its product. Early in this century, the fact of the matter was that the 
Supreme Court when deciding cases was very often unanimous. In 1900, over 
76 percent of the cases heard by the Court were unanimously decided; in 
1910, almost 90 percent of decisions were unanimous; in 1920, 82 percent 
were u n a n i m o u s .  10 in  1942, there was a large decrease in unanimity, and for 
the next fifty years the proportion hovers between a low of 16 percent and a 
high of 49 percent, n  Another plain fact, somewhat linked to the first, is that 
for most of the Court’s history, the appearance of even one dissenting 
opinion in Supreme Court decisions is a rather rare phenomenon. From the 
year 1801 until 1937, the highest proportion of cases in a single term with at 
least one dissenting opinion was only 26 percent (in 1845).12 Even this 
rather low figure doesn’t convey the rarity of dissent within the Court; the
8 See 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Also see Arizona v. Fulminante. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
9 Rodney Blackman humorously explains certain stratagems such as “Spinning,” 
“Shelling,” and “You Scratch My Back and I’ll Scratch Yours,” as commonplace Supreme 
Court practices. See Rodney J. Blackman, “Spinning, Squirrelling, Shelling, Stiletting 
and Other Stratagems of the Supremes,” 35 Arizona Law Review 503-33 (1993).




mean proportion for all 134 terms is just over 10 p e r c e n t . T h e  regularity of 
concurring opinions is even lower than that of dissents. Over the same 134 
terms, the mean proportion of cases with at least one concurring opinion is 
8.5 percent; no one term had more than 9 cases with concurring opinions.14 
Statistics such as these are important indicators of Supreme Court practice. 
Most of the time, the majority rulings of the Court have been expressed 
through a singular voice. Since 1937, dissenting and concurring opinions 
have been far more frequent. In the 1980’s for example, 61 percent of cases 
had at least one dissenting opinion and 42 percent had at least one 
concurring opinion. Increases like these have led many commentators to 
draw a parallel between current trends and past seriatim practice. But this 
comparison is too superficial; the internal practices of the today’s Court 
effect even seemingly individualistic Justices. When Justice John Blair gave 
his opinion in Chisholm v. Georgia, adhering to the seriatim practice, he did 
not negotiate or compromise the language of his opinion for the sake of the 
result. The text of his own opinion even suggests that, at the moment of his 
delivery, he was unaware of what the result of the case would be! *6 Of 
course, such disregard for the work and product of others has its own set of 
effects and disadvantages, so the point is not to praise the seriatim form of 
judicial pronouncement as the one true example of proper judicial behavior. 
The seriatim form has been introduced and referred to in these pages 
because it is an emblem of a set of standards that guides essentially judicial
13 The Court did not meet in 1802 or 1811. This figure has increased slowly 
but steadily throughout this time span. From 1801 through 1844, the mean proportion 
of cases per term with at least one dissenting opinion was just under 7 percent; from 
1801-1889, just over 8 percent.
14 ibid., 154-58.
15 Ibid., 153, 158.
16 See Chisholm v. Georgia. 2 Dallas 419, at 452 (1793).
behavior and distinguishes it from other exercises of power.
Perhaps most obviously, conventions regarding institutional 
pronouncement and opinion-assignment provide incentive for the Chief 
Justice or most senior Associate Justice to vote with the majority. The great 
John Marshall himself went against his own jurisprudential convictions on 
occasion so that he could deliver the opinion of the Court. Marshall was an 
anomaly to be sure; his behavior as Chief Justice was almost obsessive with 
regards to institutional stature and prestige. Statistics for modern-day Courts 
are less startling. During his sixteen years as Chief Justice, Earl Warren 
assigned 80 percent of all the Court’s opinions and self-assigned 10 percent. 
Chief Justice Warren Burger assigned almost 85 percent of all cases and self­
assigned about 10 percent during his fifteen year tenure (1969-84). These 
sorts of figures can be deceiving, however. Just because the case is not self­
assigned does not mean that the assignor did not apply judicial strategy. 
Assigning a majority opinion to a certain junior Justice may have precisely 
the effect upon the law that the assignor had hoped for. General 
jurisprudential positions of the Justices are well-known, and certainly the 
conference discussion of a case would reveal significant differences even 
among those Justices who agree upon the result. These sorts of 
considerations seem to be wholly out of place in an arena that has devoted so 
much of its energies to how the Constitution should be interpreted or what it 
is judges actually do in the name of the law.17
Surprisingly though, the bulk of the academy as well as much of the 
bench and bar does not countenance this discrepancy. One noted professor
17 Deborah Heilman has argued that the Court should consciously consider “the 
appearance of principle” as a relevant legal factor when deciding cases. Heilman’s 
argument is advanced on several fronts and I believe it to be severely flawed. I will not 
make a rebuttal plain in these pages, but for the moment I would point out that 
arguments such as Heilman’s are a direct result of the peculiar culture which permeates 
the exercise of judicial power. If judges would only be more principled in their 
behavior, they would have no need to take pains in order to appear so. “The Importance 
of Appearing Principled,” 37 Arizona Law Review 1107-51 (1995).
of law, Eugene Rostow, is unabashedly transparent about the role of the 
Supreme Court. “Exercising high political powers,” Rostow explains, “the 
Court must have a high sense of strategy and tactics. ”18 On this reasoning, it 
is no wonder that many lawyers agree that tactics such as assembling 
unanimity in Brown is not only unproblematic, but essential. 19 Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, concerned with the proliferation of separate opinions with 
no single opinion commanding a clear majority, echoes many others of the 
bench when she wrote in 1990 that judges should strive more toward 
collegiality.20 Ginsburg even goes so far as to say that American judicial 
power could benefit from some of the lessons of French practice, where the 
value of collegiality is so influential that judicial products are expressed in a 
unanimous judgment and the author is not identified. Justice Potter Stewart 
was also straightforward in a 1985 interview: “The business of the Court is to 
give institutional opinions for its decisions. ”21 What is described as an 
increase in “individualism” on the part of the Justices is almost unanimously 
decried by lawyers and judges alike. Or consider some of Philip Bobbitt’s 
remarks on the “expressive function” performed by the Supreme Court, 
within the pages of his highly praised typology of constitutional argument, 
Constitutional Fate. Bobbitt’s remarks are worth repeating because they
18 e.V. Rostow, “American Legal Realism and the Sense of the Profession,” 34 
Rocky Mountain Law Review 123 (1962), 142.
19 See, for example, C. B. Motley, “From Brown to Bakke: The Long Road to 
Equality,” 14 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 315-27 (1979) [unanimity 
essential to efficacy of Brown decision]; R. Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown 
v. Board of Education and Black America's Struggle for Equality (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1976), 678-99. But cf. John Paul Stevens, “The Concept of Liberty,” 41 Bulletin: 
American Academy of Arts & Sciences 11, 30 (1988) [Court’s use o f ‘all deliberate 
speed’ prevented what would have been total compliance in the South and elsewhere.].
20 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “Remarks on writing separately,” 65 Washington Law 
Review 133 (1990).
21 David M. O’Brien, Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics.
3rd edition (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1993), 276.
betray the familiar academic bent which is present when any discussion of 
the Court as communicator is attempted. The relevant portions of Bobbitt’s 
text follow:
First it should be observed how well suited our Supreme Court is 
to fulfill an expressive role. For most of the life of the Court, there has 
been a tradition of unanimity. This is crucial if the Court is to be 
perceived with clarity and with an undivided force. The strenuous 
efforts of the Court to achieve unanimity in the Brown desegregation 
opinion are evidence that the Court itself is not unmindful of this fact, 
although the recent proliferation of opinions suggests that such virtues 
are not always decisive. For a very long period of our history the Court 
spoke either through one opinion for the entire Court or through a 
single opinion not joined in by dissenters. The splintering of the Court 
and particularly the fractionization of a majority renders an expressive 
role more difficult....
The most interesting features, and the most illuminating, are 
those in which we differ from the English practice because these have 
been deliberately chosen. It is largely to John Marshall that, as with so 
much else, we owe a debt for halting the English practice of seriatim 
opinions delivered orally and summarily reported and for replacing 
them with a single written opinion. Only once in Jay’s tenure was this 
done, and this, in the important jurisdictional case arising from the 
Neutrality Proclamation, seems to have been done in part to evade 
giving reasons for the decision rather than to account for it. Jay’s 
successor, Ellsworth, tried to eliminate the seriatim practice, but his 
absence on a mission to France in 1800 provided an opportunity for 
backsliding, so that when Marshall was sworn in the following year the 
practice of delivering seriatim opinions was still in some use.
Marshall at once began urging their abandonment and 
replacement by a single written opinion. This for two reasons, was a 
crucial step in permitting the Court to exercise an expressive function. 
First, it allowed the Court to speak with a single voice, so that its message 
was both unqualified and the prestige of that message thereby 
enhanced. Second, the effort to achieve agreement on a single opinion 
increased the importance of bargaining and persuasion among the 
Justices. This meant that the statement finally agreed to would reflect 
more than the attitudes of a single person, and it increased considerably 
the proximity an opinion was likely to have to the views shared by the 
larger polity (by a sort of regression to the mean, I would surmise).22
If remarks such as Bobbitt’s are reflective of the legal academy’s view 
of the Court as communicator (and I am afraid they are), then it is no wonder 
that American judicial power is viewed through a prism of strategy.
Consider some of the important assumptions within the above passages. 
Firstly, according to Bobbitt, the expressive function of the Court is well 
served by singular pronouncements, made more difficult by multiple
22 Bobbitt, Constitutional Eate. 186-87.
pronouncements. Next, a more, critical reader of this passage might take 
issue with Bobbitt’s claim that the Court’s expressive function was 
“deliberately chosen” and the evidence of this is John Marshall’s halting of 
seriatim opinions. How is this singular act by Justice Marshall evidence of 
deliberate constitutional choice? It would fit the facts just as well to say that 
the Court under Marshall’s initiative and subsequent “ratification” by other 
Chief and Associate Justices simply amplified and concentrated their 
expression illegitimately according to any fair appraisal of the history and 
understanding of judicial practice at that time. Bobbitt’s tone regarding the 
peculiar development of the Court is all the more surprising given his 
characterization of the Jay Court when it tried to fulfill the Court’s 
expressive role once on his own (strategic) terms. The singular expression 
by the Jay Court in the case of Glass v. The Sloop Betsey. 23 is correctly 
summarized by Bobbitt as an attempt “to evade giving reasons” for the 
decision- surely not a behavioral principle towards which a common law 
judiciary should strive. The last paragraph reflects a view of expression 
which is certainly controversial and is not at all clear that it best fulfills 
Bobbitt’s expressed goal- the fulfillment of an expressive function by the 
Court. At the very least, Bobbitt’s rather conventional narrative lacks 
sensitivity to the argument that, on his own terms, the Court should only be 
acting strategically when such action produces an “expressive” 
communicative result. The fact remains that today’s culture of American 
judicial power does not in fact produce this desirable yield; singular 
statements are too often highly “qualified” constructions which do not aid 
the expressive function at all. Finally, Bobbitt’s last claim that a 
compromised singular opinion would be reflective of “more than the 
attitudes of a single person” is only an unexplored assertion that neglects an 
at least equally satisfactory interpretation. The opinion of the Court may,
23 3 u.S. (3 Dali.) 6 (1794).
and does, in many cases reflect less than the attitudes of a single person 
because of its additional baggage. A singular opinion does not in every case 
lead to an “unqualified” one. It is unclear what the value is (even if it is 
true, which it may not be) of a singular Court opinion being in closer 
“proximity” to the views of the public or whether a “regression to the mean” 
is at all appropriate in a forum of principle.
It is important to note that there are important structural differences 
between the federal courts of appeals and the Supreme Court which may 
make a judge more individualistic or more institutionally-minded depending 
on the court under discussion. Chief judges of federal courts of appeals, for 
example, are not chosen or appointed to their post; unlike the Chief Justice of 
the United States, they reach that position by virtue of seniority.24 This fact 
may explain the presence of consistent deliberate leadership exerted by a 
Chief Justice but not by a chief judge. Also, because Congress generally 
legislates uniformly with respect to the courts of appeals, 25 and because the 
Supreme Court is more powerful and closely observed, certain “feedback” 
effects and “free-rider” problems may be more serious at one level than
another. 26
These important considerations notwithstanding, there can be little 
doubt that the structure and culture of the federal appellate judiciary today 
primarily supports attitudes of an overtly institutionalist perspective. The 
conventions surrounding the formulation of the judicial opinion which may 
be invoked by key judicial actors still point to an undeniable dominance of
24 28 U.S.C. § 45(a). When the position becomes vacant, the most senior judge on 
the circuit who is under the age of sixty-five becomes chief judge. There is a term limit 
of seven years.
25 The large exception to this is the number of judges provided for by Congress 
toe each circuit.
26 See Richard Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 347-50.
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the institutionalist perspective. These sorts of claims lie in stark contrast to 
the conventional narrative of the bench and academy. “Unfortunately,” 
Richard Posner, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh 
Circuit, summarizes, “the structure of the federal appellate system, together 
with the broader American culture... fosters individual self-assertion rather 
than institutional loyalty and cohesion.”27 Posner points to many aspects of 
the federal judiciary to make his point, but in the end his argument is simply 
too one-sided; he fails to account for the all-too-frequent occurrences of 
compromise and strategy which are emblematic of an institutionally-minded 
appellate membership. Posner may be right that things have changed 
recently; increasing dissents and concurrences surely point to a relative 
trend of individuality. But even this observation lacks the context and 
perspective that would allow any judicial system under review to be 
evaluated according to the possible range of individual and institutional 
behavior available. It is indicative that Posner discusses the “costs and 
benefits” of the individual practice of the signed judicial opinion but does 
not give similarly candid treatment to more institutionally-minded 
conventions.28 The Chief Judge’s reaction to present-day concurring 
behavior by Supreme Court Justices is perhaps even more revealing: 
“Ordinarily, the inability of a judge on a multimember court... to persuade 
even a single colleague to his view should be a compelling reason for him to 
swallow his doubts and join an opinion that commends more support.”29 
Posner’s book on judicial administration is undoubtedly written for a
27 ibid., 347. See generally ibid., 347-68.
28 Ibid., 349.
29 ibid., 361. This suggestion is later combined with a Burkean sensibility 
which rounds out Posner’s feelings towards concurring opinions. See ibid., 362 [“A 
majority opinion is generally stronger when it has been recast to incorporate the 
suggestions of concurring judges.”].
professional audience, but his rather myopic treatment of the 
responsibilities of federal appellate judges speaks to the rather weak position 
that individualism holds in the minds of American judges and lawyers.
C hapter Eight: 
C onstitutional Theory and Context
An argument in favor of judicial sincerity is really only another 
contribution in what has been a string of critiques from a sizable group of 
scholars I refer to as constitutional contextualists. It would be prudent to 
explain just what it is I mean by “context” here and the assembly of minds 
that expounds upon its virtues. By using the root word context I do not mean 
to contend that all forms of social pressure and influence are considered 
worthy of examination. Instead, I utilize the term with a view towards 
institutions; quite specifically, the full set of constitutionally constructed 
institutions. “Contextualism” resembles that particular bent of constitutional 
argument known commonly as constitutional structuralism, or the structural 
modality of constitutional argument, though there are key differences.! The 
structuralist seems more concerned, and most effective, with overarching 
arrangements and intergovernmental designs.2 The contextualist would 
charge the structuralist as being less attentive to those behaviors, 
conventions, rules and understandings which govern the internal 
mechanics of the institution under analysis.
It would appear that the raison d'etre for this particular academic 
ensemble is to shift the focus away from the judiciary when inquiring about 
the Constitution. Cass Sunstein explains that the result of such a shift,
“would amount to a recovery of the original constitutional goal of creating a
1 On constitutional structuralism as a general approach, mode, or technique of 
analysis, see Walter F. Murphy, J.E. Fleming, and W.F. Harris, II, American 
Constitutional Interpretation (Mineola, New York: Foundation Press, 1986), 292-94, 
319-27. On the structural modality of constitutional argument, see Philip Bobbitt, 
Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1982), 74-92.
2 Philip Bobbitt supports this view of the structural modality as most 
persuasive when discussing those cases where intergovernmental designs are implicated. 
Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate. 74-92.
deliberative d e m o c r a c y .  ”3 ideas rooted in republican thought are very 
important for any constitutional contextualist, and a recent exploration of 
the components and implications of “deliberative democracy” offers strong 
support on behalf of institutionally-reflective norms like those I have been 
arguing for in these pages.4 Rather than shift the focus away from the 
judiciary, it would seem prudent to try explain what a revival of the 
republican tradition might mean specifically for the judiciary. The aim of 
this chapter is to present in a “realistic republican” way (a phrase that will 
receive fuller meaning shortly) what some of the shared commitments or 
understandings that animated the original foray into American 
constitutionalism might mean for the exercise of judicial power. There are 
four such “shared commitments” I wish to highlight.
Constitutional Context
First of all, perhaps the common ground for all those who would 
discuss the legitimacy, scope, and implications of the Constitution in 1787 was 
that the instrument itself was essential for peoples who wished security and 
prosperity. The first shared understanding to underscore was the respect 
accorded for constitution as political device to regulate and improve the
3 Sunstein, Partial Constitution. 10. It is worth mention that, although Sunstein 
here does in fact examine judicial interpretation, he feels that many of the resulting 
proposals to be deduced from his work, “are not intended for judges at all, but for others 
thinking about constitutional liberties in the modern state.” Ibid.
4 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson suggest in their analysis of the 
components and implications of “deliberative democracy” that the nature of the reason- 
giving which the concept “deliberative democracy” itself requires is fundamentally 
individualist. Gutmann and Thompson: “The reasons that deliberative accountability 
requires are given to and by individuals. The individual is the only kind of agent who 
can judge whether a reason should be accepted as a basis for fair comparison, in 
accordance with reciprocity.” The authors later conclude the “inescapably 
individualist” nature of the principle of accountability as a component of deliberative 
democracy. Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1996), 151. Inexplicably, Gutmann and Thompson dismiss the judiciary early on in 
their analysis of deliberative democracy, and they in large part avoid discussion of 
formal constitutional expressions of deliberation. Their discussion of the component 
principles of deliberative democracy- “reciprocity”, “publicity”, and “accountability”- 
are very much compatible with the judicial function.
general affairs of mankind. American democracy then would benefit by and 
depend upon the character of our constitutionalism. The emphasis of this 
claim, necessarily, opposes the operating assumptions of the noted political 
scientist of the pluralist school, Robert Dahl. 5 For Americans, the 
paramountcy accorded to constitution as political device stretches back to the 
Mayflower Compact of November, 1620. For the human race, 
constitutionalism has its known origins with the ancient Greeks and 
Romans.6 Rather than appeal to reason through tradition and longevity, 
however, the point is to briefly recall what exactly it means to constitute a 
people. Professor Charles Mcllwain explained that this meaning has not 
been static. For the Greeks a constitution was the clearest description- and 
only a description- of the polity.7 The Greek vocabulary did not apply 
meanings of “bindingness ” to their notion of constitution. The writings of 
St. Thomas Aquinas served as a marker of a new acquisition for constitution: 
the addition of a normative check. The constitutionalism of Rome offered the 
contribution that only the populus. in its wholeness, is the ultimate source of
5 In his review of relevant democratic theories for the American experience,
Dahl concludes that, “To assume that this country has remained democratic because of 
its Constitution seems to me an obvious reversal of the relation; it is much more 
plausible to suppose that the Constitution has remained because our society is 
essentially democratic.” Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory, ninth 
impression (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967), 143. Also see Dahl, “On 
Removing Certain Impediments to Democracy in the United States,” Political Science 
Quarterly 92 (Spring, 1977): 1-20. But cf. James W. Caesar, “In Defense of Republican 
Constitutionalism: A Reply to Dahl,” in Robert H. Horwitz, ed., The Moral Foundations of 
the American Republic. 3rd edition (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 
1986), 253-81.
My work, in rejecting claims such as this, can be seen as a “constitutionalist” 
reply to the arguments and underpinnings of an author who falls close to the opposing 
pole of this continuum- the pure “representative democrat”. This continuum is a 
plausible one, and one that explains well the disputes between interpreters in our 
political hybrid of constitutional democracy. For a clear picture of the tension and 
implications of this continuum between the pure constitutionalist and the pure 
representative democrat, see Murphy, Fleming, and Harris, “The Theoretical Context of 
Constitutional Interpretation,” in American Constitutional Interpretation. 23-47.
6 Charles Howard Mcllwain’s lectures on the history of constitutionalism remain 
seminal. For the evidence suggesting the origins of the very notion of constitutionalism,
see Charles H. Mcllwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and Modern (Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 1947), 23-29.
7 Ibid., 34-36.
legal authority and legitimate political authority in a state. 8 The law books of 
Justinian are a template for Mcllwain here. In mid-thirteenth century 
England Lord Bracton best summarized the legacy of Medieval 
constitutionalism with the distinction and dilemma presented by iurisdictio 
and gubernaculum.9 Influenced by Rome, the lesson to be derived from this 
is that to speak of constitutionalism, or to declare that a people are governed 
constitutionally, is to speak- essentially- of certain prescribed limits or 
declare that such a people are safeguarded by a limited government. 10 
Mcllwain himself states this ultimate lesson of constitutionalism’s history:
It is a very curious and interesting fact that in ordinary 
language we usually speak of a constitutional monarchy as a “limited” 
monarchy. The characteristic that distinguishes this kind of monarchy 
from others for us is a negative, not a positive characteristic. We think 
first of all what the monarch may not do, not of what he may do. The 
whole history of modern constitutionalism proves the soundness of this 
instinct. A constituted authority is one that is defined, and there can be 
no definition which does not of necessity imply a limitation. 
Constitutional government is and must be “limited government” if it is 
constitutional at all.n
Constitutional government means limited government; that is the first 
commitment. Of course, constitutions historically have varied in their 
meaning, just as the forms and principles that permeate them have. In the
8 Ibid., 56-63.
9 Ibid., 67-79.
10 This core theme of constitutionalism- as it was understood and relevant for 
the newly emerging American experience- is discussed in the works of John Locke, John 
Trenchard, and Charles Louis de Secondat, commonly known as the Baron Montesquieu. 
See Locke, Second Treatise, §§ 89-94, 134-42, 212 (1689), in P.B. Kurland and R. Lemer, 
eds., The Founders’ Constitution, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 
614-618; Trenchard, Cato’s Letters, nos. 60, 61, 62 (January, 1721), ibid., 618-23; 
Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, trans. and ed. A. M. Cohler, B. C. Miller, and H. S. 
Stone (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), bks. 5, 6, 8, 11,12, pp. 42-95, 
112-30, 154-212.
Noted colonial and revolutionary figures also emphasized this core theme, such 
as William Penn, Richard Henry Lee, John Adams, “Publius”, and influential 
antifederalists. See Kurland and Lerner, The Founders’ Constitution, vol. 1, 607.
11 C. H. Mcllwain, Constitutionalism and the Changing World (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1939), 244 [original emphasis].
Mcllwain elucidates this theme at the start of his eleventh chapter, titled, “The 
Fundamental Law behind the Constitution of the United States”. Mcllwain’s formulation 
of the relationship between fundamental law and the Constitution offers affirmation, 
consciously or not, to the claim that the very genre of the Constitution has suffered 
alteration.
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American case, respecting the value of constitution as a desirable political 
device for limited government for the people of post-revolutionary America 
means that certain forms and principles should be noted and reviewed for 
importance. For our purposes there are two adjuncts of American 
constitutionalism worth mention. The first, a principle of American 
constitutionalism alluded to in the introduction to this chapter, is “classical 
republican” ideology. Since the publication of Thomas Paine’s Common 
Sense in January 1776, republican beliefs of civic virtue were widely shared 
as being a necessary ingredient for the future of the American polity. 12 
These feelings were not the brainchild of a small group of enlightened 
gentlemen, however. The framers convened due to widely shared sentiment 
that the Articles of Confederation were seriously flawed.^ The Articles, to 
these men, were too susceptible to influence from faction. This trait severely 
hindered any form of deliberation without being overwhelmed by faction’s 
sway. Sunstein, among others, supports this reading, claiming that, “Above 
all, the American Constitution was designed to create a deliberative 
d e m o c r a c y . ” 14 in this construction, “deliberative,” profoundly affects-
12 “This pamphlet rCommonSensel. comes as close to being a justification of 
American republicanism as any document we have.” Willi Paul Adams, The First 
American Constitutions: Republican Ideology and the Making of the State Constitutions 
in the Revolutionary Era, trans. Rita Kimber and Robert Kimber (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The 
University o f North Carolina Press, 1980), 104.
It is important to emphasize here that I speak of republicanism in the same 
manner as those who invoked these ideas during, to borrow Clinton Rossiter’s phrase, the 
seedtime of our republic. I am aware that much of classical republican ideology held 
certain meanings and normative emphases that did not affect the minds of the American 
founders at all. In the case of civic virtue, however, classical republican thought was 
indeed influential. For a review of republican ideology generally, see Z.S. Fink, The 
Classical Republicans: An Essay in the Recovery of a Pattern of Thought in Seventeenth- 
Centurv England. 2nd edition (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1962).
13 I am aware that the extent to which these sentiments existed is in some 
dispute. Indeed, many of the (misnamed) Anti-federalist opposition were of the mind 
that the very purpose of the convention at Philadelphia was only to amend the existing 
articles, implying a frame of mind that the system needed only minor repair. Many 
antifederalists did not wish to even engage in much of the debate over the proposed 
constitution, claiming that such a radical break exceeded the authority and purpose for 
which they convened . See Herbert J. Storing, “What the Anti-Federalists Were For,” in 
The Complete Anti-Federalist, vol. 1 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).
14 Sunstein. The Partial Constitution, 19-20.
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genericallv affects- the nature and character of its object, “democracy.”
It is widely agreed that the points of contention between the parties 
who first discussed the Constitution clashed not on the principles that all 
wished to see included in the fabric of the new nation, but on the forms 
selected to achieve those principles. At the heart of genuine republics 
civic virtue, or a commitment to the public good, must be found. The heart of 
the debate between Federalists and Anti-Federalists consisted of what forms 
would allow civic virtue to become established and thrive. The position, and 
ensuing victory, of the Federalists was rooted in an introduction of 
mechanisms to preserve civic virtue that repudiated much of classical 
republican beliefs and replacing them with their own.16 The framers 
wanted to see the classical republican belief of virtue implemented and 
applied, “in a way that responded realistically, not romantically, to likely 
difficulties in the real world of political life.”17 The point here is that one- if 
not the central- principle that would be incorporated into the Constitution 
was a subject of little friction. On the other hand, the forms by which this 
principle would be established and maintained- or the way in which this 
principle of American constitutionalism would come to be recognized and 
admired (or criticized, depending upon your point of view) as just that, 
American- were a matter of deep division that would continue to persist 
throughout American constitutional history. One of these forms is the 
second of our constitutional adjuncts, the doctrine of the separation of 
powers.
15 See generally Storing, The Complete Anti-Federalist vol. 1; Adams, The First 
American Constitutions: Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic. 1776- 
1787 (Chapel Hill, N.C.: The University of North Carolina Press, 1969); Bernard Bailyn, 
The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1967).
16 The classic American exposition of the modernization of the classical 
republican belief in civic virtue is James Madison’s in his famous Federalist 10. See 
Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, The Federalist. Jacob E. Cooke, ed. 
(Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 56-65.
17 Sunstein, Partial Constitution. 21.
9A7
like constitutions and republican ideas, separation of powers doctrine 
has held varied meanings for different peoples in history. The doctrine 
itself is difficult to trace; even operating within the American example, 
authors disagree as to who should be given credit for certain breaks and 
e m p h a s e s ,  is it doesn’t help that there are some deep misconceptions 
surrounding the subject- the clear distinction between “separation of 
powers,” and “checks and balances,” being emblematic to many students of 
politics. There are some common threads, however, that are reassuring to 
the student. Studying the doctrine of the separation of powers, one finds a 
bond to an earlier dichotomy that applied to our brief look at 
constitutionalism generally. The separate domains of law and govemment- 
or iurisdictio and gubernaculum- contributed directly to the development of 
the doctrine. W.B. Gwyn reiterates the point: “The distinction [between 
domains] was not merely taxonomic but provided the basis for normative 
constitutional doctrine. ”19
For those interested in court-centered constitutional theory, the 
separation of powers doctrine is especially relevant. For, as Gwyn puts it, 
there were two distinctly American variants that contributed to the new 
version of the “American doctrine” of the separation of powers.20 Firstly, 
the executive was to receive an equivalent amount of respect and prestige 
relative to the legislature. The.second trait that distinguished the American 
doctrine was that the judiciary was introduced formally into the equation as 
an institution in its own right, as opposed to its latter-day perception as just a 
segment of the executive. John Adams is given substantial credit for 
introducing the judiciary, though Alexander Hamilton and James Wilson are
18 Cf. W.B. Gwyn, The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the 
Doctrine from Its Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution (The Hague: 
Martinus Nijhoff, 1965); M.J.C. Vile, Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), 119-75.
19 Gwyn, Separation of Powers, 28.
20 ibid., 124, 125.
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also considered influential.21 They of course were borrowing heavily from 
Baron Montesquieu and William Blackstone, as well as John Locke and others 
concerning the separation of powers doctrine and the role of the judiciary.22 
The doctrine itself was modified further with the additional mechanism of 
checks and balances- a testament to the willingness of the framers to address 
republican aspirations realistically. Indeed, the doctrine itself was urged by 
the Constitution’s drafters on the grounds of efficiency in addition to its 
accountability and balancing properties.^
This brief review may seem a digression to some. Hopefully a larger 
purpose is served in demonstrating what may be the common trait shared by 
all who attempted to influence and reconcile the principles and forms that 
would guide the American experiment. Nearly all who engaged in this 
critical period of constitutional debate were devoted believers to a science of 
politics. “The significance of the science of government,” Willi Paul Adams 
explains,
was obvious in an age that concerned itself with discovering laws not 
only in physics, biology, and other natural sciences but also in all areas 
of human activity. The great reputation won by Montesquieu reflected 
a widespread desire to understand the function and organization of 
social processes.24
21 Ibid. For support of the influence of those mentioned, see Malcolm P. Sharp, 
“The Classical American Doctrine of ‘The Separation of Powers’,” University of Chicago 
Law Review 2 (1934): 414, 415.
22 Sharp, “Classical American Doctrine,” 389, 393. But cf. Vile, 
Constitutionalism. 121-22. Generally, for original contributions deemed influential for 
the American doctrine see Kurland and Lemer, The Founders’ Constitution, vol. 1, S U ­
SS.
2 3 Gwyn, Separation of Powers, 34. For a summary of the historically 
demonstrated arguments in favor of the doctrine, see ibid., 127-28.
24 Adams, First American Constitutions. 120-21. Also see Henry Steele 
Commager, The Empire of Reason: How Europe Imagined and America Realized the 
Enlightenment (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1978).
A condemnation of the constitution of Pennsylvania in 1777 by the noted 
physician and politician Benjamin Rush illustrates the belief in scientific application 
for political settings, as well as being indicative of the distinction accorded for political 
principles and forms: “It is one thing to understand the principles, and another to 
understand the forms of government. The former are simple; the latter are difficult and 
complicated. There is the same difference between principles and forms in all other 
sciences. Who understood the principles of mechanics and optics better than Sir Isaac 
Newton? and yet Sir Isaac could not for his life have made a watch or a microscope. Mr.
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The belief that science could and should be applied to political dilemmas is, 
perhaps, the most telling characteristic, and most important contribution, of 
American constitutionalism. 2$ The Constitution being written down is often 
cited as the most revolutionary feature of American constitutionalism; this 
feature of “writtenness” is best seen as an example of the belief that 
enlightenment thinking could play a major role in political situations. In 
addition to the positing of the Constitution for all to see, the constitutional 
structure was devised to preserve liberty and economize upon the rare but 
essential quality of civic virtue.
From these four shared commitm ents of American constitutionalism, a 
fundamental inference emerges. Charles Black, with his well-known 
examples of “inferring from the overall structure” of the union, was 
perhaps the first to explicitly recognize this aspect of our constitutionalism. 
What Black inferred from the structure of the federal union was that 
communicative transactions play a special role. 26 Out of Black’s review of 
the famous Dennis27 and Gitlow2  ^cases, as well as Barron v. Baltimore.2^  
there surfaced a comprehensive theory of free speech that sought its 
legitimacy from the overall structure of the polity. For our purposes, what is 
noteworthy is the extent to which an otherwise obvious characteristic of our 
system received treatment. The flow of communication, for Black, is the
Locke is an oracle as to the principles. Harrington and Montesquieu are oracles as to the 
forms of government.” Benjamin Rush, Observations Upon the Present Government of 
Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1777), quoted in Adams, First American Constitutions.
120.
25 See generally I. B. Cohen, Science and the Founding Fathers: Science in the 
Political Thought of Jefferson. Franklin. Adams and Madison (New York and London: 
W.W. Norton & Co., 1995).
26 See generally, Black, Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law (Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1969).
27 Dennis v. United States. 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
2 8 Gitlow v. New York. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
29 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
“lifeblood,” of our government. Though Black at first is interested in such 
claims in order to legitimate a comprehensive theory of free speech, he does 
not stop there. Black’s contention is that serious discussion of political issues 
that, “connect with the federal government process- petition, election, 
judicial proceedings, Presidential action, and so on- would result in a 
merging of boundaries,” and must remain unfettered in our system on 
structural g r o u n d s . 30 what Black understood is that the particular patterns 
and rhythms of legal communication, in and of themselves, were central to 
constitutional maintenance. The wholesale manipulation or modification of 
these communication flows would be the end of the Constitution.
The Constitution, a short and openly-textured document, was 
envisioned by its creators and ratified by its People as a plan of government 
that was overwhelmingly committed to organizing and regulating powers 
among the institutions it created. This is in stark contrast to the way it is 
currently discussed today by the lawyer/philosopher. The first ten 
amendments, the Bill of Rights, is often given a somewhat inverted degree of 
importance relative to the seven articles that comprise the Constitution’s 
body. At the root of my foray into the world of constitutional theory then, is 
the hope that what follows will go some way to reversing the trends of the 
lawyer/philosopher and begin again to view the document in more seriously 
structural w a y s .3 i  This modality not only seems true to the original
30 Black, Structure and Relationship. 44-45. The crux of Black’s discussion on 
the importance of communication can be found ibid., 39-46. Finally, it should be 
pointed out that one of the classic cases for Black in demonstrating the legitimacy and 
efficacy of structural inferences is Crandall v. Nevada. 73 U.S. (6 Wallace) 35 (1868). 
Black placed similar reliance on the importance of communication in Crandall.
31 The reader can by now come to see that I bestow great importance to the 
conception of constitutional “structuralism”. I employ the root of the word- structure- 
in two ways.
The first is the way in which it is employed in the works of Charles Black, Jr. 
Structural argument for Black is best defined as, “the method of inference from the 
structures and relationships created by the constitution in all its parts or in some 
principal part.” See Black, Structure and Relationship. 7.
For the second way, somewhat grander in scope but I believe still complementary 
to Black’s usage, I employ the term structuralism as, “emphasizing coherent designs and 
wholes, which are seen as compositions or constructive forms,” as defined by William F.
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enterprise of our constitutionalism, but also seems to pose the greatest
flexibility for problems of continuity faced by it. Philip Bobbitt once
commented on why Black’s suggestions for utilizing structural arguments
were so often cited but so little applied. “This is perhaps,” Bobbitt said,
partly a reflection of a narrow-minded formalism that persists in law 
schools and can be observed whenever one hears the clipped citation of 
a case which is, by its very mention, supposed to resolve a serious 
question. . . . The future, however. . . will see more of structural 
approaches. As governments qua producers gain more importance in 
our lives, and hence as intergovernmental questions are brought to 
prominence, structural arguments will become more useful.32
To this point it has been argued that a plausible reading of Anglo- 
American legal history, jurisprudence, and the shared commitments of 
American constitutionalism suggest that judicial power is best understood as 
power to be exercised by authorized individuals acting sincerely. The 
remainder of this chapter will bolster that claim with support from 
authority. The most authoritative explanation of the Constitution- The 
Federalist Papers of Hamilton, Madison and Jay- offers great support to an 
argument for judicial sincerity, though these insights are nowhere to be 
found in the mainstream constitutional narrative.
Publius
It is truly fitting that the most important product of American political 
science and the only American effort considered worthy to reside in the 
pantheon of the classics of political theory is a series of newspaper articles. 
The eighty-five essays that were addressed to the people of the state of New 
York from October 27, 1787 through May 28, 1788 were produced for purposes 
of persuasion. The newly conceived offspring of the Philadelphia
Harris, II, in his book, The Interpretable Constitution. This wide view of structuralism 
is, for Harris, in contrast to “positivism”, defined by him as focusing, “on words and 
clauses, which are viewed as commands or free-standing imperative values.” See W.F. 
Harris, II, “Explaining the Constitutional Polity: The Methodology of Interpretive 
Meaning,” in The Interpretable Constitution (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1993), 114-63.
32 Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate. 91-92.
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convention was in need of defense. A student of American history learns 
early on that the eighty-five essays of “Publius” provide evidence of 
constitutional intention that remains unsurpassed. For a long time in fact, 
The Federalist Papers have been treated by many as a unified constitutional 
p h ilosop h y;33  others have suggested that Publius should be seen for who he 
really was- principally two authors (Madison and Hamilton) who betrayed 
important differences on matters of constitutional g o v e r n m e n t . 34 in 
keeping with the themes of this study, the latter view of this historical 
controversy will guide the present analysis. Madison’s essays and Hamilton’s 
essays may have been united in a single mission, but they are each the 
products of different minds. The rhetorical strategy of The Federalist is in 
fact further testimony of a major theme of this study. Ironically, just as a 
seemingly unified presentation would aid in securing the immediate 
(“result-centered”) objective of the Constitution’s defenders, it is because the 
distinctive rationales which animated the arguments of Madison and 
Hamilton continue to be recognized as distinctive that the their essays are 
still accorded such authority. The Constitution can comprehend both 
Hamiltonian and Madisonian (and Jeffersonian and Lincolnian and other) 
bases as authoritative foundations for its operation notwithstanding their 
opposition to each other at certain junctures. It is because of this capability
33 Professor Sotirios Barber is one such student of American constitutional 
theory who is transparent about doing this. His discussion of The Federalist is 
predominantly Hamiltonian, but often mixes in Madison’s views at important junctures. 
“In analyzing The Federalist I refer to its authors jointly as Publius, thus adopting their 
pen name for my purposes.... So Publius is not Madison and Hamilton viewed separately 
or as historically bounded persons. Publius is who The Federalist implicity indicates 
Publius is: Madison and Hamilton (in the main) standing together and addressing a 
coherent message to a community comprising both their generation and what the 
Constitution calls their ‘Posterity.”’ Sotirios A. Barber, The Constitution of Judicial 
Power (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 27. Also see Bruce 
Ackerman, We The People: 1. Foundations. 165-99.
34 For scholarship that insists upon a division of Publius to illuminate points 
where rationales conflict, see Burt, Robert. The Constitution in Conflict (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1992), 47-76. On this controversy generally, see 
Alpheus T. Mason, “The Federalist- A Split Personality,” 57 American Historical Review 
625 (1952); George Carey, “Publius- A Split Personality?” 46 Review of Politics 3 
(1984).
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that both the Constitution and the essays of Publius remain authoritative 
today.
Alexander Hamilton authored fifty-one essays of The F e d e r a l i s t .35 like 
many of the leaders who reacted to the excesses of liberty the revolution had 
elicited, Hamilton's political philosophy is characterized by the search and 
placement of sovereignty to provide authoritative resolutions to both 
fundamental and ordinary political problems. And like many others, for the 
fundamental problems of government Hamilton was happy to place ultimate 
sovereign decision-making in the people. But recourse to the ultimate 
decision-maker was supposed to occur very infrequently; it is in his 
thoughts about the locus of authoritative decision-making for “ordinary” 
governmental affairs where Hamilton shows his distinctiveness. Hamilton 
believed that an absolute sovereign was needed for the ordinary problems of 
government as well as the fundamental. Political scientist Robert Burt 
underlines this central feature of Hamilton’s political theory, saying that 
Hamilton was, “convinced that an actively available locus of indivisible 
sovereign authority was necessary in any government worthy of the 
n a m e .  ”36 Hamilton saw the situation faced by the newly independent states 
and constructed his political theory with a what can only be described as a 
Hobbesian sensibility. What appears to have disturbed Hamilton most at the
35 See the introduction of the editor in Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, 
and John Jay, The Federalist. Jacob E. Cooke, ed. (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan 
University Press, 1961), xix-xxx. The Cooke edition is widely regarded as the 
definitive edition of The Federalist: all subsequent citations refer to this edition.
Furthermore, I follow Cooke’s tentative conclusions regarding authorship of the 
essays. Cooke explains that it is basically undisputed that Hamilton was the author of 
essays 1, 6-9, 11-13, 15-17, 21-36, 59-61, and 65-85 (a total of fifty-one); Madison 
wrote 10, 14, 37-48 (fourteen); Jay contributed 2-5 and 64 (five). The authorship, then, 
of 18-20, 49-58, and 62-63 (fifteen) is not conclusive. Later in the introduction, Cooke- 
relying on internal and external evidence- gives Madison at least principal (and in most 
instances, sole) credit for the disputed fifteen essays, bringing his total contribution to 
twenty-nine.
36 Burt, Constitution in Conflict. 52. Bruce Ackerman gives prominence to the 
notion that the Constitution is best understood as constructing a “dualist democracy,” 
where the distinction between “ordinary” and “fundamental” politics is underscored.
See Ackerman, We The People: 1. Foundations.
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close of the 1780’s was the apparent squeamishness of his adversaries.
“While they admit that the Government of the United States is destitute of 
energy,” Hamilton wrote in Federalist 15, “they contend against conferring 
upon it those powers which are requisite to supply that energy... They still in 
fine seem to cherish with blind devotion the political monster of an 
imperium in imperio.”37 Hamilton was arguing that tough choices had to be 
made to counter the excesses of liberty, and that opponents of the 
Constitution were masquerading the alternative of multiple sovereigns as a 
viable option. Government qua government, for Hamilton, required unity. 
And according to Hamilton’s reading of the Constitution, the essential 
authoritative sovereign for ordinary affairs of government was created by 
that document.
The second clause of Article Six was evidence of the first necessary 
step needed to construct a “government worthy of the name,” for Hamilton.
In matters of national-state conflict, the national government was to be 
superior because the Constitution stated that “This Constitution, and the laws 
of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all 
treaties made... shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every 
State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any 
State to the contrary notwithstanding.”38 in Federalist 33, Hamilton speaks 
of the supremacy clause as being, “only declaratory of a truth,” and such 
“truths” simply flow from Hamilton’s understanding of power.39 The 
Constitution, Hamilton explained, did not create a mere “treaty,” which was 
dependent upon the good faith of the parties; it, rather, created a 
government, “which is only another word for POLITICAL POWER AND
37 Federalist 15 at 93.
38 U.S. Const., Article VI, §2.
39 Federalist 33 at 204.
SUPREMACY. ”40
The supremacy clause was a necessary measure for the creation of a 
Hamiltonian government, but in and of itself was not sufficient. “[Pjlacing 
the locus of authority in the national government was not sufficient,” for 
Hamilton, Burt explains, “because the national government itself was 
divided.”4! For the national government then, where was “the single locus 
of supreme national authority,” to be found? Hamilton’s answer to this is 
found in Federalist 78. Through the exercise of what Hamilton called the 
“duty... to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the constitution 
void,” the national judiciary with the Supreme Court at its head was to be 
Hamilton’s essential unitary sovereign.42 It is well known that in response 
to charges of unfettered judicial authority Hamilton emphasized the 
inherent weaknesses of the judicial power, claiming of the judiciary that, “It 
may truly be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment. ”43 
But in the same essay Hamilton’s vision of the relationship between judicial 
and legislative power led him to say that, “the courts were designed to be an 
intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in order, among 
other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their 
authority.”44 Burt’s characterization of Hamilton’s structural view deserves 
reiteration: “His hierarchical pyramid is thus clear: the people are at the 
pinnacle; but in their (ordinarily anticipated) silence, the Court speaks as 
their intermediary, as the delegated repository of ultimate sovereignty from 
the People.”45 The judiciary for Hamilton was purposefully placed in a
40 Ibid., at 207.
41 Burt, Constitution in Conflict. 52.
42 Federalist 78, at 524.
43 Ibid., at 523.
44 Ibid., at 525.
45 Burt, Constitution in Conflict. 53.
position to check the other branches, and it was the natural institutional 
weakness of judicial power itself that would serve as a check the judiciary. 
Judicial power, on Hamilton’s view, contained self-checking properties.
This review of Hamilton’s constitutional theory is important in and of
itself, but still does convey the sheer inventiveness of his view of the judicial
power. Most commentators choose to exclusively focus upon Federalist 78 to
demonstrate Hamilton’s contribution, but I think it better to include the
lesser known Federalist 22 as well. In this paper, Hamilton remarks upon the
defects of the Articles of Confederation and explains that “the want of a
judiciary power,” is a major flaw. But it is his characterization of the voice
of the judicial power which is so striking. “Laws are a dead letter,” Hamilton
writes, “without courts to expound their true meaning and operation.
Courts, not judges, are needed. Like Hamilton’s discussion of authority, there
is a dominant emphasis upon the values of uniformity, stability and singular
meaning. Later in the same paper, Hamilton explains that the one supreme
tribunal created by the Constitution will serve the purpose of uniformity.
Hamilton’s further criticism of the state judiciaries reveals his implicit
commitment to uniformity as well as his crucial recharacterization of the
nature of judicial power. The passage in full reads as follows:47
There are endless diversities in the opinions of men. We often see not 
only different courts, but the Judges of the same court differing from 
each other. To avoid the confusion which would unavoidably result 
from the contradictory decisions of a number of independent 
judicatories, all nations have found it necessary to establish one court 
paramount to the rest- possessing a general superintendence, and 
authorised to settle and declare in the last resort, an uniform rule of 
civil justice.
Hamilton’s flourish is political action by rhetorical omission and deflection. 
There is an important difference between the “diversities” which result 
from unsure and untidy jurisdictions of a haphazard legal system and those 
which occur on the same bench in a given case. Hamilton obscured this in
46 Federalist 22, at 143 [emphasis added].
47 ibid., at 143-44.
his search for a unitary sovereign authority. He carries this distortion of 
the judicial power into his later (and better known) papers on the subject, 
Federalist 78 through 83. The judiciary was the object for Hamilton which 
possessed “neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment.” More precisely, 
that would be singular, collective, unified judgment.
This collective depiction of judicial power may not appear so radical a 
departure as I am making it out to be, but it lies in stark contrast to most 
other conceptions of judicial power and process recorded at the time of the 
founding and the formative years of the Constitution. Consider the 
comments of Nathaniel Gorham, delegate to the Philadelphia Convention, as 
one such insight: “As Judges they are not to be presumed to possess any 
peculiar knowledge of the mere policy of public m e a s u r e s .  ”48 Or, for 
another, consider those of delegate Luther Martin: “A knowledge of 
mankind, and of Legislative affairs cannot be presumed to belong in a 
higher degree to the Judges than to the L e g is la t iv e .  ”49 Hamilton himself 
reveals his perceptiveness about matters of institutional “voice” in Federalist 
81, when he offers a definition of the word jurisdiction. “This word is a 
compound of JUS and DICTIO, juris, dictio, or a speaking or pronouncing of 
the law,” Hamilton says.50 Most commentators refer to the concept of 
jurisdiction in its traditional sense- a technical concept concerning a court’s 
authority to pronounce judgment in a particular case. Hamilton’s 
jurisprudence is distinctive because he envisioned a distinctive 
“jurisdiction” for the Supreme Court; not only a special category of cases, but 
a special wav to pronounce the law when operating within those categories.
To repeat what has already been said or implied to this point, perhaps
48 Max Farrand, ed. The Records of the Federal Convention 1787. 4 vols. (New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1911), vol. 1, p. 73.
49 Ibid., p. 76
50 Federalist 81, at 551. Also see William R. Casto, The Supreme Court in the 
Early Republic: The Chief Justiceships of John lav and Oliver Ellsworth (Columbia, S.C.: 
University of South Carolina Press, 1995), 5-6.
the single most important effect of Hamiltonian theory in discussions of 
judicial power was the substitution of “court” and “judiciary” for “judge.”
James Madison, the sole or principal author of twenty-nine essays of 
The Federalist, presents a view of constitutional government which differs 
markedly from Hamilton’s. In particular, Madison’s writings on the 
principle of the separation of powers and the means of enforcing that 
principle reveal crucial differences. The heart of Madison’s argument 
resides in his famous Federalist 51. Madison- in contradistinction to 
Hamilton’s vision o f a hierarchical, unitary sovereign authority- believed 
that authority should be permanently fragmented both among and within 
rival departments. The Constitution in Madison’s view insured the 
maintenance of Montesquieu’s sacred maxim of structural integrity, “by so 
contriving the interior structure of the government, as that its several 
constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the means of keeping 
each other in their proper places. ”51 Madison comes to this view of 
coordinated balance after rejecting the notion that a “parchment barrier” 
alone would be sufficient to maintain structural integrity in Federalist 48, as 
well as opposing two other possible means of enforcing the separation of 
powers in Federalist 49 and 50. Responding to Jefferson’s remarks in “Notes 
on the state of Virginia,” Madison rejects the option of an special elected 
convention (for “occasional appeals to the people,”) for such boundary 
policing in Federalist 49. In Federalist 50, Madison opposes a method of 
“periodical appeals,” to be performed by a regularly constituted organ of 
government, precisely the sort of method Hamilton envisioned and vested in 
the Supreme Court in Federalist 78.52
But Madison’s reasons for rejecting these options deserve further 
discussion. Madison’s rejection of a permanent institution to supervise
51 Federalist 51, at 347-8.
52 Federalist 50, at 343-4. Also see Burt, Constitution in Conflict. 58-59.
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constitutional boundaries in Federalist 50 is illustrated by his example of the 
Pennsylvania council of censors of 1783 and 1784. He concluded that such a 
tribunal would be ineffective and undesirable for five distinct reasons; a 
couple of these are of particular interest as they indicate with some 
precision Madison’s vision of how such determinations should be conducted. 
One of the duties of the council of censors was to determine “whether the 
Constitution had been violated, and whether the legislative and executive 
departments had encroached upon each o t h e r .  ”53 Madison found both the 
composition and the manner of proceeding of the council seriously flawed in 
light of its purpose. There was an inappropriate membership of recent, 
influential legislative and executive officials on the council, “even patrons 
or opponents of the very measures to be thus brought to the test of the 
Constitution.”54 More importantly, the proceedings of the council were 
inappropriately reflective of this impartiality and generally unsuited to its 
function. Read Madison’s observations of the workings of the council 
carefully:
Throughout the continuance of the council, it was split into two fixed 
and violent parties.... In all questions, however unimportant in 
themselves, or unconnected with each other, the same names, stand 
invariably contrasted on the opposite columns. Every unbiased 
observer, may infer without danger of mistake, and at the same time, 
without meaning to reflect on either party, or any individuals of either 
party, that unfortunately passion, not reason, must have presided over 
their decisions. When men exercise their reason coolly and freely, on 
a variety of distinct questions, they inevitably fall into different 
opinions, on some of them. When they are governed by a common 
passion, their opinions if they are so to be called, will be the same.55
Pennsylvania’s duly constituted tribunal for maintaining the structural
integrity of her constitution, in short, was unsuccessful in performing its
task because it did not properly behave like the tribunal it was envisioned to
53 Ibid., at 345.
54 ibid.
55 ibid., at 345-6.
b e .5 6  The particular development of the council toward what can only be 
described as a “legislative” style of institutional pronouncement led to the 
dominance of “passion” in its decision-making, to the exclusion of “reason.” 
Madison’s lesson is inescapable in this paragraph; individually-exercised 
“cool and free” reason is the only appropriate method for performing 
functions of such a distinct and constitutional nature. Collectively-exercised 
“passions,” on the other hand, are unsuited to the task of true opinion- 
making at this level; indeed, Madison asks whether such a method can 
produce an authentic “opinion” at all. The lesson for the Supreme Court 
here is patent, and Madison’s description of the council looks all too familiar 
to students of the Court.
So Madison in Federalist 51 sets out his famous explanation of how
political power in America will be channelled and controlled. Tyranny- or
the concentration and aggrandizement of power by a single department- will
be prevented in the national government by,
giving to those who administer each department, the necessary 
constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of 
the others.... Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The 
interest of the man must be connected with the constitutional rights of 
the place.... This policy of supplying by opposite and rival interests, the 
defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of 
human affairs, private as well as p u b lic .5 7
In addition to these national arrangements, the federal principle will ensure
security, with the governments of the several states checking the national
government, and vice versa. Also, repeating the innovative performance of
his Federalist 10, Madison explains that the size and diversity of America will
prevent easy “interested combinations of the majority,” further securing
56 Professor Ackerman gives this paper a quite different reading than this, one 
which highlights Madison’s understanding of the “limitations of legal form,” in periods 
of “constitutional creativity.” Though I find Ackerman’s reading both interesting and 
plausible, here I am employing an interpretation like Robert Burt’s- one which applies 
the lessons of the paper to the more proximate orbit of constitutional maintenance. See 
Ackerman, We The People. 176-7; Burt, Constitution in Conflict. 58-59.
57 Federalist 51, at 349.
individual and minority r ig h t s .5 8  Madison’s argument stands in sharp 
contrast to Hamilton’s; Madison is untroubled by the “monster” of divided 
sovereign authority.
But if authority is to be wielded by several coordinate departments,
how is an uncontradicted, comprehensible rule for action to be produced?
Burt explains that Madison’s vision of constitutional interpretation contains
two principles that reconcile this problem his theory confronts; Burt:
His first principle was that constitutional interpretation takes place 
over time, not in a single instant at a fixed and privileged institutional 
locus of interpretive authority. His second principle was that 
institutional competitors for interpretive authority must be linked 
together in an inextricably nested relationship, so that each would 
clearly see its interdependence with the others and all would 
accordingly work toward mutual accommodation.59
It was the conversation among and between governmental branches that
was key for Madison, one that would lead to an ultimate authoritative
p o s i t i o n . 60 But what is lacking in this otherwise excellent analysis of Burt’s
is that Madison fully recognized the essentially different requirements of
the inhabitants of each department and the different means by which their
product of power was executed. It is this recognition which in fact caused
Madison to deviate from the otherwise unassailable principle that
appointments for the three departments, “should be drawn from the same
fountain of authority, the people, through channels, having no
communication whatever with one another. ”61 Of the judiciary in
particular, Madison explains that, “it might be inexpedient to insist
rigorously on principle,” because that department essentially requires
“peculiar qualifications,” for its members and because of the permanent
58 ibid., at 350-1; also see Federalist 10, at 56-65.
59 Burt, Constitution in Conflict. 68-9.
60 Burt echoes this theme of conversation as emblematic of the outlooks of both 
Madison and Lincoln. Ibid., 98.
61 Federalist 51, at 348.
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tenure of the positions.62 It was these unique departmental characteristics 
that, in turn, would fundamentally affect the nature of the “conversation.”
It is a common anachronistic tendency of constitutional scholarship to 
graft the (largely Hamiltonian) institutional characteristics of today on to 
any analysis of texts such as The Federalist. But both Hamilton’s and 
Madison’s theories of constitutional interpretation require the student to 
provide specific institutional context in order to understand them accurately. 
Hamilton’s view demands it; without incorporating the understanding that 
judicial power itself produces a unique institutional product, Hamiltonian 
judicial supremacy can be manipulated into a more powerful sovereign 
authority than even he intended. Madison’s theory of a coordinated colloquy 
among the branches is also lacking without such attention to institutional 
context. The Madisonian view is not best represented by a conversation 
among three equal voices; the voices were coordinate for Madison but 
purposefully unequal in their manner because of their unique departmental 
characteristics.63 This is why founders like Madison spent so much time 
dealing with the composition and particular institutionalism of each 
department. In wording similar to Federalist 50 above, Sotirios Barber points 
out that Madison in the preceding paper mentions the electorate, the three 
national departments and the Constitution itself; only the judiciary and the 
Constitution is associated with “the reason of the public.”64 Madison’s
62 ibid.
63 Burt’s analysis of Madison’s theory on this point is revealing: “The 
touchstone for Madison’s governance technique,” Burt writes, “was the pursuit of 
unanimity among governmental actors (but not directly among the populace at large) in 
institutions whose interlocking authority and overlapping constituencies would tend to 
promote accommodation rather than fixed confrontation.” Burt, Constitution in Conflict. 
74. To the extent that Burt is suggesting that unanimity is an institutional end for the 
judiciary so that it may better participate in a Madisonian “conversation,” I must 
disagree.
64 Federalist 49, 342-43; also see generally Barber, Constitution of Judicial 
Power. 27-43. Hamilton is as precise as Madison in this regard. In Federalist 71, the 
four year term for the president is supposed to foster “personal firmness.” Federalist 
71, at 481.
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inventive institutionalism, as Burt correctly points out, was to facilitate 
ultimate resolution for political disputes, transforming them into a 
“unifying vision of public virtue,” characterized by “mutually respectful 
accommodation.”65 Madison’s project would be undermined irreparably if 
one of the institutions would acquire vocal dominance.
If Madison and Hamilton held different views about the locus of 
authority for the proper resolution and maintenance of constitutional 
parameters, on one large and important aspect of their theory they were of 
similar mind. Though the rhetoric of pamphlets and debates tend to mute its 
treatment somewhat, proponents of the Constitution included republican 
virtue- the creation and nurturing of civic devotion- as an essential 
ingredient for their constitutional experiment to succeed. As Cass Sunstein’s 
idiom conveys of this commitment to republicanism, present at the founding 
was an original constitutional goal of creating a “deliberative d e m o c r a c y .  ”66 
There can be no doubt that both Madison and Hamilton constructed their 
governmental apparatus with a Humean egoism in mind. Still, neither of 
them eliminated the “better motives” of citizens entirely. “The supposition 
of universal venality in human nature is little less an error in political 
reasoning than the supposition of universal rectitude. The institution of 
delegated power implies that there is a portion of virtue and honor among 
mankind, which may be a reasonable foundation of confidence,” Hamilton 
writes in F e d e r a l i s t  7 6 .6 7  Madison was equally transparent on the subject in 
Federalist 55:
As there is a degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain
65 Burt, Constitution in Conflict. 96-7.
66 Sunstein, Cass. The Partial Constitution (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1993), 9.
67 Federalist 76, at 513-14. Hamilton goes on in the same paper to praise the 
British House of Commons, in spite of well founded accusations of its “venality,” 
claiming that, “there is always a large proportion of the body, which consists of 
independent and public spirited men.” Ibid., 514. Also see Ackerman, We the People. 
197-99.
degree of circumspection and distrust: So there are other qualities in 
human nature, which justify a certain portion of esteem and 
confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of these 
qualities in a higher degree than any other form. Were the pictures 
which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some among us, 
faithful likenesses of the human character, the inference would be that 
there is not sufficient virtue among men for self-government; and that 
nothing less than the chains of despotism can restrain them from 
destroying and devouring one another. 68
This is the same Madison who wrote Federalist 10 and 51. Careful
manufacture of checks and counterchecks notwithstanding, a sufficient
amount of republican virtue among officials was required for any attempt of
self-government to succeed.
Ralph Lemer, in “The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster,” 
cites two of Hamilton’s and one of Madison’s papers to support the 
proposition that woven into their constitutional visions, “there is 
presupposed a sense of duty- rare, needful of institutional support, but in the 
last (and desperate) instant, in d isp en sa b le .”69 Lemer’s reading of Publius 
contains all the hallmarks of a Hamiltonian bent, but is no less useful for 
understanding the republican assumptions of both Hamilton and Madison.
His interpretation of “Publius” makes it clear that the judiciary is the 
department where a republican sense was most likely to receive care and 
exposition.70 The key to a republican understanding of the judiciary is to 
realize that the judges which constituted it were supposed to be different 
than most people and, indeed, most other government officials. Lemer 
remarks that only the judges for Publius would be “too far removed from the 
people to share much in their prepossessions,” and that this distinctive
68 Federalist 55, at 378.
69 Ralph Lemer, “The Supreme Court as Republican Schoolmaster,” 1967 
Supreme Court Review 127-180, 162. Lerner quotes Hamilton’s Federalist 71 and 73, at 
482-83 and 493, 497, respectively; and Madison’s Federalist 37, at 239. Also see Paul 
D. Ellenbogen, “Judges as Republican Educators: The American Judicial Aristocracy,” 
(Paper delivered at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, September 1-4, 1994).
70 Ibid., 163. Also see ibid., 180 [“Whether the Justice should teach the public 
is not and cannot be in question since teaching is inseparable from judging in a 
democratic regime.”].
dissimilarity was the special qualification for the judiciary to be the 
“intermediate body” that Hamilton envisioned.71 The judiciary in this way 
depends upon a perception of the legal distinctiveness of both its members 
and its mode of proceeding by the other branches and the people. The 
Hamiltonian location of the Court between the people and the legislature is 
dependent upon the preservation of those special qualities of judges and 
judging.
An important point of clarification should be included about what I 
mean by, “a perception of the legal distinctiveness both of its members and 
its mode of proceeding.” First of all, the word “perceived” is all-important; 
what counts here is that non-judicial officers and the populace treat the 
judicial function as a distinctive function. By “legal distinctiveness,” I mean 
a characterization of judging or adjudicating as a task which is essentially 
different than legislating. I of course realize that “legal formalism” entails 
more than this, but this view is far too broad a construction; Publius may 
have been a legal formalist in the fullest sense and viewed judges as “mere 
machines,” but the integrity of his constitutional theory does not rely upon 
such a view.77 There is no problem for Publius’ constitutional theory if a 
judge is either perceived to be or is in fact a “lawmaker.” There is no 
problem for Publius if the product of the judge is not distinguishable from 
other legal products, perceived or otherwise. The key for the Court (so far as 
Publius is concerned) is that its members and method must be regarded as 
legally distinctive; it makes no difference whether the end product is so 
regarded.
Now Lemer’s discussion is couched within Hamiltonian terms. He
71 Ibid., 165; Federalist 49, at 341; Federalist 78, at 525.
72 See Lemer’s reading of Publius’ (really Hamilton’s) characterization of the
judicial function as, “occup[ying] some sort of middle ground between a technician’s
deductions from general rules and a legislator’s pure reason prescribing such general
rules.” Ibid. I take this as a “legally distinctive” view, for the judge- while not a
purely formal technician- is certainly doing something different than the legislator.
even says that the Court as Hamiltonian sovereign implies a further Publian
commitment, namely, “that the courts would stand in a closer relation to the
deliberate will of the people as expressed in the Constitution than would the
representatives of the people. ”73 The republican arguments forwarded by
Lemer, however, work equally well for a Madisonian structuralism. It is a
great mistake to suppose that the “conversation” Madison envisioned
between departments could only be effective or worthwhile if each
department offered a similar contribution of communication- namely,
through a singular departmental expression. Lemer is right to insist that a
fair interpretation of Hamilton’s thoughts on the judiciary produces a view
of judges, “who would view themselves as teachers of republicanism using
the text of the Constitution and the national laws, interpreted in a judicial
spirit of moderation and fairness.”74 Unfortunately, Lemer’s blanket
Publian statement overlooks the crucial differences between Hamilton’s and
Madison’s views of the “judicial spirit.” Madison’s thoughts on “the faculties
of the mind” in Federalist 37 illuminate these differences most clearly:7^
The faculties of the mind itself have never yet been distinguished and 
defined, with satisfactory precision, by all the efforts of the most acute 
and metaphysical Philosophers. Sense, perception, judgment, desire, 
volition, memory, imagination, are found to be separated by such 
delicate shades, and minute gradiations, that their boundaries have 
eluded the most subtle investigations, and remain a pregnant source of 
ingenious disquisition and controversy.
This passage is generated by a very different mind than that of the author of
Federalist 78. If it were included as within the ambit of Hamiltonian
constitutionalism, it would cause the arguments of that famous paper to self-
destruct. It would be pointless to assert as Hamilton does that the judiciary is
73 ibid. Lemer actually claims that Publius "rejected” a coordinate theory of 
constitutional maintenance; he strictly relies on Hamilton’s arguments in Federalist 71 
and 78 in doing this. In this latter paper, Hamilton foresees situations when proper 
constitutional maintenance will require “an uncommon portion of fortitude in the 
judges,” so as to rebuke “legislative invasions.” Federalist 78, at 528.
74 ibid., 166.
75 Federalist 37, at 235 [emphasis added].
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a safe repository for the tasks of a sovereign interpreter because it possesses, 
“neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment,” if the shades which 
separate judgment and volition (will) are so “delicate” and controversial that 
they are impossible to distinguish.7^  If Hamilton adhered to this position, his 
central argument in favor of the judiciary branch would be harmed beyond 
repair.
As the whole of Federalist 37 makes clear, discriminating among the 
faculties of the mind for Madison was analogous to “marking the proper line 
of partition,” for the provinces of inter- and intra-govemmental functions. 
These remarks bring out the full sense of Madison’s nuanced argument of 
Federalist 51. The assertion that “each department should have a will of its 
own,” is not only an argument for judicial independence; that proposition 
was not all that inventive or controversial when the Constitution stood for 
ratification.77 Rather, Madison’s practical insights on how to make operative 
Montesquieu’s maxim suggest that in addition to independence the judiciary 
will offer a distinctive voice to the conversation of constitutional 
maintenance. It is reasonable, of course, to graft strong institutional 
conventions of a Court like John Marshall’s onto Madison’s vision. But what 
I have been trying to show is that this is only one alternative- one that
76 Lemer mistakenly combines Madison and Hamilton here into a single Publian 
mindset on this point. See Lerner, “Republican Schoolmaster,” 168, at note 122 
[“Publius was not of two minds on this matter.”]. Lerner cites Hamilton, Federalist 79, 
at 533, as evidence of this similarity, saying, “The mensuration of the faculties of the 
mind has, I believe, no place in the catalogue of known arts.” What Lemer neglects to 
say is that Madison’s passage is found within a general discussion of the practical 
operation of the principle of the separation of powers. Hamilton makes his remark while 
rebutting a proposal that there should be a broad impeachment provision that would 
enable the removal of judges, “on account of ability.” This passage of Hamilton’s is 
simply not adequate to support such an important claim of similarity.
77 Lemer himself points this out and correctly adds that at the time, (as we 
have already discussed in chapter one) most states provided for judicial tenure during 
good behavior and that appointment was the method by which the highest state courts 
were filled. Ibid., 166-67, at note 119. These sorts of comments are incomplete without 
the further recognition that judges at this time also observed the seriatim form when 
exercising their function. This point is essential for understanding the expectations 
and mechanisms of judicial power; without it those latter-day doctrines of political 
accountability are incomplete.
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clings to a Hamiltonian pedigree. Madison’s republican constitutionalism  
more readily allows for an altogether different sort of judicial 
institutionalism than this dominant Hamiltonian view. Lerner forecloses 
this alternative in what is a Hamiltonian interpretation of Federalist 51: he 
assumes a Hamiltonian institutionalism for the judiciary in order for that 
branch to be an equal and independent participant in constitutional 
maintenance. 78 “By being in a position and of a mind to resist the 
encroachments of the others,” Lerner writes, disclosing his enthusiastic 
Hamiltonianism, “each branch will be able to perform its distinctive 
function and also serve as an effective element in the system of checks and
balances. ”79
This disservice to Madisonian theory is in need of correction, or at 
least counterbalance. The distinctive quality of the judiciary which leads to 
Madison’s “deviation” of choosing judges from the people also has 
consequences for the contribution of the judiciary to the constitutional 
conversation. The judges of the federal judiciary especially must maintain 
their individuality during the exercise of their function because it is their 
distinctive individual qualities which force effective government to deviate 
from strict principle. This is what balances the equation and enables 
Madison to faithfully forward a constitutional vision which satisfies his call 
for civic virtue and his wariness of power due to its potential for tyranny. 
This rendering of Madison’s theory better serves Lemer’s argument of the 
Supreme Court as republican inculcator as well. It complies with what 
Hamilton says the republican principle demands, “that the deliberate sense 
of the community should govern the conduct of those to whom they entrust 
the management of their affair's. ”80 Most importantly for this discussion,
78 See ibid., 169-70.
79 Ibid., 170.
80 Federalist 71, at 482. See Lerner, “Republican Schoolmaster,” 171-72.
Lemer himself notes that the deliberate sense “is found in a blend of 
voices. ”81 The mistake of scholars like Lemer is to assume that the special 
quality of the judiciary lies exclusively in its ability to “remove itself from 
its popular source of power.” This is nothing more than a partial view of the 
judiciary as Publius.envisioned it; even from a purely Hamiltonian point of 
view it accounts for the special qualities of judges but neglects those special 
qualities of judging. The judicial power- just as could be said of the other two 
departments- is also special because of its distinctive vocal contribution as 
shaped by its unique institutionalism. The conventions of what it is that 
makes certain behaviors “judicial” is an indispensable aspect of the 
constitutionalism of The Federalist. Lemer, towards the end of his article, 
proclaims that John Marshall’s “greatness” lies in his explicit ploy of 
altering the Court’s voice because this enhanced the guardianship role the 
Court was designed to u n d e r t a k e .82 Lemer’s one-sided praise for such tactics 
ignores those aspects of republicanism that have been sacrificed by their 
implementation. What is most surprising is that Lemer seems oblivious of 
this duality; he fails to see that, contrary to his own statements, in important 
ways the Supreme Court is less “before the public eye” than its proponents 
had envisioned and that its function of teaching civic virtue is in many ways
81 Lemer, “Republican Schoolmaster,” 172 [emphasis added]. Lemer 
admittedly makes this statement in a different context, referring to a conversation 
between “the people and their representatives, direct and remote, present and past.” 
Ibid. Lemer cites three separate papers to support these points, Hamilton’s Federalist 
22 and 71, at 139 and 482, respectively, and Madison’s Federalist 58, at 397. Once 
again, Lemer’s combination of the two authors into “Publius” really only confuses the 
issue. The point, however, retains its value for our purposes, as Lemer (taking 
Hamilton’s cue in Federalist 71) goes on to say that the deliberate sense can be found at 
times through the courageous declarations of the judges.
82 ibid., 178-79. Matthew Franck, in his new book, takes up the questions of 
whether the national judiciary was intended to be a “guardian” at all, or whether 
justices of the Supreme Court were intended to engage in “statesmanship.” To this latter 
question Franck responds with a resounding “no”, and his sub-section titled, “Publius 
on the Meaning and Locus of Statesmanship,” comes very close to an argument for 
sincerity as a constitutionally intended postulate of judicial behavior. See Franck, 
Against the Imperial Judiciary: The Supreme Court vs. the Sovereignty of the People 
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 21-39.
th w arted  by an  asymmetric in stitu tion a lism . 83
There is one final point worth emphasis when considering the views 
of constitutional theorists like Publius. It is an observation that is perhaps so 
obvious that it escapes most discussions about Publian views of the judiciary 
and the Constitution more generally. Both Hamilton and Madison in their 
arguments about the Supreme Court and the national judiciary never  
conceive of these institutions as themselves representing a group interest of 
any kind. The judges of the national judiciary were not envisioned to be, 
sitting on their benches as a composite whole, a kind of Senate with 
additional powers of legal interpretation. This observation is crucial to 
understand; if the opposite were true, then the argument that the 
Constitution could be designed or modified to facilitate the expression of a 
group interest and could perhaps override normal judicial ethics of 
behavior. The explanations of certain judicial commentators, such as that 
geographical balance or other discernible criteria has always been sought 
by Presidents for their nominees, may foster the crude notion that the Court 
is somehow a “representative” institution.84 Any student of the Constitution 
should be alert to such metaphor.
The preceding review of The Federalist was conducted so as to 
underscore the importance of “voice” in the theories of Hamilton and 
Madison. It is this aspect of our constitutional development- the 
manipulation and transformation of voice- which comes to the fore in many 
well-known historical instances. It is perhaps the most important element of 
the 1803 case, Marburv v. Madison. So much has been said about this great 
case that there is little need for a great deal of elaboration here. For many 
students of constitutional law, John Marshall’s opinion of the Court in
83 ibid., 179-80. Lerner recognizes that how a judge “conducts himself and how 
he fashions his speech with an eye to [a large nonprofessional] public are very much 
within his control.” Given this recognition, his omissions are all the more striking.
84 See, for example, Abraham, The judiciary. 63-9.
Marburv stands as a monument to judicial supremacy in matters of 
constitutional interpretation.85 For others, including scholars like Burt, 
Bruce Ackerman and Robert Lowry Clinton, 86 the Madisonian aspects of 
Marburv are more persuasive, emphasizing those aspects of institutional 
equality or coordination for the Court but not supremacy. Whichever of 
these versions is chosen, the truly unmistakable component of Marshall’s 
opinion is his transformation of the Court’s voice. “It is emphatically the 
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,” 
Marshall’s opinion says; declaring of the supremacy clause that it, “confirms 
and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written 
constitutions, that a law repugnant to the constitution is void; and that 
courts, as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.”87 The 
words of Marshall’s predecessor, Oliver Ellsworth, are worthy of 
juxtaposition. “Suggestions of policy and conveniency,” Ellsworth said, 
“cannot be considered in the judicial determination of a question of right.”88 
In one of the most unremarked shifts of American constitutional 
development, Marshall, extending Hamilton’s theory of judicial process, 
exempted concerns of institutional prestige, uniformity and appearance 
from Ellsworth’s catalog of “suggestions of policy and conveniency.”
85 Barber lays out concisely the basic arguments for this position, though he 
himself adopts a moderate view. Barber, Constitution of Judicial Power. 40-43.
86 Robert Lowry Clinton, Marburv v. Madison and Judicial Review (Lawrence, 
KS: University Press of Kansas, 1989).
87 l  Cranch 137 (1803), 177, 180 [original emphasis].
88 Moodie v. The Ship Phoebe Anne. 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 319 (1796).
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Chapter Nine:
“A Will of Its Own”- Changing the Judicial Voice
The attempt has now been made to demonstrate that judicial power 
must be sincerely expressed if it is to be significantly distinguished from 
other governmental functions. The ancient question of the difference 
between a judge and a legislator is best answered with a reply that, at bottom, 
rests upon an ideal attitude. Current institutional conventions within the 
Supreme Court fight against this important ideal. This section will briefly 
explore some practical considerations if the reader is persuaded at all by 
what has been argued to this point. How, practically speaking, could judicial 
expression be changed today so as to embrace the value of sincerity?
Perhaps the most popular response to this question would be that 
Congress has the authority to alter the Court's mode of expression. There can 
be little doubt that a legislator who is cautious of judicial power could 
accomplish more by a single action than by passing legislation requiring 
the Court’s internal rules to reflect and encourage sincere behavior. That is, 
if the legislation itself was considered constitutional. There are good reasons 
in support of such a hypothetical congressional action. First there is the 
Constitution’s Necessary and Proper Clause, which gives to Congress the 
power “To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this 
Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in anv Department or 
Officer thereof.”1 Better support can be found in the Constitution’s third 
article, which includes the provision that “the supreme Court shall have 
appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and 
under such Regulations, as the Congress shall make.”2 Ever since the days of
1 U.S. Const., Article I, §8 [emphasis added].
2 U.S. Const., Article III, §2.
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Chisholm v. Georgia.3 the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized Congress’ 
authority to regulate jurisdiction of the federal courts. There is no doubt that 
Congress has the authority to regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts, 
though controversy does certainly thrive as to the limits of that authority.4 
This is an area of American constitutional law where, as professor Lawrence 
Sager puts it, “the rich vein of scholarly commentary on these matters does 
not yield more than a glimmer of consensus. ”5 According to Sager’s 
analysis, the records of the Philadelphia Convention concerning the 
“exceptions and regulations” clause “favor a limited view of its scope. ”6 
Some scholars have even argued that the debate over constitutional 
limitation of Congressional authority to regulate court jurisdiction is itself a 
function of the indecisive texture of the problem. The waxing and waning of 
federal court jurisdiction in its broadest sense is seen by some as part of a 
Madisonian dialogue and without fixed parameters.7
Particles of constitutional text have been invoked in support of 
Congress’ regulatory authority on issues of institutional hierarchy, appellate 
process, membership, and subject-matter jurisdiction. On each of these 
fronts, the judiciary has faced and accepted Congressional assault. For 
example, the original membership of the Court was specified in the Judiciary 
Act of 1789 at six. This number was changed to five in 1801, restored to six in 
1802, increased to seven in 1807, nine in 1837, ten in 1863, decreased to seven
3 2 U.S. (2 Dallas) 419 (1793). Justice Iredell in this case provides a 
noteworthy passage about Congressional power over Supreme Court jurisdiction. “I 
conceive,” Iredell wrote, “that all the Courts of the United States must receive, not 
merely their organization... but all their authority, as to the manner of their proceeding, 
from the Legislation.” Ibid., at 432.
4 See generally Lawrence G. Sager, “The Supreme Court 1980 Term: Foreword: 
Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the 
Federal Courts,” 95 Harvard Law Review 17-89 (1981).
5 Ibid., 19-20.
6 Ibid., 50; see generally ibid., 50-53.
7 See generally H. Hart, “The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of 
Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic,” 66 Harvard Law Review 1362 (1953).
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in 1866, and expanded to nine in 1869, which has been unchanged through 
today. All of these changes were achieved through legislative action. 8 
Various judiciary acts also constructed different judicial hierarchies and 
appellate processes. Subject-matter jurisdiction is a perpetual Congressional 
endeavor, though the judiciary has never ruled decisively on these 
encroachments.9 In the early 1980’s, for example, bills were introduced 
which would eradicate the jurisdiction of all federal courts in cases 
concerning “voluntary prayer” or in cases involving state laws dealing with 
race-based school assignments. io Throughout American history, these types 
of legislative regulation of the federal judiciary have been thought 
unproblematic as long as the “essential function” of the Supreme Court was 
not legislated away.11
These types of regulation, however, do not really shed much light 
upon the particular type of regulation which concerns us here. With the 
large exception of membership regulation, most Congressional regulation of 
the judiciary does not address issues of internal decisionmaking or the mode 
of judicial expression for cases admittedly and properly within the Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction. It is fair to say that problems of regulation concerning 
the Court’s internal decisionmaking (as well as regulation of judicial power 
g e n e r a l l y ) are so uncertain because for the most part Congress and the 
Supreme Court have behaved respectfully toward one another. As we have 
discussed, attitudes of strict judicial independence have never been codified 
as part of fundamental law; the prevalence of these kinds of feelings owe as
8 There are six relevant judiciary acts regarding the issue of the Court’s 
membership: The Judiciary Act of 1789, 1801, 1802, 1837, 1866, 1869.
9 See Sager, “Supreme Court Foreword,” 19-20.
10 See Ibid., 17-18, at note 3 [citing, among others, S. 481, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 
127 Cong. Rec. S1284; H.R. 869, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981)].
11 For an explanation of the “essential function” view of the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction, see ibid., 42-45; Hart, “Power of Congress,” 1364-65.
12 See, for example, Sager, “Supreme Court Foreword,” 20.
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much to convention as to Constitution. Some examples of historical practice, 
however, do provide further support to proponents of Congress on precisely 
these sorts of issues. As we have already seen in chapter two, Edmund 
Randolph drafted a bill in 1790 that would have required the Court to proceed 
according to the seriatim form. The bill did not become law, but nowhere can 
a student find any commentary saying that such provisions were 
unconstitutional or improperly invasive. 13 Another example of regulation 
that would have directly impacted the Court’s decisionmaking occurred in 
1868, when the House of Representatives passed a measure requiring a two- 
thirds vote of the Court to invalidate an Act of Congress.14 It would appear 
from these sorts of historical examples that Congress may include the 
manner of judicial expression as within the ambit of its authority to 
prescribe exceptions and regulations to the Court’s appellate jurisdiction.
Perhaps not; though attitudes of judicial independence may not be 
codified, they may be thought to act as operative considerations that compose 
a legislator’s oath of office and in that way may be constitutionalized. It is 
not completely clear that legislative incursions which deal with matters of 
the “judicial voice” would be accepted by Supreme Court Justices. The surest 
way of altering such conventions would be for changes to originate in the 
Supreme Court itself. “Five votes can do anything around here,” Justice 
William Brennan once remarked. One student of the Court agrees with 
Brennan’s assessment, saying that, “Five votes could change even long 
established procedures at the Court,” including for example the Rule of Four, 
the rules that privilege the Chief Justice in leading conference and 
assigning opinions, or even the rule that only Justices be present during 
conference.15 The problem, of course, is that any change would have to be
13 See text supra.
14 Cong. Globe, 40th Cong., 2d. Sess. 489 (1868).
1 5 See Schwartz, Decision. 6.
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done in concert. An individual Justice acting alone would most likely only 
diminish her own importance within the institution. The only possible 
exception to this would be if the Chief Justice sought to abolish the current 
rules. This would not ensure that the current rules would be changed, but it 
would require (at the very least) consideration by the other eight members 
as to what new rules should govern the process.
In 1983, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote an article which assessed the 
Rule of Four and its susceptibility to change. 16 Stevens first analyzed the 
doctrine of stare decisis in light of the life-span of the rule announced by 
the Court in Southern Pacific Co. v. Tensen.17 The “Jensen rule,” as it came to 
be called, held that the constitutional grant of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction (as per Article III, section 2) to the federal courts prevented a 
state from applying its own worker’s compensation statutes to 
longshoremen. A five-to-four majority announced the Tensen rule, and 
consistently applied it in subsequent cases. 18 The minority coalition, led by 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, did not waver in dissent. Justice Holmes’ 
dissent in the Tensen case, Stevens says, “is famous both for its candid 
acknowledgement of judicial lawmaking power and for its biting 
condemnation of the abuse of that power.”19 “I recognize without 
hesitation,” Holmes wrote, “that judges do and must legislate, but they can do 
so only interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.”20
16 John Paul Stevens, “The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule,” 58 New York 
University Law Review 1-21 (1983).
1 7 Ibid., 6-9; also see Southern Pacific Co. v. Tensen. 244 U.S. 204 (1917).
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere, “to stand by the decisions and 
not to disturb settled points,” is at least as ancient as Lord Bracton, though his 
understanding of the rule was quite different than the modern-day application of it 
would suggest. See Ibid., at note 1.
1 8 See Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart. 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Washington v. W.C. 
Dawson & Co.. 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
1 9 Stevens, “Rule of Four,” 6.
20 Southern Pacific Co. v. Tensen. at 218 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Even in subsequent cases, the minority in Tensen would not yield and 
reiterated its position- seemingly undaunted by the doctrine of stare decisis. 
Seven years after the Tensen rule was first announced, Justice Louis 
Brandeis authored a dissent which further illuminated the doctrine of stare 
decisis. Explaining that stare decisis is “ordinarily a wise rule of decision,” 
but not a “universal, inexorable command,” Brandeis judged that the 
doctrine should not deter the Court from overruling Tensen.21 Eighteen 
years later, Justice Felix Frankfurter- notwithstanding his own judgment of 
the Tensen rule as erroneous- concluded that the circumstances which had 
transpired in the twenty-five years since Tensen was decided precluded 
judicial repudiation of the Tensen doctrine.22
There is an important lesson to be gleaned from the opinions of 
Holmes, Brandeis and Frankfurter concerning a judge-made rule like the one 
in Tensen. Stevens, in a concise set of guidelines, explains:
Thus, the question whether a case should be overruled is not 
simply answered by demonstrating that the case was erroneously 
decided and that the Court has the power to correct its past mistakes.
The doctrine of stare decisis requires a separate examination. Among 
the questions to be considered are the possible significance of 
intervening events, the possible impact on settled expectations, and the 
risk of undermining public confidence in the stability of our basic 
rules of law. Such a separate inquiry is appropriate not only when an 
old rule is of doubtful legitimacy- as was true of the Tensen rule- but 
also when an old rule that was admittedly valid when conceived is 
questioned because of a change in the circumstances that originally 
justified it.2^
From this appraisal of what stare decisis demands, Stevens suggests that the 
Court’s Rule of Four is an example of this latter example- a rule that should 
be questioned because the circumstances which originally justified its 
existence have changed. Stevens then provides an excellent summary of
21 See Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co.. at 238 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
22 See Davis v. Department of Labor and Industry. 317 U.S. 249 (1942), at 258- 
59 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens sums up Frankfurter’s rationale succinctly: “An admittedly 
erroneous judge-made rule had taken on a life of its own and even today continues to 
survive despite its questionable origins.” Stevens, “Rule of Four,” 9.
23 Stevens, “Rule of Four,” 9.
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how and why the Rule of Four came to b e .2 4  Though the precise origins are 
unknown, it is widely agreed that the Rule of Four was created by the Court 
about the same time as the Judiciary Act of 1925 was passed.25 The Judiciary 
Act of 1925 alleviated the Court’s increasingly crowded docket by 
reallocating many classes of cases from mandatory review to discretionary 
review. Until that time under the Judiciary Act of 1891, the Court’s 
discretionary docket was much smaller; nevertheless the Court had developed 
procedures for processing such cases. Under the newly proposed legislation, 
the Court intended to follow those same procedures. The Rule of Four,
Stevens explains, was one of many features of Court practice which were 
stressed to Congress “in order to demonstrate that the discretionary docket 
was being processed in a responsible, nonarbitrary w a y .  ”26 Stevens explains 
that other features of Court practice were also emphasized; (1) copies of the 
printed record and briefs were distributed to each Justice; (2) each justice 
personally examined the papers and prepared a memorandum indicating his 
view; (3) each petition was discussed by each justice at c o n f e r e n c e .2 7  The 
Rule of Four was only one component of a complete practice regarding 
discretionary cases, perhaps not even of equal importance compared with 
other such components. Stevens’ own impression of the legislative history 
of the Judges Bill was that “the principal emphasis in the presentation made 
by the justices concentrated on the individual attention given to every 
petition by every justice and the full discussion of every petition at 
conference, and that significantly less emphasis was placed on the Rule of
24 ibid., 10-12.
25 ibid., 10. Stevens on the Rule of Four: “It was first publicly described by 
the justices who testified in support of the Judges Bill that became the Judiciary Act of 
1925.” Ibid (footnote omitted).
26 ibid., 11.
27 ibid., 12.
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F o u r .”28 The point Stevens is making is that a judicial process is tailored to 
its times. When the Rule of Four was created, it addressed circumstances that 
no longer hold t o d a y .  29 Many of the features of Court practice which 
accompanied the Rule of Four no longer occur. Stevens’ suggestion is that, 
in light of these facts and circumstances, it is perfectly acceptable to 
question whether the Rule of Four should be a b a n d o n e d .  30
The relevance of Stevens’ discussion of stare decisis and the Rule of 
Four is manifest. The reasoning which he applies to the Rule of Four should 
be applied to the rule regarding opinion-assignment as well as any other 
rules or practices which promote a strategic judicial attitude. Attitudes of 
judicial strategy no longer fit the constitutional circumstances. Stevens 
wrote his article (though cautiously) to suggest that the Rule of Four should 
be reexamined because the Court today faces circumstances which did not 
exist when the rule was instituted. First on this list of circumstances is 
docket overcrowding. For Stevens, being of the opinion that the Court takes 
“far too many cases” for review, today, an abandonment of the Rule of Four 
(in favor of, perhaps, a Rule of Five) would suit his purpose of decreasing the 
number of cases taken by the Court. Stevens’ general assessment- that the 
Court should be less concerned with the quantity and more concerned about 
the quality of its work- of Supreme Court practice appears sound and has 
firm support from the legal academy.3i Surprisingly however, 
commentators and students of the Court almost invariably insist that the 
“m odem ” proliferation of concurring and dissenting opinions is a bad
28 Ibid., at note 59.
29 The explosion of writs of certiorari is well known. See chapter one, ??
30 Stevens, “Rule of Four,” 14.
31 Perhaps the most lucid explanation of this general assessment was made by 
professor Henry Hart in 1959. Hart also felt that the number of concurring and 
dissenting opinions had become “excessive,” but this charge (which most of the legal 
academy seconds) actually blunts the force of his primary argument. See Henry M. Hart, 
Jr., “The Supreme Court, 1958 Term- Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices,” 73 
Harvard Law Review 84-125 (1959), 94-101.
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thing. This stance is undeniably a function of the dominant but erroneous 
perception of what the Supreme Court should be. The musings of Henry Hart 
are indicative of this dominance; “the Court is predestined in the long run 
not only by the thrilling tradition of Anglo-American law but also by the 
hard facts of its position in the structure of American institutions to be a 
voice reason,” he writes.32 Professor Hart’s lessons should not be challenged 
casually, but his appraisal of the judiciary is undone by an over-reliance 
upon a particular variant of American institutional development. The 
proper destiny for the Supreme Court- which is sustained by common law 
traditions- is to be the voices of reason. Of course, any program of sincere 
institutionalism must be part of an overall scheme of judicial maintenance. 
The constraints of time and docket are very real; any alteration of the Court’s 
internal procedure would have to occur simultaneously with other changes 
in judicial practice so that the judiciary would maintain a position of prestige 
and balance commensurate to its purpose. For example, different canons of 
opinion-writing would need to be in place as a counterweight to the 
increased demands that individual opinion-writing would certainly bring.33 
Specifically, opinions would no doubt need to be shorter and contain far 
fewer research appendages such as footnotes.34 The proliferation and
32 ibid., 99.
33 The work of Karl Llewellyn and Richard Posner are two well-known efforts 
which deal with the problem of opinion writing and suggest general guidelines for 
reform. See Karl N. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: Deciding Appeals (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Co., 1960); Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Misunderstood 
Relation (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), 269-316; Posner, The 
Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), 
223-58. Posner is a rare scholar in that he notes the difference between individual and 
institutional perspectives. However, he summarily dismisses the individualist 
perspective for appellate judges as “not a realistic model for American appellate 
courts.” Posner, The Federal Courts. 227, at note 7. Also see generally Ruggero J. 
Aldisert, Opinion-Writing (St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 1990).
34 One member of the legal academy has even suggested that the Supreme Court 
would be well-served by an opinion-style exemplified by the famous Pentagon Papers 
Case, where a short per curiam statement was followed by nine individual opinions. See 
New York Times Co. v. United States. 403 U.S. 713 (1971). The result of such a style, the 
author explains, would be “similar to the legislative model of law-making because the 
single consensus expression of the law in a statute is accompanied by a published
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augmented influence of the law clerk upon judicial opinions (a modern-day 
phenomenon) would no doubt be affected by a shift toward sincerity as well.
There are two final points worth considering before concluding. In 
fact, these two points are really concentrated reiterations of problems 
considered earlier. The first of these is a set of practical concerns: How, if 
appellate institutions like the Supreme Court were constructed so as to reflect 
the importance of judicial sincerity, would national rules of law be fashioned 
from increasingly plural voices? If individual opinions were to dominate 
the Court, wouldn’t every case result in an unintelligible babble? The 
simply reply to concerns such as these is that lawyers and judges, both in 
Great Britain and the United States at every level of their respective judicial 
systems, have performed such feats for a very long time. Professional rules 
of judicial rule construction have been applied to diverse opinions so that- 
over time- authoritative ratios emerge. There can be no doubt that a return 
to sincerity as a judicial virtue will elevate once again lessons of judicial 
reasoning to higher rank within the law school curriculum. The well- 
known teachings of Arthur Goodhart, Jerry Stone and Edward Levi will need 
more study in a world where judicial sincerity is valued highly.35 The more 
important reply, I believe, to this first set of concerns though is to reiterate 
that this sort of alarm reflects a misunderstanding about the effects of 
today’s collegial, strategic institutionalism. It is simply not the case that a 
sacrifice of individualism leads to more legal certainty and precision. In
legislative history of debates and committee proceedings that reveal individual 
viewpoints of interested legislators.” See Ray Forrester, “Supreme Court Opinions- 
Style and Substance: An Appeal for Reform,” 47 Hastings Law journal 180 (1995).
35 See generally, A.L. Goodhart, “The Ratio Decidendi of a Case,” in Essays in 
Jurisprudence and The Common Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931), 
reprinted from 40 Yale Law Journal 161 (1930); J. Stone, Legal System and Lawyers7 
Reasonings (1964); E.H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1949). Goodhart is plain that determining principles from several 
opinions is simple and uncontroversial. “Ratio Decidendi,” 178-9. Stone, even as he 
stands in general critique of Goodhart, is equally transparent that “competing versions 
of a legal category” are unproblematic and part of the essential nature of the Common 
Law.
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many instances, the opinion crafted out of strategy and compromise is a 
vague or internally contradictory standard. To those who would decry the 
“lack of guidance” or “delegation of authority” given to lower court judges 
that would occur in a system where judicial sincerity was valued, there is 
again a similar reply. Over time, through more refined litigation, the 
judicial system would produce clear legal rules. Meanwhile, just because (in 
a hypothetical case) a particular result is buttressed by different analyses 
does not in any way provide less guidance to individuals. More precisely, the 
multifaceted rationale which supports the Court’s decision provides a clearer 
reflection of the range of relevant principles which animate the holding. It 
would be silly to deny that the current brand of institutionalism which 
characterizes Supreme Court practice does indeed aid in producing an 
immediate authoritative precedent of “singular meaning,” though the utility 
of that singular meaning is often very much in dispute. There is nothing 
about a sincere Supreme Court that would preclude similar outcomes, either 
immediately or over time. All that is possibly given away is the immediate 
presentation of an artificial legal unity in the service of prestige.
Secondly, the following proposition needs to be firmly resisted:
Judicial sincerity as a primary organizing feature of appellate courts is not 
needed because a moderate alteration of current Supreme Court practice 
where dissenting and concurring behavior increases is the same as a system 
which embraces the ideal of sincerity. There is nothing preventing a Justice 
from concurring or dissenting from an institutional opinion today, so this 
line of thinking goes, so any Justice who prizes “sincerity” may do so. The 
flaw of this suggestion is that it fails to recognize that there is a price to be 
paid by the “sincere rogue” who dares to act sincerely if one or a few of his 
number wish to engage in collective rationale formulation, aided by the 
existence of conventions of strategy. John Frank actually provides a possible 
example of this in his study of Justice Felix Frankfurter, whom Frank dubs
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the “concurringest” member of the Court during his era. Frankfurter’s 
concurrences were almost never cited by anyone, which led Frank to 
conclude that Frankfurter’s opinions “for all practical purposes, might as 
well have been written on paper airplanes and thrown out a Supreme Court 
w i n d o w .  ”36 Those who would equate this alternative with sincerity forget a 
distinctive premise of American constitutionalism: institutional 
arrangements directly bear upon substantive action.
When Madison in Federalist 51 remarked that “each department should 
have a will of its own,” he was attending to the need for a proper foundation 
to be laid for a constitutional system whose hallmark was the “separate and 
distinct exercise” of governmental power. The will of the American 
judiciary was largely fashioned during threatening moments of institutional 
marginalization. In the absence of such threats its continued existence 
unbalances and disserves the system as a whole. The will of the judicial 
department today actually blurs away its distinctive function and in that way 
undermines the revolutionary principles of American government.
I suggested at the beginning of this paper that events which have 
developed the peculiar institutionalism of the Supreme Court are just one 
example of the dynamism of American constitutionalism. This illustration of 
“amendment by other means” is a prominent feature of professor 
Ackerman’s widely-acclaimed project, and is a theme to which many 
scholars have devoted attention.37 The importance of recognizing the 
centrality of “voice” can be (and has been, though often unconsciously)
36 Frank, Marble Palace: The Supreme Court in American Life (1958), 126.
37 See Ackerman, We The People: A.R. Amar, “Philadelphia Revisited:
Amending the Constitution Outside Article V,” 55 University of Chicago Law Review 
1043-1104 (1988); Walter Dellinger, “The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: 
Rethinking the Amendment Process,” 97 Harvard Law Review 386-432 (1986); Sanford 
Levinson, “A Multiple Choice Test: How Many Times Has the United States Constitution 
Been Amended? (a) 14; (b) 26; (c) 420 +/- 100; (d) all of the above,” (Paper delivered at 
the 1990 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association).
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applied to the other two departments of the national government as well. 
Perhaps the best example of this predisposition can be found in the work of 
Jeffrey Tulis on the executive p o w e r .38 For the legislative branch, studies 
like Barbara Sinclair’s also testify to the importance of the unique, often 
silent institutional changes which occur within flexible constitutional 
parameters.39 Studies of the evolution of the “advice and consent” doctrine, 
for example, are in the same vein as the change of judicial voice. The 
founding generation, with much deliberation and purpose, endowed the 
legislative power and executive power with different voices. Different 
periods of history have seen voice-changes in each of these departments. 
The possible voice of judicial power, though, seems to have been largely 
forgotten.
This discussion commenced in the spirit of towering constitutional 
lawyers and political scientists like Charles Black and Walter Murphy. 
Certain political values that were once fiercely contested have now achieved 
the status of being “the way things have always been.” In a constitutional 
democracy this is perhaps the highest status of all. Nowhere is this more 
evident than the specific commitment to a plausible but contestable value of 
judicial power. I do not pretend that there is nothing to be said for the status 
quo or that the alternative I have been suggesting is somehow “neutral”.
The status quo, in the case of the judicial power of the United States, is not 
power illegitimate, but power ill-conceived. At bottom, this discussion, like 
others before it, is animated by the desire to allow constitutional citizens “to
38 See J.K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton 
University Press, 1987). Also see, J. M. Bessette and J. K. Tulis, “The Constitution, 
Politics, and the Presidency” in J. M. Bessette and J. K. Tulis, eds., The Presidency in 
the Constitutional Order (Baton Rouge: LSU Press, 1981), 3-30; R.W. Grant and S. Grant, 
“The Madisonian Presidency,” in ibid., 31-64; H. Flaumenhaft, “Hamilton’s 
Administrative Republic and the American Presidency,” in ibid., 65-114.
39 See Barbara Sinclair, The Transformation of the U.S. Senate (Baltimore and 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989). The constitutional issues of executive 
impoundment is another example.
choose self-consciously rather than blindly among our possible futures.”4*) 
Thomas Reed Powell in 1917 in a classic essay argued for the importance of 
the individual voice of the judge within the institution of the judiciary. Lack 
of judicial unanimity should not breed insecurity about judicial power,
Powell contended; he insisted that “the fact that judges disagree, and freely 
express the reasons for their disagreement, should add to our confidence in 
their labors rather than detract from it.”4* The peculiar institutionalism of 
the Supreme Court is not foreordained or somehow inexorable. In the early 
1830’s, Alexis DeToqueville observed and analyzed the United States of 
America and saw that an unfolding “tyranny of opinion” was a potentially 
dangerous characteristic of American constitutional democracy. Louis Hartz 
gave voice to this Tocquevillian concern when he detected within the 
dominant liberal consensus of the United States “a hidden conformitarian 
germ.” Reflection and deliberation upon the problem of “The judicial Power 
of the United States,” has been infected by such a pathogen for far too long.
40 R. Dahl, “On Removing Certain Impediments to Democracy,” in R. H. Horwitz, 
ed., The Moral Foundations of the American Republic. 3rd edition (Charlottesville, Va.: 
University Press of Virginia, 1986), 230.
41 Thomas Reed Powell, “The Logic and Rhetoric of Constitutional Law,” 15 







Majority, Dissenting, and Concurring Opinions, 
U.S. Supreme Court, Selected Terms 1895-1996
Number of Opinions Majority Opinions
as Percentage of
Term Majority Dissenting Concurring Total
1895 188 18 0 91.3
1915 272 14 2 94.4
1935 156 14 4 89.7
1955 82 47 15 56.9
1975 137 101 51 47.4
1976 156 117 . 86 43.5
1977 142 140 91 38.1
1978 135 143 81 37.6
1979 138 122 78 40.8
1980 149 156 79 38.8
1981 138 119 91 39.7
1982 167 135 95 42.1
1983 162 140 70 43.5
1984 163 127 68 45.5
1985 151 117 62 45.8
1986 159 161 89 38.9
1987 152 154 76 49.8
1988 142 97 64 46.9
1989 143 116 88 412
1990 139 118 85 40.6
1991 120 95 47 45.8
1992 116 89 75 41.4
1993 114 81 63 442
1994 87 65 82 37.2
1995 86 64 50 43.0
19% 79 67 46 41.1
Sources: With two exceptions, data for number of opinions taken from 
November issue of Harvard Law Review. For 1895 and 1915 terms, see 
Richard A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Challenge and Reform (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 358 (Table 11.1).
APPENDIX 2:
Review of Reports by Alexander J. Dallas
Total Reported Cases: 67 
Cases Discarded:1 24 
Cases Classified: 43
Total Behavior Types (cases are listed in their proper category below figure):2 48
“H om ogeneous”
30
Glass v. The Sloop Betsey 
U.S. v. Hamilton 
U.S. v. Judge Lawrence 
U.S. v. Peters 
Hills v. Ross I 
NTDonough v. Dannerv 
Gever v. Michel 
U.S. v. La Vengeance 
Cotton v. Wallace 
Aracambel v. Wiseman 
Olnev v. Arnold 
Moodie v. Phoebe Anne 
Gravson v. Virginia 
Jennings v. Perseverance 
Clerke v. Harwood 
Fenemore v. U.S.
Brown v. Barry 
Hollingsworth v. Virginia
1 Cases may be discarded for a number of reasons, as follows: report is unclear, 
suit is discontinued, merits not discussed, opinion(s) not offered, writ is non-prossed, 
cause is double-counted, disposed of after 1800. I have followed many of the guidelines 
for inclusion in Goebel, Jr., A History of the Supreme Court of the United States Vol. 1. 
795-801.
Cases which were discarded, reason given in parentheses:
(1) West v. Barnes (report unclear); (2) Vanstophorst v. Maryland (report 
unclear); (3) Oswald v. New York I (suit discontinued); (4) Oswald v. New York II (report 
unclear); (5) Haybum’s Case (not an “opinion”); (6) Oswald v. New York III (no merits; 
counsel failed to appear); (7) Georgia v. Brailsford II (not an “opinion”); (8) Bingham v. 
Cabot I (record unclear); (9) Hunter v. Fairfax (record unclear); (10) Moodie v. Alfred 
(no merits); (11) Hills v. Ross II (see Hills v. Ross I); (12) Del Col v. Arnold (record 
unclear); (13) Huger v. South Carolina (record unclear); (14) Emory v. Greenough (no 
merits); (15) Hamilton v. Moore (writ non-prossed; merits not discussed); (16) Dewhurst 
v. Coulthard (no merits); (17) Ex Parte Hallowell (opinion(s) not offered); (18) The Same 
Cause (see New York v. Connecticut; double counting); (19) The Same Cause (see New York 
v. Connecticut; no merits); (20) Hazelhurst v. United States (writ non-prossed); (21) 
Rutherford v. Fisher (record unclear); (22) Blaine v. Charles Carter (no merits); (23) 
Priestman v. United States (record unclear); (24) Talbot v. Amelia (disposed after 1800).
2 Behavior types total 47, 5 more than the number of classified cases. This is 
due to the classification of Georgia v. Brailsford III. Chisholm v. Georgia. Penhallow v. 
Doane’s Administrators. Hvlton v. U.S. and Ware v. Hvlton as containing both 
“Dissentient” and “Conversing” behavior.
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“D is se n t ie n t”
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Georgia v. Brailsford III 
Chisholm v. Georgia 
Penhallow v. Doane’s Admin. 
Hvlton v. U.S.




Georgia v. Brailsford I 
Georgia v. Brailsford III 
Chisholm v. Georgia 
Penhallow v.Doane‘s Admin. 
Talbot v. lanson 
Hvlton v. U.S.
Ware v. Hvlton 
Brown v. Van Braam 
Calder v. Bull 
Wilson v. Daniel 
Sims v. Irvine 
Cooper v. Telfair
(Appendix 2 continued from previous page)
“H om ogeneous” “D is se n t ie n t”
Bingham v. Cabot II
Tones v. Le Tombe
Fowler v. Lindsey
Clerk v. Russel
New York v. Connecticut
Turner v. Enrille








Behavior Types by Chief Justice (same format as Appendix 2)
I. John Jay (February 1790 - July 1795): 7 cases; 10 behavior types
“Hom ogeneous” “D is s e n t ie n t” “C onversing”
3 3 4
Glass v. The Sloop Betsey Georgia v. Brailsford III Georgia v. Brailsford I
U.S. v. Hamilton Chisholm v. Georgia Georgia v. Brailsford III
U.S. v. Tudge Lawrence Penhallow v. Doane’s Admin. Chisholm v. Georgia
Penhallow v. Doane's
Admin.
II. John Rutledge (July 1795 - February 1796): 2 cases; 2 behavior types 
“H om ogeneous” “D is se n t ie n t” “C onversing”
1 0  1
U.S. v. Peters Talbot v. Tanson
III. Oliver Ellsworth (February 1796 - February 1801): 34 cases; 36 behavior types 
“H om ogeneous” “D is se n t ie n t” “C onversing”
26 3 7
Hills v. Ross Hvlton v. U.S. Hvlton v. U.S.
M’Donough v. Dannerv Ware v. Hvlton Ware v. Hvlton
Gever v. Michel Wiscart v. D’Auchv Brown v. Van Braam
U.S. v. La Vengeance Calder v. Bull
Cotton v. Wallace Wilson v. Daniel
Aracambel v. Wiseman Sims v. Irvine
Olnev v. Arnold Cooper v. Telfair
Moodie v. Phoebe Anne 
Grayson v. Virginia
Jennings v. Perseverance 





lones v. Le Tombe
Fowler v. Lindsey
Clerk v. Russel
New York v. Connecticut
Turner v. Enrille
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